ML20053B927
| ML20053B927 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1982 |
| From: | Bielawski A COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO., ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE |
| To: | Callihan A, Cole R, Mark Miller Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8206010351 | |
| Download: ML20053B927 (4) | |
Text
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ISH AM, LINCOLN & BEALE COUNSELORS AT LAW Ci[*[ Z THREE FIRST haTIONAL PLAZA CMiCAGO. ILuNOI5 60602
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.W WILUAV G SEALE, 1885-1923 SUI 840 2ca mene May 24, 1982 Marshall E. Miller, Esq., Chairman Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Union Carbide Corporation Panel P.O.
Box Y U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Stations, Units 1 and 2)
Decket Nos. 50-454 & 50-455
Dear Administrative Judges:
Recently, Commonwealth Edison Company has provided certain information to the NRC Staff which the Board may deem relevant to matters pending before it.
Attachment A consists of a letter submitted pursuant to 10 CFR S 50.55 (e) from T.R.
Tramm, Nuclear Licensing Administrator, Common-wealth Edison Company to James G. Keppler, Regional Administra-l tor for the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region III, and two related documents.
In essence, these l
l documents indicate that the manufacturer of the emergency i
diesel generators installed at Byron, Cooper Energy Services, discovered a defect in the diesel generator lube oil strainers, Dso3
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May 24, 1982 Page Two which, had it not been detected, may have rendered the diesels inoperable.
Ac Mr. Tramm's letter indicates, new baskets have been designed and tested, and will be installed in the Byron diesels.
We are providing this information to the Board despite the fact that, in Edison's estimation, the basis on which DAARE/ SAFE relies for the admission of pro-posed contention 12, i.e. the investigation concerning Hayward-Tyler pumps, pertains to the pumps installed at Byron which are intended to supply cooling water to the auxiliary feedwater pump diesels, and not the diesel generators.
Attachment B is a letter from T.R. Tramm to Harold Denton, Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated May 4, 1982.
The letter provides informa-tion to the NRC regarding the premises and methodology being used in the turbine missile hazard analysis which is currently in progress.
DAARE/ SAFE has argued that this analysis pro-vides a basis for the admission of its proposed Contention 11.
As was stated in our responses to DAARE/ SAFE's proposed contentions, we do not believe that the fact that the analy-sis is being performed of itself warrants the admission of Contention 11.
However, given DAARE/ SAFE's position and arguments we are providing a copy of Mr. Tramm's letter and its attachment to the Board.
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May 24, 3982 Page Three Attachment C is a letter from L.O. Del George, Edison's Director of Nuclear Licensing to Harold Denton, requesting an amendment to the Byron construction permits.
Specifically, the letter requests that the latest completion dates for construction be extended from June 1, 1982 to October 1, 1984 for Byron Unit 1 and from November 1, 1983 to April 1, 1986 for Byron Unit 2.
Although the letter expressly in-dicates that the requested amendment does not reflect a change to the dates by which Edison currently expects to load fuel at Byron Units 1 and 2, the Board may believe that it contains information relevant to the scheduling of the Byron licensing proceedings.
As the dates for the commencement of evidentiary hearings approach, it obviously becomes increasingly diffi-cult to await the completion of investigations and reviews prior to determining whether these investigations and reviews raise issues which may be deemed relevant and material to contested matters pending before the Board.
l Accordingly, in order to assure that the Board is provided with information which may have a bearing on these matters, we are proposing to submit to the Board all cover letters with all attachments for all correspondence hereinafter initiated with the NRC Staff dealing with operating license issues.
When the information conveyed to the Staff is
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r; May 24, 1982 Page Tour extremely bulky, we propose to provide to the Board a copy of the cover letter with an explanation as to why the attached information is not being provided.
Of course, if the Board believes that the information ommitted should be provided we will make it available on request.
Sincer ly, L
u A an P.
'e ski One of the Attorneys for Commonwealth Edison Company APB:ldj cc:
Service List
,T ATTACHMENT A
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Comm:nwrith Edison orfe First National Ptua. Chicago. Ithnois r
! CJ/ Accrsss Riply to: Post Offica Box 767 h
/ Chicago, lilinois 60690 May 11, 1982 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Directorate of Inspection and Enforcement - Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Strainer Basket Defect NRC Docket Nos. 50-454, 50-455, 50-456 and 50-457 Reference (a):
February 1,1982, letter from F. B. Stolba, Cooper Energy Services and Enforcement, NRC
Dear Mr. Keppler:
On April 23, 1982, L. Bowen of Commonwealth Edison reported to J. Neisler of your office a defect in the Byron /Braidwood diesel generator lube oil strainers.
This defect is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).
In accordance with a request from Region III, con-trol numbers 82-01 and 82-02 are assigned to this report for Byron and Braidwood Stations, respectively.
Description of De ficiency Cooper Energy Services has advised the NRC (reference (a)) and Commonwealth Edison that the emergency diesel generators at Byron and Braidwood each contain a defective strainer basket located in the lube oil strainers.
After performance testing the mesh strainer basket liner was found to be torn loose at the top of the basket where the perforated sidewall and the liner were sandwiched between two Tlanges.
Safety Imolications Recent testing indicates that the strainer mesh disintegrates af ter it tears and could then pass through the engine bearings.
If this were to occur, one or more engine bearings would probably fail and the unit would be incapable of performing.
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J. G. Kepple.r 3-Ma y 11, 1982 Corrective Action A new basket has been designed and tested.
It will be installed in all eight Byron /Braidwood diesels prior to fuel load.
Please address further questions regarding this matter to this office.
Very truly yours, ff t[Adv = ^
T.R. Tramm Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1m cc:
Director of Inspection & En forcement 4079N
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COOPER ENERGY SERVICES CoopfR
- 5" AJAX COOPER BESSEMER PENN PUMP SUPERIOR February 1, 1982 l
l Office of inspection and Enforcement U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D
.C.
20555 Attention: Director of Inspection and Enforcement Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10CFR Part 21, this letter is noti fica t io n of a deficiency that has been determined to exist in emergency standby diesel generator sets manufactured and supplied by
-Cooper, Energy Services. The affected units are as follows:
Four sets at Pennsylvania Power and Light Company's Susquehanna Steam Electric Station at Berwick, Pa.
Four sets at Commonwealth Edison's Byron Station Units 1 and 2 in Byron, Illinois.
Four sets at Commonwealth Edison's Braidwood Statio n Units 1 and 2 in Braidwood, Illinois.
Six sets at Arizona Public Service's Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Palo Verde, Arizona.
Two sets at Niagara-Mohawk's Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2,
in Scriba, New York.
One set already shipped to Houston Light and Power's South Texas Project, Nuclear Power Plants I and 2.
There are five additional units remaining to be shipped on this order.
The defect exists in the strainer basket located in the lube oil strainer manufactured by Zurn Industries,.Inc. After performance testing at Cooper Energy Services, it was found thic the mesh strainer basket liner was torn loose at the top of :Se tisket where the perforated sidewall and the liner were
-sandwiched between two flanges. The tear propogates in an axial i
direction.
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This problem was originally discovered in December of 1980, but based upon information available at that time, was deemed not reportable under the provisions of 10CER Part 21, since a failure of this type would not prevent the generator unit from performing its designated function in a safe manner.
However, based upon recent testing conducted at our Grove City plant, it is now apparent that the strainer mesh disintegrates after it tears, and would then be capable of passing through the engine bearings. If this were to occur, a bearing failure would be probable and the unit would be incapable of performing.
The baskets in the four units at Pennsylv,ania Power and Light's Susquehanna Steam Electric Station have already been r e p l a c e.d with new baskets of an improved design manufactured for Zurn by Michigan Dynamics. These baskets were examined after performance of a 300 start test at the site, and no deterioration of the mesh was observed.
A 'new basket design, iifferent from the Michigan Dynamics basket, has just been qualified by test in Grove City and will be provided as a replacement for units at the remaining I c.c.a t i on s listed above. Replacement of all remaining baskets s houl d lie completed within the next six months.
Sincerely, P
F.
B.
Stolba Vice President & General Manager, Reciprocating Products cc:
C.
C.
Bemilier H.
F. Curren G.
A.
Dorton H.
T.
Gardner M.
J.
Helmich T.
W.
Kearns R.
A.
Miklos R.
O.
Wells Per Attached Copy Distribution
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d COOPER EtiERGY SERVICES xce -
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1 May 3, 1982 i
Subject:
Byron and Braidwood Stations 10CFR50.55(e) Reportable Item Diesel Generator Strainer Basket Defect Mr. T.R. Tramm:
This constitutes the 30 day written report on the subject deficiency reported to Mr. J. Neisler of NRC Region III on April 23, 1982.
The NLA is required to assign a number to this deficiency.
This is intended to be a final _ report.,
Cooper Energy Services informed the NRC Office of Inspection and Enf orcement of.a 10CFR Part 21 via letter dated February 1,1982 f rom F.B. Stolba to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement (the letter is attached).
The deficiency is a " defect in the strainer basket located in the lube oil strainer manufactured by Zurn Industries, Inc.
After performance testing at Cooper Energy Services, it was found that the mesh strainer basket liner was torn loose at the top of the basket where the perforated sidewall and the liner were sandwiched between two flanges.
The tear propogates in an axial direction".
A failure of this type could cause a bearing failure in the emergency diesel generator sets which would render the diesel incapable of performing its intended safety function.
The corrective action is to redesign and replace these strainer Cooper Energy Services has contracted for a newly designed baskets.
basket, is qualifying it and is expected to ship replacement baskets to our units during the autumn of 1982.
If there are any questions, do not hesitate to call.
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LesqjeA.Bowen l
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Cbmm::nw: lth Edison One First Nationil Pina, Ch cago. Bilenois ATTACHMENT B Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago. Ilknois 60690 May 4, 1982 Mr. Harold R.
Denton, Director Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braiowood Station Units 1 and 2 Turbine Missile Evaluation NRC Docket Nos. 50-454, 50-455, 50-456 and 50-457 Dea r Mr. Denton :
This is to provide information regarding the Byron /
Braidwood turbine missle hazard analysis which is in progress.
A report of this work will be provided by the end of August, 1982.
NRC review of that report should close Outstanding Item 2 of the Byron SER.
Attachment A to this letter outlines the premises anc methodology being used in the current turbine missle hazard analysis e f fort.
Key points were reviewed with NRC personnel in a conference call on March 31, 1982.
Please let us know at the earliest oppor-tunity if the analysis plan is unacceptable.
Questions should be adoressed to this office.
One signed original fif teen copies of this letter are l
provided for your use.
1 Very truly yours,
$n Sw-T. R.
Tramm Nuclea r Licensing Adminis trator i
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i ATTACHMENT A Byron /Braidwood Turbine Missile Hazard Analysis Plan The following items summarize the assumptions and methodo-logy to be used in the turbine missile hazard analysis:
1.
Turbine missile generation probability and missile characteris-tics are provided by Westinghouse.
These probability values are based on stress corrosion mode of turbine disc failure at rated speed and design overspeed as a function of turbine inspection interval.
For destructive overspeed, probability values are based on ductile burst mode of turbine disc f ailure.
2.
Plant damage probability is evaluated by a simulation process in which the consequence of turbine missiles impacting various plant equipment and initiating accident scenarios is studied.
The following steps are involved in this analysis:
a.
The plant is modeled as cubicles whj 7h house essential equipment.
In this model, actusi r inforced concrete and structural steel barriers are considered for simulating the missile path, b.
The passage of a missile through a cubicle barrier is assumed to cause f ailure of all equipment in that cubicle.
c.
Fault trees are developed which relate the failure of plant equipment to accident scenarios.
d.
Accident scenarios meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.115 for turbine missile protection of essential systems.
3.
Equipment redundancy, separation, and operator intervention is considered in the development of fault trees.
4.
To determine if turbine missiles can penetrate cubicle barriers, the CEA-EDF formula will be used for reinforced concete and masonry wall barriers and the BRL formula will be used f 7r steel barriers.
5.
The overall probability of turdine missile damage is based on combining the turbine missile generation probability with the plant probability and will be presented at various turbine inspection intervals.
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. Address R;p., a: Post Othee B;x 767 Chicago, ilhnois 60690 ATTACHMENT C April 19, 1982 Mr. Harold R.
Denton, Director Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.
Nuclea r Regula to ry Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Cons truction Permi t Extension NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 ano 50-455 References (a):
December 31, 1975 letter from D.B.
Vassallo to Byron Lee, Jr.
Dear Mr. Denton:
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(o), Commonwealth Edison hereby requests amendment of the byron Station Construction Permits CPPR-130 and CPPR-131 issued by reference (a).
For the reasons delineated below, we request that the " latest completion date" be revised from June 1, 1982 to October 1, 1984 for byron Unit 1 ano from November 1, 1983 to April 1, 1986 for Byron Unit 2.
This amendment involves only a change to construction completion dates.
In our opinion it does not involve a significant hazard consideration.
The need for an extension of time beyond the present construction permit completion dates is a result o f an extended construction period, despite the fact that construction has continued without interruption since its inception.
The longe r period. has resulted principally from the need to install larger quantities of material and equipment than originally contemplated as well as changes in NRC regulatory requirements, some of which resulted from the NRC's response to the Three Mile Island incident.
The need for extension is also based upon improvements in the manner in which we are implementing NRC requirements.
These changes have increased the amount of design work and installation labor required to complete the installation of each component, pipe, cable, and structural member.
These additional measures have been and are being implemented at a pace consistent with the Company's need to spreaa financing requirements more evenly throughout the construction period in order to keep annual financing requirements within the Company's capabilities.
Although the requested revised completion dates extend beyond the dates by which Edison currently expects to load fuel at Byron Units 1 and 2, this letter does not represent a change to the current fuel load schedules.
The revised completion dates reflect a conservative estimate of actual completion of the units.
This has been done to avoid the necessity of having to request another constr.uction completion date extension at some future time should any unanticipateo delays in construction actually occur.
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Denton April 19, 1982 At tached is a proposed " Finding of No Significant Impact" prepared by Commonwealth Edison to address the environmental impac t of the extension of these construction permits.
Three (3) signed originals and thirty-seven (37) copies o t' this submittal are provided f or your review and approval.
Enclosed is a check in the amount o f $1600, submitted in accoroance with the fee schedule defined in 10 CFR 170.22.
Very truly yours, L. O. De lGeo rg e Director o f tbclea r Licensing 1m SUdSCHIBED and SWOH)t to befure me this ddbLday of M
1982 66L a. La,
Nota rp Public 3412N l
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' i' ENVIRONMENTA'L IMPACT APPRAISAL SUPPC' TING THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF THE DATES FOR COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION OF BYRON STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON.
UNIT 1, CPPR-130 - UNIT 2, CPPR-131, DOCKET NOS. 50-454, 50-455 1.
Description or Pr' posed Action o
The action requested is the issuance of an URDER pertaining to Byron Station Units 1 and 2.
The ORDER would extend the latest completion date of Unit 1 by 28 months and the latest completion date o f Unit 2 by 28 months.
2.
Summary Description of the Probable Impacts of the Proposed Action The environmental impacts associated with construction of Byron have been previously addressed in the NRC staff's final environmental statement, construction permit stage (FES-CP) issued February, 1974, and determined by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in their partial initial decision-Environmental and Site Suitability Matters dated December 6,1974.
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board identified in the Initial Decision the following major ef fects due to construction:
A.
Station related construction will disturb 300 acres of the site. 1]f this,150 acres would serve as an improved habitat for small mammals, deer and birds, owing to the exclusion of f armers and hunters'.
B.
Construction activities of the intake and discharge structures will have a temporary effect upon the Rock River due to siltation caused by dredging.
C.
Construction of the station and development on the 300 acre site will generate noise and dust.-
D.
Dewatering of the construction site will have an ef fect on groundwater.
E.
Short-term traffic problems may occur due to construction aciivities.
F.
Transmission line construction associated with stetion development will create minor impacts.
G.
Impacts may occur to cight acres on the pipeline corridor due to construction which were tentatively identified to contain possible archeological artifacts.
It was recommended that these areas be tested for archeological significance prior to pipeline corridor construction.
H.
Area surface runoff from the construction site may have an impact upon streams of the area.
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.. With respect to Item A, the extension of construction activities on the site would delay the return of the 150 acres not used for station f acilities back to agriculture productiveness or restoration to a natural state.
Construction related effects identified in Items B ano O noted above have already occurred, were monitored and the effects were found to be localized.
Therefore, 'the construction permit extensions would not add impacts in these areas.
In relation to construction effect C noted above: major excavations and structures, the make-up and blowdown pipelines, ano ancillary structures are completed and adoitional noise and dust would not be generated as a result of extending the con-struction permit.
The granting of the required construction permit extension would extend noise and dus t.from other sourecs such as parking lots for construction workers and construction roads.
These sources are, however, continually treateo f or dust control.
With respect to Item E, listed above, the construction work force has already reached a maximum and is now declining.
With respect to Item F, three transmission lines are to be constructed for Byron Station.
The Byron East transmission line is partially completed (the 6.5 mile portion extending east from the station to the Nelson-Cherry Valley transmission line is complete and the remaining 15.3 miles to the Cherry Valley Transmission Substation is scheduled to be constructed in 1983).
The dyron South transmission lire is under construction and will be completed in 1982.
The Byron Wempleton transmission line construction has started and will be completed in 1983.
The extension of the construction schedule will delay the minor impacts o f construction discussed in the Atomic Sa fety 'and Licensing Initial Decision.
Less land will be committed due to the selection and use of single shaf t structures for tangent und light angles (up to 130) rather than the wide based lattice steel towers specified in the original environmental report, thus reducing the impact on farming activities.
Item G recommended testing of the eight identified Jrcheological sites on the pipeline corridor.
Further investigations o f the sites showed that thrae were o f archeological importance.
These sites have been, and will continue to be, protected from i
construction impacts.
The remaining five were found to consist of only scattered surf ace finds and the archeological consultant and the State Historic Preservation of ficer determined that
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protection from construction impact was. lot required.
An exten-sion of the construction permit will not result in aoditional impacts to archeolog'ical resources.
-v.s 3-With respect to Item H, area surface runof f due in part to construction is circulated tnrough an oil separator to the wastewater collection basin where suspended solids settle uut prior to discharge.
A construction permit ext ~ension woulo extend the period that construction related runof f would be treated and released.
Frequent discharges o f -water into the Woodland Creek have affected two landowners cownstream from the plant.
These e f rects have been mitigated by installation o f culverts in the motocross raceway area and a bridge over the creek in a subdivision.
The quantity o f water from precipita-tion discharged is no longer a funtion of construction activities.
3.
Conclusion and Basis for Finding of No Significant Impact On the basis of the above, it is our opinion that there will be no significant impacts attributable to the requested action.
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