ML20054G031
| ML20054G031 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1982 |
| From: | Varanini E CALIFORNIA, STATE OF |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054G032 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0139, RTR-NUREG-139 DOE-EIS-0085-D, DOE-EIS-85-D, ERDA-1535, NUDOCS 8206200017 | |
| Download: ML20054G031 (72) | |
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3' (916) 920-6815 Nunzio Palladino, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Chairman Palladino:
As presiding member of the California Energy Commission's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, I am writing you to urge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue a supplemental draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to the 1977 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR).
As I stated earlier this year in comments on the Department of Energy's overall breeder reactor program, development of the program would divert limited federal research dollars from other energy research and development programs (such as alternative energy technologies, conservation, reactor safety and reliability, nuclear waste management) that offer a more sustainable, least-cost energy future.
Pursuit of the CRBR, a major component of the program, would move the nation toward reliance on a plutonium economy, requiring extracrdinary safeguards against sabotage, fuel diversion, and accidents.
Recognizing these problems, the prior federal administration suspended the CRBR after concluding that its benefits were simply not worth the environmental or economic costs, particularly the risks associated with the use of plutonium for breeder fuel.
In light of these factors, any decision to proceed with the breeder program, particularly the CRBR, can be made only after the most careful regulatory review.
In particular, the NRC must fully comply with requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as part of any licensing proceeding on the CRBR.
NEPA requires Environmental Impact Statements to offer " meaningful, timelv information of the effects of agency action" (Scientists' Institute for Public Information. Inc. v. Atomic Enervy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
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In order to comply with these and other directives under NEPA,' it is imperative for the NRC to issue a supplemental draft EIS for the CRBR.
Since issuance of the 1977 FEIS on the breeder, much new information about both the CRBR itself and nuclear matters affecting the breeder reactor has been developed which the NRC needs to analyze to fully comply with NEPA in its licensing decision on the CRBR.
In particular, any supple-mental EIS should address the implication of the Three Mile Island accident and the risks of serious reactor accidents (Class 9) previously not considered.
We specifically reference the President's Council on Environmental Quality's advice to former NRC Chairman John Ahearne that Class 9 accidents should be fully discussed in future EIS' on NRC liceasing actions (March 1980).
Additionally, both the National Research Council (1979) and the NRC itself (H.W.
Lewis, Chairman, Risk Assessment Review Grouc Reoort to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0400) have raised new safety concerns about breeder reactors and nuclear facilities that are not addressed adequately in the 1977 FEIS.
Secondly, a recent U.S.
Court of Appeals decision has invalidated the NRC's summary consideration of the environ-mental impacts of long-term radioactive waste disposal
(" Table S-3") in its licensing proceedings.
It is therefore incumbent on the NRC to update its analysis of the environ-mental impacts of the waste disposal from the CRBR in light of this decision.
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40 CFR 1502.1.
(An EIS must " provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.")
Morecver, the document should "present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative fo rm, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public."
(40 CFR 1502.14) l L
Third, the NRC has significantly revised many of its regu-lations since 1977 in areas directly affecting the CRBR--
l reactor siting, accident risk reduction, radiation pro-l tection, transportation of radioactive material and emergency planning.
In its EIS, the NRC must examine the impacts of CRBR with respect to the requirements in effect at the time it issues its licensing decision, rather than the superceded requirements in effect in 1977.
Finally, there have been major changes in the design of the CRBR reactor vessel and fuel core since 1977, which are obviously not addressed in the 1977 FEIS.
I therefore urge you to issue a draft supplement to the final EIS for the CRBR and to circulate it to interested parties, including the CEC, for comments.
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LIO VAhANINI, III Commissioner and Chairman, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee
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CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION i
1 COMMENTS ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER REACTOR (DOE /EIS-0085-D)
FEB 1982
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COMMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ORAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE LIOUID METAL FAST BREEDER REACTOR PROGRAM I.
INTRODUCTION The Departnent of Energy's (DOE) Draft Environmental Incact Statement (DEIS) on the Liouid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program (LMFBR) fafis to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), does not adequately justify the need for the LMFBR program, fails to provide an adeouate discussion of alternatives and their environmental consequences in comparison with impacts of the proposed project, and therefore should be withdrawn and substantially revised.
Of major concern is that the development of the breeder reactor program would divert limited federal research dollars from other energy research and development programs (such as alternative energy technologies, conservation, reactor safety and reliability, nuclear waste management) that offer a more sustainable, least-cost energy future.
Shifting federal research emphasi s toward the breeder program would move the nation toward reliance on a plutonium economy, requiring extraordinary safeguards against sabotage, fuel diversion, and accidents.
Because of the sianificant hazards and economic uncertainties of a plutonium fuel I
cycle, especially in view of the increased development of alternative sources of energy since ERDA's 1975 EIS on the breeder reactor, the DEIS should carefully explore the need for this program, its environmental
- impact, and feasible alternatives. Such an extensive review of the breeder program is carticularly needed in view of the Nuclear Regulatory 1
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Commission's (NRC's') position that review of the need for the Clinch Rive
'reeder reactor and alternatives to it are not proper issues for tnc NRC's Clinch River licensing proceeding but only can be addressed in the DEIS on the entire breeder reactor progran.
Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant, (Docket No.,
50-537), CCH Nuc. Reg.
Rptr. 5 30,094 (1976).
The DEIS does not present a forthright discussion of issues confronting the development of the breeder reactor program--safeguards; safety; pros-Dects for commercialization; technical, envircnnental, and economic prob-lems in existing foreign breeders and United St ates prototypes; and uranium availability, to name a few. The DEIS fails to provide an objec-l ti ve review of the need for the breeder program, its environmental impact, and the existence of more economical and environmentally benign al ternatives.
In our detailed comments below, we discuss the failure of l
the DEIS to meet NEPA recuirements (Section II),
inadeouacies of the DEIS' review of the need for the LMFBR (Section III), the availability of i
1 alternatives to the LMFBR (Section IV), and the environmental impacts of the program (Section V), with emphasis on safeguards and proliferetion, safety and waste management.
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II. FAILURE OF DEIS TO MEET NEPA RE0UIREMENTS The DEIS fails to comply with the following requirements of NEPA:
1.
"NEPA documents must concentrate on the issues that are truly signi-ficant to the action in question rather than amassing needless detail" (40 CFR 1500,1(b)).
Issues significant to the action in question include:
o The environmental consequences (in particular, issues related to proliferation, safeguards, safety, waste management, and decommissioning of contaminated facilities and equipment) of the proposed LMFBR program in comparison to the environmental consequences of alternative technologies.
o The need for the LMFBR program, relative to alternatives, as i nfl uenced by decreasing projections of energy demand growth, cancellation of nuclear reactors, surplus uranium inventories and declining uranium prices.
o The potential for commercialization of the breeder reactor.
o The opportunity cost of supporting a breeder R&D program at the expense of al ternate federal R&D programs
( for example,
research to improve nuclear safety and plant performance, waste management, conservation and alternatives).
On pp.152 - 157 (DEIS) efforts to improve safeguards applicable to the LMFBR are briefly overviewed.
However, the risks and environ-mental impact of sabotage and theft of nuclear material s at all stages of the LMFBR fuel cycle ( reproces sing, waste management, 3
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reac tor, transportation) are not di scussed.
Nuclear weapons proliferation has been considered to be the potentially most serious catastrophic problem posed by nuclear power (CONAES study p. xv). A major deficiency that should be addressed is the envi ronnental impact of the expanded use of plutonium in view of current safe-guards uncertainties and limitations and to what extent a delay in the LMFBR to avert further nuclear proli feration and safeguards problems can result in better control institutions being put into place.
(See Section V on environnental impacts of the LMFBR program).
The DEIS does not address the reduction in need for the breeder reactor as the result of surplus uranium inventories and the cancel-lation of reactors.
Moreover, the DEIS fails to acknowledge that the diversion of billions of dollars of a very limited federal budget into this program is done at the expense of research to address reactor safety and waste management issues and developing conservation and al ternative energy sources.
NRC Commi ssioner l
Victor Gilinsky stated in 1981:
"If nuclear power should fail to survive into the twenty-first century, i t will be at least in part because 25 years of hard sell for an all-nuclear future got in the way of common-sense consolidation of this new technology.
Whil e problems in exi sting plants cried for attention, i ndustry and government pursued visions of even grander reacto rs.
In my view, the romance with the pl uto nium-fueled breeder which was supposed to solve all our energy problems diverted attention from the hard business of mastering the commercial reactors we have been building and operating."
(Bull. Atom. Scien., January,1980).
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After enmnentino on problems confronting the nuclear industry, Comnissioner Gilinsky stated:
"The commi tment to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor is a distraction from these problems. Not only will it consume noney in large quantities, but it will also eat up the government's bureaucratic eneraies to little effect in the period of time we must talk about.
To use an economist's term, the opportunity cost is very high.
My own feeling is that even though the breeder reactor is currently funded, it is not going to be built.
The country is just not in a mood to fund projects that do not make sense economically.
And this one does not make sense at this point because uranium is plentiful and the number of reactors expected to use it is diminishing."1 l
l 2.
The DEIS must offer " meaningful, timely information of the effects of agency action" (Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v., Atomic Enercy Commissv:n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.1973).
The DEIS provides no discussion of the effect of devoting billions of federal R&D dollars to the development of the breeder reactor program at the expense of R&D funding for conservation and renewable energy resources and funding for research that addresses major prob-lem areas in nuclear reactors (safety, improving the reliability of nuclear plants, waste management).
3.
Environmental impact statements "shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental imoacts and shall inform deci:ionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse imoacts or enhance the cuality of the human environment" (40 CFR 1502.1).
The DEIS does not provide a fair and full discussion of the environ-nental impacts of the LMFBR and alternatives.
Only solar electric and fusion are discussed as alternate long term technologies.
A major oversight is that it ignores the sicnificant contributions made by conservation in reducing national dependence on imported 5
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2 petroleum, as reported in five major national studies (CONAES, the 3
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6 Harvard Business School Study, SERI, RFF, Ford Foundation ),
4.
"The discussion will include the environmental impacts of the al ternatives including the proposed action, any adverse environ-mental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be imolemented, the relationship between short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term oroduc-ti vi ty, and any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposal should it be imolemented."
It shall include discussions of:
"(e) Energy requirements and conservation potential of various alternatives and mitigation measures."
"(f) Natural or depletable resources reauirements and conservation potential of various alternatives and mitigation measures."
(a0 CFR 1502.16)
The DEIS fails to identify any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided and to discuss the relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the enhancement of long-term produc-tivity and any irreversible commitments of resources which would be involved.
In particular, long-term environmental impacts from the decommissionina and disposal of contaminated facilities, equipment, and wastes should be identified and discussed.
5.
Agencies shall " devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail including the prooosed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits."
(40 CFR 1502.14)
A major inadecuacy of the DEIS is its failure to provide an objec-tive assessment of conservation and alternative technologies for comparison with the LMFBR program (see Section IV discussion on 6
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al ternatives).
An example of the poor quality of the analysis of alternatives is Figure 1 (DEIS, p. 31) which provides a dated (1976) comparison of energy available from renewable energy resources.
Such information does not reflect significant recent advances in renewable energy technologies, particularly in photovoltaics, wind, small hydroelectric, etc..
6.
Environmental impact statements "shall be concise, clear and to the point, and shall be supported by evidence that the agency has made the necessary environmenta1 analyses" (40 CFR 1502.1).
The DEIS vaguely states that, "None of the new information developed since ERDA-1535 indicates a significant change in the environmental consequences of the LMFBR Program over those analyzed in WASH-1535 and ERDA-1535" (DEIS, p. 112).
However, there is no discussion of the nature of the "new information developed since ERDA-1535" nor the extent to which the data and conclusions drawn in ERDA-1535 were subjected to critical analyses in light of new findings.
7.
Environmental impacts must be considered early enough in the planning of federal programs to ensure that the EIS process does not become a rationalization of past decisions (see, e.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,
~
481 F.2d 1M (D.C. Cir.1973).
The DEIS ignores this requirement by supporting the development of the breeder reactor program, not because the environmental impacts of the program are minimal or can be mitigated, but because of past federal support of the project and the resources committed to the project (see, DEIS, pp. 86 -90).
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8.
The environmental impact statement "should present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among ootions by the decisionmaker and the public" (40 CFR 1502.14).
The DEIS provides only a limited discussion of solar electric sys-tems and fusion (pp. 94 - 106).
It does not provide an objective, thorough discussion of the major issues (safeguards, proliferation, economics, waste management, safety) identified with breeder devel-opment, nor does it orovide a clear assessment of alternative tech-nologies and conservation and their resoective environmental impacts.
Consecuences of Failure to Comoly with NEPA In summary, the DEIS does not meet NEPA requirements because it; o Fails to concentrate on the significant issues.
o Fails to offer meaningful information on the effects of agency action, e.g., reduction in alternate RD&D programs.
o Does not provide a full and fair disscussion of significant impacts and reasonable alternatives, o Fails to discuss adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided, irreversible impacts and irretrievable resources.
o Does not orovide a detailed treatment of alternatives and their conoarative nerit.
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o Is not supported by evidence that the necessary environmental analyses have been made, and o Is a rationalization of past actions.
Full compliance with NEPA befnre embarking upon a major commitment to breeder reactors is not only mandatory but also necessary for informed policymaking as is demonstrated by our experience with the light water nuclear reactor (LWR).
In the past, covernment and industry did not adeouately address basic safety, environmental, and economic problems with LWRs and the lowering of projected electrical demand growth, while ever larger LWR's were planned.
Failure to sufficiently address these problems has seriously damaged the LWR industry, causing escalating costs and turning nuclear into a highly questionable energy source.*
Consecuently, no LWR's have been ordered since 1978, private investors are unwilling to finance new nuclear orojects, and many utilities are cancelling nuclear reactors
- Poor plant performance is an ongoing probl em.
Design errors, equipment failures, and the accident at Three Mile Island have led to widespread shutdowns.
The 62 licensed reactors in the United States with over 400 MW capacity averaged slightly under 57 percent capacity factor from January 1979 through June 1980.
The 39 large plants (over 800 MW) averaged only 51 percent capacity factor during the same 18 months (Bull. Atom. Scien.,
November 1980, Charles Komanoff, "U.S. Nuclear Plant Performance.")
UT~the 72 nuclear plants with operating licenses, 25 were shut down as of Feb. 6,1981 according to an informal Associated Press survey of the units.
(Sacramento Bee, Feb. 7, 1981).
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under construction.* According to a Congressional Research Service estimate, more than 40,000 megawatts (or 40 million kilowatts) of nuclear or coal-fired generating capacity that had been scheduled to be in service by 1985 has been cancelled or deferred beyond 1990.7 Because DOE's DEIS on the liquid metal fast breeder reactor program clearly fails to satisfy NEPA requirements, we urge that it be with-drawn until a complete and realistic assessment of the need for the
- program, its environmental impacts, and alternatives to it is performed.
- A report Dy the Securities Research Division of Merrill Lynch (Utility Nuclear Power Plants--The Outlook for the '80's) lists 18 plants as candi-dates for cancellation to improve the near-term financial situation of some utilities (Nucleonics Week, April 2,1981).
A Wall Street Journal article (November 20,1980, " Generating Doubt:
Some Investors Shun Nuclear Powered Utilities, Jeopardizing Funds to Build New Atomic Pl an ts ) similarly reported that some utilities will be hard pressed to finish nuclear projects underway, not to mention any new ones.
Peter Bennett, a managing director who works on private debt placements for the Merrill Lynch White, Weld Caoi-tal Markets Group, an arm of Merrill Lynch, estimates 25 -30 percent of his fi rm's 200 clients who do long term lending now " shy away" from nuclear.
(Id.) Carleton Surtt, Executive Vice President of Ecuitable Life Assurance S'ociety states:
"We are very concerned about the financial obligations of the utilities that face large unfinished nuclear power facilities..." Equi-table is " working out an investment strategy that will avoid utilities with heavy nuclear commitments."
(Id.)
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III. DEIS INADECUACIES IN REVIEWING THE NEED FOR THE LMFBR PROGRAM The need for the LMFBR can be detemined by assessing:
o Projected U.S. energy demand growth, o Portion of U.S.
energy demand that is provided by electrical
- energy, o Portion of U.S.
electricity needs projected as being supplied by nuclear power, o Availability and price of uranium and, l
o Prospects for breeder commercialization (i.e., ability of breeder to be made commercially available).
However, the DEIS' discussion of the need for the LMFBR Program does not adequately review these issues.
Instead of presenting a detailed need analysis for LMFBR development, the DEIS relies upon vaguely stated and at times erroneous justifications for the breeder reactor--the need for nuclear power to meet future energy requi rements, economic growth requirements, limited uranium supplies, breeder electrical generating costs, the relatively advanced state of breeder reactor development, and the unavailability of alternatives. We address below the deficiencies in the DEIS' discussion of each of these factors.
Projections of Growth in U.S. Energy and Electricity Demand First, the projected national energy needs that are used to justify the DEIS' assessment of the need for the breeder program are unclear. Whil e the DEIS does not forecast future energy growth, i t appears that the 11 GC-4 LC l
i rationale for the need for the breeder is based upon assuming a 3 percent or higher energy growth rate (DEIS, p. F-7).
However, there is consider-able uncertainty of future demand.
Current projections (see Table 1) range from -1.4 to 5.4 percent annual growth rate.
As shown in Table 1, the Exxon, Audubon, and SERI studies predict future demand growth below that assumed by DOE in the DEIS.*
Nowhere does the OEIS mention such lower forecasts of demand growth and their implications for the need for the LMFBR program.
Projected electrici ty growth rates also require careful review.
For example, the California Energy Commission's (CEC) forecast fo r Cali fo r-nia, adopted af ter extensive analytical review and public hearings, proj-ects statewide peak demand to grow at 1.65 percent per year and annual sales at 1.44 percent per year through 2000** (ET, p. 92).
As we found:
"In the year since the 1979 Biennial Report was issued, the s tunning decline in the electricity demand growth rate has continued, wi th expected growth rates now below 1-1/2 percent per year versus forecasts of over 5-1/2 percent in 1975.
The debate over demand forecasting has eased as utilities have begun to accept that the post-embargo drop in growth rates is permanent" (p.xv)
- See for example, The Solar Energy Research Insti tute study, A New Pros-peri ty:
Building a Sustainable Energy Future, 1981 which showed that througn increased energy ef ficiency, the United States can achieve a full-employment economy and increase worker productivity, while reducing national energy consumption by nearly 25 percent (p.1).
The report of The Energy Project at the Harvard Business School (Energy Future, by Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin,1979) similarly predicts a decline of 30 - 40 percent in the United States energy consumption given a national commitment to conser-vation (p.136). The CONAES report shows that U.S. energy demand (78 quads used in 1978) by 2010 could be as low as 58 quads (C0FMES, p. 9,128).
- The CEC undertakes a thorough review of California's energy situation every two years and issues a " Biennial Report" summarizing its findings.
The CEC adopted i ts Third Biennial Report in December 1980.
This report contains two volumes (Energy Tomorrow, referenced as ET in this document (Appendix A) and Electricity Tomorrow ( Appendix B) referenced as Elec. T.).
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Table 1 FORECASTS OF ELECTRICITY DEMAND GROWTH ANNUAL GROWTH (N DATE PUBLISHED PERIOD sol'RCE 18 1978 1977-2000 5.4 EPRP 2.0 to 5.1 l
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1978-2000 eel '
(4.3 in " preferred" scenano) 4.1 1980 1979-1989 NERC'3' 3.9 1980 1979-1990 E'.eemeal WoM*
3.0 1990-2000 3.3 58
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19S0-1990 P!RINC 3.1 to 3.2 COE E!A*
1930 1978-1995 3.0 to 3.1 DOE EIN7' in Draft 1978-1995 EXXON'8' 1978 1990-2000 1.9 1.3 AUDUBON*'
In Draft 1950-2000
-1.4 to 2.0 SERI
- 1981 19S0-2000 2
- 11) E:nvc Power Rewarch l wcace suppv 77. May 1979 (quoted in De Eg Fact Sook.
Cxpessonal R=seacci 5enwe. Comrmtree Pans %FC4 p. c63) 121 EcL.on Cecnclrsrtue. E onome Gw Un N Futu+-.7.
i31 Nacone Cecnc4 Renou.tv Counct.1930 Semory of Pn>eced Peak Demand. atr.
JGv1950
.41 E'ectrca Werto Jh Anm.cl E:<c:nery >tery Foceense. Seremve 15.1960.
Si v'U.C a etein Pe Ene gv Faa Book Cr9essionai Rewarch Semce. Comrmttee Pnna MFC+) p. n591.
W t: S Oepawt cw E:ww. Annual Rcme to Congest 1979. VoMne 3. Svncess, Cer. E A.e173 Nt F $W. Octeder IWO 671 0 $ Ekwei on Erergv. Anns Repos to Consms.14% Daitt
- Euen (quowe n Se Ene gy Faa Booe. Cs9reu.onal Rewarch 3emce. Comm. nee Pnnt
" EC-ed p e5*
M.5cn Ervrw Pm ito te puuked N Namnd AuJuMn Sorwe, :n May 1091 cuoted et f
- 45 Ce Nrma - Leew Conwrvanon 7he Deate Be;rs. Sccee. O!0. 24 Arne 1931).
(10 %, &cw pm.wn ine.tute. Revoa on hung a Sourcow Fuwe Ccmenmee on i
Ems eng Canmerce, Comm. rise P-nis 97-X and CL 97th Congess. A;mi I'*31.
(From Future of Electric Power Workshoo Surmtary, The MITRE Corporation, July 1931.)
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"The Commission forecasts a continuing moderation in the growth of electricity demand for the rest of this century" (p. 35).
In fact, many of the California utilities' projections are as icw or lower than CEC projections.
The DEIS' assertion that a healthy American economy depends upon a high energy growth rate (DEIS, pp. 29 - 31) is a much contested theory.
It is the CEC's position that:
While there is still a link between economic growth and elec-tricity demand, the linkage has changed dramatically since the early 1970s.
As a result, the lower electricity growth rates forecasted are entirely consistent with a strong and growing Cali fornia economy" (Elec. T., p. 29).
This conclusion is supported by the Califo rnia Buil di ng Industry Associ ation:
"The conventional view that conservation neans deprivation, lower productivity, and a lower standard of living is simply incorrect.
The past three years have shown that imprcvements in ef ficiency will save energy, money, and are consistent with increased productivity.
The view that conservation is equated with curtailment is not only erroneous, but dangerous to a healthy state economy" (ET, p.163).
The CONAES Study a7 so concluded:
C at the energy-to-economic output ratio in the l
"it appears 1
United States economy can be lessened, over the long tenn, and the prudent, sustained policies can help the economy continue growing with onstrained growth of energy consumption" (CONAES
- p. 120).
The Harvard Business School Study reported that there has been wide and erratic variation in the relationship between energy and GNP in the United States (Harvard Business School Study, p. 142 ).
Si.tilarly, the 13 GC-4 LC
Resources for the Future study noted that rarely has there been a lock-step relationship between energy and the GNP and that a given rate of GNP growth need not signify an equivalent or a near equivalent growth rate in energy demand (RFF, p. 85).
Nonelectricity 011 Usage The DEIS correctly states that oil currently supplies only a small por-1 tion of total electrici ty usage and that the majority of the r.ation's oil consumption is in nonelectricity sectors.*
The DEIS hypothesizes that substantial nonelectricity oil usage will convert to electricity usage and thus require increased electricity supplies from the breeder reactor (DEIS, pp. 28 - 29).
The DEIS presents no facts supporting this conjec-ture.
This assumption mistakingly repeats a similar misconception that LWRs would be instrumental in displacing oil.
As a recent study pointed out, LWRs are displacing coal, not oil, and LWRs in 1979 displaced only one-tenth (87 million barrels) the amount of oil that tne federal govern-ment claimed they would for that year (Barron's, August 24, 1981, p. 5).
The DEIS fails to give any basis for assuming that nonelectric uses of oil will actually convert to breeder-supplied el ectrici ty.
While the DEIS cites electric cars as a justification for the breeder reactor program (DEIS, p. 28), such cars still face major technological barriers (ET, p. 77) which are not mentioned in the DEIS.
Moreover, the current
- The DEIS states that oil provides about 10 percent of U.S.
electricity now, and it is projected to produce only about 1 percent in the year 2000 to 2020 timeframe (DEIS, p. 29).
While petroleum supplies approximately 61 percent of the primary energy consumed in California (ET, p. 9),
oil-fired electric generation supplies less than 4 percent of California's total end-use energy consumption (ET, p. 5).
More than hal f of the petroleum (62 percent) is used for transportation, which i s al so the largest overall energy end-use sector (ET, p. 9).
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CEC electrical forecast assumes that electric vehicles will account for about 2 percent of the total miles driven in California in the year 2000 and still projects an electrical growth rate of only 1.65 percent for peak demand and 1.44 percent for sales (ET., pp. 78, 92),
far below levels used in the DEIS.
Furthennore, assuming that the DEIS correctly states that the real need for the breeder reactor program is to reduce oil usage in sectors currently not dependent on electricity (DEIS, p. 29), the DEIS does not examine alternatives to the breeder reactor for displacing oil usage in the nonelectrici ty sector.
The automobile is estimated to account for about one third of total petroleum consumed in the U.S.8 In the trans-po rtation sector, potential al ternatives include increasing energy efficiency (through improved automobile efficiency, fuel efficient car maintenance and driving practices, improved traffic control systems, more efficient freight handling methods), alternative transportation systems (mass transit, ridesharing, bicycling, tel ecommunications), and alter-native fuel sources (pure alcohol fuels, gasohol, diesel fuel)
(ET.,pp.
61 - 76).*
These alternatives are not mentioned in the DEIS.
Energy Contributions of the Procosed LMFBR Program I
Another crucial anission from the DEIS' need assessment is identification of the capacity and projected erergy contributions from the U1FBR program
- The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 mandated that the fuel economy of new cars rise from an average 18.0 mpg for 1978 model year to at least 27.5 mpg in 1985.
A new Volkswagen car is under advanced development that is expected to achieve a fuel economy rating of 60 mpg. Therefore, by 2000, there will be a significant savings in petroleum use simply through the use of more ef ficient cars.
The DEIS does not address this alternative method of decreasing oil usage.
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to the natior.'s electrici ty grid.
The original ERDA EIS projected 80 large LMFBRs (DEIS, p.11) apparently supplying 80,000 MW.
The new DEIS references a "more limited program" but never identifies what is the size of the program.
The DEIS' effort to determine the need for the LMFBR program, i ts environmental impacts and alternatives has limited useful-ness without knowledge of program size.
In addi tion, where the DE!S hints at program size, the assumptions of size are contradictory.
A program 1/10 the size of the original program (or 8,000 MW) is assumed for reprocessing (DEIS, p. 80), while a reduction to 1/20th the size (or 4,000 MW) is assumed for fuel fabrication (DEIS, p. 84).
Forecasts for LMFBR Electricity Costs The DEIS identifies " forecasts for LMFBR electrical generating costs" as an "important element in the rationale for United States LMFBR develop-ment" (DEIS, p. 33). However, the studies cited compared costs of LMFBRs wi th only LWRs, did not use cost information from foreign breeder experience, and are highly dependent on uncertain assumptions that cannot be verified until breeders approach commercial availabili ty (DEIS, p.
37). Despite the uncertainty of LMFBR cost estimates, the DEIS concludes that the LMFBR is nevertheless justified because " responsible national energy policy dictates that the pace of the LMFBR development program be structured to accommodate significant uncertainties" (DEIS, p. 38).
How-ever, in view of the serious cost overruns and plant cancellations pl aguing the LWR industry, significant economic uncertainties regarding b reeder development warrant concern.
The DEIS should include a more extensive analysis of LMFBR electricity costs, including cost information from foreign breeder programs, since these costs are c rucial to the successful commercialization of the breeder.
16 GC-4 LC
Uranium Availability The DEIS asserts that limits on economically recoverable uranium will restrict the use of nuclear powerplants and that breeders, offering an essentially unlimited fuel sunply, are therefore recuired (DEIS,
- p. 33).
However, an analysis of the uranium market does not support this hypo-thesis. United States production of uranium is more than twice that con-sumed by utilities; mines and mills are closing, and yellowcake prices have been dropping for over 20 months.9 Further, the DEIS projections of uranium resource requirements and reserves (DEIS, p. 36) ignore:
(a) any reduction in LWR uranium requirements through increased fuel-use effi-ciency and reduced losses during enrichment with advanced technology (30-50 percent improvements have been projected) and (b) any improvements in uranium mining technology over the next 30 - 60 years.10 The purported need for rapid deployment of breeders decreases with the continuing decline of uranium prices ($40 per pound in 1979, $28 per pound in December 1980, to $23.50 per pound in December 1981, and still falling).
DOE's Energy Research Advisory Board predicts that sufficient uranium supplies exist to satisfy projected levels of electric demand for at least 40 years and possibly well beyond.ll Contrary to DOE's beliefs, new LWRs beyond those built or under construc-tion are extremely unlikely.
NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky, in remarks made before the World Nuclear Fuel Market's International Confer-ence on Nuclear Energy, October 27, 1981, reported that 72 nuclear reactors (having a total generating capacity of 55,000 MW) are currently licensed for commercial operation and 77 large plants (about 1,000 MW 17 GC-4 LC
each) are in various stages of completion, with some nearly finished, and others barely begun.
(This number does not include 12 plants which were under construction and which have been cancelled since 1975).
The Commissioner expected that at least another 20 of the 77 plants under construction will also be cancelled.
Therefore, no more than about 50 new plants (about 60,000 MW) appear to be headed for. completion and
{
operation.
It is interesting to note that a study by Merrill Lynch recommended that while nuclear plants above 95 percent completion should be completed, those plants whose construction has not progressed beyond 15-20 percent should be considered candidates for cancellation.12 DOE's own figures (DEIS, App. A) on uranium supplies in the United States show sufficient fuel for the entire life-time of up to 215 reactors.
United States and worldwide uranium production has exceeded consumption by over two to one.
In 1980, United States produced about 42 million of U 0s, whereas United States utilities only burned about 18 l
pounds 3
million pounds to oroduce el ectrici ty.
There is little doubt that uranium inventories will increase substantially in the years ahead.13 Thus, there is little basis for the DEIS' assumption that a greatly increased supply of uranium will be needed for LWRs.
More importantly, the DEIS fails to include available uranium supplies outside of the l
United States.
In 1980, worldwide uranium production was 110 million pounds of which 20 million pounds were used for electricity production.3 4 l
In view of the surplus of uranium inventories and the decline in new reactor orders, the need for breeder development at this time is unjusti fied.
~
18 GC-4 LC
Commercialization of LMFBR The DEIS states (p. 38), "The LMFBR is in a relatively advanced state of development, both in the U.S. and worldwide."
However, the report does not include a discussion of experience with actual breeder reactors nor does it include a cmplete discussion of the status of other major cm-ponents of' the LMFBR fuel cycle (reprocessing, fuel fabrication, etc.).
The DEIS should include a more cmprehensive analysis of the perfomance, status of development and econmics of foreign breeders and United States prototypes.
The DEIS further states (p. 46) "If the U.S. were to reject current development, of the LMFER, it would be rejecting or deferring a relatively certain technology capable of producing inexhaustible elec-trical energy supply." An assessment of the perfomance and econmics of foreign br ?ders and United States prototypes,is clearly warranted to support or refute this claim.
Moreover, an inspection of these breeder programs reveals a number of significant technical and econmic problems, e.g. cost overruns, which the DEIS ignores.
~
Past U.S. experience does not provide reassurance of acceptable tech-nical, economic and safety risks of the breeder program 15.
o The core of EBR-1 mel ted down anc was reported to have nearly exploded due to an autocatalytic reactivity ef fect; o The Femi reactor suffered a meltdown of two fuel ducts; o EBR-II was to be operated as a power plant but has operated at only about one-half of its design power level; 19 GC-4 LC
,s
.i
~.
o West Germany's Kalkar breeder (300 M) was nearly cancelled..due to financial orablems.
Although the DEIS (p. 45) refers to the " excellent breeder progress in U
France", it should be noted that France's breeder'devslopment program is s
decades from making any significant addition to the country's nuclear
~
power supply.
One small pilot plant (Phenix, 250 MW) is in ooeration.
Even the Superphenix (1200 MW)'is act a prototype for commercial brieder i
reactors.
Yet another still larger plant will be riesspd to demonstrit?(
commercial power production.
A recent report by the~ France's Gr oupement -
de Scientifiques d'Information sur l'Energie Nucleaire (Nucleonids Week, March 12, 1981) noted that the costs of the Superphenix have grown'from e
original estimates of $400 million in the early 1970's to $2.2 billion in 1981.
The study concluded that the Superphenix posed serious technical hazards and economic uncertainties and attacked efforts 6 claim the Superphenix safe by simply extrapolating from operating experience at smaller prototypical breeders such as the 250 MW Phenix.
The report further stated that no serious economic analysis of breeders has been done in France and that breeders may be decades from profitability.
The United Kingdom's Atomic Eneray Authority hah expressed hope that it will achieve a 50 percent olant caoacity factor with its 250 M'( Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) at Dounreay, Scotl and.
If it. does, the DFR will l
produce more electricity in 1981/82 than it has in 6 years (Nucleonics Week, March 9, 1981).
In over 73 months the plant produced about o.ne-t.,
third less power than the Phenix reactor in France produced ir' 1980 alone which corresponds to a lifetime plant factor for PFR so far of around 7 p.
A 20 GC-4 LC s
4 percent.
Due to technical problems, DFR's potential maximum output has been-cut by approximately 20 percent.
PFR's poor perfo rmance, as explained by the Dounreay director Cliff Blumfield, was due to the fact that the British design "took more technical risks and more closely approximated commercial breeder design",
The difference between PFR's performance and the output of France's Phenix was thoucht to be due to
%. the substantial differences between the Phenix and commercial fast I
breeder reactors.
(Phenix fuel elements are not full size and its l
modular boilers are very different from a commercial design.)
The DEIS states that concurrent development of other elements of the
'LMFBR fuel cycle (reprocessing, fuel fabrication, transportation, and waste management) is recognized as essential to any assessment by the nuclear industry of readiness to deploy breeders in significant numbers.
Therefore, successful commercialization of the breeder reactor is dapen-dent on the progress of work in other areas of the LFMBR fuel cycle. The DEIS does not provide sufficient information on the status of these other imoortant components of the fuel cycle and fails to adequately note the substantial research, development and demonstration work that is still required to bring them to a state of ; mmercial avail abil ity.
For example, reprocessing of spent breeder reactor fuel requires extensive engineering development, followed by experience at the pilot-scale plant.
The high olutonium content of breeder fuel s necessitates additional redesign for criticality control.
These modifications should be demon-strated before proceeding to full industrial-scale breeder fuel repro-cessing.
Other components of the fuel cycle similarly require extensive developmental work.
21 GC-4 LC
IV. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE LMFBR Potential for Conservation There is a serious failure in the DEIS to make a rigorous and objective evaluation of all reasonably available alternative energy resources. The report concludes that the breeder reactor program is the only alternative for meeting the goals of a healthy economy and decreased oil usage. How-ever, the only alternatives discursed are fusion and solar electric systems on the basis that "other alternatives are either too small in potential (e.g., geothennal or expanded hydroelectric facilities) o r too '
far off with uncertain development schedules (e.g., solar electricity or fusion)" (DEIS, p. F-6).
The report further states that the only certain alternatives for electricity production on the scale required are coal and nuclear energy.
As mentioned, this statement ignores conclusions by major national studies by the National Academy of Sciences (CONAES), the Solar Energy Research Insti tute, and the Harvard Business School which stressed the opportunities for reducing national dependence on imported petroleum by both conservation and switching to alternative technologies.
The CONAES study concluded that " reducing the growth of energy demand should be accorded the highest priority in national energy policy" (CONAES, p. xiii).
DEIS statements on p. 32 and F-3 which dismiss the important contribu-tions of conservation ignore the substantial impact of improved energy
.fficiency reported in recent studies.
The study by the Solar Energy Research Institute
- concluded that through increased energy efficiency, "the United States can achieve a full-employment economy and increase 22 GC-4 LC
worker productivity, while reducing national energy consumption by 25 cercent."
The study estimated about 20 - 30 percent of the reduced demand could be supplied by renewable resources (SERI, p.
1).
"A strategy built around energy efficiency and the widespread use of renew-able resources could result in virtual elimination of oil imports."
(SERI, p. 1)
Conservation and the increased use of alternative energy resources (solar, geothermal, cogeneration, wind, small hydroelectric, biomass) are the focal points for California's long-term energy supply investment strategies.
A detailed report on California's projected energy supplies and state-of-the-art energy demand forecasting methods by the California Er.ergy Commission concluded that, "A
concerted, but reasonable, acceleration of programs to channel public and private investment into conservation and al ternative supplies would yield substantial additional bene-fits.
Such an approach would, by the year 2000, more than cuadruple the present contribution of alternative and renewable energy supplies in California.
By expandino this state's al ready strong programs to eliminate energy waste, California could shave another 10 percent off its total energy use by the year 2000 equivalent to savings of 400,000 barrels a day of oil."
(ET, 1981, p. 165)
California's existing conservation programs for electricity and natural l
gas are projected to save the equivalent of over 100 million barrels of oil per year by 2000 (ET, p.187).
Enercy Tomorrow estimated that these savings and continued efforts to improve transportation efficiency can result in virtually zero growth in end-use energy demand over the coming 20-year period while allowing healthy economic growth.
Moreover, when renewable and alternative energy sources, as well as conservation are 23 GC-4 LC
considered, these supplies can furnish almost 22 percent of California's energy needs in 2000, eauivalent to over 700,000 barrels of oil per day l
l (p. 187).
Potential for Alternative Enercy Resources The OEIS' cursory dismissal of wind, geothermal, cogener'ation, biomass, l
and hydroelectric as alternative energy sources to the breeder reactor, is unwarranted and violates NEPA's mandate that the DEIS fully explore al te'rna ti ves.
The DEIS ignores comprehensive studies, including studies done by DOE itself, that these sources are feasible, less environmentally disruptive than nuclear power, and will displace oil more rapidly than breeder reactors (see Apoendices A and B).
The DEIS' assertion that "other al ternatives are too small in potential (e.g.,
geothermal or expanded hydroelectric facilities)" (DEIS, p. F-6), is simply unfounded.
For instance:
1.
Coceneration The market potential for cogeneration applications is quite large.
DOE's own estimate is that cogeneration could provide 40,000 MW of electrical capacity by the year 2000.16 General Electric Company, the leading manufacturer of cogeneration turbines, estimates 50,000 MW by the year 2000.17 Resources for the Future, on the other hand, projects a possible total cogeneration electrical capacity of 134,000 MW by the end of the century.18 The State of California has adopted a goal of installing 6000 MW of cogeneration by 1990.19 24 GC 4 LC
l 2.
Geothermal It has been estimated that there are sufficient geothermal resources in the U.S. to supply all of its future energy needs.20 The State of California has adopted a goal of producing 5,000 MW of geothermal electricity generation by the year 2000.21 The Energy Department has adopted a nationwide goal of 7,500 to 15,000 MW of anticipated geothermal contribution by 1990.22 The National Academy of Sciences has estimated that with a national commitment the maximum potential realizable from geothermal energy could be just over 60,000 MW by the year 2010.23 3.
Wind As a near-term source of energy, wind energy develoonent has become an increasingly attractive investment area. Based on extensive wind data studies prepared for the state, the California Energy Commis-sion has identi fied 13,000 MW of wind resource potential, not including potential coastal offshore wind resources.24 In addition, the state has adopted a goal of building 7,700 MW of installed wind power capacity by the year 2000.25 Nationwide, 00E itself estimates that wind power could provide the United States with 60,000 MW of installed capacity by the year 2000.25 4.
Small Hydroelectric At the national level, DOE's own estimate is that small hydro could provide the United States with an additional 20,000 MW of elec-tricity by the year 2000 increasing to 50,000 MW by the year 2020.27 An even higher estimate is projected by the U.S.
Army Corps of 25 GC-4 LC
li Engineers. Based on an analysis of the watersheds of existing dams, the Corps estimated that "54,600 MW of additional electrical gener-ating capacity is available for immediate development in existing dams."28 The California Energy Commission estimates that about 2000 MW of small hydro remain to be developed at exi sting dams in Cal i fo rnia.29 Additional detailed information on the feasibility and availaDility of these technologies, as well as biomass, solar, and other sources, can be found in Electricity Tomorrow ( Appendix B, pp. 203 - 298; see al so,
Appendix A).
The DEIS should be revised to reflect this information, particularly DOE's own statements oc the availability of these alterna-tives.
Energy R&D Allocations The DEIS overstates the need for and economic potential of the breeder programs.
In its initial evaluation of DOE energy R& D programs, at least two-thirds of the members of DOE's Energy Research Advisory Board (ERAB) agreed that the Clinch River Breeder Reactor has low urgency, low economic potential, low benefit-to-cost ratic and that funding should be, reduced.
Three-qua rters of the ERAB members recommended that the
"(breeder reactor) demonstration be delayed until a future time."30 The DEIS' understating potential contributions of conservation and alter-natives and overstating the potential for nuclear programs, in particular the breeder, is reflected in the Energy Research Advisory Board's evalua-tion of DOE energy R & D programs.
The Board noted imbalances in energy programs such as:
26 GC-4 LC
o There is very heavy stress on electrical technology in FY 81, further accented in FY 82, although it is noted that fluid fuels constitute our principal vulnerability.
o Similarly, within the electrici ty sector, federally sponsored nuclear programs are receiving a larger proportion of funding than the expected nuclear share of the United States energy mix during the next few decades, o Conservation, a very small fraction of the energy R & D budget in FY 81, is further and drastically reduced in FY 82, although it has so far contributed much more than supply augmentations in reducing our dependence on insecure oil imports.
The DEIS states, "A relatively vigorous path of LMFBR development is therefore prudent for the government to pursue, based on the promise of the LMFBR and the uncertainty over future energy events." (p.
- 46) How-ever, the DOE's Energy Research Advisory Board concluded " construction of a demonstration plant in the early 1980s is not an urgent national p riori ty.
Sufficient coal and uranium supplies exist to satisfy pro-jected levels of electrical demand for at least 40 years and possibly well beyond."
The panel, in fact, recommended that demonstration of breeder technology be delayed until a future time.
In addition, although the DEIS argues that the cancellation of CRBR will result in the loss of staff resources and an investment of over $1 bil-lion already incurred, it is necessary to weigh forward benefits of the program against forward costs. Current estimates of the total CRBR costs 27 GC-4 LC
i are approximately $3.2 billion (1981 dollars) making the forward costs 32 l
billion.
(In comparison, the estimate in 1973 for the project was $700 million).
The question arises whether the LMFBR program is receiving a l arger portion of funding completely out
'line wi th the expected nuclear share of future United States energy supply and to what extent this research investment will contribute to reducing the. nation's depen-dency on foreign oil imports.
As the three national studies cited in this report have concluded, improvements in energy efficiency have proven to be a more cost-effective means of meeting the nation's energy needs.
6 28 GC-4 LC
V.
EHVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE LMFBR PROGRAM There are several key environmental issues that are not adequately addressed in the DEIS:
o Safeguards and proliferation concerns, given the current status of materials accountability methods and institutions to. control the use of nuclear materials, o Uncertainties associated with health and safety ri sk estimates, (e.g., Class 9 accidents and acts of' sabotage), and o Major unresolved waste management issues.
Comments on specific sections of the DEIS are provided below.
1.
Proliferation Concerns Associated with a Plutonium Economy Are Hot Adeauately Addressed Proliferation risks would be extreme in a plutoniuim economy.
Wi th development of the breeder program large amounts of plutonium would circulate through the LMFBR system ( reactor reproces sing, fuel f ab rication) in fo rms requi ring extraordinarily tight physical s ecuri ty.
It has been estimated that more than 10 million kilograms per year of fissile plutonium would circulate in fresh fuel in a pl utonium breeder-based nuclear economy.31 Widespread access to this material would remove a major barrier to the construction of nuclear weapons.
By making plutonium more readily available, these plutonium fuel cycles could cut down or even eliminate the lead time required for a political entity to build or use a nuclear weapon.
As a result, decisions involving the deployment of plutonium recycle 29 GC-4 LC J
are intimately connected to the acceptability of safeguards to protect their use.
A 1977 report sponsored by the Ford Foundation stated:
"In our view, the most serious risk associated with nuclear power is the attendant increase in the number of countries that have access to technology, materials, and facilities leadino to a nuclear weapons capability...
If widespread proliferation actually occurs, it will prove an extremely serious danger to United States security and to world peace and stability in general."32 Moreover, a recent study by the American Physical Society stated,
" Strict accountability of fissile material cannot be achieved practically throughout the entire fuel cycle.a33 The study recom-mended an evaluation of " safeguards advantageous" fuel cycles using low-enrichment uranium fuel.
Of major concern are large plants in which nuclear materials accountability becomes an even greater p robl em.
David Fischer, recently retired as International Atomic I
Energy Agency (IAEA) assistant director general and still consultant to the agency, said that I AEA safeguards experts concerned with the i
diversion of nuclear material must begin to consider the possible l
creation in the 1990s of large enrichment or reprocessing plants where a measurement of uncertainty of a half of percent could mean
(
an uncertainty of 50 kilograms of plutonium either way (Nucleanics
{
1 Week, April 9, 1981).
He further stated (Nucleonics Week, March 9, 1981) that the accounting of nuclear materials is a slow process.
Simply relying on accounting to find out whether a country has or has not made explosives may involve a delay of 30 days for the report to be sent and perhaps an additional 3 months by the time the report is analyzed and inspected. As David Fischer stated, "This is 30 GC-4 LC
not an ideal situation if you are dealing with large quantities of plutonium."
NRC's safeguards director Robert Burnett (Nucleonics Week, April 13, 1980) similarly expressed concern about the level of attention being paid to safeguards:
"We have not solved the nuclear materials accountability problem" - "there are significant materials differences that cannot be explained."
He further remarked that if the United States moves to the use of commercial reprocessing and the use of mixed oxide fuels, "then the approaches available now are unlikely to be acceptable." He cited the case at Erwin, Tennessee's fuel fabrication facility of Nuclear Fuel Services as being totally unacceptable in failing to account for over 300 kg of uranium over 15 years.
The DEIS' discussion of international safeguards and institution,al measures to address the risks of proliferation (pp. 167 - 169) fails to recognize these safeguards problems and fails to provide assurances that adequate control measures can be put in place.
The DEIS refers to the President's Nuclear Nonproli feration Policy Statement of July 16, 1981, proposing to imorove nonoroliferation objectives by strongly suoporting and continuing to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
However, the report does not recognize that United States officials have recently expressed concern about the IAEA and have discussed the possibility of United States withdrawal from the agency and possible agency collapse j
(Nucleonics Week, November 5,
1981).
The OEIS' failure to adequately address concerns regarding existing nonproliferation institutions and control measures is a major inadequacy of the l
report.
31 l
GC-4 LC
1 2.
The DEIS' Discussion of LMFBR Health and Safety Issues Is Seriously Inadeauate The discussion on LMFBR safety technology relies heavily on informa-tion presented six years ago (WASH-1535 and ERDA-1535).
It does not f
l provide a complete up-to-date discussion of safety issues associated i
with the breeder raised, for example, by the National Research
- Council, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Council on Environmental Qual i ty.
The Na tional Research Council (1979) summarized the unanswered questions remaining for LMFBR safety:
whether inherent or engineered safety features eliminate or greatly reduce the probability of core melting; whether, if this probability cannot be reduced to desirable unlikelihood, engineered features can contain the consequences, and by what mechanisms a reasonable consensus can be reached that these objectives have or have not been net.34 In addition, the President's Council on Environmental Quality advised former MRC Chairman John Ahearne (March 1980) that Class 9 accidents should be fully discussed in future EIS' on NRC licensing actions.
Since the NRC staff classified TMI as a Class 9 event, it is no longer possible to avoid full discussion of such accidents.
The DEIS needs to address current information on Class 9 accidents and their implications for safety imoacts related to breeder devel-opment.
The consequences of Class-9 accidents in a breeder reactor could exceed the consecuences calculated for the worst accidents in light water reactors.35 32 GC-4 LC
In addition, the DEIS fails to discuss the potential impacts of sabotage even though such large consequences may be the major con-tributors to public risk.
An assessment of the true risks of the proposed project, as required by NEPA, is therefore not presented.
The CRBR risk assessment, patterned after the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), concluded that CRBR risks are comparable to those from LWRs as characterized in WASH-1400 (DEIS, p.
C-1).
However, the CRBR risk assessment fails to acknowledge major weaknesses of the WASH-1400 study reported by the Risk Assessment Review Group to tFe Nuclear Regulatory Commission.36 This review group was organized by NRC to clarify the achievements and limitations of WASH-1400, assess the peer comments and responses, and study the present state of risk analysis methodol ogy.
The Review Group concluded that:37 o Statistical analyses in WASH-1400 suffer from a spectrum of problems, ranging from lack of data on which to base input dis-tributions to the invention ana use of wrong statisical methods; o The peer review process of WASH-1400 was defective in many ways and the review was inadeauate; o The lack of scrutabili ty is a major failing of the report impairing both its usefulness and the quality of possible peer review; 33 GC-4 LC
o The Review Group was unconvinced of the correctness of the WASH-1400 conclusion that ini tiating events (e.g.,
fi res,
earthquakes, human accident) contribute negligibly to overall risk; and o Error bounds in estimates of the probabilities of accident sequences are greatly understated due to an inadequate data base, questionable methodological and statistical procedures and inability to cuantify common cause failures.
The Ford / Mitre study also found that "the WASH-1400 probability estimate could be low, under extremely pessimistic assumptions, by a factor of as much as 500" and that the expected number of cancers for a given accident "could be several times higher" than in WASH-1400.38 This implies an upper limit risk 1500 - 3000 times the WASH-1400 median value, or 36 - 72 cancer deaths per reactor year.
In addition, to perform an adequate risk assessment, the physical processes must be understood and correctly modeled and uncertainties properly taken into account. Such a complete assessment of the risk associated with the CRBR and other components of the breeder fuel cycle is not provided in the DEIS.
3.
The DEIS Fails to Address Unresolved Waste Management Issues The DEIS' discussion of waste management, one of the four environ-mental impacts of the breeder program addressed in the document, is inadequate. The DEIS' very framing of the waste disposal issue--the availability of a " generally accepted method" for handling radio-active waste (p.173) is improper. By characterizing the issue this 34 GC-4 LC
t way, the DEIS implies that there is an acceptable method for handlina wastes.
'lo method for the permanent disposal of waste exists, as DOE has admitted in its filings with the HRC in the waste confidence proceeding.
(NRC Docket PR-50, 51. )
Thus, from the outset, the DEIS' discussion of waste manacement is structured to minimize the significance of the issue.
The DEIS consistently understates the obstacles to developing an adeauate waste management program.
While the DEIS summarizes at length DOE's program, it fails to acknowledge the sharp dispute over the adequacy of the program and the conclusion of many that DOE's program is insufficient to assure that permanent, safe disposal of radioactive wastes will be developed in the foreseeable future. The inadequacies of DOE's waste management program are summarized in a recent consolidated filing submitted by the California Energy Com-mission; California Department of Conservation; the Attorney General of the State of New York; Illinois; Massachusetts; Minnesota; Ohio; Wisconsin; Delaware; and Ocean County and Lower Alloways Creek Town-ship, New Jersey, in the HRC's waste confider e proceeding.*
We have included this filing as Appendix C.
"The DEIS fails to discuss the ongoing modifications to its waste management program, President Reagan's plan to abolish DOE, and the impacts of these changes on developing a waste management program for the breeder reactor.
As we and other states have pointed out in our filings, the inevitable results of these changes will be further delay in any resolution of the radioactive waste disposal probl em.
(" Statement of the Cali fornia Department of Conservation and California Energy Commission Concerning the Impact of Recent Developments on a Commission Decision in This Proceeding",
NRC Waste Confidence Proceeding, Docket No. PR-50, 51, December 18, 1981.)
35 GC-4 LC
Neither the technical nor the institutional deficiencies in DOE's waste management program, summarized in Appendix C, are addressed in the DEIS.
For instance, while DOE's program is based on "the mined geologic repository strategy for disposal of commercially-generated hi gh-l evel and transuranic radioactive wastes" (DEIS,
- p. 178), the scientific feasibility of isolating radioactive wastes from the biosphere for the extensive periods recuired to assure human safety has not been validated.
(Appendix C,
- p. 5).
The DEIS fails to acknowledge this lack of scientific verification.
The DEIS relies in large part upon DOE's " system approach" in concluding that problems with waste disposal are insignificant.
(DEIS, p. 180.) However, as Appendix C points out:
"D0E (and the industry) have adooted a systems approach to waste disposal--use of a series of natural and engineered barriers that supposedly provide a degree of isolation not possible for the natural systems alone.
00E fails to recognize that this approach is still hypothetical and needs to be scientifically verified with respect to the redundancy, effectiveness, and independence of a series of barriers that are still being conceptualized."
(Appendix C, p. 6, f.n. 4).
The DEIS also fails to acknowledge the numerous gaps in present technical knowledge concerning permanent waste disposal.
These technical gaps include:
a.
Waste Rock interaction--There is no real understanding of the interaction of waste with host rock and therefore no assurance that the physical, chemical, and thermal effects induced by the presence of the waste will not cause unmanageable disruptions.
(Appendix C, p. 7).
36 GC-4 LC
b.
Hydrol ogy--Li ttl e is known about water transport of radio-nuclides to the biosphere.
(Appendix C, D.
7),
c.
Selection of geological mediums--The DEIS asserts that "any of (the potential host rocks) can prove to be acceptable for the mined geologic repository" (DEIS, p.185).
Contrary to this assertion, none of the geological mediums under study have been shown to be technically capable of assuring safe isolation.
Each medium under consideration is known to present serious, time-consuming, and possibly insurmountable problems.
(Appendix C, p. 8).
d.
Future climatic changes, shaft sealtr_g and borehole plugging, monitoring, cannister degradation, waste form di ssolution, reaction in the overpack region, rock mechanics, retriev-abil i ty, seismic and tectonic activity, and waste packaging.
(Appendix C).
The DEIS addresses none of these problems.
The states' comments on DOE's presentation of its waste program in the NRC waste confidence proceeding are equally true for the DEIS' discussion of DOE's plans for ha..dling wastes from the breeder reactor:
"Given its lack of knowledge, DOE basically contends that the mere existence of its waste program is grounds for assurance.
00E resorts to speculation that it will suc-cessfully overcome all of these technical barriers in the near future, despite the lack of scientific knowledge after 25 years of study.
Such statements do not disguise that these are important, existing data gaps, and that there is no assurance at this time that these gaps will be successfully filled in the future".
(Appendix C, p. 9).
37 GC-4 LC
A third technical problem that the DEIS fails to adequately address is the state of DOE's mathematical models.
(DEIS, p.
182).
The models are used to compensate for uncertainties in technical knowl-edge.
(DEIS, p. 182).
However, the DEIS fails to acknowledge that the modelling is currently undeveloped, that there is no indication that it will be successfully developed, and that USGS has rejected j
reliance on models.
(Appendix C, p. 10).
Other technical deficiencies in the DEIS include the failure to analyze how many sites would be needed for disposal of wastes and the failure to discuss the lack of evidence that sufficient sites for handling wastes will be found.
(Appendix C, pp. 10-11). There is also a failure to provide information on how long the wastes will be stored or that they can be stored safely for the requi si te period.
Finally, the DEIS alludes to " predetermined criteria" for the waste disposal repository.
(DEIS, p. 181).
However, environ-mental, site selection, and performance criteria for a repository are still speculative, as is a demonstration that the criteria can be net.
(Appendix C, pp. 12-13).
One of the most imoortant studies on waste management, the Inter-agency Review Group
- report, concluded that the resolution of social, political, and institutional concerns is necessary to pe 71t the orderly implementation of a nuclear waste program and that
" resolution of institutional issues may well be more difficult than
- The interagency Review Group on Nuclear Naste Management was established in March 1978 by President Carter to make recommendations for the establishment of an integrated and credible nuclear waste management policy.
38 GC 4 LC
finding solutions to remaining technical problems".
(Appendix C, co.
13-14). Nevertheless, the DEIS' discussion of institutional obstacles to DOE's waste management program is almost nonexistent.
(DEIS, pp. 180, B-3).
There is no mention whatsoever of the numerous problems on the federal level which have prevented a satisf actory waste disposal program--D0E's failure to maintain a consistent
- program, the substantial chances in orogram goals with each successive admini-
- stration, the proliferation of decision-makers in the federal government, and the division of jurisdiction in Congress over waste disposal.
(Appendix C, 00. 14-16).
State and local concerns over waste disposal are an eoually impor-tant issue.
In this area, the DEIS fails to analyze the problems at all, and simoly asserts that DOE is " committed to providing an effective role" for states and local governments and Indian tribes (DEIS,
- p. 180).
Clearly, this cursory statement does not present the analysis required by NEPA.
The states' review of DOE's presen-tation of this issue in the NRC waste confidence proceeding applies equally well to the DEIS:
"As DOE itself acknowledges, the public is very concerned about the consequences of building repositories, and many state and local governments, through legislation or other-wise, have expressed opoosition to accepting repositories.
Every government effort to date to select particular sites has been opposed.
Since dozens of candidate sites must be selected for testing and evaluation, the acknowl edged public opposition creates doubt that repositories actually will be established".
39 GC-4 LC
" DOE's response is that it will engage in consultation with affected state and local governments and that objec-tions therefore will disappear.
This approach, however, is naive, because discussions are not likely to override strong local objections to the siting of the repository.
Moreover, DOE has consistently failed to adhere to its purported policy of ' consultation and concurrence'. DOE's promise in its filings to deal with states is suspect, given its failure to even inform Wisconsin of its disposal plans for that state during this proceeding. As Wisconsin says, DOE deliberately concealed from the state a report showing-that the state was the primary candidate for exploration of granite formations."
"On an equally fundamental level is DOE's pervasive inability to deal with the concept of public trust and participation.
DOE (and the NRC Working Grouo) continues to view the public as a special interest group whose sup-port is desirable but unnecessary.
00E has no meaningful internal mechanism for instilling public confidence and this limitation will most likely effectively frustrate site selection and development.
DOE fails even to acknowl edge the existence of a credibility problem, let alone begin the arduous task of dealing with it.
- Instead, DOE simplistically argues that the public should just accept whatever risks DOE determines should be accepted from radioactive wastes.
Such an approach clearly does not present a factual basis for concluding that institu-tional barriers will be overcome."
(Appendix C, pp. 16-17; cites omitted).
l i
In sum, the DEIS fails to address the many technical and institu-l tional issues associated with waste disposal for the breeder reactor program. Had these issues been adequately addressed, the DEIS could not have concluded, as it does, that "[t]here does not appear to be any constraint on the LMFBR Preqram imoosed by disposal requirements for high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes" (DEIS, p.174) and that waste management will not have a significant environmental impact.
(DEIS, p. 7) We therefore recommend that the DEIS be with-drawn until a complete analysis of this crucial issue is cerformed and that the federal government not add, through the breeder reactor 40 GC 4 LC
program, to the existing waste disposal problem until the technical, institutional, social, and political barriers to waste disposal are significantly diminished.
b t
al GC-4 LC
REFERENCES 1.
Remarks of Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion before the World Nuclear Fuel Market's International Conference on Nuclear Energy, October 27, 1981, Washington, D.C., "The New Policy for Nuclear Power."
2.
Final Report to the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, Energy;Ijl Transition 1985 - 2010, 1981; Cited herein as CONAES.
3.
Energy Future, Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School, edited by Robert Stoubaugh and Daniel Yergin,1979; Cited herein as Harvard Business School Study.
4.
The Solar Energy Research Institute study, A New Prosperity:
Building a Sustainable Energy Future,1981; Cited hereIn as SERI.
~
5.
S. Schurr, J. Darmstadter et al.,
Enercy in America's Future:
The Choices Before Us, prepared by the Resources for the Future National Energy Strategies Project; John' Hopkins University, Press, 1979; Cited herein as RFF.
6.
A Study Group, Hans Landberg, Chairman, Eneray:
The Next Twenty Years, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, Dallinger Publishing Co.,1979.
7.
National Journal, " Utilities Paying Price for Counting on Demand Growth that Never Came. ' October 17, 1981.
8.
M.
Ross and R. Williams, Our Energy Regaining Control, 1981, McGraw -
Hill Book Co., p. 135 9.
NUEX0, Monthly Report on the Uranium fiarket, October 1981.
10.
00E, NASAP Report, 00E/NE-0001, Executive Summary, June 1980, p.11.
11.
Report of the Research and Development Panel, Energy Research Advisory Board, " Federal Energy R&D Priorities", November 1981, p. 56.
12.
Energy Daily. " Duke Power Hesitate on Cherokee Units," March 2,1981.
13.
NUEX0 Special Report, Uranium: A Market in Transition, June 1981 14.
NUEX0 Special Report, Uranium: A Market in Transition, June 1981.
15.
R. Webb, The Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst,l[776.
- 16. Colin Norman, " Renewable Power Strikes Financial In teres t,"
- Science, June 26, 1981, p. 1480.
17.
" Energy Conservation Spawning A Billion Dollar Business," Business Week, r
April 6, 1981, p. 60.
42 GC 4 LC
I 18.
RFF, p. 176.
19.
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Cogeneration:
Eneroy for the 80's and Beyond, Conference Proceedings, June 1981, p. 10.
20.
Richard T. Sheahan, Alternative Energy Sources, An Aspen Publication, Aspen Systems Corporation, Rockville, Maryland, London,1981, p.188.
- 21. California Energy Commission, Geothermal Energy:
Opportunities for California Business, September 1981, p. 3.
22.
U.S. Department of Energy, Geothermal Enercy, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1980, p. 15.
- 23. CONAES, pp. 417-418.
24 California Energy Commission, Enercy Tomorrow: Challences and Oooortuni-ties for California, p.102; California Energy Commission, Electricity ToEorrow:
1981 Final Report, January 1981.
- p. 258; California Energy Commission, Nontraditional Enercy Technoloafes:
Issues and Actions, Dec. 1980, p. 8.
25.
California Energy Commission, Wind Eneras Procram Progress Reoort, P500-80-001, Jan. 1, 1980, p. 1; TTC Wind Eneroy, Investing in our Energy Future, April 1981, p. 7; CEC, A Guide to Financial Assistance for Wind Energy, P500-81-014, March 1981, p. 4.
- 26. M.
- 27. 00E, Environmental Readiness Document: Small-Scale Low Head Hydro, Sept.
- 1978,
- p. 5; Jonn Huetler, Jr.,
"Small-Scale Hydroelectric Power:
The Community-Size Renewable Enercy Source," Community Energy Self-Reliance Proceedings of the First Conference on Community Renewable Eneray Systems, SERI7CD-TR-421, Aug.1979, p. T49; Richard Corrigan, "With an Off-Handed Push from Congress, Speculators Plunge Into Small Hydro,"
National Journal, May 30, 1981, p. 977.
28.
Norman M. Clapp, former administrator, Rural Electrical Administration, "Take A New Look At Small Hydro," Public Power, May-June 1979, p. 30.
- 29. California Eneray Commission, Enercy Futures For California: Two Scenar-ios, 1978 - 2000, P300-81-005, Sept. 1980, p. 3T.
30.
Report of the Research and Development Panel, Energy Research Advisory Board, " Federal Energy R&D Priorities," November 1981, Appendix 0., p.
6.
31.
M. Ross and R. H.
Williams, Our Enercy Regaining Control, McGraw Hill Co., 1981.
32.
The Ford / Mitre Study Huclear Power:
Issues and Choices, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing Co.
43 GC-4 LC
- 30. Report of the Research and Development Panel, Energy Research Advisory Board, " Federal Energy R&D Priorities," November 1981, Appendix D., p.
6.
31.
M. Ross and R. H.
Williams, Our Eneray Regainino Control, McGraw Hill Co., 1981.
- 32. The Ford / Mitre Study Nuclear Power:
Issues and Choices, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing Co.
- 33. American Physical Society, " Report to the APS by the Study Group on Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Waste Management," Reviews of Modern Physics,
~~~
Vol. 50, January 1978, p. 293.
34 C0HAES, p. 292.
- 35. CONAES, p. 291.
36.
H. W. Lewis, Chairman, Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0400.
37.
Id., p. viii, fx.
- 38. C0HAES, p. 627.
44 GC-4 LC
[
A PPEN D t'4 A
ENERGY T
O M
O R
R O
W CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CALIFORNIA 1981 BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE E
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE E
I 1
E l
I l
CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION Russell L. Schweickart, Chairman Arturo Gandara C. Suzanne Reed. Second Member, Biennial Report Committee Emilio E. Varanini. Ill James A. Walker. Presiding Member.
Biennial Report Committee Gloria Megino, Public Adviser John Geesman. Executive Director Wilham Chamberlain, General Counsel N
f Appeunix B Electricity Tomorrow 1981 Final Report to the Governor and the Legislature I
January 1981 M&i
[46Wg-T
-di f (+
CAL' ORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION F
Commissioners y
c
'v
,N,:... wg/fy, t[a.,
Russell L. Schwe.ckart. Chairman 5-Ronald D. Doctor 15 C. Suzanne Reed
- 4 -
Emilia E. Varanim !!!
James A. Walker Y
d.
f},
,hy Gloria Megino. Public Advisor "E7 John Geesman, Executive Director
.M W-m$kkea i
l
l 4
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4
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4.$x
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s
- - i NV 85 9.
!'Ef'
=. = - -
)
Appendix C UNITED STATES OF AMEFICA MUCLEAR REGULATOF? COMMISSION 4
In the Matter of:
)
)
f Proposed Rulecaking on Storage Disposal
)
of Nuclear Waste, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 51 )
PR-50, 51
)
(34 FF 61372)
(Waste Confidence Rulemaktnri.
)
t CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT-0F Tug 3747g gaggp I
I I.
INTRODUCTION This consolidated State =ent is submitted on behalf of the Califo rnia Depart =ent of Conservation
("CDC"),
Cali-fornia Energy Commission
(" CEC"), Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota
("Minn."),
Attorney General-of the State of New York ("NYAG"), Ocean County and Lower Alloways Creek Town-ship (New Jersey), Ohio, Wisconsin and Delaware, pursuant to the Commissions' Second ? rehearing Memorandue and Order, dated November 6,
1981.
The recaining participants con-solidated in Group 3, listed on p.
7 of the Memorandur and Order, have not joined in this Statement.
There is no factual basis today for. confidence either that nuclear waste will be safely disposed of by the necessary tine fra=e or that it will be safely stored until it is disposed of safely.
Further ore, because a permanent, safe solution to the waste canagement problem will not be available when needed, both the California Energy Cottission and the Attorney General cf the State of New York support a policy of ceasing to issue new construction permits for 1.
l Q
g l
p'ma.
I v
nuclear cower plants until the technical, instidutier51, social and political barriers are si nifica'ntly dirfrished.
s II.
THE CCMMISSICtf FUST CETERMI!!E UNETHE? C? ITCT IT ISs IT0il CCt!?IDE!!T, O!! THE BASIS OF EYIST!!!O FACTS, THAT TFEFE 3
UILL BE SAFE DISPOSAL OT !!UCLEAR WASTE.
i
~
[
s At issue is not whether radioactive wastes produced -bv I
nuclear facilities "can" be dispesed 'of safely but whether they " vill ba" safely disposed by a specified date.
3 4 Te c';~
2 s,
Reg. 61372-73 (October 25, 1979)
(erphasis added).I The 1
=ere conclusory statements by DOE that there 'can te safe.
waste disposal are an insufficient basis fo r th e,!!RC t o -
s
~ i s
^^
s" conclude that it has assurance that wastecswill'be disposed of safely.
C 1
DOE has not met its burde:r of proving that a factual
' j basis exists.
Its filings consistently.. ignore cast events,1 do not shew reasonable facts existing today for assurance i
and;instead speculate that j
that waste disposal vill occur,
<x discosal can, =ay, or should cccur. <The decision to abolish i
COE =akes DOE's position even more ill'usory.
k In order to make a finding of co'nfidence at this ti=e, the Cormission, among other things, would have to conclude,
' 'E-l r
t g
1.
At a mini =ue, the legal standard for the !!?C to use is whether it has " reasonable assurance" that wastes will be disposed of safely.
While participants have used differing phrases to describe this burden, all states jcining in this filing agree that DOE's filings do not satisfy the " reasonable assurance" standard.
J s
e s
i I
[
free facts exis ting today, that all technical and political-social
(" Institutional") problems will truly be resolved by a specified date.
However, there is no basis for reaching that conclusion.
Indeed, even if safe disposal is tech-I nically feasible, in the sense that no known scientific principle would orevent its beint achieved, renetheless, the Concission could not find confidence because (1) many l
repository sites are needed but no site has been found which would be suitable, and questions are known to exist about the suitability of all the various rerions and media under consideration; (ii) it is possible that technical solutions to outstanding problems will not be found by the specified date; and (iii) institutional problets could prevent the establishment of any repositories by the specified date.
t Instead of discussing long-ter: safety, DOE frames its s
case in terms of whether it will succeed in rettint one
~
repository licensed by the NRC by the year 2007.
But that question misses the point.
First of all, =any repositories b
will be'needed, not only one.
Secondly, even if a license is obtained, that does not. assure establishment of a repcsi-
!s tory because public opposition could prevent it.
- Further, r
.the cere existence of a license does not establish that the b
repository will function without accident for the necessary e
i time period.
Events at Three Mile I '.and, Brown's yerry and Diablo Canyon deconstrate this point.
Actual facts, rather than beliefs, are recuired in is determining confidence, particularly in view of the past 1
e
histors of waste dis:csal efforts ("an unbecken history Of failure").
(CEC SP 30; 111 1112 Illinois SP D-5; Minn.
S?,
Dr.
Abrahs son's ecm=ents 13-20.)
Additionall/, the nature of the problem--extrerely long-terS danter to many future generations--calls for the highest care in reaching conclusions in this ereceeding.2 DOE and the industry groups say erroneously that because research is planned or in peccess we can be confi-dent today that safe disposal will be achieved.
- However, for years govern =ent officials have = isled the public with assurances that the technical solutions were at hand.
The I
l truth is that we do not know today whether the ongoing 1
research will re=ove all obstacles; instead, it may fail to i
1 1
2.
Disposal of nuclear waste presents unique problets because never before has any society had to devise plans to assure safety so far in the future, and never before have government agencies had to devise regu-lations to assure such safety.
Thus, it is more than natural to expect that errors will occur in the tech-nology, and that the regulations themselves will be less than perfect.
Indeed, the U.S. Geological Survey
("USGS") has noted that waste disposal "recuires new and hitherto untried technology" which " typically" involves " initial failure of some conponents to perform as originally conceived, discovery of new problems to be resolved, and reconsideration of desirn concepts."
USGS S?
5.'
This view is in accord with that taken by the N3C in its draft technical criteria for regulatinz disposal, that building a nepository "is a new human enterprise," and it is therefore
" reasonable to expect that, whatever the care exercised and however advanced the technicues, mistakes will occur, it: roved technologies developed, better designs created, and coerational procedures i= proved."
25 Fed.
Reg. 313cS, col. 2 (May 13, 1c30).
C' "S?" refers to the participants' Statenents of Position and "CS" references the Cross-Statements of Position.)
4
do so, or even uncover new uncertainties or problems raking the task still core difficult to achieve.
Confidence cannet be predicated on hope or blind technological opticism.
Until the research has been ccepleted and has successfully resolved all the technical difficulties, it is precature even to talk about confidence.
III.
THERE IS NO FACTUAL SASIS TODAY FOR CONEIDENCE THAT TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO THE SAFE DISPOSAL OF WASTE WILL BE SUCCESSFULLY OVE3COME.
A.
The scientific feasibility of isolating radio-active wastes frc= the bioschere for the extensive periods required to assure human safety has not been validated.
A key factor in the states' position that there is no
- present, reasonable assurance that technical barriers to e
safe waste disposal w111 be sur=ounted is the lack of
~
scientific verification of the geologic repository concept.
Actual assurance that geologic repositories can isolate radioactive wastes recuirea:
"[C]omparing the results of field experiments to the =odel predictions and codifying the models.
The experiments must, of course, be carried out under conditions representative of those inside a leaded repository; that is, ir-situ.
It is only under these circu= stances that the isolation hypothesis can be validated and reasonable assurance achieved."
(CEC S? 7; 233, 3.1.2.2. N YAG SF 60; Wisconsin S? $; Delaware S? 6.)
None of the waste experiments to date have utiliced a vigorous scientific hyocthesis testing and model verifi-cation rethod, and certainly no in-situ test experirents have been performed which demonstrate verification of the 5
_. - _ -.- =_
i
~
I geologic recository conce:
?+a ain l
1 Wisconsin S? 3 3).
1 3
DOE admits that in-situ testing is necessary to assure adecuate site characteri:ation and verification and to l
Verify the codels used for performance assesscent.
However, in this area as in others,- DOE looks to additional " planned in-situ tests to provide sufficient d
t I
DOE thus admits that concept feasi-l bility has not been proven,3 and that its optimism that it i
i will be shown is dependent upon successful completion of It as-yet unperformed in-situ expericents.'
3.
The nunerous gaps in present technical knowledge coccerning permanent waste disposal prevent a finding of confidence at this ti=e.
c Every filing in this proceeding identified =any generic uncertainties and data gaps in the technology for waste t
3 The IRG report recogni:ed that concept feasibility for geologic repositories is unproven:
"The feasibility of safely disposing of high level waste in eined respositories can only be assessed on the basis of specific investirations at and determinations of suitability of particular sites."
3 DOE (and the industry) have adopted a systers ap: roach to waste disposal--use of a series of natural and engineered barriers that supposedly =rovide a degree of isolation not possible for the natural systees alone.
DOE fails to recogni:e that this approach is still hypothetical and needs to be scientifically verified with respect to the redundancy, effectiveness, and independence of a series of barriers that are still i
being conceptuali:ed.
(CEC S? 05.)
6.
i t
4 j
discosal.
These gaps creclude assurance at this tice that technical proble=s with waste discosal will be overecee.
i
(!f!AG SP 77-101 ; CEC SP 6-12; Appendices A, 3 and C; CDC S?
It is i possible to even list all V
the existing data gaps in the limited space allowed for this succary.
However, some of the most important data gaps and uncertainties are:
1 1
1.
Vaste-rock interactions--USGS has stated that "the uncertainties associated with hot wastes that interact i
checically and =echanically sith the rock and fluid system i
l atpear very hizh" (NYAG SF 79; CDC CS ?).
DOE acknowledres i
I i
that the effect of the heat emanating from the wastes on I
the surrounding rock of a repository is "a
=ajor unknown I
~
reologic factor (presenting) the most difficult engineering l
uncertainties."
( !!! A G SP 79.)
One participant has described in detail the raps in knowledge that prevent any l
understanding of the interaction of vaste with host rock and t
the resulting lack of assurance that the physical, checical, and ther=al effects induced by the presence of the waste r
will not cause unmanageable disruptions.
(!!YAG SP 78-33.)
It is simply not known if any site will be able to perform its function given the heat and radiation being ecitted by l
the waste.
(!!YAG SP 78-8 3 ; 123, a l s o C EC S P 10.)
l r
2.
Hydrolory--DOE admits that "knowledre of tround-i l
l wa ter hydrolozy, is perhaos, the cst important requirecent "or under:tanding :ne long-ters behavior of a cined,re o l o ric i
I ao l
4.
i f
-_ -._ _ r - _ _, - -
l i
repository."
(DGE SP II-76.)
Nevertheless, little is known about water transport of radionuclides to the bios:here (CDC S? 15-17; CDC CS 13-15, 13, 20-21; CEC SP 10, 50-55).
As USGS has said:
. The need for such data severely taxes both the available data base and the technology for generating it.
Most of the requisite data are presently unavailable; :ost of the available data have such large error limits that their usefulness in predictive models is lim i t e d. "
Circular 779, pp. 8-9.
3 Selection of geologic rediun- *dhile salt, shale,
- basalt, and granite are all under study as potential repository =edia, none have been shown to be technically capable of assuring safe isolatien.
Each medium under consideration is known to present serious, ti=e-consu=ing, and possibly insur=cuntable problems which leaves the possibility of achieve =ent within the requisite ti=e frace speculative.
(NYAG S? 32-92 ; CDC SP 9-10, 24-15; CDC CS 3, U
t 6, 33-36; see also Delaware S? 5.)
4.'
Future climatic changes--It recains to be estab-lished that repositories can be located to withstand future clicatic changes such as re-glaciation or significant increases in precipitation or surface erosion.
(NYAG S? 27;
)
i CDC SP 12-13; CDC CS 10-12.)
l 3
Shaft sealing and borehole plurging--There is no established way to seal a repository so as to prevent radionuclide release to the biosphere for the necessary 8.
a period of time.
(CEC SP to; NYAG S? 99; CDC S? 19-23; CDC CS 25-29.)
DOE has terred the sealine. probler a " key unknown" (!!Y AG S? 99) but there is no consensus that the technology which is currently anticicated will provide adequate seals for even a few decades.
(M. 99. )
6.
Monitoring- *Jhile DOE believes that a =enitoring system should be developed to operate fo r a few centuries
(!!YAG S? 100), DOE's fi.ings ignore the lack of equipment and nethodology for monitoring the repository af ter closure.
( M.; DOE S? II-220; CDC S? 13-19; CDC CS 23-27.)
Given its lack of present knowledge,I DOE basically l
contends that the =ere existence of its waste program is
~
grounds for assurance.
DCE resorts to speculation that it will successfully overcome all of these technical barriers in the near future, despite the lack of scientific knowledge after 25 years of study.
10-11, 46.)
Such statements do not disruise that these are important, existing data gaps, and that there is no assurance at this time that these gaps will be successfully filled in the future.
(CEC S? 26.)
DOE's abolishment cakes its representations rezarding the future success of its waste program even emptier.
5.
Other identified knowledge gaps include cannister degredation (CEC SP 50), waste form dissolution (CEC S?
52), reaction in the overpack region (CEC S? 53), rock mechanics (CEC S? 50), retrievability (CDC S? 23-24; CDC'CS 30-32), seismic and tectonic activity.
(:'YAG SP 46; CEC S? 10), and waste packaging (Illinois S? 30.)
9.
C.
cessary. mathematical codeling of recository perferrance is undeveloped.
Because reo10ric and other scientific data are unavail-able, DCE wants to use computer modeling to demonstrate the validity of the geologic waste concept and wants to have the Commission find confidence based on these =cdels and on results of future =cdelin studies.
There is no clear indication of whether modeline will be successful or whether it can be succesfully achieved during the necessary time frame.
And, there is no valid basis for assigning numbers to represent the probability of an earth-quake, huran intrusion, re-glaciation or other repository failure many years in the future.
USGS, in its Preli=inary Statement of April 15, 1980 (pc. 11-12), rejected reliance r
on =edels, and insisted on hard data from site-specific investigations.
The =cdels are not based on detailed site-specific information, and the re fo re, are net subject to i
1 verification.
In any event, DOE concede.s that even the redels already cited will not be available for a number of years.
(DGE SP II-203, 219, 222.)
Simply having l
an extensive program for ic; rove =ent of models is not evidence of confidence new that the f a r-field predictions will be more accurate.
D.
There is no basis fo r confidence that sufficient sites will be found.
COE says that as =any as eight repositories would be needed if salt or shale is used as the medium.
(DCE S?
10.
II-239.)
If ultimately eizh; sites are needed, dozens of sites meeting all the technical criteria must be loca ted so that in-situ testinz can bezin.
Such testing will likely discover orcblees with at least some of the sites.
For example, the Salt Vault site in Lycns, Kansas was abandoned after a decade of testing, when it was finally found to be unsuitable.
(!T Y A G SP 61.)
Also, extra repository sites are needed in case of a need to cuickly transfer the nuclear waste fece an existing repository which has preven unsatisfactory.
There is simply no basis for confidence that dozens of sites meetine all the technical criteria will be found.
The vague assu=ptions that the expanded Tational Waste Terninal Storage Progra=, because it includes a larger area e
for consideration, provides the confidence necessary to believe that the timetable will be
=et, is unacceptable.
The site selection process has not even been properly started yet, and therefore, cannet possibly demonstrate confidence now that a repository will be available by 1997-2006.
Indeed, DOE and USGS acknew-ledge that unknown deficiencies nay exist in many of the regions under consideration and that knowledre about all the regions is insufficient to project the location of cultiple suitable sites.
(!!YAG SP 65-67; ?!YAG CS 42 45. )
5.
Moreover, even if de: ens of sites are found initially, rany of them may be rendered unsuitable during M si;u testing, because non-destructive testing methods have Footnote continued on next page 11.
E.
DOE has not shown, and does not even clair, that disposal will be safe for the necessary period.
Nuclear waste, as DOE admits, cust be isolated for up to one million years.
(!!YAG S? 30.)
However, DOE's filing predicts isolation for only 10,000 years, only 1 percent of the time for which ' isolation is needed for safety, by DOE's own admission.
(NYAG SP 30.)
Industry argues that nuclear waste will be truly,hazardeus for a mere few hundred years, ignoring that sece elements have half lives of hundreds of thousands of years.
In fact, a chart submitted by the utilities shows that spent fuel will be more toxic than uranium ore for about to,000 years.
(Doc. 3, p. 2-8 of U?iWMG-EI S?.)
Another source cited by industry says that soee of the waste products re=ain hazardous for millicas of r
years'.
(hYAG CS 10-11.)
DOE has failed to provide any assurance that its program will provide protection for that period of time and, in fact, admits that it has no plans to e.1sure such isolation.
F.
Environmental, site selection, and cerfor:ance criteria for a repository are speculative as is a demonstration that the criteria can be met.
Several participants have pointed out that establish-ment of enviroceental, site selection, and perforcance not been demonstrated.
(ITYAG S? 63-53.)
And, sites surviving that hurdle may be breached during exca-
- vation, because there too non-destructive technology
~
has not been developed.
(NYAG S? 96.)
Therefore, sites which are otherwise safe e.ay be rendered unsuit-able before a repository can be established.
12.
criteria for a cepository and demonstration that these criteria will be satisfied, are necessary for a reasonable assurance that safe waste disposal will be available.
(!' inn. S? 0; CDC S? 6; Illinois S? 2.)
EPA has not yet published even its proposed environmental criteria for disposal of high-level wastes.
( 2. )
!!?C has admitted that there is insufficient earth science knowledge to set forth general site acceptability criteria, and that therefore it may be necessary to deternine suitability on an 3d. h.2.0. basis for each tentative site.
(Minn. S? 5.)
While lfRC has proposed technical criteria (46 Fed. Reg. 35280-96, July 3~,
1981), the criteria are not yet final.
The absence of final regulations and sites to compare the= with precludes confidence at this time.
!!R C is also responsible for issuing perfor=ance standards.
While the !!RC has identified preli=inary technical perforrance criteria (Minn.
SP 6),
DOE's filings ignore these recuirements and provide no assurance that they will be met.
(Minn. S? 7-11.)
IV.
I!!STITUTIO!!AL S ARRIERS PRIVE!!T A FI!!DIliG OF C0!!?IDE!!CE THAT THERE WILL BE WASTE DISPOSAL.
A.
Unresolved institutional issues are as great a hindrance to a finding of confidence as technical obstacles.
There is no basis fo r confidence that institutional problems can be resolved.
( !!Y A G S? 68-75; Ohio S? 15; Wisconsin S? 2; Minn. S? 5, and Dr. Abraharsen's cocrents 23-30.)
The IRG report concluded that the resolution of social, political, and institutional concerns is necessary 13
P to permit the orderly implementation of a nuclear waste program and that " resolution of institutional issues cay well be = ore difficult than finding solutions to remaining technical croblems."
(IRG, p.
37; I!YAG S? 58-60.)
00E has acknowledged that "less confidence can be placed in assess-
=ent of (institutional] i= pacts on the repository prorram" than technical i s s t' e s (DOE S? III-87) and that it is I
"possible that unanticipated or unresolved issues of concern 6
at the State or local level could cause prolonged pertur-6 a
i bations in the schedule."
The states' 5:
j submittals (and indeed, almost all non-industry and non-federal government filinzs) have pointed out that DOE's blithe conclusien that institutional concerns can be resolved igneres reality and presents no factual basis fo r I
confidence that they will be resolved.I t
3.
Institutional proble=s at the federal level are a i
significant obstacle precluding a finding of confidence.
.l t
The federal government's own handling of the waste disposal problea precludes finding assurance that waste diaposal will be available.
DOE, the lead federal a ency 7.
Virtually all the instituticnal fectors cited by the states in their filines as precluding confidence that there will be safe storage of waste cemain.
President Reagan's support for reprocessing shows that, once again, a change in administrations has caused a change in the basic objectives of the nation's waste disposal prorram.
Bitter strurgies centinue over the for-and scals of waste disposal legislation, particularly with recard to state government and local participatien in the program.
13
i responsible for the waste disposal prograr, suffers fror disjointed project management.
(CEC S? 19-20.)
DOE has failed to maintain a consistent program and objectives, due at least in part to the fact that the program is amenable to drastic change with each successive administration and that Congress has yet to take action to provide stability to the program.
(Ohio S? 5-11.)
The overall federal government management structure is inadequate (Wisconsin S? 4), char-acterized by a disorganized proliferation of decision-makers (at least six other agencies in the Executive Branch alone l
compete with DOE for jurisdiction over waste disposal) (CEC S? 20);
disagreement among' these decision-makers (CEC S?
21-22); and inefficient coordination of the decision-makers' activities.
r In addition, there is the continuing i ns ti t u tio n a l-uncertainty in presidential input, as illustrated by the succession of presidents with differing waste management policies.
(Ohio S? 6.)
Congress, through its budgetary and statutory authority, is obviously also essential to timely i=plementation of an effective waste disposal solution.
Jurisdiction in Congress over waste is split among numercur cc=mittees (Wisconsin S? 5) and no bill establishing a national program has passed.
(Ohio S? 3-9.)
Most importantly, significant changes in congressional 8.
Participants have also pointed to the repeated failure of the AEC, ERDA; and new EPA and DOE to meet their own timetables.
15
me.mbershic occur regularly, causier an ever-cha.9 gin set of goals (and legislation).
00E filints ignore these political obstacles.
(Ohio S? 9.)
C.
State and local concerns over waste disposal and the federal government's consistent failure to deal with the= prevent a finding of c on fid e r.c e.
As DOE itself acknowledges, the public is very con-cerned about the consecuences of building repositories, 9
and racy s ta te and local governments, through legislation or otherwise, have expressed ocposition to accepting repositories.
Every government effort to date to select particular sites has been opposed.
Since dozens of candidate sites =ust be selected for testing and evaluation, the acknowledged public opposition creates doubt that repositories actually will be established.
(NYAG S? 69-75; CEC S? 26-23; Chio SP 13; Minn. S? 5.)
I DOE's response is that it will engage in consultation with affacted state and local governcents and that objec-tions therefore will disappear.
(DOE S? V-19.)
This approach, however, is naive, because discussions are not likely to override strong local ebjections to the siting of a repository.
(NYAG S? 72; Ohio S? 15-16; Pinn. S?,
Dr.
Abraharsen's coerents, p.
30.)
Moreover, DOE has 9
By October 1979, some 19 s ta tes had enacted bans or noratoria on the sitin of a nuclear waste repository.
(CEC S? 26.)
Alrost 20 s ta tes have either censidered or taken scme action concerning nuclear waste disposal.
( %.. 4 o C.D
- 7. )'
t, w
16.
consistently failed to adhere to its purported policy of
" consultation and concurrence."
DOE's premise in its filings to deal with states is suspect, given its failure to even inform 'disconsin of its disposal plans for that state during this proceeding.
(Wisconsin Supplemental Statement, dated October 10, 1980.)
As Visconsin says, DOE deliber-ately concealed from the state a report showing that the state was the primary candidate for exploration of granite formations.
(11. )
On an equally fundamental level is DOE's pervasive l
inability to deal with the concept of public trust and i
participatier.
DOE (and the !!?.C Working Group) continues to l
view the public as a special interest group whose support is desirable but unnecessary.
DOE has no meaningful internal nechanism for instilling public confidence and this li=it-ation will rest likely effectively frustrate site selection and developeert.
(Verment SP 3.)
DOE fails even to acknowledge the existence of a credibility problem, let alone begin the arducus task of dealing with it.
(CEC S?
30.)
Instead, DOE sinplistically argues that the public shculd just accept whatever risks DOE determines should be accepted frca radioactive wastes.
(DCE S? II-12; !!YAG S?
f3.)
Such an approach clearly does not present a factual basis for concluding that institutional barriers will be evercene.
(Minn. S? 5-6.)
1 p.l.
V.
THERE IS NO SASIS FOR C0ff f!DE f!C E THAT SAFE D IS POS A L UILL BE IM?LE"EffTFD BY A CIV?ti DATE.
Even if it could be said with c on fid er c e that safe disposal will be achieved ultimately, there is no basis for confidence that it will be achieved by any given date.
This is because there is no way of knowing when, if at all, the required number of repository sites meeting all' the tech-nical requirements will be found, verified through in-situ testing, and accepted by state and local governments.
It also cannot be known when, if at all, ongeing research will furnish satisfactery answers with respect to the existing data gaps or known technical problems.
DOE itself, in concenting on a report issued by the General Accounting Office in June 1979 on the need for spent fuel storage l
~
(
facilities, said that it was not then possible to develop specific time frames for the final disposal of spent fuel.
(NYAG S? 36.)
The Acerican Nuclear Society says that the timing of waste disposal is a " political cuestion" and that under certain political assunptions--such as " reductions in
- funding, and policy changes"--the date of implementation would be later than is projected by DOE in this proceeding.
(AUS SP,
- p. 3 and in.)
f USGS also recognizes that no date can be esticated.
In its Statement of Position, as in its Preliminary State =ent of Acril 15, 1980, USGS points to all the research that cus still be done in so =any areas, and says it is " unable to estinate when [ waste] dispcsal will be available" because 18.
such crediction "will be imprecise and precature until cany of the key issues identified in tais Statement have been addressed."
(USGS S?
4, 29.)
"From a technical standpcint," adds USGS, estinating a date for waste disposal is impossible because "new and hitherto untried technology" will be needed, and initial failures are therefore likely.
(M. at 5.)
"How much time should be allowed for such contingencies is not clear."
(H. )
Estimating a date is also i=possible, says USGS, because of institutional unknowns.
(H. )
VI.
THERE IS NO 3 ASIS FOR C0!!?IDE!!CE THAT MUCLEAR '4ASTE CAN SE SAFELY STORED FOR THE NECESSARY ?ERIOD.
Long-term storage, for the indefinite period until and if safe disposal becomes available, is no answer.10 It i
cculd be decades, er even centuries or more, b efo re safe disposal is achieved, and there is no basis for confidence that nuclear waste can be safely stored for that period of ti=e.
To the contrary, a report prepared for the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") has said about technicues for storing spent fuel:
"[5]ince operating experience for core than 20 years is not available, a very long-passage o f t i= e (i.e.,
several decades or longer) also may make the fuel assenblies less reliable by weakening the cladding, which means that the current cethods for storing these asse=blies are interic ceasures."
O 10.
Chio has ?cinted out cost, safety, and institutional concerns raised by storace at AFR facilities.
(Chio SP 77 19.
(Appendix to the TVA S? 10.)
Therefore, until it is known when disposal will be available it cannot be said that nuclear waste will be safely stored until that date.
'dhil e storage in this country has not so far resulted in any calamitous accident, NRC records deconstrate that there have been many mishaps already, seme of which led to releases of rad io ac t ivity.
These are discussed at NYAG S?
105-107 and demonstrate the frequency of mechanical failure and human errer at storage facilities.
On at least one occasion, storage of nuclear waste did result in a major release of radioactivity.
An Oak Ridge study concluded that this occurred in the Soviet Union and required the removal of the population free an area of reca 38 to 380 square miles.
(L1 107-108.)
Therefore, the fact that no major accident has yet occurred in the* United States is reason to be thankful, but not reason to be confident that storage will be safe for an indefinite period of time.
VIII.
CO NC T.,US IO N The Co= mission should rule that it does not have co n fid en c e at this tine that nuclear waste will be safely dispesed of by a specific date, and that it also does not have confidence that such waste will be safely stcred until safely disposed of.
Any other conclusion would be based l
on hope er speculation rather than fact, and would be j
unjustified, arbitrary and capricicus.
+
20.
1
l i
Dated:
December 18, 1981 CALIFORflIA EllERGY CCMMISSION By l W~
41mlix/
DIAllGRUE!I5ICH Deputy General Counsel 1111 Houe Avenue Sacramento, California 95825 (916) 920-6257 l
ROBERT BRAMS l
Attorney General of the State of tieu York By
/?MV.h Ef9 A I.
SIALIK 4LC Assistant Attorney General 2 World Trade Center New York, lTev York 10037 (212) 488-7565 I
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