ML20053B096
| ML20053B096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1982 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1956, NUDOCS 8205280031 | |
| Download: ML20053B096 (8) | |
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' h j, g Minutes of the ACRS Subcommittee ISSUED: APR.
Meeting on Byron Units 1 and 2 W
t February 26, 1982 8
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Rockford, IL IS02Lu The ACRS Subcommittee on Byron /Braidwood met at the Ramada Inn, in h7lf=
Rockford, Illinois on February 26, 1982, to review the OL application of Byron Units 1 and 2.
The applicant is Commonwealth Edison.
The agenda, Federal Notice, and attendee list are attached (Attachment 1, 2 and 3).
Handouts received at the meeting are attached to the office copy of this minute.
The meeting was entirely open to the members of the public.
Two oral presentations were made at the meeting by Betty Johnson of the League of Women Voters of Rockford, Illinois, and by Elizabeth McKay.
Betty Johnson stated in her presentation that the League of Women Voters of Rockford would like to see resolution of all unresolved generic safety issues at the Byron Nuclear Station before plant operation.
Eliza beth McKay stated that bentonite is not appropriate for sealing voids beneath the plants and requested that the Byron Station be designated I
inoperable until the strength and permanency of the bentonite grouting is guaranteed.
l Concerning Ms. Johnson's statement, Dr. Shewmon stated that Appendix C of the SER addresses the generic concern.
It states that these are long term matters and work should be done to resolve them in an orderly manner, but that they are not of such immediacy that the license of the 8205280031
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BYRON UNITS 1 AND 2 plants should be either withheld for new plants or withdrawn for operating plants until they do get resolved.
Concerning Ms. McKay's statement, R. Wetzel of Sargeant & Lundy Engineering stated that the rock grouting program that was used at the Byron Station did not use bentonite in any form.
The grout was made up of four ingredients; sand, portland cement, fly ash and water.
Dr. P. Shewmon called the meeting to order at 8:30 and read the opening statements.
There were no comments from the members and consultants at the conclusion of the Chairman's opening statement.
Stephen Chestnut,NRC Licensing Project Manager, presented an overview of the Staff's review of the Byron Stations Units 1 and 2.
The principal review matters included site characteristics, plant design fabricatiog 7 and its expected performance characteristics, response of facility to l
anticipated operating transients and postulated accidents, applicants organization and plans for conduct of operations including industrial security and emergency preparedness, and design of systems to control radiological effluents from the facility.
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BYRON UNITS 1 AND 2 3.
The staff's SER identified 17 open items of which agreements between the applicant and the NRC have been reached on 15 items and no agreements have been reached on two items.
These are the pipeline foundation design and the fire protection program.
In the pipeline foundation issue the staff require that additional borings be made to determine the size of the assumed sinkhole.
In the fire protection program the major issue is the use of water in the cable spreading room above the control room.
The licensee states that they feel that halon and automatic CO2 systems in the upper spreading room and an automatic CO2 system in the lower spreading room is adequate for fire control.
S. Chestnut next discussed the comparison of Byron with other previously reviewed facilities.
The Byron Station contains a Westinghouse NSSS.
The A/E is Sargent & Lundy.
The containment is similar to Zion's and l
l the reactor coolant system is similar to Comanche Peak.
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This application is one of two applications submitted by Commonwealth l
Edison under a duplicated plant concept. The FSAR that was submitted is for both the Byron and Braidwood Stations, and that this subcommittee l
will address only the Byron Stations.
Byron and Braidwood are dupli-cated plants located at different sites in Illinois.
Upon completion of the Staff's review, a final duplicate design approval will be issued at the conclusion of the Byron ope, rating license review.
Future duplicate or replicate plant evaluations would rely on Byron review for those duplicated features. Any site specific features and differences l
BYRON UNITS 1 AND 2 4,
would be considered during future plant reviews in conjunction with their applications.
Mr. Chestnut stated that the Byron Station will use Westinghouse Model D4 and D5 type steam generators for Byron Units 1 and 2 respectively.
The Byron Steam generators are subject to flow induced tube vibrations but not to the extent of the D2 and D3 type steam generators used in foreign plants, which caused extensive degradation and leakage. The foreign plant steam generators have a different inlet feedwater flow configurations that causes higher cross-flow velocities at the tubes.
Westinghouse has stated that tube degradation and leakage is caused by flow induced tube vibration impacting against the tube support plate and causes the tube to erode.
Maguire Nuclear Station is the first domestic steam generator using the Model D type (D2 and D3) steam generators.
Westinghouse has redesigned the feedwater inlet geometry in order to reduce to cross flow velocities.
They have also instrumented the tube l
to determine its vibration characteristics.
Preliminary test results 1
are encouraging and tube degradation is being reduced by the modifications.
1 Mr. Chestnut then reviewed items related to the plants licensing conditions.
It was suggested by a member of the subcommittee that the matter of air in l
leakage and secondary chemistry control should be discussed at the full ACRS meeting.
Mr. Chestnut, at the end of his presentation, stated that there was no staff dissenting opinions on the SER.
BYRON UNITS 1 AND 2 5.
O Mr. J. Weisler, Region 3 I&E Inspector, stated that inspections performed at the Bryon plant uncovered no major problems.
He stated that the quality assurance program provides adequate job controls during construction.
Their staffing level is adequate and there has been no evidence of any intimidat*an of any of the quality assurance people on the job, and that management support is evident.
In response to a question Mr. Weisler stated that he is also the principal inspector of the Braidwood site.
He further stated that the licensee quite frequently rotates the people involved in qJality assurance from the Byron and Braidwood site.
Mr. W. Stiede, Asst. VP to the Vice President of Nuclear Operations discussed Commonwelath Edison Company corporate organization.
He stated that the Project Manager of the Byron-Braidwood project has 32 years of experience in the construction, maintenance and administration areas at Commonwealth Edison.
He stated that Commonwealth Edison has over 20 years of successful and efficient nuclear power operation.
He further l
described how Commonwealth Edison interfaces with the industry including EPRI.
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R. Querio, Station Superintendent for Byron Station, discussed the station organization and personnel experience levels and training programs.
He l
stated that he has about 3 years of fossil station experience and 14 years of nuclear station experience, including positions as Technical Staff Supervising Engineer and SR0 at the Quad Cities Station.
He also served as the Byron Station operating Assistant Superintendent for 3-1/2 years and has been Station Superintendent for the past 1-1/2 years.
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BYRON UNITS 1 AND 2 6.
The average experience level of the technical personnel at Byron is about 6.3 years.
The NRR licensee training program is currently directed toward obtaining 37 SRO and 35 R0 prior to fuel load of Byron Unit 1.
The Zion simulator is being used in this training program, until the simulator for Byron /Braidwood is completed.
Leslie Bowen briefly discussed the applicant's consideration of existing PRA and systems interaction studies.
She stated that they are aware of the Zion Station PRA study and that the conclusions drawn from that study are positive with regard to Zion, but that the applicant has no plans for conducting similar study on the Byron Station at this time.
She stated that the Byron site demography does not result in any unusual interest in such a study and that the similarities in plant design between Byron and Zion provided the applicant with a substantial degree of comfort.
Regarding systems interaction, she stated that during the past several years there have oeen many interpretations of the nature and extent of systems interaction and its effect on plant safety.
R. Querio then discussed emergency planning at the Byon Station.
l Commonwealth began planning for nuclear emergencies in 1959 when an emergency plan was developed for Dresden Station, Unit 1.
In 1970, the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP)was introduced as a corporate l
plan.
The GSEP is a written radiological emergency plan that establishes concepts, evaluation and assessment criteria, and protective actions I
necessary to limit and mitigate the consequences of potential or actual
BYRON UNITS 1 AND 2 7.
radiological emergencies.
The plan is in two parts: a generic plan appli-cable to all Commonwealth Edison generating Stations and a site specific pl an. The site specific plan is being prepared at this time. A plant drill is scheduled for the end of this year.
J. Westermier discussed the inspectability of the primary pressure boundary including waivers to Section XI. A member of the subcommittee stated that Palo Verde nuclear plant is not requesting any waivers to Section XI and stated that he wonders why Commonwealth should not do likewise.
J. Westermier stated that these waivers depend on the interpretation of the ASME Section XI code that states that the examination shall cover essentially 100 percent of the weld.
It is Commonwealth's position to assume that " essentially" mean 100 percent of the weld to be examined.
Therefore, if Commonwealth Edison were to examine only 99 percent of the weld, they will seek relief for the 1 percent of the weld not inspected.
Other constructors in this case may not ask for waivers.
Dave Maire next discussed the effects of residual elements on the behavior of the reactor pressure vessel.
He stated that the reactor pressure vessel is fabricated with low impurities (.05% copper and.01%
phosphorous) and that problems concerning pressurizer thermal shock are l
not anticipated.
J. Westermier discussed the support bolts for safety related compon-ents.
He stated that no ultra high-strength maraging bolts are used in Byron support systems, although high strength bolts are used.
These
BYRON UN1TS 1 AND 2 8.,
o high-strength bolts are torqued according to the ASME specifications (70% of the ultimate tensile strength).
In response to a request from a member of the subcommittee, Byron will present at the full ACRS meet-ing their bolt inspection program and results that determines whether the bolt hardness value is within specifications.
R. Querto discussed secondary chemistry.
He stated that Byron will use the guidelines provided by the steam generator owners group, which are similar to Zion's.
Zion steam generators are not experiencing any tube degradation by denting or other degrading mechanisms.
Commonwealth was commended by a member of the subcommittee for the performance of its steam generators.
K. Ainger briefly discussed the reactor vessel level indicator system.
This system incorporates a heated junction thermocouple (HJTC) which is designed and manufactured by Combustion Engineering, Inc.
The subcommittee recommended that the ACRS review Commonwealth Edison's Application for an OL for Byron Units 1 & 2 at the Full ACRS Meeting in March 1982.
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