ML20054F557
| ML20054F557 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1982 |
| From: | Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054F558 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8206170099 | |
| Download: ML20054F557 (3) | |
Text
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GPU Nuclear
- NMCIMF P.O. Box 388 s
Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
June 7, 1982 Mr. Ronald C. Ilaynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Ilaynes:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Repo rt Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-26/03L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-26/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.
Very truly yours,
/%4 Peter'B. Fiedler Vice President & Director Oyster Creek PBF:Ise Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 l
Director (3) l Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 8206170099 820607 PDR ADOCK 05000219 S
PDR GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Pubhc Utilities System s t
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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New' Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-26/03L Report Date June 7, 1982 Occurrence Date May 7,1982 Identification of Occurrence During surveillance testing, the backup valve monitoring channel (thermocouple) for Safety Valve NR28J was found to be inoperable. This condition is permitted by a limiting condition for operation as given in paragraph 3.13.B.2 of the Technical Specifications.
l This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the l
Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.f.i.b.2.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was in steady state of operation.
Ma_ior Plant Parameters:
Power:
Reactor 1276 MWt i
Generator -
419 MWe Mode Switch Position:
RUN l
De scription of Occurrence During the performance of the " Thermocouple Valve Monitoring System Monthly Channel Check" procedure, the thermocouple for Safety Valve NR28J was found to be reading low.
Although the value indicated was within procedural acceptance criteria, all thermocouples were rechecked using a more accurate digital meter.
During this check, it was discovered that the thermocouple for NR28J was open and, therefore, inoperable.
i In accordance with Section 3.13.B.2 of the Technical Specifications, the acoustic monitors (primary indication) for safety valves NR28J, NR28H and NR2 8K were checked. Since the acoustic monitors for all three valves were operable, the limiting condition for operation was met by reducing the setpoint
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of the acoustic monitor on one of the adjacent valves (NR28H).
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Licensee Event Report Page 2
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Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-26/03L Apparent Cause of Occurrence The cause of the occurrence was attributed to a broken lead wire at the the rmocouple. This condition was repaired when the thermocouple was replaced.
Analysis of Occurrence There are two types of instruments installed on the safety and relief valves in order to detect inadvertant valve opening.
The primary indication is an acoustic monitor which senses vibration or pipe movement at the valve discharge. The backup indication is a thermocouple which senses the temperature at the valve discharge.
Per Technical Specifications, the adjacent safety valves must have operable acoustic monitors,if a safety valve thermocouple is declared inoperable.
In this case, the setpoint of one of the adjacent acoustic monitors is reduced, due to the fact that the valves are physics 11y close together so that the acoustic monitor for the adjacent valve detects the opening of the valve next to it.
Since the acoustic monitor for the affected safety valve was operable, appropriate actions were taken per Technical Specifications, and as the thermocouple serves as a backup indication for the acoustic monitor, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.
Corrective Ac tion The immediate corrective action taken was to reduce the setpoint of an adjacent safety valve's acoustic monitor. The thermocouple for NR28J was replaced during the recent outage and was tested satisfactorily. After returning the thermocouple to its operable status, the setpoint of the adjacent valve's acoustic monitor was readjusted to its normal setting.
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