ML20053C497
| ML20053C497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053C491 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8206020230 | |
| Download: ML20053C497 (3) | |
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o SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-1 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
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THE CITY OF EUGENE, OREGON PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-344 Introduction By letter dated February 10, 1982, Portland General Electric Company, et al., (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating. License No. NPF-1 for operation of the Trojan Nuclear Plant located in Columbia County, Oregon. The request relates to revised surveillance testing for the pressurizer power-cperated relief valves (PORVs).and to a clarification of the monthly surveillance requirement for tie-pressurizer PORV and PORV
. block valve position indicators.
I Discussion and Evaluation 1.
PORV Surveillance Testina.
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At present, the Technical Specifications require that each PORV be demon-strated operable:
4 at least every 31 days, by demon'strating control circuit contin-l o.
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at least every 18 months, by performance of a test to verify that the PORV opens at the correct pressure setpoint.
l The licensee proposes to delete the 31-day ciontrol circuit continuity check and expand the scope of the 18-month surveillance requirement to include a full channel calibrc. ion and an exercise of the valve through one full cycle of travel. The licensee's proposed change is consistent in all respects with NUREG-0452, " Standard Technical Specifications for Westing-i house Pressurized Water Reactors, Revision 4 (issued fall 1981).
NUREG-0452 Rev. 4 revised the requirements for PORV testing which were issued earlier by letter to all Pressurized Water Reactor Licensees on July 2, 1980.
l 8206020230 820512 PDR ADOCK 05000344 P
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. The July 2, 1980 letter required, among other things, that a PORV channel functional test be conducted every 31 days, excluding valve operation.
The 31-day channel functional test schedule was adopted to be consistent with the schedule for other similar channel functional tests..However, by adding the proviso " excluding valve operation", the scope of channel functional test was, in effect, reduced to a circuit continuity check, which did not demonstrate' total valve operability. Since it is not desir-able to cycle PORVs to demonstrate operability during plant operation, the requirements were revised as seen today in NUREG-0452, Rev. 4, to require a channel calibration and full valve cycling at least once per 18 months. This testing, when combined with additional valve testing required by Section XI of the ASME Code *, provides adequate assurance of PORV valve operability.
Based on the foregoing, we find the licensee's proposed revision to PORV surveillance requirements acceptable.
2.
PORV and PORV Block Valve Position Indicator Surveillance These position indicators are presently required to receive a " channel check'" at least once per month. This term is defined in the Technical Specifications as follows:
A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation.
This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent inst'ru-
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ment channels measuring the same parameter.
PGE proposes to add a clarifying footnote for the PORV and PORV block valve position indicators to say that the scope of the channel check is to ob-serve (only) the lighting of the valve position indicator for the current valve position. The stated reason for the proposed change was to avoid various interpretations of this monthly surveillance requirement.
The purpose of this definition is to check not only the specific instru-ment or indication itself, but others when available for confirmation.
For example, the PORV position indicator (light) might show the valve to be closed.
If it were open slightly or leaking, this would be indicated by high tail pipe temperatures downstream of the.PORV, or by abnormal temperature / pressure / level in the pressurizer relief tank. For other valve positions, e.g. block valve open, there may well be no other instru-ments available for confirmation.
If that is the case, the channel check requires nothing further.
We car, see no special reason for narrowing the definition of channel check for the position indicators for these valves. We discussed this matter with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector and confirmed that there had been no interpretational problems in this matter.
- Valves of this type are required to be tested during each cold shutdown if not testable during power operation.
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, Following discussions with the licensee regarding the intent of the channel check as applied to these indicators, the licensee agread that the change is.not needed. Accordingly, the proprsed revision has not been included in this amendment. The licensee she.d define, in its procedures, the elements of a channel check for these indicators as discussed above to-eliminate any inconsistent interpretations of this requirement.
Environmental Consideration We have dete" mined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase.in power level and will not. result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR $51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion
~ We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or' consequences of accidents previously considered and ~does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendnent does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable. assurance that the health and safety of.the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's
' regulations and the issuance o this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date:
May 12, 1982 lrir.cipal Contributors:
Charles ' ram.nell 4
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