ML20053F034
| ML20053F034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1982 |
| From: | Eddleman W AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8206100328 | |
| Download: ML20053F034 (13) | |
Text
.
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g@une 5, 1992 U?!ITED STATES OF A3E ICA NUCLEAR REGUIATC 9 CCMMISSTCH Before the ATCMIC SAFET? Am LICEUFI?'G 30APD
.: o r,. ;
AMZUDI"'.!TS TC C'HTEETICI!S and ADITIONAL CCN TE!!TICUS eF8[
of Wells Eddleman ggNED JUN 091982 I hereby file the following additional contentions and amendments to contentions based on informatien tiich was first available to me 6/2/82 or later at the LPD9 (Olivia Raney Libxrary, Paleigh UC):
Contention 136:
CP&L and UCDIPA have failed thus far to conuly with section 7(d) of the Endangered Suecies Act (and NRC has also failed to conn 17 with said sectien 7(d)) which nrovides that the Federal Agency and/or the nermit or license annlicant(s) shall not :ake any irreversible or irretrievable co-"11tment of resources during the consultation ne"iod, which, in effect, would deny the formulation or innlenentation of reasonable alternatives regarding their actions on any listed Endangered or Threatened species, e.g.
the Bald Ea 1e and 3
the P.ed-cockaded woodpecker, in that site clearing, lake clearing, plant construction and other irreversible activities destroying habitat for said endangered snecies and threatening their ability to use the SENFP site (e.g., eagles are distrubed by ncise and bv human activity near theiv nesting areas, but n85 do crefer nests near water such as the creek CP&L has danned o e n.
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o= the Harris nlant), have proceeded without taking necessary
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measures to nrevent irreve=sible connitnents of resources Ws MU (e.g. clearing, constructicn) which areclude reasonable alter-oo oa M
8e natives such as relocating the clant site or lake, or settine WQ mo.o aside habitat for eagles and woodneckers that would be un-
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disturbed during ccnctruction of SEMPP (including taking anuropriate neacures to erevent noise from reaching such undisturbed areas in amounts that may reasonably be errected to disturbn anxxx bald eagles and red-cockaded woodoeckers or lead then to abandon nests in said undisturbed area or nrevent then fron choosing nesting sites in said area).
Contention 137; Annlicants ' site energency nlan is inadequate because it does not exist, does not crovide
?. cans to guarantee that the nublic and emergency rescanse authorities and personnel will be promotly no tified of any conditions at SHUP? which nay adversely affect the oublic health and safety (including accidental radiological releases and degraded or inocerable saf ety-related cystems ), does not nrov'de adequate radiat' on nonitoring cauability on-site and of'-site (outside the exclusion area) carticularly cressurized icnization detectors or equivalent means to detect lovels of individual rad!.onuclides in real time, does not urovide sufficient nersennel suf"iciently well-brained to ca"ry out such radiation nonitoring on and off-site and to 'nforn energency resnonee nersonnel and the nublic accurately and ranidly enough to assure the *ublic health and safet~ in accident condi tic ns, and does not n rovide managenent or fundinc suf ficient to ensure that the above recuisite canabilities will be continuously naintained throughout the onerating life of the Harris nlants.
Contention 136:
The electric al drawings fer 3E'!??
are not available at the L'DR fer 'nsrection and do not nrev.' de cufficient information to cecurately analyze the circuitry to determine its resnonse under the arnlicable ranges of ncrnal and accident ccnditiens said circuitry nay face.
T Said electrical drawings fail to nrovide suf fic ! en t infornation on the caubbilities and electronic characteristics of all conconents and wiring and connecting materials to nrovide a concrehensive failure modes and efCects analysis of the entire olant electrical systen, narticularly the. emergency cower systen (including diesel generators, nower buses, control logic for the diesel Sene rato"s and for conrection of and interruption of safety-related loads from the regular and energency buses, DC power from batteries and or othe r sources, and all connonents and connections and switches and relavs therefor) and the logic of the 'n.tegrated control system t
and the ' ntegrity of its nower sunnly, to be able to reasonably assure that SEMP3 can be placed in and held in a safe shutdown j
condition fol) owing an accident w' th or widaout loss of offsite cower, narticularly one in which the transformer yard or nower lines leading to SHU?o were to be sabotaged or destroyed by hunan or natural forces (e.g. tallin tornado, high winds, hurricane, hail, earthcuake, benbs, cuttin6. bolts o" other connonents of the rover lines to weaken same, using ex-losives or nrecis! on guided nunitiens (PGMs) against transforme"s,
rower lines, power line towers and o the r s uonorts, buses or other neans of electricity supuly) and in any other j
accident involving Iccs of of fsite ocwer.
The following amendment 's added to content' en 3 on the basis of ITU7"G-083h, which was not found by me in the L'DP. en or before lh May 1082, but which I did no tice in the reference librarian (L. Hickman)'s stack of mate"ial on SEIP? that had been used by someone and was waiting to i
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I *-ra s at the L?DR and went through this stack at least twice befo" e that date but af te" 1h May 1982 and NU3EG-083h was r.c t
'n the stack (on
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Anendnent to conxtention 3:
NUCEG-083h (N9C Licensee Assessnents) daows that CP&L's Brunswick onevatiens c entinued to have "a conbination of characteristics having negative undesirable qualities; disrlaying less than desirable on nerformance.
A facility is characte"ized as bed ng below average if tnere exists evidence of significant administrative, rannageriall or material norlbnes in seve"al activity areas; substantive construction or onerational events (when ccmnared to others);
sienificant itens of noncompliance (when connared to others);
evidenceofreneateditensofnonconnliance;orseveralr@ulatnwy issues and nanagenent contact involving the licensee's nerfonnance.
The licensee nav have had difficulty in its ability
' o meet recuirements inmortant to nuclea" safety.
A substantial t
fraction of the significant activity areas reviewed nav be characta"ad as halou average. "(vr 'O OP3h r,2)
"Sinnly stated, a below average f acili ty disrlars negativa chs"acteristics or undesirable quali ties tha t a re not tinical of a najority of facilities." (p.3)
C?&L's Brunswick overation was rated below ave"9ge for the ne" icd h/1/79 through 3/31/80 (Table 1, "Belew Average Fa cili ti es " ).
This is the year right af ter the conclusien of USC 's "enand he arings on CP&L's nara gement canability (Feb, Mar lo"9 at Raleigh NC) whe"e C &L and NRC Staff testified that C?&L had basically m lved the stagg fring, nanacenent, and renair and safet.* nroblens that had nlagued 3runswick
'.: 1976-78.
This 77C assessment shoss that CP&L's renresentations at that hearing ue~ re at least questionable and probably not in gcod faith and not accurate.
It f.ows N'C 9taff continues to 5e of
- 'en -inda a % ut C'? L 's co-"etenc e
( "C J'? ins" ecto"s
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surveyed for the 1979 renand hearing nostly had "no crinion" on whether CP&L was connetent to onerate Shearon Harris or construct it.
But the Staff witnesses in 1079 we"e nortly 'ron the 5 or 6 I&E personnel who said the felt CP&L was co netent.
See IPC Staff exhibits & testinony in that hearing, esn. the insnectors ' & other staff oninions of CP&L co~netenb9, and the testimony of N9C Staff witnesses Long, Dence, Cantrell, Miner (?s,)
and Hurchy.)
This SALP review in MUFFG-083h is the latest tiRC evaluation of CP&L, and of their operating facilities, the one designed and built for CP&L as a turnkey nlant ('obinson
- 2) is " average" rated, while the plant CP&L was more involved in designing and building (3runsw'ck) is "below average" rated.
Although the Harris contructicn trogran is rated " ave-ace 2, n'C 's connents re 3runswick "everal weaknesses in enerat* ons and reneated failures in quality centrol and cuality assurance.
Cuoting IR*DEG-083h at nage A-7:
"The Brunswick facility displayed evidence of weaknesses in the areas of radiation control, conta&nination control, and environnental protection.
"The inadecuate nana genent control over "adia tirn exnosure and contaninati on resulted in unnonitored and unc6ntrolled "elease or airborne radicactive material.
Manacement control weaknesses X1x also resulted in the inerener release of licensed nate-ial to a sanitary landfill and a local salvage dealer.
3nunswick managenent control weaknesses were charac ter' zed by numerous nonconcliances concerning the cuality asrurance program (sene of wnich were renetitive ), croblems in sunervisorv ovenview ana the cenduct of c ontittee ac tivitier, and instances nf ac tivities c onducted wi thout nrocedures.
The IZ cerformance apu raisal tean found sirnificant weaknesses in areas involving management overview, t raining, and corrective acticns."
(ennhasis added).
Repeat ed roncomn11ances, nanagenent control weaknesses sunerviserv overview weaknes ses, a ctivitie s conducted without pro cedures, and s ignificant weaknesses in
-aneca-art ova"viaw, nrd in cov ect*ve act'ane, ve-e aP #rurd by F.S. Cantrell and other 5 C nersonnel insnect'ng 3runswick 1976-78, as brought out nthe 1979 renand hearings.
. The moint is that 3runswick cont'nues to be badly remand mnaged, even af ter unusual IPC hear'.ngs and extra enforcement actions a'nd nunercus neetings with C?&L nanagement as described in the 1979 remand hearings record.
Sinc e C'&L is evidently unable to s traighten out their Brunswick operati on, there is no assurance whatever that CF&L will have the resources or nersonnel or nanagement abil' ty to safely crernte Earris.
Mangy of CP&L's management personnel at Harris had their nain non-Harris nuclear electric facility exnerience at 3"unswick.
(See listing of vitas of these people at FSAR 1313, etc)
If they were the best peonle at Brunswick, why d'd n't C?&L keen then there to fix the overwhelming nreblens?
And if they weren't anong 3runxswick's best nersonnel, how can they really be well qualified to coerate and const"uct5txx Ear"is any better?
Either way you look at this history, Ct&L nanagement co netence is cuite susoect.
One must also consider that Harris will be added to CF&L's resnonsibilities when 3runswick is not yet V
strai htened out and has no nrosnect,of so being (as noted E
this elsewhere in contention 3) since C &L continues to delay fixing mn jor nroblens su ch as the torus, f'.re nrotect'nn, and earthcuake-resistance cf 3runswick, snreading such wo rk into & e nid-1960s.
'obinson 2 will also be hav' ng stean generators "enlaced in er about 1085, when Earris is seneduled to s tart un, putting additional strain on C?LL mnagement canability.
In sun, the record of IT'TG-C'8% shcus that C?&L centinues t o be of ve"" cuestirnable con"etence, or inco.retent, tc cons truc t ' and saf ely o*e rat e Haris.
Assessnent of The Sys t em t'.cgLicensee 'erformance is centinuing, so more data may arrear.
I would a si-Se lo a=d to enjoin Cof L from attemting to prevent evidence of CP&L e=" ors, failures
. and inen-,atarea in nuclean corstruct'nn erd c awat'.ces from coning to the attention of MDC 's SAL: "eviewers.
I do not believe this amendment filed now will work i
any pnejudice to CP&L or UFC staff in wenlying since both are in nossession of NUoEG-0834 and it states that the results were discussed with CP&L before the recort was issued (n. ii).
The following contention (new) is based on Frank Mi gglia's 5-21-82 letter to J.A. Jones requesting additional info on Harris snecifically at section 3117 (I first obtained this docunent 6-28-82 when I was allowed to onen the LPD9's incoming.t.11 from N90 to see if anything had been received).
Contention 139:
Applicants ' and NoC Staff 3's review of the transient nonulation engaEed in recreational activities j
a t the 3 Evevett Jo" dan Dan !: 'esenvot* end P? Foci?ted wildlife management and o ther recreational areas is inadequate because: (1) only ponulation within 5 niles of SENP' is considered; (2) the evacuation plan for Harris is not adequate to re-ove this neak transietn nonulation in time (at the average SHV"?
site wina speed of over 7 niles per hour, only about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> i
and 25 ninutes is available to evacuate everyone within 10 t
7 miles of Sh7PP in the event of a release.
CP&L's record of unnonitored releases at 3runswick, and their gene = ally slack management of nuclear nlants as detailed in contention 3 (infernation therein incornorated here b7 reference) show that persons engaged in recreation near the riant are ix at risk due to such releases and due to inadeounte evacuat'on clanning, norsonnel and eau'nnent (e.g. warning s7 stems, eiucatie" ce th a "acrer.tirt nonulat*cn R9 to tehnt the si-ars i
_8 nean, etc)
(3) the recreating nc-ulation with'.n 20 ni.les of SE !PF should be taken into account because the severe zzzinx accidents nossibla at Harris (e.g. Class IX accident by neans e.g. of station never f a' lure f ollowed by/or failure of emengency nower, resultinE in failure to SCCAM and ' nab'.11ty to delivery cooling uater and borated water to the reactor, re s ul t *. ng in a meltdown and release to atmosnhere through valves and other nenetrations of containment not clo sed due to nower failure and/or due to sourious electrical signals when tower is failing and centrol logic is exuosed to currents and voltages not normally experienced und whose effects have not been analyzed to shcw the * ' hey carnot cause the control logic of SHUP? to generate sourious control signal.s that would leave containnent nenetrations onen or cause other safety systems (than containnent isolation) to f ail to funct'on in the event of a rower failure as described above) have their effects reach well beyond ten miles of the clant (SH:!?? ).
A#1h0.
An-licants', F'JMA 's, the State of UC 's, and local energency resno se clans are inadequate because *Jdey do not take acccunt of and rrovide fer the cro mn t an d saf e removal of ree eating roculations as described in centention 139 (in-corrorated herein by reference) under conditions cf nuclesr accidents including Jiass IX accidents zsxf.
I Centention y76 on loss of c ntrcl never is herebv anended as follows based on :*iragl' a's C-21-32 letter to Jones and the attached data request:
Add the fellouing to co ntentien 73
'3 ' h a da91gr 9."d anal si s of backun newe" r-'te-s, both diesel generator, other AC, and DC at Harris are inadequate and
-9_
and inadequately tested inadequately analysed {or f ailure modes and effects the-eof, g
- o= 4a14 ab(11 tv unde" acc ident c oni' t urs and 6tha" ennt' ors such as earthquake (design basis o r greater), to"nado, hu*-icane or severe storms, or a loss of offsite electrical nower however caused (e.g. wind breaks a nower line in the co~"idor where CP&L's nower sun"17 lines to Har=is run ta narallel and the whio"ing broken line sho-ts out the othe-s; e.g. sabotage with exolosives at the bases of the towers, o~ using n"ecisien guided munitions, tonnling the tcwens either pay and shorting 4
i out, breaking, or otherwise causing the breake=s on those lines p to assure the health and s afety of the nublic and the j3Qng to onen Requests h30.12 through h30.64 and h30.88
.gg h)^IbbCVl through h30.102 and h30.109 and h30.110 through CGpabd 4' 430.112, h30.113(1)(2)(3)(k) and (5), h30.Ilh W>r,lNfP.
(e.g. fa*1ure inducsed by scurious signal) anc h30.115 through L30.119 of the NRC data request in Miraglia's above-referenced F/21/82 letter are incornorated herein by reference as if fully set out here, the centention i
being that br fail' ng to nrovide all of the =ecuested informat4.cn and/or an'; of it, by f ailing to nrovide adequate analysis includ' ng f ailure ~. odes and effects analysis, by failing M nrovide be ld, '%,j ggg.,.
adecuate testing of com7enents, b7 f ailirg t o adequate 17 ddsign f g;yg av and test circuitry, logic, and sources of el-ctrical nouer Ef/*(
or by failure to adequately and correctly justify dera-tures fren Ir:E standards (e.g. IEEE-270, Ir7E-h50) and '90 requi"enents,
CP&L has failed to a ssure that safety related acuinnent will have adecuate nouer sunn17, correct centrol signals, and assured,zroner operation in the event of a loss of control power or offsite rower to SE_N?? due to any cause including tho s e lis ted a bove, and thus f a
- 1s to adequately cra tect
L
. the public health and safety, i
This above anendment in its entirety is also nade to conten-tion 13h on nage 239 of my contentions sunnlenent of 5/1h/82, as an addition thereto.
Contention #112 (u.222 of contentions sunnienent) 's anended as follows:
Anolicants' analysis of stean g enerator failu e is inade-quate for both single and nultiple tube failures which can be reasonably cexoected to result from such wear and tear as well as c orrosion.
Section 450.h of Frank Miraglia's 5-21-82 data rec.uest fren CP&L is incornorated hereinx by reference as an exanole of the inadequate analysis so far.
as in that request The sane datagshould also be provided assuning -ultirle
/\\
ea*thcuake, or tube failures sinultaneous (due to water hanner or\\ s tean t
hanner or tube whiucing or(e it breaks at a weakened coint> 5 0'~'
0 cm.3 etc. ) or over a ceriod of sene hours or days,.
4 l
A connrehensive analysis of such f ailures has not yet been i
ccnducted nor has the ability of SE"VS, as now designed and bef.ng built, been established to shut doun sa'el arm nrevent release of "adioactivity to at osrhere or rrevent neltdoun in the event of nultiple s tean tube #ailures.
Contentions f 's 20 and 30 are herebr anended to irclude the fellowing :
Release of radiciodines from a fuel handling accident in uhich filters do not funct' on or containnent pene tratf ons fail te clease has 'ceen inadecuately considered.
Such a release noses a great danger to 9.e cublic health and safety.
. Contezntion #3 is hereby anended to add the follouing:
"Setnoint drift as described in ?!7.C data request h30.108 of 3.21.82 to C?&L has been a continuing nroblen at 3runswick and has required nuch a ttention to calibrate and correct
'. natrunents and to nake nrocedures adequate to nrevent serious innairmnent of safety-related equinnent, and safetyx functions.
(?&L has failed to take tinely and adecuate measures to n revent ficoding of equinment o" subne pence thereof at 3runswick also (see 1979 renand hearing, re watertight door alarns, Tr.
) and the"e is ro assurance that CP&L will nerform any better in this natter at Harris.
I believe the above are sinnly amendnents and new contentions e n the basis of information not n revinusly availa ble to ne.
But should the Board consider any of the above contentions or amendments as late contentions, I say that (1) the above infornation was not available to ne as defined in ny contentiers sunnlenent, on or before F-lh-52, and such unavailability is good cause for filing now; (2) with the excention o f the EU"EG-0831; info rnation which o ther netitioners have referred to, no othe" netiti onern a"e rentesenting ny interest in the above contentf ons and anendments; I de not believe :T3C Staff is able to do so el dr.er, as detaf le d in ny contention #106; (3) f ull resolution of the issues decc"ibed in the above amendnents and contentions is necessar-to ievelen a sound record in S:is nroceeding.
The natters involved are very innortant to the nublic health and safety, and to C?&L's conne tence to design, build and onerate SE 0?. (h) I do not believe ny interests are adequately retrosented b~ other narties
.. with rasnect to the odner certentions and anendments above excent to f3, and even there I am not sure that cP&L's failurea with resocet to set,oirt drif t and submergence of safety ecuin-ncnt and other equiument are adeountely recresented by other carties.
It does not annear to ne that the other parties are actively pursuing theseissues or daat N"C staf# uill not allow CP&L to e scane by delay and inadeo.uate analysis and thus avoid really dealing wi th the above issues.
(5) in. vieu of the large number of contentions heretorfore filed bv ne and o thers, the addition of the above does very little to broaden the scone of die croceedings, and where it might, i
innortant issues are involved, e.g. nublic health cnd saf ety, and CP&L's ecmuetence to run a nuclear clant.
In view of the 6-3-82 conference call, I do not believe that filing these anendnents and contentirns new wi'l delay the nroceedinrs at all, since Annlicants and Staff id 11 still have two or three weeks to =esnand to these anendments and further contentions before the resecheduled q3 ecicl prehearing conference, on which I have not yet received the Bo ard 's order, but believe will now occur no earlier than late June 1982. I reserve the right to a gue f ur the r under 10 CFR 2.71h re ad,5 ss'bility 1
hf[ Mg g,~,.,,.
of the above amendnents and co ntentions.
i
' dell s rd dl eman "' ' -
i 5 June 1C82 l
l L
OERTIFICATE OF SF~"/ ICE U
I hereby certify that the foregoing 6/5/82 Amendments to Contentions and Additional Contentions of Wells Eddleman'{'n have been served by first class mailing nostage ureraid tnis date to the following:
48[
Y L-L Secretary and Service Attn Docketing /h01 0.L.
Dockets 50-ko0 USITRC Washington DC 20555 Atomic. Safety and Licensirs 9eard Dockets 50-k00/h01 0?L.
USURC Washington DC 20555 L. Treby and Marjorie Rothschild Counsel for NRC Staff Dockets 50-400/h01 0.L.
USir4C Washington DC 20555 Richard E.
Jones Attn URC Dockets 50-400/h01 0.L.
p.e(V fgQfg (~ fq y,J.,
o 1 Devartment Raleigh NC 27602
, [
,g ol/LD U [g g f'g4'gj George Fox Trowbridge g
ctts & Trowbridge Shaw oit tr an o h,,. fpf {1 (CiN'N. Qs)'C 1800 M St. M*:1 f
Nashington DC 20036
/ilff,MQ*fi f'NV L
This 5th dav of June 1982 b
m violls Endleman 4
t m*
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