ML20054B826
| ML20054B826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1982 |
| From: | Mark Miller Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204190233 | |
| Download: ML20054B826 (32) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I '. m - r.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD gg p, 7 5
,,1 Before Administrative Judges:
Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
)
SERVED APR151982 In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-537 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
)
PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
)
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
)
.)
April 14, 1982 s
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) g g
J' M'C5mg
.t D
anoI A 1962 A ORDER FOLLOWING CONFERENCE WITH PARTIE i
e N
t.
- t N
A conference with counsel was held pursuant to notice in this e proceeding ori April 5-6, 1982 at Bethesda, Maryland.
Counsel l
representing the United States Department of Energy, Project Management Corporation and Tennessee Valley Authority (Applicants), the Staff, Natural Resources Defense Council and Sierra Club (Intervenors), and the State of Tennessee participated in the conference.
1 The Board considered and heard arguments on the Revised Statement of Contentions and Bases filed by the Intervenors on March 5,1982.
l Responses and objections had been filed subsequently' by Applicants and Staff. The Board also considered and ruled upon all motions regarding
' discovery then pending.
g s
/ /
t 8204190233 820414 l
PDR ADOCK 05000537 c
PDR l
_.]
' All parties agreed that the evidentiary hearing commencing August 24, 1982 would concern only LWA-1 issues (Tr. 425,445). The Staff stated that it was on schedule for the June 22 issuance of the environmental update report and for the July 9 issuance of the site suitability safety issues report.
The Staff also stated that since LWA-2 safety matters will not be covered by the site suitability report, there is an improved chance that the document will be issued in late June,1982 (Tr. 246-247).
Applicants and Intervenors agreed that the time for responses to requests for admissions would be the same as the time provided under the regulations regarding replies or answers to interrogatories, namely 14 days, plus one day allowance for expedited delivery of responses (Tr. 66-67).
Admissibility of Contentions The Board determined the admissibility of the Intervenors' proposed contentions, which were set forth in their Revised Statement of Contentions and Bases.
These proposed contentions included contentions as originally admitted in 1976, revised contentions, and new contentions. All Admitted and Renumbered Contentions are set forth I
in Appendix 1, thereto, and they are incorporated herein by reference.
l In considering these contentions at the conference, they were referred O
- to as numbered in the Revised Statement of Contentions and Bases.
They were renumbered if admitted.1/
Contention 1 Contention 1 asserted that the application is illegal because as a matter of law the LWA procedure is inapplicable to first-of-a-kind reactors such as the CRBR.
The Board denied Contention 1.
The Board believes that as a matter of law, the LWA procedures do apply to the CRBR proceeding.
Further, the denial of this contention as a pleading will not prejudice Intervenors because the applicability of LWA regulations can be challenged by proposed conclusions of law after a factual record has been developed at the evidentiary hearing.
The contention as framed presents an ultimate legal question for the Board following the taking of evidence, rather than a factual issue or pleading (Tr. 98).
Contention 2 Contention 2, concerning the envelope of design basis accidents (DBAs) as including the core disruptive accident (CDA), was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 1 (Tr.125).
l Contention 3 t
Contention 3, concerning the adequacy of the analyses of CDAs by Applicants and Staff, was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 2.
The Board overruled objections by Applicants and Staff, holding that language added by the Intervenors to the previously M Disscussion of contentions commences at Tr. 75.
O -
admitted (1976) contention only added to the clarity of the contention and did not expand its scope,(Tr. 135).
Contention 4 Contention 4, alleging that neither Applicants nor Staff has given sufficient attention to CRBR accidents other than the DBAs, was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 3.
The Board overruled objections by Applicants and Staff to the addition of subsection (d), which concerns the factor of human error in accident analysis, finding there was sufficient specificity and nexus to the
" lessons learned from TMI" to be considered by the Board (Tr. 142).
Contention 5 Contention 5, alleging that neither Applicants nor Staff adequately analyze the health and safety consequences of acts of l
sabotage, terrorism or theft directed against the CRBR or supporting f acilities nor adequately analyze preventive programs, was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 4 (Tr. 148).
Contention 6 l
Contention 6, which questions the suitability of the site 1
selected for the CRBR and suggests that an alternative site would be preferable, was admitted as revised to include reference to the Y-12 plant and references to population considerations (Tr.149).
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 5.
The Board overruled objections by i
'the Applicants and Staff to the addition of the reference to the Y-12 plant, fi.nding that the Y-12 plant raises significant concerns involving public health and safety, in the context of alternative sites l
l
5-being preferable. The Board further noted that the inquiry into this Y-12 plant will not be qualitatively different from the inquiry into the other f acilities mentioned in the original contention (Tr.184).
The Board overruled objections by the Applicants and Staff to the addition of references to " population density," " population characteristics" and " population disadvantages" on the grounds that consideration of population f actors was reasonably within the scope of the contention as previously admitted in 1976 (Tr.162).
Contention 9 Contention 9, which alleges that the SER and the FES do not include an adequate analysis of the environme'ntal impact of the fuel cycle associated wth the CRBR, was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 6 (Tr. 210).
Contention 10 Contention 10, which alleges that neither Applicants nor Staff has adequately analyzed alternatives to the CRBR, was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 7.
Subparagraph (a)(5) was renumbered as subparagraph (a)(3); subparagraph (d) was renumbered as subparagraph (b); and subparagraph (g) was renumbered as subparagraph (c) (Tr.
213).
Contention 14 Contention 14, which alleges that neither the unavoidable adverse
, environmental effects nor the costs associated with the decommissioning of the CRBR have been adequately analyzed by Applicants and Staff in l
the NEPA cost / benefit analysis, was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 8 (Tr. 233).
Contention 16 Contention 16, which alleges that neither Applicants nor Staff I
has given adequate attention to the presence of radioactive sediments already present in the Clinch River, was denied because the contention was untimely and the showing necessary for an untimely filing of a new contention was not made. The information necessary to set forth this contention was available to Intervenors in 1977 and the contention could and should have been pleadeel at that time. The rules for filing an untimely contention (10 CFR 2.714) require a showing o' good cause which, in this case, has not been shown (Tr. 271).
In determining whether to admit an untimely contention, the Board must consider the five f actors set forth in 10 CFR 2.714( a)(1).
Good cause for failure to file this contention has not been shown. The ER in 1976 addressed the monitoring of the Clinch River sediments, and for that reason NRDC was put on notice to this issue.
U (i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time'.
l (ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.
(iii') The extent to which the petitioner.'s participation will be expected to assist in developing a sound record.
(iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties.
(v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding.
1
,- The f act that a later document " triggered" NRDC to reexamine the 1976 ER does not suffice to meet the good cause factor.
A f ailure to show good cause for late filing means that the petitioner carries a heavier burden with respect to the other four factors. With respect to factors (ii) and (iii), the Board believes that the requirement that the ER contain a preconstruction radiological monitoring program, a construction radiological monitoring program and an operational radiological monitoring program and the requirement that the cost / benefit analysis in the FES consider the radiological effects of the facility and alternatives weigh against admittance of the contention.
The substance of Intervenors' contention, concern regarding radioactive sediments existing in the Clinch River, will be addressed in these documents.
Although the Intervenors' interest will not be represented by existing parties (factor iv), the Board does not believe this f actor should be given much weight in light of 'the fact that the ER and FES must consider the radioactive sediments in the river.
Finally, with respect to factor (v), admittance of this I
co'ntention would delay the proceeding by adding further areas of l
discovery and litigation to an already tight schedule.
Contention 17 Contention 17, which questions the availability of fuel for the CRBR, was denied as a matter of law.
This contention concerns a policy l
(
l i
0
8-or programmatic issue which, in accordance with the guidelinen set forth by the Commission in its earlier decision, is outside the permissible scope of this proceeding. The contention involves questions of DOE policy and future actions which go wholly beyond the proper issues relevant to this particular plant (Tr. 283-4).
Contention 18 Contention 18, which addresses the adequacy of the Applicants' quality assurance program, was amended to strike the following language appearing at the end of the first paragraph:
"or that such program would protect the public health and safety adequately even if it complies with NRC requirements." The Board' granted the amendment, but denied Interveno's' request to file the contention at this time.
Quality assurance is an important matter that might be pleaded at the construction permit stage, rather than at the LWA stage. The denial of Contention 18 at this time will not bar Intervenors from filing a contention at the construction permit stage which addresses these matters with the specificity, bases and good cause which the Board I
feels is now lacking (Tr. 293).
l Contention 19 Contention 19, which addresses the adequacy of Applicants' plans for coping with emergencies, was admitted by the Board and renumbered E CLI-76-13, 4 NRC 67, 78, 83-6, 92 (1976).
l O Id., at - 89.
. Admitted Contention 9 after the Board struck the following language at the and of the first paragraph:
"or that such plans would protect the public health and safety adequately even if they comply with NRC requirements."
However, the Board determined that this contention was premature for action at the LWA-1 phase, and therefore ordered that discovery and other actions by the parties with respect to this contention be deferred until after the evidentiary hearing and partial initial decision (Tr. 308).
Contention 20 Contention 20, concerning CRBR accidents beyond the design basis, was withdrawn by Intervenors after the Board indicated that the issues raised by Contention 20 are cognizable under previously Admitted (1976)
Contentions 1, 2 and 3 (Tr. 330-331).
Contention 21 Contention 21, challenging the adequacy of Applicants' proposed systen for classifying rnd categorizing postulated DBA's, was withdrawn by Intervenors after the Board indicated that the issues raised by Contention 21 are cognizable under previously Admitted (1976)
Contentions 1, 2, and 3 (Tr. 339).
Contention 22 Contention 22, alleging that neither Applicants nor Staff has demonstrated that the design of the containment reduces offsite doses during accidents to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable, was denied as a matter of law. The Board held that the ALARA
1 i
regulations do not apply to accidents, but only to normal reactor operations.
If at some future time the Commission changes the regulations, Intervenors may then be entitled to raise the question.
The Board is bound by the existing regulations, and ALARA principles do not apply in the manner sought to be established by Intervenors l
(Tr. 341-342).
Contention 23 Contention 23, alleging that neither Applicants nor Staff has demonstrated that the facility will be provided with systems necessary to establish and maintain containment integrity capable of performing l
their functions during and after being exposed to certain specified environmental conditions, was admitted.
It was renumbered Admitted Contention 10.
However, all discovery and other actions relating to l
Contention 10 are deferred until after the LWA-1 evidentiary hearing and partial initial decision (Tr. 344).
Contention 24 Contention 24, alleging that neither Applicants nor Staff has shown that the CRBR can be constructed at the proposed location without
. undue risk 'to the health and safety of the public, was withdrawn by Intervenors after the Board indicated that the substance of Contention 24 is cognizable under Admitted Contention 2 (Tr. 346).
I Contention 8 l
l Contention 8, concerning the health and safety. consequences which l
l may occur if the CRBR merely complies with current NRC standards for j
I radiation protection of the public health, was admitted as modified.
. All parties agreed to a change in the language appearing in the second line of 8(d)(1) from "once in a lifetime organ dose" to "10 CFR 100.11 organ dose." The contention was renumbered Admitted Contention 11 (Tr. 362-363).
Agreements Regarding Discovery All parties agreed to the following schedule for discovery prior to the LWA-1:
All parties will serve their first round of discovery, encompassing all requests relating to old contentions, by April 15, 1982, and will answer these requests by April 30, 1982, the date specified in the Board's Prehearing Order of February 11, 1982 (Tr. 367).
In addition, all responses to discovery filed in.the 1975-1977 period will be updated and served by April 30, 1982 (Tr. 368).
During the second round of discovery running from April 30 to June 18, 1982, the parties will proceed with follow-up discovery on l
questions relating to old contentions, and will conduct initial l
discovery with respect to new contentions.
The discovery relating to new contentions will include naw parts to old contentions, and will l
involve two rounds of discovery -- a first set of questions seeking to plicit basic information and then any follow-up that is necessary (Tr. 368-369).
l
. Intervenors agreed to conduct discovery during the follow-up period on a contention-by-contention basis with respect to Applicants.
Therefore, Applicants will receive all. follow-up questions relating to each contention at the same time.
In addition, Intervenors agreed to try to develop a schedule for the follow-up discovery.
This schedule would not necessarily bind Intervenors, but would set targets to allow the Applicants to plan for responses to discovery (Tr. 370).
Intervenors agreed to provide Staff with all the follow-up discovery requests at once, as Staff preferred.
Staff agreed to answer interrogatories during this period, April 30 to June 18, 1982, on a 14-day turnaround basis.
In addition, Intervenors need not go to the Board in the first instance for permission to conduct discovery on the l
Staff (Tr. 370).
t l
All parties agreed that during the follow-up period, there may be a mix of discovery (Tr. 370). Parties may proceed by deposition rather j
than by interrogatory with respect to all matters, or utilize requests for admissions where such procedure is more efficient (Tr. 370-371).
Finally, all parties reserved the right to object to particular discovery requests on substantive grounds, i.e., they may raise legal I
objections to specific questions but not to this overall approach (Tr. 371).
In addition, Staff reserved its right to object to a request on the grounds appearing in 10 CFR 2.720(h)(2)(ii) -- that the answer is' not necessary to the decision in this case or that the information is obtainable elsewhere.
Staff agreed to give Intervenors l
. 10 days notice if it intends to object or seek a protective order on those grounds (Tr. 380-381).
Motions Applicants' March 29, 1982 Motion For A Protective Order The Board considered and heard arguments on Applicants' Motion for a Protective Order, dated March 29, 1982 with regard to NRDC's (1)
Sixteenth Set of Interrogatories, (2) Ninth Request for Admissions, and
'(3) Fif th Request for Production of Documents, all of which were rerved on March 18.E The Board denied a protective order with 1 respect to the discovery requests for information relating to Applicants' arid E.PA's position with regard to proposed occupational exposure limits. The Board granted NRDC's discovery request subject to the understanding that we will not permit a challenge to the occupational dose limit values set forth in 10 CFR Part 20. This is I
discovery going to certain effects in an accident sequence under 10 CFR. 100.11. To the extent.that the information NRDC seeks is illuminative as -to a proper way to approach the question of exposures,
to actinides, we feel that this discovery is appropriate (Tr. 399-400).
8 E(TheBoard'srulingonobjectionstodiscoveryrequestapplies to Staff as well as to Applicants where Staff has made the same objection as Applicants to a discovery request (Tr. 400-401).
. All discovery requests regarding fuel availability were considered moot because the contention regarding fuel availability, old Contention 17, was not admitted.
Intervenors withdrew voluntarily the following requests for admissions:
11, 13, 14, 20 and 22-24 because they related to old Contention 22, concerning the application of the ALARA principle to accidents, which was denied by the Board.
The Board ordered Intervenors to strike the corresponding requests to the Staff. The Board ruled that Applicants shall answer the remaining requests concerning the ALARA principle because those requests are relevant to Admitted Contention 11(a), which also concerns the ALARA principle (Tr. 410).
Finally, the Board ruled that Interrogatories 4 and 5, appearing at pages 7 and 8 of the Sixteenth Set of Inte.rrogatories, and the request for production of documents at pages 1 and 2 of the Fifth Request for Production of Documents, which relate to Admitted Contention 4, need not be answered.
These interrogatories and requests concern the adequacy of safeguards at DOE, 000 and NRC licensed facilities and are beyond the scope of the purpose for which Contention 4 was admitted -- a NEPA cost / benefit analysis (Tr. 413).
Applicants' April 2, 1982 Motion For A Protective Order a
The Board considered and heard arguments on Applicants' April 2, l
1982 Motion for a Protective Order in regard to NRDC's Seventeenth Set l
l
. of Interrogatories and Request to Produce to the Applicants.
NRDC's Twenty-Third Set of Interrogatories to the Staff contained the corresponding interrogatories to the Staf f.
The Board sustained objections to the series of interrogatories addressed to safeguards in these sets of interrogatories.
It is the Board's belief that this series of interrogatories goes well beyond the scope of permissible discovery with regard to safeguards. Applica'nts shall answer Interrogatories 1 and 19 of their set of interrogatories and Staff shall answer Interrogatories 1 and 20 of their corresponding set of interrogatories.
No objection was raised as to these interrogatories (Tr. 421-423).
Objections To NRDC's Twenty-Second Set Of Interrogatories To The Staff And Motion For A Protective Order Of April 2, 1982 Staff's objections to NRDC's Twenty-Second Set of Interrogatories to the Staff were resolved by the parties.
Those interrogatories which were identical to interrogatories disallowed against the Applicant were disallowed against the Staff (Interrogatories 4(a) through (e) and 5(a) and (b) under old Contention 5, Admitted Contention 4, and Interrogatories 7 and 8 under old Contention 8, Admitted Contention 11) (Tr. 431-432). The Staff withdrew objections to Interrogatories 3, 4, 5 and 9 because they were of the same nature as 7 and 8, which had been resolved by the Board. The Staff withdrew its objections to old Contention 24 based upon the understanding that the substance of Contention 24 was subsumed by Admitted Contention 2.
The Staff withdrew objections to Interrogatories 10-12 based upon its understanding that such interrogatories became appropriate when Contention 8(d) was admitted as Contention 11(d) (Tr. 431-432).
The Staff took a similar approach with respect to old Contention 23, Admitted Contention 10.
The Staff and Intervenors agreed that interrogatories relating to Contention 10 are conceivably relevant to parts of Admitted Contentions 1, 2 and 3 (Tr. 430).
Since the Board deferred discovery with respect to Contention 10 until af ter the LWA-1 evidentiary hearing and partial initial decision, a ruling as to which interrogatories will also be deferred will be delineated by the Board at the conference to be held on Tuesday, April 20, 1982, in Bethesda, Maryland.
Final Matters All parties agreed that Contentions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and ll(a)-(d) were litigable at the LWA-1 stage and that ll(a) be deferred until the CP stage. The Board ruled that Contentions 9 and 10 were deferred for litigation and discovery until after the LWA-1 evidentiary hearing and
~
partial initial decision (Tr. 435-437,440-442). The parties were unable to resolve their differences at this conference as to which matters relating to Contentions 1, 2 and 3 were discoverable at the LWA-1 phase.
The Board and counsel for all parties will reconvene on Tuesday, April 20,, 1982, Bethesda, Maryland for the purpose of ruling upon which matters will be addressed in ongoing discovery relating to i
1 l
. Contentions 1, 2 and 3, and which will be deferred until after the LWA-1 evidentiary hearing and partial initial decision.
The Board advised counsel to file more than two days in advance of the conference all written material which they wish to have considered ~ at the conference (Tr. 465).
If any discrepancies exist between statements made by the Board at the conference and this Order, this Order ' hall be s
controlling.6/
It is so ORDERED.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD b
Marshall E. Miller, Chairman ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 14th day of April, 1982.
l 5 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr. was unable to attend this conference because of teaching commitments at the University of California (Berkeley), but he requested the Board to proceed by a quorum.
Judge Hand studied the Transcript and participated in the preparation of this Order, in which he concurs.
APPENDIX I ADMITTED AND RENUMBERED CONTENTIONS 1.
The envelope of DBAs should include the CDA.
a)
Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated through reliable data that the probability of anticipated transients without scram or other CDA initiators'is sufficiently low to enable CDAs to be excluded from the envelope of DBAs.
b) Neither Applicants nor Staff have established that Applicants' " reliability program" even if implemented is capable of eliminating CDAs as DBAs.
(1)
The methodology described in the PSAR places reliance upon fault tree and event tree analysis.
Applicants have not established that it is possible to obtain sufficient failure mode data pertinent to CRBR systems to validly employ these techniques in predicting the probability of CDAs.
(2) Applicants' projected data base to be used in the reliability program is inadequate.
Applicants have not established that the projected data base encompasses all credible failure n; des and human elements.
(3) Even if all of the data. described in Applicants' projected data base is obtained, Applicants have not establishd that CDAs have a sufficiently low
?
, probability that they may be excluded from the CRBR design bases.
(4)
Applicants have not established that the test program used for their reliability program will be completed prior to Applicants' projected date for completion of construction of the CRBR.
2.
The analyses of CDAs and their consequences by Applicants and Staff are inadequate for purposes of licensing the CRBR, performing the NEPA cost / benefit analysis, or demonstrating that the radiological source tenn for CRBRP would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from any accident l
considered credible, as required by 10 CFR s100.1(a), fn.1.
a)
The radiological source term analysis used in CRBRP site suitability should be derived through a mechanistic an alysi s.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have based the l
radiological source tenn on such an analysis.
I b)
The radiological source term analysis should be based on the assumption that CDAs (f ailure to scram with substantial core disruption) are credible accidents within I
the DBA envelope, should place an upper bound on the 1
explosive potential of a COA, and should then derive a conservative estimate of the fission product release from such an accident.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have performed such an analysis.
l l
- c)
The radiological source tenn analysis has not adequately considered either the release of fission products and core materials, e.g. halogens, iodine and plutonium, or the environmental conditions in the reactor containment building created by the rele'ase of substantial quantities of sodium.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have estad.lished the maximum credible sodium release following a CDA or included the environmental conditions caused by such a sodium l
release as part of the radiological source term pathway analysis.
d)
Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated that the design of the containment is adequate to reduce calculated offsite doses to an acceptable level, i
e)
As set forth in Contention 8(d), neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately calculated the guideline values for radiation doses from postulated CRBRP releases.
f)
Applicants have not established that the computer models (including computer codes) referenced in Applicants' CDA safety analysis reports, including the PSAR, and referenced in the Staff CDA safety l
analyses are valid.
The models and computer codes 1
i
. used in the PSAR and the Staff safety analyses of CDAs and their consequences have not been adequately l
documented, verified or validated by comparison with applicable experimental data.
Applicants' and Staff's safety analyses do not establish that the models accurately represent the physical phenomena and principles which control the response of CRBR to CDAs.
g)
Neither Applicants nor Staff have established that the input data and assumptions for the computer l
models and codes are adequately documented or verified.
h)
Since neither Applicants nor Staff have established that the models, computer codes, input data and assumptions are adequately documented, verified and validated, they have also been unable to establish I
the energetics of a CDA and thus have also not
, established the adequacy of the containment of the source term for post accident radiological analysis.
~
3.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have given sufficient attention to CRBR accidents other than the DBAs for the following reasons:
l l
l l
a)
Neither Applicants nor Staff have done an adequate, comprehensive analysis comparable to the Reactor Safety Study ("Rasmussen Report") that could identify other CRBR accident possibilities of greater frequency or consequence than the accident scenarips analyzed by Applicants and Staff.
b) Neither Applicants' nor Staff's analyses of potential accident initiators, sequences, and events are sufficiently comprehensive to assure that analysis of the DBAs will envelop the entire spectrum of credible accident initiators, sequences, and events.
c) Accidents associated with core meltthrough following loss of core geometry and sodium-concrete interactions have not been adequately analyzed.
d) Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately identified and analyzed the ways in which human error can initiate, exacerbate, or interfere with the mitigation of CRBR accidents.
4.
Neither Applicants nor Staff adequately analyze the health and safety consequences of acts of sabotage, terrorisn or theft directed against the CRBR or supporting facilities nor do they adequately analyze the programs to prevent such acts or disadvantages of any measures to be used to prevent such a t,t s.
6-a) Small quantities of plutonium can be converted into a nuclear bomb or plutonium dispersion device which if used could cause widespread death and destruction, b) Plutonium in an easily usable form will be available in substantial quantities at the CRBR and at supporting fuel cycle facilities.
c) Analyses conducted by the Federal Government of the potential threat from terrorists, saboteurs and thieves demonstrate several credible scenarios which could result in plutonium diversion or releases of radiation (both purposeful and accidental) and against which no adequate safeguards have been proposed by Applicants or Staff.
d) Acts of sabotage or terrorism could be the initiating cause for CDAs or other severe CRBR accidents and the probability of such acts occurring has not been analyzed in predicting the probability of a CDA.
5.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have established that the site selected for the C'RBR provides adequate protection for public health and safety, the environment, national security, and national energy supplies; and an alternative site would be preferable for the following reasons:
a) The site meteorology and population density are less favorable than most sites used for LWRs.
O b
m
-.4,
-+
. (1)
The wind speed and inversion conditions at the Clinch River site are less f avorable than most sites used for light-water reactors.
(2)
The population density of the CRBR site is less f avorable th.an that of several alternative sites.
(3)
Alternative sites with more f avorable meteorology and population characteristics have not been adequately identified and analyzed by Applicants and Staff. The analysis of alternative sites in the ER and the Staff Site Suitability Report gave insufficient weight to the meteorological and population disadvantages of the Clinch River site and did not attempt to identify a site or sites with more favorable characteristics, b)
Since the gaseous diffusion plant, other proposed energy fuel cycle facilities, the Y-12 plant and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory are in close proximity to the site an accident at the CRBR could result in the long term evacuation of those facilities. Long term evacuation of I
those f acilities would result in unacceptable risks to I
the national security and the national energy supply.
l l
I l
6.
The ER and FES do not include an adequate analysis of the environmental impact of the fuel cycle associated with the CRBR for the following reasons:
I a)
The ER and FES estimate the environmental impacts cf the fuel cycle based upon a scale-down of analyses presented in the LMFBR Program Environmental Statement and Supplement for a model LMFBR and fuel cycle. The l
analyses of the environmental impacts of the model LMFBR and fuel cycle in the LMFBR Program Statement and Supplement are based upon a series of f aulty assumptions.
b)
The impacts of the actual fuel cycle associated with CRBR will differ fran the model LMFBR and fuel cycle analyzed in the LMFBR Program Environmental Statement and l
Supplement.
The analysis of fuel cycle impacts must be i
done for the particular circumstances applicable to the CRBR. The analyses of fuel cycle impacts in the ER and FES are inadequate since:
l (1)
The impact of reprocessing of spent fuel and plutonium separation required for the CRBR is not included or is inadequately assessed; l
l
. (2) The impact of transportation of plutonium required for the CRBR is not included, or is inadequately assessed; (3)
The impact of disposal of wastes from the CRBR' spent i
. fuel is not included, or is inadequately assessed; (4) The impact of an act of sabotage, terrorism or theft directed against the plutonitsn in the CRBR fuel cycle, including the plant, is not included or is inadequately assessed, nor is the impact of various measures intended to be used to prevent sabotage, theft or diversion.
7.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately analyzed the alternatives to the CRBR for the following reasons:
a)'
Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately demonstrated that the CRBR as now planned will achieve the objectives established for it in the LMFBR Program Impact Statement l
and Supplement.
(1)
It has not been established how the CRBR will achieve the objectives there listed in a timely l
l fashion.
1 (2)
In order to do this it must be shown that the specific design of the CRBR, particularly core design and engineering safety features, is sufficiently similar to a practical commercial size LMFBR that building and operating the CRBR will l
. demonstrate anything relevant with respect to an economic, reliable and licensable LMFBR.
(3)
The CRBR is not reasonably likely to demonstrate the reliability, maintainability, economic feasibility, technical performance, environmental acceptability or safety of a relevant commercial LMFBR central station electric plant, b)
No adequate analysis has been made by Applicants or Staff to determine whether the informational requirements of the LMFBR program or of a demonstration-scale facility might be substantially better satisfied by alternative design features such as are embodied in certain foreign breeder reactors, c)
Alternative sites with more favorable environmental and safety features were not analyzed adequately and insufficient weight was given to environmental and safety values in site selection.
- (1)
Alternatives which were inadequately analyzed include Hanford Reservation, Idaho Reservation (INEL), Nevada Test Site, the TVA Hartsville and Yellow Creek sites, co-location with an LMFBR fuel reprocessing plant (e.g., the Development Reprocessing Plant), an LMFBR fuel f abricating
~
plant, and underground sites.
_ 11 -
8.
The unavoidable adverse environmental effects associated with the decommissioning of the CRBR have not been adequately analyzed, and the costs (both internalized economic costs and external social costs) associated with the decommissioned CRBR are not adequately assessed in the NEPA benefit-cost balancing of the CRBR.
a)
There is no analysis of decomissioning in the Applicants' Environmental Report; b)
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) related to LWRs prepared by NRC have been inadequate due in part to recently discovered omissions (see below), and the FES for the CRBR is no different; c)
A recent report "Decomissioning Nuclear Reactors" by S. Harwood; May, K.; Resnikoff, M.; Schlenger, B.; and i
Tames, P. (New York Public Interest Resear'ch Group (N.Y.
PIRG), unpublished, January,1976) indicates that (with the exception of the Elk River reactor) the isolation
(
period following decommissioning of power reactors has been based on the time required for Co-60 to decay to safe levels.
Harwood, et al. (p. 2) believe the previous analyses are in error because they have underestimated the significance of radionuclide, Ni-59. The time period
(
for Ni-59 to decay to safe levels is estimated by l
l Harwood, et al. (p. 2) for LWR to be at least 1.5 million l
years. The economic and societal implications of this i
1.5 million year decay period are at present unknown.
l l
l
[
I
_ 12 -
d)
Petitioner believes the NRC must systematically analyze all neutron activation products that may be produced in the proposed CRBR to determine the potential isolation period, following decommissioning, and then provide a comprehensive analysis of the costs (both economic and societal) of decommissioning.
9.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated that Applicants' plans for coping with emergencies are adequate to meet NRC requirements.
a)
The PSAR contains insufficient information regarding Applicants' ability to identify the seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the Emergency Planning Zones, b)
Applicants and Staff have failed to account properly for l
local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the plume exposure pathway l
and ingestion pathway EPZs for the CRBR.
l
. c)
The PSAR contains insufficient analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, nor does it note major ' impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions, d)
The PSAR contains Ir. sufficient information to ensure the compatibility
's iroposed emergency plans for both onsite areas and the Er :s, with f acility design features, site layout, and site location.
e)
The PSAR contains insufficient information concerning the procedures by which protective actions will be carried out, including authorization, notification, and instruction procedures for evacuations, f)
Applicants' proposed emergency plans fail'to take into account the special measures necessary to cope with a CDA, including the need for increased protective, evacuation and monitoring measures, reduced response time and special protective action levels, g)
Applicants and Staff have f ailed to provide adequate assurance that the proposed emergency plans will meet the l
requirements and standards.of 10 CFR 50.47(b).
l 1
i
- 10.
Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated that the facility will be provided with systems necessary to establish and maintain safe cold shutdown and maintain containment integrity that are capable of performing their functions during and after being exposed to the environmental conditions a) associated with postulated accidents, as required by General Design Criterion 4,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A; or b) created by sodium fires or the burning (or local detonation) of hydrogen.
- 11. The health and safety consequences to the public and plant employees which may occur if the CRBR merely complies' with current NRC standards for radiation protection of the public health and safety have not been adequately analyzed by Applicants or Staff.
l l
a)
Neither-Applicants nor Staff have shown that exposures to l
~
the public and plant employees will be as low as I
i l
practicable (reasonably achievable)..
b)
Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately assessed the genetic effects from radiation exposure including genetic effects to the general population from plant employee exposure.
e l
~ '
c)
Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately assessed the induction of cancer from the exposure of plant employees i
and the public.
d)
Guideline values for permissible organ doses used by Applicants and Staff have not been shown to have a valid basis.
(1)
The approach utilized by. Applicants and Staff in establishing 10 CFR 100.11 organ dose equivalent i
limits corresponding to a whole body dose of 25 rems is inappropriate because it f ails to consider important organs, e.g., the liver, and because it f ails to consider new knowledge, e.g.,
I recommendations of the ICRP in Reports 26 and 30.
(2)
Neither Applicants nor Staff have given adequate consideration to the plutonium " hot particle" l
hypothesis advanced by Arthur R. Tamplin and Thomas B. Cochran, or to the Karl Z. Morgan hypothesis l
described in " Suggested Reduction of Permissible Exposure to Plutonium and Other Transuranium Elements," Journal of American Industrial Hygiene (August 1975).
j l
1