ML20054A954
| ML20054A954 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1982 |
| From: | Gregar L, Greger L, Hueter L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054A950 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-254-82-05, 50-254-82-5, 50-265-82-06, 50-265-82-6, NUDOCS 8204160242 | |
| Download: ML20054A954 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000254/1982005
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-254/82-05(DETP); 50-265/82-06(DETP)
Docket Nos. 50-25,4; 50-265
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Quad-Cities Site, Cordova, IL
Inspection Conducted: February 23-26, 1982
Mw
3-29-21
Inspector:
'.
. Hueter
Mg41:_
Approved By:
L. R. Greger, Chief
t3/2 Y /
Facilities Radiation
Protection Section
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 23-26, 1982 (Reports No. 50-254/82-05(DETP);
50-265/82-06(DETP)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of actions taken in
response to post-TNI requirements; radiation protection aspects and appli-
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cation of ALARA principles associated with the Unit 2 temporary repair of
non-isolable piping on the reactor water cleanup system, a leaking Xenon-133
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calibration source; and a radwaste shipment which contained free water.
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The inspection involved 40 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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B204160242 820331
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PDR ADOCK 05000254
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
J. Diereckx, Chemist
- G. Gary, Lead Chemist
- L. Gerner, Assistant Superintendent for Administrative Support
Services
R. Hehler, Engineering Assistant, Chemistry
- J. Heilman, QA/QC
C. Ilen, Tech Staff Engineer
- N.
Kalivianakis, Plant Superintendent
- T. Kovach, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor
R. Moore, Engineering Assistant, Chemistry
S. Reynolds, Technical Staff Engineer
- G. Tietz, Technical Staff Supervisor
W. Wiebenga, Chemist
S. DuPont, NRC Resident Inspector
- N. Chrissotimos, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
General
This inspection, which began about 8:00 a.m. on February 23, 1982, was
conducted to review the status of licensee actions regarding post-TMI
requirements and radiation protection considerations of temporary repair
of pipe cracks on the Unit 2 reactor water cleanup system. Tours were
conducted of various areas of the plant including the turbine building,
reactor building, control room, and the new sampling / analysis facility
for reactor coolant and drywell atmosphere.
3.
Status of NUREG-0737 Items
Preliminary / final status was determined for the following NUREG-0737
items (long-term) initially scheduled for implementation by January 1,
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1982.
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By letter dated December 15, 1981, from CECO to the Director, Division
of Licensing, the licensee identified problem areas which would preclude
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meeting the scheduled January 1, 1982 implementation date for specific
NUREG-0737 items and provided a revised implementation schedule for these
items,
a.
Plant Shielding (Task II.B.2.2.B) Vital Area Access Only
As noted during a previous inspection *, a shielding study concluded
' Inspection Report No. 50-254/81-18
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that access to vital equipment to control and shutdown the plant
could be ensured if the reactor building floor drain sump, the
equipment drain tank, and the HPCI sumps were prevented from
pumping potential high level radioactive liquids to the radwaste
storage and processing area wnen a group II isolation signal
occurs. These modifications and testing of the completed modi-
fications were conducted under Modification Test M-4-1(2)-80-13.
A review of the modification package showed that the HPCI sump
pump discharge reroute from radwaste to the reactor building
floor drain sump was completed and satisfactorily tested on
December 31. 1981. The modification, including logic interlock,
to prevent the reactor building equipment drain tank and the
reactor building floor drain sump pumps from transferring potential
high level radioactive liquid to the radwaste facility during
a group II isolation was completed and satisfacotrily tested
on February 26, 1981.
It appears the licensee has met the intent of long-term NUREG-0737
item II.B.2.2.B for plant shielding for vital area access.
b.
Post-Accident Sampling Capability (Task II.B.3.2.B)
In the previously referenced December 15, 1981 letter, the licensee
requested an extension of the implementation date to April 1, 1982,
for the post-accident sampling and analysis capability. As of this
inspection, the licensee anticipates meeting the April 1 implementa-
tion date.
The licensee's High Rad Sample System (HRSS) will utilize a Century
Sampling System, located in a shielded concrete structure built
near each reactor building, for collecting reactor coolant and
containment atmosphere samples during routine and post-accident
conditions. The system is designed to perform required analyses
within the system and/or provide for dilution of the sample for
safe handling and transport to nearby onsite analytical equipment.
Nearly all equipment is onsite and installed. During this in-
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spection, testing of one unit's system was in progress using
nonradioactive inputs while testing of the other unit was in
preparation.
The reactor coolant sampling system is designed to collect samples
from four sample points:
(1) reactor water recirculation line;
(2) reactor water regenerative-nonregenerative heat exchanger; and
(3) and (4) A and B RHR heat exchangers. The system provides either
an undiluted 15 m1 sample or a 0.024 m1 sample which is diluted
1000 to 1 to yield a diluted 24 mi sample. Further dilution of
the samples can be carried out in the hot lab if necessary. The
system provides for chloride analysis of liquid samples using an
ion chromatograph and for hydrogen analysis of the liquid sample
by stripping the hydrogen from the liquid using argon gas and then
using a gas chromatograph for analysis. Radiological analyses are
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performed using onsite analytical facilities . The system is
designed to limit the maximum integrated dose to 100 mrem to perform
any sampling procedure, even under design basis accident conditions.
The containment atmosphere sampling system is designed to sample
from five locations:
(1) drywell vent; (2) east drywell cooler;
(3) west drywell coolcr; (4) suppression chamber; and (5) standby
gas treatment system. The sample is normally directed to an
Eberline SPING for monitoring particulate, ".odine, and noble gas
activity, but on a gamma detector high alarm, this pathway
isolates. The system then provides for collection of a 5 m1
sample in a shielded container for transport to analytical
equipment.
Provisions exist for both hydrogen and oxygen analyses of con-
tainment atmosphere by the Century Systems. Radiological analyses
are performed using onsite analytical facilities.
Operating procedures for the various components of the High Rad
Sample System (HRSS) were either completed or in rough draft form
at the time of this inspection.
The post-accident sampling system, referred to by the licensee as
the High Rad Sample System (HRSS), is currently scheduled for
completion by April 1, 1982, and will be reviewed further during
a future inspection. This item remains open,
c.
Extended Range Noble Gas Effluent Monitor (Task II.F.1.1.B.2)
The two pathways identified as needing extended range noble gas
effluent monitors are the reactor building vent stack (common
to both units) and the chimney stack (common to both units).
SPING-4 Units, each having three separate noble gas detectors,
are utilized to provide this monitoring. No high range backup
monitors are currently planned for either pathway since NUREG-0737
does not require redundancy, however, the vent stack system design
provides for isolation of the system during accident conditions.
The planned changes to the technical specifications regarding
limiting conditions of operations for these modified effluent
monitoring systems have not been made.
Although the licensee had initially committed to having this system
operable by January 1, 1982, problems with equipment and related
problems resulted in the licensee, by letter dated March 23, 1982,
requesting an extension to July 1, 1982, for the extended range
noble gas effluent monitor.
Problems identified included: a re-
placement detector was not readily available for a defective high
range noble gas detector in one of the two monitors; calibration
of the monitors was incomplete; and the control terminals for
the monitors (located in the reactor control room) were not func-
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tioning properly. When a vendor representative arrived on site
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about two weeks after this inspection, it was determined that
the latter problem was apparently due to use of the wrong type
electrical cable. This problem will require replacement of
several extensive lengths of cable. Proper cable is not readily
available according to licensee personnel.
The extended range noble gas effluent monitor is currently
scheduled for completion by July 1, 1982, and will be reviewed
further during a future inspection. This item remains open.
d.
High Level Iodine and Particulate Effluent Sampling and Analysis
(Task II.F.1.2.B.2)
The high level iodine and particulate effluent pathways identified
are the same as described in Section 3.c for noble gas effluent.
In the previously referenced December 15, 1981 letter, the licensee
requested an extension to the fourth quarter 1982, for implementing
high level iodine and particulate effluent sampling. A Victoreen
accident range particulate and iodine shielded sampling system is
scheduled to be delivered in August 1982 and installed during the
following four months to replace current iodine and particulate
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sampling equipment for the chimney stack. The shielded sampling
system is needed to meet the five-rem exposure limit to personnel
collecting and handling samples during accident conditions. The
presently installed iodine and particulate sampling equipment for
the reactor building vent pathway appears acceptable since the
isolation function on this pathway will preclude large activity
buildup on the sampling media. Modifications to the iodine and
particulate sampling systems for the chimney and reactor building
vent are needed to correct anisokinetic sampling problems identi-
fled in a licensee evaluation. These modifications are planned
to be completed in the same time frame as the Victoreen sampling
system. The analytical equipment for the high level iodine and
particulate samples appears complete.
The high level iodine and particulate effluent sampling and analysis
system is currently scheduled for completion in December 1982, and
will be reviewed further during a future inspection. This remains
an open item,
e.
Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (Task II.F. f.3)
The licensee has installed two General Atomic high range radiation
monitors in drywell sealed penetrations on opposite sides of each
containment.
By letter dated January 22, 1982, from the NRC
Division of Licensing to CECO's Director of Nuclear Licensing,
the licensee was notified that the placement of the containment
high range monitors in drywell sealed penetrations constituted a
deviation to the stated positions of NUREG-0737. This deviation
was accepted provided procedures and correction factors are sub-
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mitted to modify the instrument readings to correspond with the
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actual radiation levels inside containment. The licensee stated
during the inspection that the procedure cnd correction factors
are being prepared for submittal.
Although the four high range monitors have been installed,
" electronically calibrated" throughout the range of the instru-
ment, and " bugged" with a radiation source to demonstrate response
to radiation, they have not been calibrated by the licensee with
a radiation source. The licensee has on order and plans to receive
in April 1982, a calibrator with a large Cs-137 sealed source for
use in source calibration of the four monitors. The frequency of
calibrations had not been established.
The containment high range radiation monitor system remains an
open item pending the licensee's submittal of procedures and
correction factors to modify instrument readings due to placement
of the monitors in drywell sealed penetrations and subject to
proper calibration of the monitors. This item will be reviewed
further during a future inspection.
4.
Temporary Repair of Non-Isolable Reactor Water Cleanup System Piping
T1.e inspector reviewed with the Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor and
with the ALARA Coordinator, the planning, preparation, supervision,
and conduct of activities associated with the Unit 2 Reactor Water
Cleanup System piping repair work to minimize exposure of welders
and other workers involved in the activity. No specific problems
were identified. The activity entailed about 300 man-rem total of
which about one-third was received by welders.
The inspector also reviewed recently compiled data regarding the total
1981 man-rem which was about 2800. Of this total, about 2400 was
related to outage activities during the third and fourth calendar
quarters with 1424 attributed to hanger installation work, 245 attri-
buted to torus work, and 87 attributed to installation work associated
with the High Rad Sample System (HRSS).
5.
Receipt of Leaking Xe-133 Calibration Source
On the evening of February 26, 1982, an approximate five curie gaseous
Xenon-133 source arrived onsite for use in calibrating the extended
range noble gas effluent monitors in conjunction with NUREG-0737
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(Task II.F.1.1.B.2).
The source container, consisting of a metal tube with a glass to metal
seal at one end with approximate dimensions of 1/2 inch diameter and
4 inch length, was designed and fabricated by a licensee contractor.
The xenon was placed in the soutce container, unpressurized, by AECL
in Canada. The source was retained at AECL for seven days before
shipment and checked for evidence of leakage with no reported indi-
cations of leakage. The source was then placed in a five gallon
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styrofoam lined 37A container, the lid " sealed" with a plastic type
tape and closed with a bolted metal ring. The shipper, a competent
foreign authority, provided a certification that the package was a
type A package. The package, reading 2 mR/hr at the surface, was
labelled with a yellow II label and shipped by AECL to Dresden Nuclear
Power Plant via chartered air service to O' Hare where it was picked
up by a CECO truck for delivery to Dresden.
Dresden, deciding not to use the sealed source as initially planned
before shipping it on to Quad-Cities, did not open the container but
did relabel the container with a required yellow III label noting that
the contact reading with the container was about 38 mR/hr as opposed
to the 2 mR/hr shown on the original shipping papers. The source and
new shipping papers were tranferred by CECO truck to Quad-Cities Nuclear
Power Plant where the container was taken to the hot lab for opening.
The survey of the package showed radiation levels of 120 mR/hr at
contact with the package before it was opened. The three occupants in
the room exited when a portal monitor in the room alarmed shortly after
the package was opened.
Surveys in and adjacent to the hot lab were
performed while re-entry was made to place the package in an exhaust
hood in the hot lab.
Surveys at that time and over the next several
days indicated that about one half of the activity escaped from the
source container and was exhausted through the plant ventilation
system. No Technical Specification relase rate limits were approached.
Film badges worn on the bodies of the individuals involved, and a TLD
ring badge worn by the individual who opened the package, all showed
minimal exposure when processed by the vendor.
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Certain aspects of the matter, including disposition of the source,
review of procedures for opening packages, and airborne activity
migration into the hallway adjacent to the hot lab will be reviewed
during a future inspection. (Open Item 254/82-05-01, 265/82-06-01)
6.
Shipment of Cask with Residual Water
By letter dated February 16, 1982, the South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control notified Quad-Cities Nuclear Plant of
receipt, on February 1, 1982, of a Model NL-1/2 shipping cask from
Quad-Cities which contained, in addition to the described irradiated
spent fuel pool metal, approximately 20 gallons of contaminated water.
Quad-Cities procedure, QFP 150-11 " Handling of NL-1/2 Fuel Cask" incor-
porated the cask supplier's recommended procedure for use of compressed
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air to force water out of the cask through a pipe extending from the
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bottom of the cask beneath the liner to the cask lid. The pipe leads
up the inner wall of the cask to a junction box.
A second pipe leads
from the junction box through the cask lid. The lower pipe is designed
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to make a seal with the junction box by use of a ferrule fitting. After
loading the cask, the water was not completely forced from the cask when
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the lower pipe became disconnected from the junction box, apparently due
to a loose ferrule fitting. Neither the licensee's nor the cask supplier's
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procedures specified that the water removal system be checked. To pre-
clude recurrence, the licensee has modified their procedures to include
both an inspection of the drain line integrity and to measure the amount
of water removed from the cask.
The failure to remove the water from the cask before shipment to the
burial site appears to have been due to equipment failure which could
not have been reasonably foreseen by the licensee.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on February 26, 1982. The inspector
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The following
items were discussed:
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Status of certain NUREG-0737 items
a.
Plant shielding for vital area access was acknowledged as being
completed.
(Section 3.a).
b.
Post-accident sampling and analysis of reactor coolant and contain-
ment atmosphere is scheduled for completion by April 1, 1982.
(Section 3.b).
c.
Extended range noble gas effluent monitor not operable due to
identification of increasingly significant problems with equip-
ment and related problems.
Implementation now planned for
July 1, 1982.
(Section 3.c)
d.
High level iodine and particulate effluent sampling and analysis
system is not complete. A Victoreen shielded sampling system which
should limit exposure of sampling and analysis personnel to five
rem during accident conditions should arrive in August and be
installed by December 1982. Modifications to provide isokoenetic
sampling are planned for completion by the same date. (Section 3.d).
c.
Containment high range radiation monitor not functional as required
due to inadequate calibration. A " hold" on the implementation date
is effected by January 22, 1982 letter from the NRC requesting
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additional information from the licensee.
(Section 3.e).
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