ML20053E896

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Response to NUREG-0803,generic SER Re Integrity of BWR Scram Sys Piping
ML20053E896
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 06/04/1982
From: Morisi A
BOSTON EDISON CO.
To: Vassallo D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0803, RTR-NUREG-803 72-160, 82-160, GL-81-34, NUDOCS 8206100188
Download: ML20053E896 (30)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:r ? o 'E BOSTON EDISON COMPANY DE N ERAL OFFICEE 3 00 SOYLETO N STREET j 90 57DN. MastAcNusETTa 0 219 9 A. V. M O R151 MANAGER NUCLEAR OPERATION E SUPPO RT DEPARTMENT June 4,1982 BECo. Ltr. 782-160 Mr. Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 72 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washi ngton, D. C. 20555 License No. DPR-35 Docket No. 50-293 NUREG 0803, Generic SER Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping

Dear Sir:

In response to NRC's Generic Letter 81-34 and in accordance with our letter of January 14, 1982 (BECo. Ltr. #82-9), Boston Edison Company's response to the subject NUREG is submitted herewith. Very truly yours, W/lO Attachments: 1 - BECo Response to NUREG 0803 2 - BECo As-Built Drawings: 1. M-4894 2. M-4895 3. M-4896 4. M-4897 5. M-4898 6. M-4899 0 0 82061001EE O20604 PDR ADOCK 05000293 PDR p

BOSTON EDIS0N COMPANY Response to NUREG 0803, Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping May 25, 1982 O r 0 9 / 1

2 The infonnation below is presented in the same order as discussed in Section 5 of NUREG 0803. I. Piping Integrity A. Seismic & As-Built Requirements Requirement: "The quality assurance of SDV piping should be verified at each plant by providing the results of any as-built inspections and seismic re-analysis of the SDV piping and its supports conducted in accordance with IE Bulletins or othenvise. If such an inspection has not been previously conducted, the responses should provide a schedule for con-ducting an as-built inspection and seismic reanalysis of the SDV piping and its suoports and a program for correcting any deficiencies i denti fied."

Response

Both the FSAR (Section A.3.1 and 12.2.1.2) and the GE CRD Piping Specification specify that the scram discharge volume (SDV) piping is seismically designed. The SDV piping was designed using the rigid range (or span) method as described in Bechtel Topical Report BP-TOP-1. Using this method in lieu of a detailed dynamic analysis, pipe supports are located such that the first fundamental frequency of each piping span (assuming a simply supported beam) is in the rigid range. Pipe stress and pipe support loads are then obtained by applying static equivalent loads corresponding to the acceleration in the rigid range of the response spectrum curves for the applicable floor elevations. The use of this method for the CRD system design was confirmed by Bechtel as part of the IE Bulletin 79-14 work scope. Attached are six as-built drawings of the SDV system which were developed as part of the IE Bulletin 80-17 work scope. Support locations and type are indicated on these drawings; however, no detailed as-built support drawings are included. Stone & Webster is currently under contract to perform the modifica-tions to make the SDV system comply with IE Bulletin 80-17. Part of this work scope is to develop as-built drawings (including supports) and to perform a reanalysis of the system. This will meet the re-quirements of NUREG 0803 and is scheduled for completion by December, 1983. At that time a final repo.*t will be made to the NRC. B. Maintanance Procedure Review Requirement: Provide "... A schedule and program for reviewing and revising, as appropriate, the HCU-SDV maintenance, surveillance, and modifica-tion procedures... "

3

Response

Boston Edison Co. is reviewing all maintenance, surveillance, and modification procedures for the SDV system against the following cri teria: 1. Is this procedure applicable to the concerns of NUREG 0803 (i.e., is there any potential for breaching SDV integrity while rods are withdrawn)? 2. Is there sufficient guidance to the operator to ensure system integrity? 3. Can the procedure be improved to reduce risks to system integrity? The following procedures will be myiewed: PNPS 2.1.1 Startup from Cold Shutdown 2.2.87 Control Rod Drive System 3.M.1-1.3 Preventive Maintenance (Mechanical) 3.M 4-1 Control Rod Drive Removal and Installation 3.M.4-10 Valve Packing 3.M.4-20 Valve Disassembly and Assembly 8.E.3 Control Rod Accumulators 6,wability 8.E.3.1 Control Rod Drive Flow Inst. Calibration 8.I.11 Cold Shutdown Valve Testing 8.7.1.3 Local Leak Rate Test 3.M.2-8 Control Rod Drive Performance 3.M.2-16 Scram Pilot Valve Maintenance 3.M.2-18 CRD Collet Finger Flushing The review and revision of these procedures (where applicable) will be completed by September 30, 1982. C. Inservice Inspection Requirements Requirement: ... licensees and applicants for BWR plants should propose in their responses a program of periodic inservice inspection for the SDV system meeting the requirements for Class 2 piping in the Section XI ASME Code. This revised inservice inspection program should be implemented on a schedule consistent with the requirements of the licensee's inservice inspection program for ASME Section XI Class 2 piping."

Response

PNPS 1 has incorporated the SDV system piping into its inservice inspec-tion program in conformance with the requirements for Class 2 piping of Section XI of the ASME Code. Inspections were started during our 1980 outage, and all requirements for the first inspection interval were completed during our recent refueling outage.

4 II. Mit.igation Capability A. Revision of Emergency Procedures Requirement: " Provide a commitment to implement the required revised emergency procedures in their plant-specific responses by the first refueling outage occurring after January 1,1982." It is recommended that these changes be implemented through the BWR Owners' Group on Emergency Procedures Guidelines.

Response

Per its charter, the BWR Owners' Group cannot respond directly to NRC requests for utility action, except at the discretion of its members. Neither can BECo conmit the Owners' Group to a specific course of action except by its participation in Owners' Group decisions by vote. Thus, BEco can only provide a response to the staff's guidance to the BWR Owners' Group in NUREG 0803 as if it were addressed to BECo directly. However, the BWR Owners' Group has discussed the guidance of NUREG 0803 regarding modification of the Emergency Procedure Guidelines and acknowledges the benefits of treating the subject generically. The BWR Owners' Group is in the process of completing an extension of the Guidelines to include steps for reactivity control, and cer-tain other modifications to the Guidelines which have been discussed with your staff. It is BEco's judgment that completion of these modifications outweighs, in immediate importance, the NUREG 0803 guidance for other Guideline modifications. After current activities on the Guidelines are substantially complete, BECo will support a preliminary study by the BWR Owners' Group to determine the best approach to fulfilling the intent of the guidance provided in NUREG 0803. It is not clear that the best approach will involve modifica-cation of the Guidelines. When that study is complete the Owners' Group will determine whether to authorize specific actions to modify the Emergency Procedure Guidelines. We will then determine what course of action is necessary for PNpS and advise you of our plan. B. Iodine Concentration Limits Requirement: The Standard Technical Specification (STS) limit of 0.2 microcuries per ml of water iodine concentration should be implemented for all operating BWR's unless 1) "it is demonstrated that the probability of requiring operator access to the reactor building is consistent with the staff's quantitative risk assessment (pipe break plus failure to reset scram)" and 2) based on analysis of operating history and current and projected in excess of those allowed by STS is less than 10 goolant activity levels fuel performance, the probability of operating at per reactor year. t

u-5

Response

Boston Edison Company does not plan to implement the STS limit for coolant activity at Pilgrim as recommended by NUREG 0803. This decision is not based on meeting the conditions (1 and 2) specified above but rather on an evaluation of the NRC's basis for the re-quired change. Specifically, the NRC calculations show that activity levels above the STS level could cause violation of 10 CFR 100 limits and could preclude reactor building access after an SDV rupture. This is not the case for PNPS 1. A plant specific analysis conducted for BECo by Entech Engineering, Inc., shows that 1) the current technical specification activity limit (20.0 microcuries of total iodine per ml of water, or 100 times STS) does not result in violation of 10 CFR 100 limits after a rupture of the SDV system, and 2) a concentration of 2.0 micro-curies per ml of water (10 times STS) is low enough to allow reactor building access for the worst case SDV rupture. Therefore, based on this analysis, a technical specification limit reduction to 2.0 microcuries is being proposed. This level will provide the necessary margin of safety for reactor building access while placing no undue restrictions on reactor power operations. This proposed change will be submitted in July,1982. It should be noted that the Entech analysis assumes a plant configura-tion that will exist after modifications required by IE Bulletin 80-17 are completed (i.e., two separate isolation scram discharge instrument volumes. These modifications will be completed by December,1983. Con-tinued operation with the present configuration is based on the following logic which is similar to the NRC reasoning in NUREG 0803 Section 5: 1. Violation of 10 CFR 100 will not occur even with the present configuration. 2. Reactor building access will only be hampered under the worst case SDV rupture. 3. Probability of SDV leak actually occuring during the time period prior to the modifications is low. 4. No SDV piping leaks or breaks have been reported in any operating BWR, III. Environmental Qualification A. Detection Equipment Requirement: " Identify the equipment that would be used to detect a break and/or leak in the SDV system and include the qualification of this equip-ment in the NRC's ongoing EQ program to show that it would perform the identification function."

I 6 . Response: Table 1 provides the qualification information for equipment available for detection of a leak or break in the SDV system. Not all this equipment is qualified to the expected environment; however, it is BECo's contention that sufficient equipment is qualified to these parameters, as shown on Table 1, to perform the intended function and provide reliable indication. This detection equipment includes

1) ECCS and RCIC rooms temperature indications and alarms (TS 2370 &

2372 C&D, TS2371 & 2373 A & B, TS 1360-14 & 1360-16 C & D, and TS 1360 15 & 1360-17A & B) and 2) reactor building exhaust ventilation radiation alarms (Process Radiation Monitors 032A & B). In addition, there are numerous temperature alarms (TE 8125-56, 58, 62, 65, 66, 70, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80 and 83) which, while not qualified in the strict sense, are expected to alarm when their set-point is reached. Since BECo's evaluation of the consequences of this accident adopts the position that recognition and proper corrective action do not occur for 4 hours, it is felt that these indications working together are sufficient to warn the operators of a problem and allow for investigation of the conditions in the reactor building. BECo also contends that it is highly unlikely that the environment created by the rupture will cause failure of all the unqualified equipment and that operators can expect supplementary alarms from the drain sump level alarms, CRD high temperature alarms and area radiation alarms. This coupled with expected routine inspections of the area and the fact that a rupture of this size will be audible from anywhere in the reactor building ensures detection of this condition within four hours of the scram. B. Mitigation Equipment Requirement: Identify the equipment needed to mitigate an unisolable break in the l SDV system and include the qualification of this equipment in the l NRC's ongoing EQ program to show that it would perform the mitigation function, paying particular attention to the following guidelines: 1 1. Qualification of ADS 2. Qualification for water impingement and wetdown by 212 F water. 3. Verification of feedwater and condensate system operation l independent of the reactor building environment. 1 4. Availability of HPCI and RCIC turbines due to high ambient temperature trips.

7 . Response: BECo has evaluated this accident and concludes that the following systems and support systems should be available to ensure adequate mitigation: 1. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) 2. Feedwater & Condensate System 3. Core Spray System 4. Residual Heat-Removal System (for LPCI) 5. Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System and Salt Water Systems 6. Standby Gas Treatment System This system list is based on the Pilgrim 1 FSAR and NED0-24342, "GE Evaluation in Response to NRC Request Regarding BWR Scram System Pipe Breaks", April, 1981,and is consistent with the NRC probability analysis of NUREG 0803. Only equipment required during the first six hours is considered, based on four hours for break detection and two hours for SDV isolation. After that time, the environment is not expected to impact equipment operation. The bases for the systems selected are as follows: 1. ADS is required for plant depressurization, which will reduce the leak rate and allow reactor building access for isolation. 2. The feedwater and condensate system is provided as a backup for plant cooldown and depressurization using the main condenser (assuming MSIV's remain open). 3. Core Spray and the LPCI mode of RHR are required for redundant low pressure core cooling. 4. RBCCW is needed to supply cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers as the ultimate heat sink if the main condenser is not available. 5. Standby Gas Treatment is required to provide cleanup of the reactor building environment created by the rupture. High pressure cooling (HPCI &RCIC) is not considered necessary because

1) the plant must be depressurized to preclude undesirable consequences, and 2) HPCI and RCIC are expected to isolate on high temperature within one hour of the rupture.

Table 2 provides the present. qualification of equipment required for operation of the mitigation systems. Only components located in the reactor building are listed, since equipment outside the reactor building will not be affected. Water impingement and wetdown are considered only for equipment located in the CRD modules area where the SRV's are located. Results of FSAR Amendment 34 flooding calculations based on Pilgrim I conditions show that flooding will not affect any significant equipment.

8 ~ Additionally, majorload centers and distribution equipment were evaluated within the post-accident environment. This evaluation shows this equip-ment should be available for operation in an environment in excess of 2120F and at 100% humidity and to be protected from failure by direct impingement. C. Plant Specific Qualification Requirement: "For any equipment required for identification and/or mitigation that is not qualified for service at 212*F and 100% humidity, provide a schedule for defining the plant-specific SDV break environment and a commitment to qualify the equipment in accordance with the NRC's ongoing EQ program"."

Response

BECo has contracted for Bechtel Power Corporation to model the reactor building and generate pressure and temperature profiles during a SDV rupture. Preliminary results from this analysis show the maximum temperatures to be significantly less than the NRC requirement of 212 F. Additionally, we are participating in work by the BWR Owners' Group to evaluate further the SDV rupture scenario and potentially reduce the need for environment qualifications to meet this transient. Since the above work will not be completed before late September 1982, BECo does not feel any decision on a commitment to environmental qualification under NUREG 0803 can be made before October 15,1982. At that time we will provide an update of our intentions.

laole 1 Qualitication or tquipment Ava11able for DeteC. Pg 1 of 3 EQUIPM NT DESCRIPTION LOCATION UAlpCggtg QUAL COMMENTS = 212o F 100% RH LS 8016 RHR Pump Room A RHR5CSPumpi NQ(1) NQ(1)N0 No flooding of this area is expetb:u Water Level Room A LS 8017 RHR Pump Room B RHR&CS Pump NQ(1) NQ(1:N0 No flooding of this area is expected Water Level Room B TE1001-92A RHR Steam Leak RHR&CS Pump NQ(1) NQ(1 N0 No flooding of this area is expected Detection Room A g TE1001-92b RHR Steam Leak RHR&CS Pump NQ(1) NQ(1; N0 No flooding of this area is expected i Detection Room A TE1001-92F RHR STEAM LEAK RHR&CS Pump NQ(1) NQ(l 'N0 No flooding of this area is expectea Detection i Room B TE1001-92G RHR Steam Leak RHR&CS Pump NQ(1) NQ(1 lN0 No flooding of this area is expected Detection Room A TE1001-92H RHR Steam Leak RHR&CS Pump NQ(1) NQ(1 )N0 No flooding of this area is expecteo Detection Room B LS 8018 HPCI Pump Room HPCI Pump NQ(1) NQ(1 )N0 Level Switch Room TS 2370&2372 Hi Space Temp CRD Modules 305 100% YES Note: Switch monitors temp. In duct C&D Switch Area West fro'm HPCI valve room. TS 2371 & Hi Space Temp RHR&CS Pump 305 100% YES Note: Switch monitors temperature in J37j Switch Room B duct from HPCI Pump room. LS 8019 RCIC Pump Room RCIC Pump NQ (1) NQ(1 )NO Level Switch Room TS 1360-14C&Q RCIC Steam Leak RCIC Piping 305 1001 YES 1360- 16CFp Detection Room TS 1360-15A&B RCIC Steam Leak RCIC Pump 305 1005 YES 1360-17A&B Detection Room TE 8125-56 HPCI Room HPCI Room NQ (1) NQ1 ) NO Reads & Alarms in control room ^ Temp (l') BECO contends environment will not con- +,. n.,

  • o +n railurn nrinr tn alarm.

NOTE: (1) Qualification is not yet proven f

Table 1 (cont.) Pg 2 of 3 l i = Equipment ) Description Location ualifi Comments ht? h g2iogb . Qual Nb Ok. No. TE 8125 - 58 RHR Room A RHR Room NQ (1) NQ(l No Reads & Alarms in Control Room BECo con-Temperature A (12), tends environment will not contribute to 52 41,,rn n r, ne + n alam Reads & Alarms in Control Room BECo con-TE 8125 - 62 RCIC Room RCIC Room No , Temp. (28) tends environment wi l not contribute to l r,41nre nr,nr +n 212rm Reads & hlarms in Control Room BECo con-TE 8125 - 65 CRD Pump Room CRD Pump NQ(1) NQ(l; No Temp. Room (7') tends environment will not contribute to r34 1,, rm nrsnr en alam Reads & Alarms in Control Room BECo con-TE 8125 - 66 RHR Room B RHR Room NQ (1) NQ(1 No Temp. B (7') tends environment will not contribute to failnro nrinr tn alam Reads & Altms in Control Room BECo con-TE 8125 - 70 RCIC PIPING Area RCIC Piping NQ (1) NQ(ll No Temp Room (23') tends environment will not contribute to < > < 1,, r m nrsnr +n 212 m Reads & Alarms in Control Room BECo con-TE 8125 - 72 RHR Piping RHR Piping NQ (1) NQ(I No Area Temp Area 23'el tends environment will not contribute to f241nro nrinr tn alam _ TE 8125 - 74 CRD Area CRD Area NQ (1) NQ(1 ' No Reads & A1 arms in Cgntrol Room BECo con-tends Temp. West (23) railnr, environment will not contribute to o nr,nr en alam Reads & Alarms in Control room BECo con-TE 8125 - 72 CRD Area CRD Area NQ (1) NQ(1 i No Temp. East (23') tends environment will not contribute to <><torm nr,nr +n alarm Reads,& hlarms in Control Room BECo con-TE 8125 - 7E 51' Level Temp Drywell Wall NQ (1) NQ(1 I No Ind North tends environment will not contribute to <>141orm n ,nr +n 212rm TE 8125 - 75 74' Level Temp Drywell Wall NQ (1) NQ(l > No Reads & Alarms in Control Room BECo con-Ind North tends environment will not contribute to vg4,nre nr,nr tn alarm Reads & Alarms in Control Room BECo con-TE 8125 - 80 Fuel Pool Area Fuel Pool Are a NQ(1) NQ(1 ) No Temp 74, el tends environment will not controbute to ,,43m ,,4,, ,3,, Reads &hlarmsinControl'RoomBEcocon-TE 8125 - 8D 91' Level Ind Wes,t Wall NQ (1) NQ ( 1) No tends environment will not contribute to ^" " "'""" Process RAD. Exhaust Ventilation Mnnitors 032 Radiation Monitors See Comments Not Required Yes These monitors are located extsrnal to the A&B Reactor Building 41 AKM Ln fu MMt.A navinsiva MONITOR Rx Bldg 23' Level NQ (1) NQ(1 )No i i l Y

Table 1 (Cont.) p 3 of 3 g i EQUgENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION OVALIFICATION gl. COMMENTS Temp / Humidity LM 1001 R9 41 ARM Ch #10 Area Rad Monitor 23' Level NQ(1) NQ (1) N0 Reactor Bldg, 14 ARM Ch # Area Rad Monitors 117' Level. NQ(1) NQ (1) No 11-14 Rx Bldg. i a i i w e l i 1 5 j i i I 4 9 i 2 I 1 1

TABLE 2 REQUIRED FOR MITIGATION QUALIFICATION OF fQUIPMENT Pg 1 of 6 EQUlPMENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION OUALIFICATION QUAL COMMENTS Temg/ Humidi ty NO-212 F 100% RH OK t ADS SYSTEM SV 203-3A ADS Actuation Valve DRYWELL 347 F 100% YES Will not be affected by s s, l Rupture Environment SV 203-3B ADS Actuation Valve DRYWELL 347 F 100% YES Will not be affected by-Rupture Environment i SV 203-3C ADS Actuation Valve DRYWELL 347 F 100% YES Will not be affected by i Rupture Environment f SV 203-3D ADS Actuation Valve DPYWELL 347 100% YES Will not be affected by Rupture Environment' CORE SPRAY SYSTEM \\s DPIS 1459A&B Rx Vessel CS Line CRD PUMP ROOM 212 F 100% YES Rupture Detection MEZZANINE _\\ M01400-3A CS Pump A suction RHR & CS Pump, 250 F ~ 100% YES Valve Room A M01409-33 CS Pump B Suction RHR & CS Pump 250 F 100% YES Valve Room B s M014pp-4A CS Pump A Test Line RHR & CS Pump 250 F 100% YES Block Valve Room A M01400-4B CS Pump B Test Line RHR & CS Pump 250 F 100% YES Block Valve \\ Room B M01400-24A Injection Block Valven RWCU Hx. Ex. 212 F 100% YES i i Mo1400-25A Loop A & Pump Room M0140@-24R Injection Block Valves Open Area 51' 212 F 100% YES M01400-25A Loop B l.evel West Half P 215 A Core Spray Pump A. RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES Room A I

Tabl e ? (Cont I Po 2 of 6 I EQUIPMENT DESCRIPT10N LOCATION SUAllflCATION QUAL COMMENTS N0. 37J8 / yg{d g OK P 215 B Core Spray Pump B RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES Room B PS263-52A CS & RHR Valve Open Area 51' 212 F 100% YES Open Permissive Level East Hali l PS 1451 A ADS Permissive RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES Room A 1 PS 1451B AM Permissive RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES Room B PS 1464A ADS Permissive RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES Room A PS 1464B Ads Permissive RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES Room B SV1400-51A&B Testable Check Valve Drywell 346 F 100% YES Bypass Vav. l l RHR SYSTEM DPIS1001-79A Low Flow Trip Signal RHR & CS Pumo 212 F 100% YES l to M01001 - 18A Room A SPIS1001-793 Low Flow Trip Signal RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES i to M01001 - 18A Room B 1 LIS263-72 A&C RHR Pump Start OPEN AREA,51' 250 F 98% N0 (LPCI) Le ve.1, Eu t AIF i i LIS263-72 B&D RHR Pump Start OPEN AREA,51' 250 F N0 98% (LPCI) Len/,Werf No rf LITS 263-73A Containment Spray PerriCRD Modules 250 F 100% YES s (Monitoring) Area East

Pg 3 of 6 Table 2 (Cont.) ~, EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION ' QUAllFICATION QUAL. COMMENTS NO. gg [ Hggig 0K LITS 263-73B Containment Spra Perm CRD Modules 250 F 100% YES l (Monitoring Area West YES M01001-7A&C RHR Pump A&C Suct. RHR & CS Pump' 250 F 100% Block Valve Room A YES M01001-7B&D RHR Pump R&D Suct. RHR & CS Pump 250 F 100% Block Valve Room B 1 250 100% YES M01001-16A A RHR H t. Ex. Bypass RHR & CS PUMP Block Valve Room A 250 F 100% YES M01001-16B B RHR H t Ex. Bypass RHR & CS Pump Block Valve Room B 250 F 100% YES M01001-18A RHR Pumps A&C Min. RHR &CS Pump Recirc Block Valve Room A 250 F 100% YES RHR Pumps B&D Min RHR & CS Pump f101091-18B Recirc Block Valve Room B 250 F 100% YES M01001-21 RHR to CHEM WASTE CRD Pump Valve is normaly shut & will fail as is Block Valve Room Mezz. M01001-23A & Containment Spray RWCU H t.Ex 212 F 100% YES 26A Block Valve Pump Room 212 F 100% YES 101001-23B & Containment Spray RCIC Piping 26B Block Valve Room 250 F 100% YES M01001-28A LPCI Flow Control RHR Piping Valve Room 250 F 100% YES M01001-288 LPCI Flow Control RHR/HPCI Pipirg Valve Room M01001-29A~ LPCI Loop A RHR Piping 250 F 100% Block Valve Room M01001-29B LPCI Loop B THR/HPCI Pipins 250 F 100% Block Valve Room f

Table 2 (Cont. ) Pg'4 of 6 EQUlPMENT DESCRIPTION LOCAT10N OUALIFICATION QUAL. COMMENTS [p6Pp/ Huggtygg OK NO. 25G F 100% Yes 8101991-32 Block Valve to CRD PUMP Chemical Waste Room Mezz. 250 F 100% M01991-34A _oop A Torus Coolin9 RHR & CS pump Yes & Spray Block Valve Room A 250 F 100% M01001-34B oop B Torus Cooling RHR & CS Pump Yes & Spray Block Valve Room B 250 F 100% M01001-36A Loop A Torus CoolinS RHR & CS Pump Yes Block Viv Room A M01901-36B , Loop B Torus Spray RHR & CS Pump Yes 250 F 100% _ Block Vallve Room B M01001-37A Loop A Torus Spray RHR & CS Pump Yes 250 F 100% Throttle Valve Room A l101001-37B Loop B Torus Spray RHR & CS Pump Yes 250 F 100% Throttle Valve RoomB RHR & Shtdown Cooling M01991-43AhC Block valves for Pumps RHR & CS Pumr Yes 250 F 100% AAC Room A RHR & Shutdown Cooling 250 F 100% !101001-43B&D Block Valves for Pump ; RHR&CS Pump Yes B&D Room B

Common RHR & Shutdown M019@l-47 cooling downstream RHR Piping Yes 250 F 100%

block Valve Room Common RHR & Shutdown M01991-50 cooling downstream Drywell Yes 329 F 100% block valve Rx Vessel Head Spray ?1019pl-60 Upstream Block Valve Fuelpoolf. 250 F 100% Yes Ex Area 51 1.v. Rx Vessel Head Spray M01991-63 nstream Block Drywell Yes 329 F 100% P 203 A&C RHR PUMPS A & C RHR & Cs Pump 212 F 100% Yes Room A 4

Table 2 (Cont.) Pg 5 'of 6 i QUAL QUAL. COMMENTS EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION }V9%/ FICA.TJ.0Nf q ght#n OK No. ~' P203 B&D RHR Pumps B&D RHR ik CS PUMP 212 F 100% YES Room B PS261-23 A&B Close Shutdown System CRD Pump Room 200 F 100% NO haggpray Is01ation Mezzanine PS263-57. A CS & RHR Valve Open 51' Level NO DATA NO Permissive Open Area East" PS263-52 B CS & RHR Valve Open 51' Level NO DATA NO Permissive Open Area West t PS263-52 A CS & RHR Pump 51' Level No Data NO Permissive Open Area East PS263-52 B CS & RHR Pump 51' Level No Data NO Permissive ) pen Area West PS10@l-89A&C ADS Permissive 74' 3" Level 212 F 100% YES North PS1991-898&D ADS Permissive 51' Level 212 F 100% YES 3 pen Area West PS1001-90A&C CS & RHR Initiation 74 3" Level 212 F 100% YES (Drywell Pressure) North I PS1001-90B&C CS & RHR Initiation 51' Level 212 F 100% YES (Drywell Pressure) Open' Area West l PS1001-93AEC ADS Auto Actuation RHR & CS Pump 212 F 100% YES ] PS1001-104A&C Permissive Room A l PS1001-93B&D ADS Auto Actuation RHR &CS Pump F 212 100% YES PS1001-104B&E Permissive Room B )

Table 2 (Cont.)

  • Pg 6 of 6 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION QUALIFICAT!0N QUAL COMMENTS Temp / N umidi ty OK NO' 2120 F Innt pH RBCCW M0 4060 A&B A'RHR Ht. Ex.

RHR & CS Pump 250 F 100% YES Isolation Valves Room A M0 4010 A&B B RHR Ht. Ex RHR & CS Pump 250 F 100% YES Isolation Valves Room B M0-4065 Fuel Pool Ht. Ex 74' 3" Level NQ (1) NQ (1) NO Need to insure isolation to provide flow to i Isolation Vlv, RdR H t Ex, i STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM I SVL 55 & 56 CRD Maintence Room 51' Level 346 F 100% YES Vent Isolation Open Area West SVL 57 Reactor Builaing RCIC Piping 346 F 100% YES Containment Exhaust Room Tn enTs SVL 58 SGTS Filter A RCIC Piping 346 F 100% YES Inlet Room SVL 60 REFUELING Area to RCIC Piping 346 F 100% YES SGTS ISOLATION Room SVL 62 SGTS Filter B

RCIC Piping 346 F 100%

YES Inlet Room SVL 79 Reactor Building C1. RCIC Pipidg 346 F 100% YES 1 Up Exhaust to SGTS Room Il G

y e i 1 e-r==. N i N N i W w w N 2 3 l 3 l l 1 I g i s e p- ---1] i i 1 u ij { $,]. '1 (,' i L-v t c i.

f EF r

s :- It ,I; I >k I is I t.; ) 6 U e' i i. a p j .1 l1 I g l Yf I. fm x't f i [ s -mq' j w s i 'q 3: m i i i, i ,<r I _d l* ,l a 7:' l 2 ~., f ;,~ w;;4 9 i !r e 1 Y f ? ?

  1. it hi l

s s s a s i g ...y{ l l ${ 4

}

p L..__.. sv l g i .a; p _y-_4 ? 1__ m i .l p__m.___ i e L ..p- ,l 'I bi 'l 'i,l l l il (lli h l i hm g j c ' ~. ' l i \\ l i i/. l 4 s :d l . /. '\\ l .) r . ; C.3 ' E -- i I 'k / i ?* (1 4- ~N ?< [j

f. '

\\ l i l ~ i )'/ ll \\ ] i n f N j p ,s g j i (i. t 'g b !! j' W l V + l e . E, l I O

M

/>(I 4 i / e a i i i (k g/c i 4 l l y xi. i i i i / ( \\' i i i i i T 3 i E r r g / !,; I ,e 9 i i l i ( l I i g i n I .b h I l6 i 111 m til. 1 t l u .: i o 'l s !.l L 1: 9 l1 l

l L

=

== l '= = ! ?,- l

.4 l

t . t!. i ! p 'S. + u r l l

7.,.

i D J

y 11 _t .y_ l ,e [ g;u .].' l -r i l j i p i ' -l 8 7 t -g i ~, g..- a i l Sv c.d '. 8 j ,y 3-3 i 9 :- a. l' i

e 4

~ ' i.t O I

r. t*/i,

,2' v i e; ,-}> l-l .J g i .a :a: .p n_.;; C:3 i ,1 r * /, t - o t+ r. [ j Ii ,r - l m ll '( 1 !b i u. . m .y\\/. yr-ttt'af x l / ';. :,',' 3, ^ : j:y...it.._ L.. o l i.: \\ I, .':f{ k, ' 4 .l ,j ' '*/ '~ s ( l .. ~

  • /; /

.i, k? :a.e,\\. e, g . :,, n' l. i r .c...-,a l /:. ~,, - ,e .., - r\\ s j ,ff

  • ll '

k* l i

  • 'j v r

? n 'e e*,\\ ./. /.,, = e ,4 \\ :3., / ,f + y ) ,A ,,,, j . <a .*f s s t \\ t 3..J 3 1,L s

5. % ' * -

b /i; \\ i }I f,s L,* r>8.- I .p r s ,.s > ~. //3. k,yy'\\ t, /,' \\ t t g.. d' r8 '"F.), \\M, s\\ if 2' / j's'[ gi rj . Q' \\ <t, ,sp ' i _\\-- , /. >1, s ,,, \\s p. s. \\, J '; ' \\; '? / ,v t g [c'y s .e s . \\ 4 / / / \\ Y .h \\ '/ / f (- t s .'y

  • e. \\

, 'y., }' i t' s b s-A \\.- y \\ .gv J %f l ~.'O \\* c-1 4.T ,-a. s s. s i ss A.y, y ( j, r i [ j ~,9;; 'p 8 s i A./; '[ P /, g I \\ l l 1- / a .i t lk [' I m] I" 'i. as P t i 2 li. /- l .n f-dM l.;*r } l '.p I

m y bl.

x, d;l*f]il F-j o L + .,,v U C O as U g{ l r m ,~ = >3 8 ao m ,g E..

  • t l

i T., 4 4 i l 1 l 7

0 g E N. M N m W j ~ i y u l { ' p-l a 8 8 1 l 4 m d ef $ il 7, 3 .. _L dit .,'s 1,g 1+ i . t l-7. t {- M..; c i = g q d,z l

c. 3

&j& I e .I rj g r, p = l.?. 'S,- ?,Akt ? l O Q p._ I e l.. c: a 1_ 4_44+-- n r;a z ,c $H+-t - T 1

-:11:.;r i

j L,. r~: [f. c? 1 m i .e /. e2\\ l .a ,s, a.. / /. .\\ 'f / AN,\\ 'N - .) 'L 4 - "+- ,.7 .g. / x 1 J,/ I lI-l l 7 g,4 [ \\ '\\j)a! l j g, . i ,o y

  1. M f.l

.'/i l/ ' S s' '/ l 't j ./'\\ Kro j

l.

-[ k,, / \\ y~ d ..l a. u r 5 g q ,.. = >, ' ' \\.= v '(.,. \\\\ ,a / // ,s i. +; 3 \\' V. / Q /y! m(f-) 1 s e g/ z o s en i ...l ie N k,, ' J [,' . < e( . %i* ,f . ' %! \\' 7 yh. ./ 's j ./ f ' l \\.)i ,/,% y < 4. s .i f s A ' \\.,, ' ' i. khI 'I j/ ./ ) 1 ' 1, .,'ei* ,[f.t >,[,... ' 40 . \\ N s\\ g> x g, j/. t; .i o .s .,/

  • k' y

r j . \\,' ) lY' x'$ f..f,f. ' l,t l 1 y m. .f,, l l l \\ f.*

  • / ' /

i s ?,/{:f' , l ( ) I l \\ / 1 b c. \\ t, .N. 3. l n i hli l l l!l.: . j. = t l I' l [l. j ' j,$a$i [dj. 11 .i il i i r _ L___ ( . ;,. j r .!:J. .i l i 0,i i e, m t ..1 ~ s,n g *; Onr.

id,.-

u, l = ~ l i I

.l i I

...... I .y

Ml p, l l ~ ~ d. '. ! /l j l 7 l e u p. m r-t-l ge i, j 1 i l,' q I .g '3,,, 4 j fy { ll O]. .b.. I -? t r- + m,- m q g i.3 n, d' - '5 7 mC l{ e b _p l 'I :> a c.h

u l

p; i ;, i i i.a :z: f-,r)- 7 [ Q '} 8 i $ $ 1 l u. t 1 J n f.,,,== i 1 - : {. .,t ' ',j /f; l[: ] f i t.,,;3 i r -. i

,. /

%-.- y l l'i M ./ / ! .i l.s ' ,I. as,,./ l,. r J'. 7 g N b4 1! \\ / .,,,,4)e l,. i. t - n i s - L '1r. . I(. 4 --p.--- {:l 3., C. .) y z Q g .g h.( t " A 2~ ' h % jkh ; W b i-k, A., N i[ .i p / ,e,e-, } &. l 'l i4'. i, .3* ./ ' / 3.sg ;. lj i i .g 'J l .p* l Q.,, *; s - ,s ;3 - ') ' 1 l l

l

'q. I j.'/; N '- 4 (\\ ,q' 3 P:nT:: t c-np3 -S l ~ ! - 3 s c. '), l s 1q i I (. 1 l ,l ' 1 8 i g } !) p {;j t ) e [ g I + v r. + i c t 1 h : i a; .a h i .v n. -l. I t l .i 1 m O l. l l s, ti

  • I L.

t

* (.,-
  • l 5

i + t g ,,7 L = 6g ~ 'd i ', i ~ .I a i; 'i J, i ll l [I. g3 e - p*- u / .,,, ' - k't O i. .!!ll nl = +m-7 i m ll 1 >! i ! 5 7 I f. ,l L o i i, ,p $. I 5 6' t e.,I' .g fj s

[.D

} j, ? i 2 l sg3 s -.s, j ,\\ e i.J , *d. t -i i U-

e. h W 4 si l-ji

~ p 'rN p/ .- -E -.n -,M,J . o e-i 4 d. / /.g ' {tj h h {' N y ii s i {4 E i c !; L, i t , j. e

(.'It

.[ h,; i' 4,( ,3 -[ l* i i .L ., 7. l .,di f l i ~

  • g l

li y1

l,'

,e t

. 4.-
n 1. i.

,q. t i I: 2 i. ~ lt {'i ; Ah I i 4 El I ~ Qri z ,l t.ef k.N / _g$y.r);-g i .i y n g

1.,

i .dN: I i.,.-,,'.. lll%'37h l ,A. s W i C..Y.. i T+ M a m

,. p i

2 l ,l ~- i. u, h = ens 4 - it -a. ' t N u,p.N-9

a... pt

~ s..n, .y s r~ q, t. 4 m Wr ,1 te! m.n .}'

  1. (
  • J 4! >V

^

4. ? t

) r i t.1 - T r-t. A+g4 L ...n. ! ?_lE J U l' CI r'? .g. l .l t t i f < *' ~. f

a y =' 's ri e 4 r g j' f k l pl M > s.;__ ! ..14 g a e 'th 'l ~ l a c l z i , n t% \\ 3 0 m ? r l 4* 4 e 1. 4 ai

n

/ a,, 11 lh i g ij ss , r/ g/\\ i \\\\ ,? lxj h \\ ' i; i l ,.~ d ~ .i ' ' ~ slqV', 3..e'f;r s 4 a 5 1 l s p 'g i/ i ,,s, I i 'f ) m /> ! 1 l el %g !=, O r 5 I i y; +l t a g y : l' I 5 . r. . ;I l

  • t,..

E i i , }3 E i s j l eb, lr: u e rm i r d

s c-i s

>+:1 I___ [- 5; 7

t x

3 r l -] p S( 'l ; 4 l JI .a 1 :2l: ./ fj L t: a --j C h M 'l i, f: A .. t 3 i.: p l;. + M'~,l ) M 4 i ( :f? a i i l lj' 'h) ' 'l 1.' I ll , bl-l i 'l l l in z 6 [.!!, : ..r, s; il i p i 'jii e M er $ J.h l f,k l o,Mv. i w + x i i, j e ,,r- " Si ^**4 fI .' [ i l-~ f \\ .'s .'n. a i. i '; i, ],"f,m i ;- 'f 3 y j l t'.

6. \\'[ /.$q

-{, 'W v a y ) 1 4 4a l' i bsGl s T \\ t i !s i { i ., e s\\i g - g i .A l n a s ! y 'i M E 2 h 4 I .L . \\w, . 1 n3 , n, r 1 t a l a j t-3 j i ' I !! l' i e '8 e l-2 i s w i , e l 1. }; ' m.. f. l i - y:; ' .l jg-p y . ($ F-. j;. t Z , 4; e.1b g I l i -[Y,j j . I }"(. 6 l 'r. l = l z 4* T j ).. a ,.i n 4 %L .f l,

(

j - r~ o 0I -) ai j s ) U O ~ [ { '_. 'j($ %p y Ji -}N~i 6 y e e~ 'n T s s l s s '.t7 i Iq W: (L ) g i.- g 4 '.... Ot,0 i l -l't- [l

I #

i I A E JL .... ' l ' i -i ..s... '"Nf ETi 3

i I 'a l :* =.i.

== g:. = --l = = ~ u m 2 F R.% d e r i !q

7. l g'E gi

~ i va g i 5 ._ku [i \\

  • {

e g h3-s: [ \\\\ l t' \\X >h l of,

  • I a

j \\ i ? 'I i I ~ a 2x t i )a e 'e ' / \\ [:- -g 4 ~ ~ / / J's&/,e% s, n h l ! /L i 6, yg d' '. ps a y i s ( kl ~ h'\\ j y b' .f s \\ s. i w nf/', f s. s, s.s s -- l '4 il t i , i j t. "1 i 'i Y& l g-q% 0,' .,i.: i. 1 "\\ l l l ' g t/

  • \\, 4 i

i V s_\\z 7 f cA k e f I ._. ;'/ \\ j I g%A i ga j I! l \\. w l....,\\ l' + +. y i s i '~ \\ i l I'. f i n l:!.. \\ li a. s s !!.i i g l \\1. s i u h, i.j ?./ca i.l ).: s / e s N /' ' t \\ ,,g i s 3, / I y /hs ~ ] ,f/ ' h, I, \\\\ l h"b' l s / Y f .,/ si s i ) "Z M } \\ a ; r f% l q. , ]# [/ ,, C3 { M w' jo-!!i l 'Y ? i l l ~ { } 3 k [ jl l j j k' l / f ~ ~ / ,..,, n i in i p g...;. 9 m i ,3 Fi i- ,, i n.. L' s,I h ~, t ' 3 I t -}}

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20053E896&oldid=4501076"