ML20054G018
| ML20054G018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1982 |
| From: | Hand C, Johnston E, Kelley J Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | GUARD |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8206180348 | |
| Download: ML20054G018 (10) | |
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3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA C
JIJN 141982 > O f
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0
otra of the Sett**
W N/
r ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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s r-BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES James L. Kelley, Chairman Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
Mrs. Elizabeth B. Johnson
)
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-361-OL
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50-362-0L SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,
)
.ET_ A(,.
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating
)
Station, Units 2 and 3)
)
June 16, 1982
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Declining to Reopen the Record on the Adequacy of the Siren Warning system)
Our Initial Decision of May 14, 1982 authorizing operating licenses for San Onofre, Units 2 and 3, was accompanied by an Order directing several questions to the parties and to the City of San Clemente about the adequacy of the siren warning system in the plume EPZ. We retained jurisdiction over that matter, pending receipt and evaluation of responses 03 to our questions. We have received responses from all parties and from the City, supported by affidavits, technical data, and other information.
Our analysis of these responses leads us to tnese conclusions:
The Board will not take any further action on this matter.
We leave to the
'820 e 18 0 3c/ g g
2-Staff in the first instance any action that may be required in the light of subsequent events. The present record will fully support a finding of reasonable assurance concerning the siren warning system when buttressed by the Staff confirmation we are requiring -- i.e., that the sirens perform as expected or that, in any areas of deficient performance, specific arrange-ments for alternate means of public notification have been made.* We base these conclusions on the factors described in the following paragraphs.
Submissions of the Applicants and NRC Staff. When the record was closed last October, the sirens were installed but not yet tested.
The submissions of the Applicants and the Staff are in essential agreement and indicate the following facts and circumstances:
e The sirens originally installed and first tested in January 1982 were defective and did not produce adequate warning signals.
e Thirty-nine of the forty sirens were subsequently replaced with sirens from a different manufacturer.
e The new sirens have been tested. The Staff guidance from NRC and FEMA in NUREG-0654 provides that siren systems should emit a signal 10 dB above average daytime ambient background, and that a conservative estimate of anbient background in areas with population below 2000 people per square mile is 50 dB.
The most recent tests show that there is only two small areas in San Clemente that do not meet the NUREG-0654 standards, The Applicants have committed themselves to take special e
compensatory action in the non-complying areas in San Clemente, and, where necessary, in any noncomplying areas outside the City in the EPZ.
Such The underscored language was implicit in the formulation of this license condition in the Initial Decision. We are making it explicit because it now appears likely that there will be some areas of deficient siren performance.
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,A actions will be comparable to those described and approved by tile Board in our Initial Decision (1 G 11),
e Appropriate NRC and FEMA Staff personnel have concluded that (1) the present siren warning system for San Onofre is consistent with. its description in the record and that it meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), the criteria of Part 50, Appendix E, Part 0 3, and the guidance of NUREG-0654.
e In addition, Mr. Nauman of FEMA, an emergency planning expert who testified extensively at the hearing, states that (1) the alternate means of notification approved by the Board are adequate to alert the public should the sirens fail; (2) alternate methods of notification, such as a NOAA radio-type system or cablevision override, would not improve the siren system and have significant disadvantages; (3) the Applicants have
" demonstrated a highly conscientious effort to correct the ' siren deficiencies;" and that (4) " FEMA intends to continue monitoring the notification process for San Onofre... to assure the protect. ion of the health and safety of the public."
San Clemente's Concerns. As we initially read the City of San Clemente's letter of April 26, 1982 to the Commission, we thought that the City was concerned exclusively with the question e A,er the sirens alone would be, in Mayor Mecham's words, "an adeor P si e and warning system."
The thrust of that letter seemed to be that ".he ater; warning system must be multi-channeled" to overcome ambient noise conditions. The other
" channels" suggested by the City for inclusion in their warning capabilities were a "NOAA-type radio system" or a "cablevision overridc system."
e
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'There are three associated but distinct steps in the public alert and instruction phase of emergency planning.
Each of these steps is reflected separately in the NRC planning standards and in the contentions in this case.
First, there is an ongoing public education process in which the public is taught, among other things, that a long siren sound means:
"There is an emergency. Turn on your radio or TV set for specific instructions."
Second, there is the actual notification step in a real emergency.
This involves turning on the sirens, the public (at least most of it) hearing the sirens, realizing there is an emergency of some kind, and going
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to their radios or TVs for further instruction.
Third, there is the instruction phase, in which the public learns from radio or "' that there is a nuclear emergency and that they should take sps fic :ctions under present circumstances.
Bearing these distinct phases of the process in mind, we turn to San Clemente's response to the Order.
In contrast to the apparent thrust of their letter of April 26, they now tell us that Admittedly, the sirens cover the entire community.
If they are turned on, it will result in people knowing that there is an emergency.
However, we ha,e conducted two separate, independent, surveys af ter the siren tests and have detennined that the most serious deficiency in the alert and warning concept is the f act that a significant number of peopia simply do not know what to do once the sirens are set off. We are actively seeking means of increasing that awareness through public education.
L i.
The letter goes on to state that although the Emergency 3roadcast System is l '
supposed to provide effective communications with the public, there are problems with that system, which are briefly listed.
It then suggests that L
e either a NOAA-type radio or cablevision override system would provide needed communications capabilities.
In its response to our Order, San Clemente has shifted the focus of-their concerns away from notification of the public (the second step noted above) to the prior step of public education about emergencies and the subsequent step of instructions to the public (the first and third steps noted above). This Licensing Board no longer has jurisdiction over the issues raised in this case concerning those distinct first and third steps in the public alert and instruction phase of emergency planning for San Onofre. We retained jurisdiction only over the adequacy of the sirens to perform the public notification function, a part of Contention 28. Our findings on the adequacy of the public education program (Contention 2C at pp. 157-169), and of the physical and administrative means for public instruction following a siren warning (another part of Contention 2B at pp.
172-175) are now pending before the Appeal Board.
Any request to reopen the record on those matters at this time should be addressed to the Appeal Board.
l Notwithstanding San Clemente's apparent acknowledgment that the present siren system is basically adequate for its purpose, Major Mecham's letters reflect some concern over the fact that some people will not hear l
the sirens.
It is important to recognize that no warning system can be expected to reach 100 percent of the target population.
As stated in NUREG-0654, This design objective does not, however, constitute a guarantee that early notification can be provided for everyone with 100%
assurance or that the system when tested under actual field conditions will meet the design objective in all cases.
App. 3, at 1.
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. The best of siren systems presumably will fail to reach some people for a variety of reasons, including, for example, unusually high ambient noise levels in some places, individual hearing defects, being asleep, etc.
But we think it reasonable to assume that a carefully engineered siren system will be heard by the great majority of the people in the EPZ and that virtually all those who do not hear the sirens will be warned soon thereafter. Experience indicates that many people would check on their neighbors, particularly if they are hard of hearing or otherwise handicapped.
Police and other emergency personnel could make area surveys or door-to-door checks. Remote areas can be checked by helicopter. And the high level of activity associated with a mass evacuation (if one is ordered) seems bound to have a Strong ripple effect.
Taking these factors into account, there is nothing in the submissions before us indicating that a supplemental warning system is needed in the San Onofre area.
Having found either no authority or no reason to act on San Clemente's concerns, we could elect to proceed no further with this extra-record correspondence from a non-party.
We think it more appropriate, however, to treat San Clemente's correspondence as a late petition to intervene.
Application of the five tests prescribed by rule for late petitions (10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)) requires its rejection. First, the City advances no reason (and we can think of none) why they did not file a timely petition several years ago.
Second, the City's interest can be protected in the future by requests to the Staff for enforcement action if time and subsequent events show a need.
The third test, whether the City's participation would assist in developing a sound record, no longer applies; the record has already been developed and we have found no reason to reopen.
Fourth, the City's l
. interest has been substantially represented to date by GUARD, some of whose members live there.
Fifth, addition of another intervenor party at this stage could delay the proceeding.
GUARD's Request for Further Hearings. GUARD asks us to reopen the record for further hearings on the r'sults of the siren tests and on the need for " additional systems such as NOAA." GUARD's request for hearing stands on a different footing from San Clemente's belated letter.
As an intervenor party in this case from the beginning, GUARD has standing to request reopening for further hearings. However, reopening is within the Board's discretion.
There is "no need to reopen absent a ' showing that the outcome of the proceeding might be affected thereby'" and that reopening woulo involve issues of " major significance."
Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station) 10 NRC 775, 804 (1978), quoting from Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station), 6 NRC 33, 64, n.35 (1977) and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Station), 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973).
We apply these standards to GUARD's asserted justifications for reopening.
GUARD argues that the results of the siren tests should be submitted to the parties for review and for cross-examination at a hearing.
As matters now stand, these results are being analyzed against objective criteria by the NRC Staff.
If significant deficiencies are found, the Staff will require that they be fixed or that adequate interim arrangements be made, arrangements which we have already found to be available.
Althougn the siren adequacy determinations might be the subject of some debate were a hearing convent:d, they are relatively straightforward and I
objective -- e.g., whether a particular siren does or does not produce a 60
. dB sound at a certain distance, Absent special circumstances indicating a particular need, ar opportunity for cross-examination on such determinations is no; necessary.
(Compare our discussion of medical arrangements ai pp. 77-78 of the Initial Decision)
And where, as here, any deficiencies can be readily cured by interim arrangements, there is no realistic possibility that reopening would change the result.
The only new siren evidence GUARD has brought to our attention is certain materials from Mr. Jack Stowe, Manager of the Pendleton Coast Area of the State Department of Parks and Recreation, indicating that siren signals in some beach areas may be inadequate. The Applicants' Exhibit A to their submission indicates that most of the 15 sirens covering the beaches are very close to the waterline, and that they project a 60 dB signal 1000 to 2000 feet out to sea. This conflicting siren evidence indicates that the Staff should take a careful look at these beach areas.
If any areas of inadequate signal exist, they should be marked for coverage by alternate means.
In addition, GUARD complains that "the sirens do not reach the ocean vessels within the EPZ."
As we explained in our Initial Decision, it is not necessary to reach ocean vessels because they "would have relatively sophisticated communications equipment to receive word of the emergency and would, in any event, pass through the possible danger area in a short time."
_Id. at 175, n.62.
GUARD questions the adequacy of the alternative means for alerting the public, noting that our finding on available vehicles and helicopters did not include data on numbers of vehicles and helicopters and estimates on
_g-times of arrival.
GUARD also asserts, apparently as a statement of counsel, that --
The use of helicopters is highly speculative as the noise of the motors would block out normal loud speaker systems. GUARD letter at 2.
As to the last point, Chief Ben Killingsworth, Commander of the Border Division of the California Highway Patrol, which includes all of the EPZ, testified under oath that there are at his disposal CHP helicopters from the Los Angeles area equipped with loudspeakers.
(Tr.8222)
We accept the Killingsworth statement.
As to numbers of vehicler, and distances, we think that particularized data are unnecessary when, as here, the record clearly indicates that potential back-up resources greatly exceed any anticipated needs. We believe, however, that as specific interim or permanent needs for alternate means of notification are identified by the Applicants or the Staff, specific arrangements should be made to meet those needs.
In light of our earlier discussion of various points, we need not discuss GUARD's comments about alternate systems, except in one respect.
GUARD cites as a significant advantage that one does not need to know what station to tune to if one has either a NOAA or a cablevision override system.
We are willing to assume that many people who hear the siren may not know or may forget the EBS station or channel they are supposed to tune to.
However, we are not willing to assume that such people would be suddenly bereft of their common sense or completely helpless. Rather, we believe that they would turn their dials until they got the right station.
In consideration of all the factors cited by GUARD, we conclude that a reopening of this case for further hearings on siren adequacy or related
. issues would not change the results previously reached, would be prejudicial to the Applicants, and is not warranted.
GUARD's request to reopen for further hearings is denied. Mayor Mecham's letter of April 26, 1982 to the Commission and the submissions of the parties in response to our Order of May 14, 1982 are included in the record for the 1imited purpose of showing the bases for the actions we are taking in this Order and not as evidence bearing on any contention in this case.
The jurisdiction previously retained by the Board by our Order of May 14,1982 and as described in our Initial Decision (at pp. 56, 171-172 and 214, nn.32, 61 and 67) is hereby terminated.
The matters discussed herein are now ripe for appellate review.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD U
'w.
Japres L. Kelley, Chairman ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE LQ /Y f
I r
i Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
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ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE p a $1 fa 4
m.
Elizaffeth B. JohnsoV e
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 16th day of June,1982.
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