ML20054D624
| ML20054D624 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1982 |
| From: | Swartz E COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 3801N, GL-82-05, GL-82-5, NUDOCS 8204230206 | |
| Download: ML20054D624 (38) | |
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C:mm:nw:cith Edison one First Nationa' Plaza. Chicago, Ilhnois s-Address Reply to: Post Othee Box 767 s
Chicago, lilinois 60690 ag April 5, 1982 w
7 Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director
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<ffC Division of Licensing i
Washington, DC 20555 g3'b '[d U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission g_
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Subject:
Zion Station Units 1 & 2
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3' NUREG 0737 Item II.B.4
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Training Program Outline 4
g NRC Docke t No s. 50-295/304 Reference (a):
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Varga letter to L.
De lGeo rg e dated March 2, 1982.
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
Reference (a) requested that Commonwealth Edison submit, within thirty (30) days, the training program outline or table of contents of the training for mitigating core damage which satisfies NUREG 0737 Item II.B.4 for Zion Station.
In response to this request, we are enclosing the training program outline of the course given at Zion Station.
Please be advised that we will discuss our implementation o f this item in our response to Generic Lette r No. 82-05 due April 16, 1982.
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Please address any further questions that you or your staf f may have concerning this matter to this of fice.
One (1) signed original and thirty-nine (39) copies of this letter with enclosure are being provided for your use.
Very truly yours, n0a +,J b
E. Douglas Swa rtz Nuclea r Licensing Administrato r 1m O
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G. Keppler - Region III Region III Inspecto r - Zion
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ENCLOSURE Zion Station Units 1 and 2 NUREG 0737 Item II.B.4 Training Program Outline for the Mitigating Core Damage Training Course Given at Zion Station.
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WESTINGHOUSE MITIGATING CORE DAMAGE Introduction O
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Tab Topic 1
Introduction 2
Core Cooling Mechanics Potentially Damaging Situations 3
Small Break LOCA's - No High Head Safety Injection Potentially Damaging Situations 4
Loss of Feedwater Induced Loss of Coolant Accidents 5
Vital Process Instrumentation 6
Recognizing Core Damage - Incore Instrumentation 7'
Response of Excore Instrumentation 8
Post-Accident Primary Radiochemistry 9
Radiological Aspects of Core Damage O
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MITIGATING CORE DAMAGE INTRODUCTION h
Topic 3
Objectives 3
Overview l
5 Accident Evaluation 3
Sununary 6
References 7
Self Assessment 8
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TERMINAL OBJECTIVES
' O' The plant operator should understand the key role that he pl gating the consequences of any accident that could lead to cor To fulfill this role, it is imperative that he thoroughly understands l
the principles of accident analysis and the role of plant technica specifications in accident safety studies.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES.
h ld Af ter studying the chapter and other resource material, the stud be able to:
Explain his role to insure plant safety.
1.
Explain the role of technical specifications in accident eval 2.
ident
- 3. ' Explain the initial conditions that effect the severity of the acc and the assumptions made in accident analysis.
Explain the conditions that must exist in an accident situation O
i enable the accident to progress into a pote',tially damaging situ 4.
OVERVIEX To insure that plant operators and supervisory personnel can i
cope with accident situations that can develop into a potenti situation, one must possess a strong foundation of knowledge following areas:
Plant technical specifications.
1.
How potentially damaging situations can develop if multip 2.
or operator errors occur.
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Various core cooling methods and their effectiveness in accident situations.
4.
Plant instrumentation vital to accident diagnostics and its reliability in an adverse environment.
5.
Methods of detecting clad or core damage and impact on personnel safety.
The operator's action during any off-nonnal event depends on proper diagnosis of the event, by evaluating the symptoms and key plant indicators. Accident analysis plays a key role in understanding these symptoms and indicators.
Once the specific event is determined the operator carries out the appropriate f
procedure to mitigate the consequences of the off-normal event. The pro-cedure was written to insure adequate core cooling based on first principles used in accident analysis.
In the event that present plant conditions are beyond those assumed in the accident analysis, the operator must recognize that a potentially damaging situation 'is developing and take the appropriate action to. insure core safety. Thus, the key role of the operator is to thoroughly understand the accidents analyzed in the safety study and to insure the following:
1.
The plant is operating in accordance with plant Technical Specifications and set up to respond properly to the malfunction (off-normal event) as assumed in accident analysis.
2.
The plant is operating within the bounds of the initial conditions assumed in accident analysis.
3.
The plant is responding as designed and if not, understand the actions necessary to assist the plant to insure plant safety.
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MITIGATING CORE DAMAGE Core Cooling Mechanics i
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f CORE COOLING MECHANICS Pm Topic _
3 Objective 3
l Overview 3
Introduction 5
Mechanisms of Heat Transfer 8
Definitions 11 Steady State Heat Conduction 27 Steady State Heat Transfer in a Slab 29 Steady State Heat Transfer in a Cylinder 32 Convection 36 Nucleate Boiling 39 Thermal Limits 42 Hydrogen Generation 47 Natural Circulation 55 Boron Precipitation 58 Non-Condensable Gas Formation
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r HEAT TRANSFER REVIEW Teminal Objectives 1
The plant operators should understand the effects of various parameter changes upon the heat transfer mechanisms occurring within the core. They should also appreciate some of the plant consequences when these mechanisms fail or are unavailable.
Enabling Objectives After studying the chapter and other resource material, the student should be able to:
1.
Describe the fuel temperature and heat flux profile across the. fuel assembly and coolant channel.
2.
Describe how these profiles change under degraded heat transfer conditions and why.
3.
Be able to describe the various mechanisms for hydrogen generation under accident conditions.
4 Be able to discuss the factors which will influence natural circulation, and how the operator can detemine when natural circulation is in progress.
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Overview The purpose of this portion of the Core Mitigating Damage Training Course is to review tiasic conceots of heat transfer, so as to understand the shape of the fuel temperature and heat flux profile. Also reviewed are several important heat transfer phenomena (nucleate boiling and DN8),
and a brief discussion of natural circulation.
Finally, several topics associated with heat transfer under accident conditions (hydrocen ceneration and boron precipitation) are presented.
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POTENTIALLY DAMAGING SITUATIONS O',
S)MLL BREAK LOCA'S - NO HIGli HEAD SAFETY IflJECTION M
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3 Objectives 4
Overview
'7 Description of Loss of Coolant Accidents
- Minimum Safeguards 27 Core Cooling Mechanics - ffatural Circulation 37 Small Break LOCA's - No High Head Injection
- One Inch Cold Leg Breaks 37 41
- Four Inch Cold Leg Breaks 45 ICC Instructions O'
59 Sumary 59 References 60 Self Assessment 61 Tables and Figures I
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3 SMALL BREAK LOCA'S - NO HIGH HEAD INJECTION TERMINAL OBJECTIVES _
The plant operator should understand that a small loss of coolant accident can lead to a potentially damaging situation and to understand the perferred method of depressurizing the coolant system to increase safety infection flow to the core.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES After studying the chapter and other resource material the student should be able to:
1.
Explain the anticipated plant response for various small break loss of
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coolant accident with/without high head safety injection available.
2.
Explain'the perferred methods of re-establishing are cooling on small breaks where the SG plays a vital role as a heat sink.
3.
Explain the methods of initiating core cooling flow on large breaks where SG flow is essential to replace the mass lost from the reactor coolant
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4.
Discuss the basis behind each major step of the Inadequate Core Cooling Instructions for a loss of coolant accident with no high head safety injection.
5.
Discuss various plant conditions.that could potentially lead to the above accident.
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0VERVIEW Accidents which cause a decrease in Reactor C901 ant Inventory can lead to the potentially hazardous conditions of inadequate core cooling due to core uncovering. The following events can result in a decrease in RCS inventory (mass):
1.
Inadvertent opening of a pressurizer safety or relief valve. (vapor space break) 2.
Small break loss of coolant accident caused by small lines carrying primary coolant outside containment.
3.
Primary to secondary leak or SG tube rupture.
4.
A large loss of coolant accident resulting from a spectrum of postulated piping breaks within the RCS pressure boundary.
Only the small and large break loss of coolant accident will be discussed.
If a mass loss occurs from the reactor coolant system, the pressurizer level
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and pressure will decrease. The resultant depressurization will cause a unit trip and safety injection. Safeguards actuation (ECCS) will provide borated water for core cooling adequate shutdown margin.
Emergency Core Cooling following a loss of coolant accident is divided into three phases:
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POTENTIALLY DAMAGING f
SITUATION f
LOSS OF FEEDWATER INDUCED I
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS f
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POTENTIALLY DAMAGING SITUATIONS LOSS OF FEEDWATER - INDUCED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDEN h
Topic 3
Objectives 3
Overview 4
Loss of Feedwater Accident 7
Loss of Feedwater Induced LOCA's 9
Zero Break - Auxiliary Feed Initiation 11
- Bleed and Feed-SI Actuation 13
- Bleed and Feed-Delayed SI Actuation 26
- Feed and Bleed 28 Loss of Feedwater Coincident with Small LOCA O
31 ICC Instructions 40 Sumary 40 References 41 Self Assessment 43 Tables and Figures 2
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LOSS OF FEEDWATER - IllDUCED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDE l
TERMINAL OBJECTIVES _
The plant operator should understand that a loss of all feedwater to the steam generators can lead to a potentially damaging situation and under-stand the preferred methods of re-establishing an adequate heat sink for the reactor.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES _
After studying the chapter and the other resource material, the student should be able to:
Explain the anticipated plant response for such an accident and how if 1.
no operator action is taken this accident will lead 'to eventual core damage Explain the preferred methods of re-establishing the heat sink.
2.
A.
Advantages of Bleed and Feed B.
Advantages of Feed and Bleed C.
Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Explain the expected plant response and minimum time for ope'rator ac 3.
if this event is in coincident with a small break loss of coolant acc Discuss the basis behind each major step of the Inadequate Core Cooling 4.
Instruction for a complete loss of all feedwater.
Be able to discuss various plant conditions that could potentially lead S.
to the above accident.
OVERVIEW In order to prevent the core from becoming severely damaged, it is essential In this light, several that adequate core cooling always be provided.
multiple failure accidents will be discussed that without proper and timely 3
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operator action could develop into an inadequate core cooling situation.
This in turn results in rapid fuel rod heatup and' eventual rod burst with the release of radioactive fission products to the reactor coolant system.
Since the abcve accidents are assumed to involve a breech in t'ie primary pressure boundary, they also present a potential off-site radiation release hazard. The above situations can develop with the plant operating at power due to multiple equipment failures, operator error, or improper plant system lineups. For example, a loss of feedwater accident will be addressed.
The accident will be reviewed to look at expected plant response under boundary or most limiting conditions. The loss of feedwater accident is a heat-up accident which results in an RCS over-pressurization or integrity problem.
However, the entire accident scenario changes complexity if the auxiliary feedwater is not available to service the steam generator to maintain the heat sink or if the primary pressurizer relief valve fails open (small loss of coolant accident).
When the multiple failures occur it'is vital that the operator analyze the accident core cooling method. Since several options might be available during an accident it is crucial that the operator understand core cooling mechanics and the basis behind the operating procedures involving situations that could develop into one of inadequate core cooling.
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WESTINGHOUSE MITIGATNG CORE DAMAGE Vital Process Instrumentation i
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Topic Page 3
Objectives 4
Overview 4
Temperature Measurement i
15 Pressure Measurement 26 Level Measurement 4
i 30 Flow Measurement i
33 Summary References 33 35 I
Self Assessment 36 Tables and Figures i
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Vital Process Instrumentation o
TERMINAL OBJECTIVES f
i The nuclear plant operators shall be able to describe the factors that affectgthe reliability and potential failure of instrumentation associated with critical parameters and describe the probable failure modes and degree of accuracy of critical instrumentation when exposed to an accident
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environment.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES 1.
The student will be able to explain the operation of a thermocouple which will include the following concepts:
a.
Law of Intermediate Metals b.
Law of Intermediate Temperatures The importance of the reference junction and why it is needed.
c.
2.
The student will be able to explain how the plant's thermocouple.
temperature indications will react during an accident condition.
N 3.
The student will be able to understand the operation of a RTO and the RTD bridge circuit used in temperature measurement.
4.
The student will be able to explain why lead compensation is necessary and what, effect an accident environment has on it.
5.
The student will be able to explain how the plant's. RTD temperature instruments will respond in an accident environment and why they react that way.
9 6.
The student will be able to explain how plant pressure is converted to an electrical signal.
7.
The student will be able to explain how the Primary Transducer operates for I
measuring pressure, level and flow in a NSSS.
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The student will be able to describe the operation of a secondary 8.
ff transducer in measuring pressure, level and flow in a NSSS.
The student will be able to describe what happens to the pressure, level 9.
and flow transducers when subjected to an accident environment and how he can expect the indications to react.
The student will also be able to describe alternate methods of determining 10.
plant conditions should the primary method fail.
OVERVIEW Process Instrumentation includes those devices which measure temperature, This instrumentation is composed of pressure, fluid flow, and fluid level.
measuring devices, power supplies, indicators, recorders, alarm actuating devices, controllers, signal conditioning devices and their interconnections, which are necessary for monitoring the operation of the Nuclear Steam Supply In addition, Process provides control signals for normal System (NSSS).
operation of the plant plus initiation of protective functions if the plant approaches unsafe conditions.
1 The performance of the process instrumentation during accident conditions The design plays a vital role in the operator response, to any situation.
of process instrumentation is based on providing indications as required for safety during the cause of an accident, including.ong term stable shutdown, as discussed in references 1 and 2.
The normal response of vital Process Instrumentation and how this response l
is affected by accident conditions is the topic of the following discussion.
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IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION page Topic 3
Objectives 3
Overview 4
Movable In-Core System Hardware Description 6
Ability of Movable Detectors to Sense Ganna Levels 7
Low Level Detector Setup 9
Movable Detector Surveillance in an Accident Condition 12 Thermocouples 17 Lessons Learned from TMI-2 18 Summary 19 References 20 Self Assessment 21 Tables and Figures u
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e Recognizing Core Damage In-Core Instrumentation TERMINAL OBEJCTIVES The nuclear plant operators shall be able to utilize both the in-core movabl detectors and the thermocouples to' analyze various degraded core conditions ENABLING OBJECTIVES After studying the text chapter in conjunction with other specified resource materials, the student shall be able to:
Describe the setup and operation of the in-core movable detector system 1.
for measuring low level gamma fluxes.
Discriminate between the normal low level trace and a trace involving 2.
partial core uncovery.
i Os Utilize the in-core movable detectors to determine significant core damage.
3.
Utilize the thermocouples to determine inadequate core conling.
4.
Take corrected extended thermocouple readings manually.
5.
Determine peaking factors (FaH) with the thermocouples.
6.
OVERVIEW The in-core instrumentation system consisting of movable detectors and core exit thermocouples can be utilized in post-accident situations to perform the following vital functions.
Determine the effectiveness of core cooling by measuring the core 1.
exit temperatures.
3 SS/38038/01618
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An alternate meth:d of deteraining Reactor Vessel water lev 31.
3.
Determining various levels of core degradation.
To understand how the system can accomplish the above, the system operation will be reviewed for normal operations and then expanded to cover the post-accident situation where core damage might have occurred.
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- MITIGATIN G C6RE DAMAGE TRAINING a
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EXCCRE INSTRUMENTATION TO POST ACCIDENT CONDITIONS Page Topic 3
Objectives 4
Overview 6
Normal Response to Reactor Trip 7
Source Range Response During Accident Conditions Core Voiding Effects on Reactor Kinetics 9
11 Non-HomogeneougEffects 17 TMI-2 Excore Respon e s\\
Recriticality Analysis 21 O
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EXCORE INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS p
Terminal Objectives The plant operators should understand the Excore Instrumentation response to post accident conditions. The operator should understand the NIS response due to different thermal hydraulic conditions in the core and the downcomer.
Enabling Objectives t
After studying the chapter with other resource material, the student should be able to:
t 1.
Understand the normal NIS response to post accident conditions.
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Understand the NIS response to different void fractions in the core.
3.
Understand the NIS response to different void fractions (non-homogeneous) in the core and downcomer region.
4.
Understand the effects of core voiding on reactor kinetes.
S.
Understand the factors that affect reactor recriticality and how to use NIS detectors to determine recriticality.
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OVERVIEW The purpose of this portion of the Core Mitigating Damage Training Course is to discuss the effects on excore (outside the reactor vessel) nuclear instrumentation for varying levels of voiding in the core region and also due to the uncovering of all or portions of the reactor core and downcomer regions. The instrumentation considered is the source range instrumentation since this instrumentation monitors core power for the extended time period following any planned or unplanned shutdown. This portion of the course is not concerned with how the accident or shutdown occurred.
Instead it assumes varying core and downcomer conditions and postulates the changes in source range detector (SRD) response due to these conditions.
The possibility of using source range instrumentation to gauge the level of voiding of the core due to bulk boiling or to gauge the degree to which.the
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core is uncovered arose as a result of the TMI-2 incident. Correlation of various plant conditions with the response of the source range instrument led to the tentative conclusion that the actual core water level could be closely' related to the source range count level. The response of source range detectors (SRD) on Westinghouse supplied NSSS has been analyzed and is the subject of this seminar.
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O Topic Page 3
Objective 4
Overview 4
Baseline Data and Assumptions 7
In-core Release Mechanism Rod Burst Effects on Coolant Radiochemistry 8
Mechanism for Extensive Core Damage / Radiochemistry Effects 12 Radiological Hazards of Sampling 16 Sumary 20 References 21 Self-Assessment 22 Tables and Figures 24 4
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e Post-Accident Primary Radiochemistry O
Terminal Objectives The plant operators should understand the effects of a major accident on primary radiochemistry. The operators in turn must appreciate the radiological hazards associated with sampling, and potential hazards associated with coolant spills.
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Enabling Objectives After studying the chapter and other resource material, the student should be able to:
1.
Explain the incore release mechanism of fuel failure and their effects on primary radiochemistry.
2.
Be able to estimate the effects of rod burst on daily 8-y activity.
Similar estimates should also be done for minor amounts of fuel melt.
3.
Be able to discuss the radiological hazards of sampling and how the hazards vary with time.
4.
Understand the consequence of transferring primary water outside the containment following core damage.
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OVERVIEW In this portion of the Mitigating Core Damage Course the changes in primary
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water radiochemistry following a core damage accident are investigated. Also considered in this section are the radiological consequences of drawing, transferring or handling a sample of primary coolant following a core damage accident.
Two levels of core damage are considered in this analysis. The first is an accident in which the fuel rod cladding is cracked or ruptured, referred to as a gap release or rod rapture accident. The second accident condition is one in which partial fuel meltdown occurs due to high core temperatures and catastrophic failure of a portion of the fuel rods following uncovering of parts of the core.
In each case, 10 percent of the fuel rods in the core are considereo damaged.
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DAMAGE TRAINING RADIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CORE DAMAGE A-CCID.ENTS i
8 RADIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CORE DAMAGE Page Topic i
3 Obj ectives 4
Overview 4
Postulated Plant Accident 6
Concentrctions of Fission Products in Containment 11 Affects on Area Monitors 12 f
Contauf nation Levels in Containment O
Estimate of In-Containment Measurement from External Readings 14 15 Effects of Environmental Release 19 Emergency Action Level Guidelines 22 Sumary 22 References 24 Self Asses.snent 28 Tables
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Radiological Aspects of Core Damage O
Terminal Objectives The plant operators should be able to describe the major radiological concerns following a major accident.
Enabling Objectives After studying the text chapter in conjunction with other specified resource materials, the student should be able to:
1.
Estimate the airborne radioactivity inside containment for rod burst and fuel melt situations and the resultant effects on process and area monitors.
2.
Estimate the radiological hazards such as:
a.
Sampling and Venting Hazards b.
Containment Dose Rates due to airborne radionuclides c.
Off-site dose rate release potential hazards.
3.
List and describe the factors tnat affect the off-site dose rates.
4.
Estimate the surface contamination hazards that exist for containment j
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Be able to explain the Emergency Action level Guidelines.
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Be able to estimate potential radiation hazards inside containment based on external readings.
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OVERVIEW In this seminar, the effects of a major accident on the installed Process and Area Radiation Monitors will be discussed. The accident postulated is similar to the accident discussed in the chemistry section of this course. The effect on the monitoring systems of the release of fission product gases and particu-lates are estimated as well as how abnormal monitoring instrument indication may be interpreted. Also discussed is the use of measurements outside the containment to determine conditions inside the containment.
C This analysis assumes that all monitoring instruments for process systems and.
effluents are operating properly following an accident.
It is not concerned with instrument reliability or whether instruments will continue to operate following an accident. Rather, it considers that if the instruments operate, they will respond as noted.
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