ML20053A493
| ML20053A493 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1982 |
| From: | Mclendon G LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3K-82-0284, W3K-82-284, NUDOCS 8205260148 | |
| Download: ML20053A493 (5) | |
Text
LOUISIANA f 242 OuARMDE SmHT POWE R & L1G H T/ P O BOX 6008
- NE W ORLEtNS. LOUIStANA 70174 * (504) 366 2345
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May 18, 1982 G D McLENDON Sensor Vice President W3K-82-0284 Q-3-A35.07.55 9;, i,.
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Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV p
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S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission EY20 m r
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012 i
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Waterford SES Unit No. 3
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Docket No. 50-382 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 55 "lloid Up and Boric Acid Make Up Tanks Incorrect Structural Calculations"
Reference:
Telecon - R. G. Bennett (LP&L) to D. Tomlinson (NRC) on April 7, 1982
Dear Mr. Collins:
In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 55, "lloid Up and Boric Acid Make Up Tanks Incorrect Structural Calculations." This item was originally identified as PRD No. 75.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Very truly yours, Uom X M e b lr' GDMcL/LLB/grf Attachment cc:
- 1) Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement l
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 7
(with 15 copies of report) h
- 2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 820526 oitifw{hIcopyofreport)
r LOUISIANA POWER & LIGilT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 55 IIold Up and Boric Acid Make Up Tanks Incorrect Structural Calcualtions Reviewed by 1;[%
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INTERIM REPORT SICNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 55 HOLD UP AND BORIC ACID MAKE UP TANKS INCORRECT STRUCTURAL CALCULATIONS I
INTRODUCTION l
I This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).
It describes errors that have been found in Vendor Stress Reports, which include the seismic support rings and lugs of the hold up and boric acid make up tanks. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.
DESCRIPTION During review of Vendor Stress Reports by Combustion Engineering in regard to the four (4) hold up tanks and both boric acid make up tanks, the structural calculations were found to be in error.
It has been determined that none of the above mentioned as-built tanks can accommodate the present Ebasco support structure which imposes radial loads on the seismic support rings. Additionally, it has been tentatively concluded that the hold up tanks are not structurally adequate as supported.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Failure of the boric acid make up tanks could reduce the ability of the Chemical and Volume Control System to charge the Reactor Coolant system following a small break LOCA. Therefore, the seismic design deficiency of the boric acid make up tanks could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.
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Failure of the hold up tanks has the potential to release significant amounts of radioactive material. This radiological release may increase the previously calculated release for the postulated waste System Failure documented in FSAR Subsection 15.7.3.2.
Therefore, the seismic design deficiency of the hold up tanks could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.
CORRECTIVE ACTION Presently, Ebasco is in the process of determining the necessary design changes required. This will be completed by July 15, 1982. At that time, a construction schedule can be defined. An Interim Report will be sub-mitted by August 2, 1982.
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k LOUISIANA POWER & LICitT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 55 lloid Up and Boric Acid Make Up Tanks Incorrect Structural Calcualtions Reviewed by
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May 13, 1982 i
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INTERIM REPORT SICNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 55 HOLD UP AND BORIC ACID MAKE UP TANKS INCORRECT STRUCTURAL CALCULATIONS INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).
It describss errors that have been found in Vendor Stress Reports, which include the seismic support rings and lugs of the hold up and boric acid make up tanks. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.
DESCRIPTION During review of Vendor Stress Reports by Combustion Engineering in regard to the four (4) hold up tanks and both boric acid make up tanks, the structural calculations were found to be in error.
It has been determined that none of the above mentioned as-built tanks can accommodate the present Ebasco support structure which imposes radial loads on the seismic support rings. Additionally, it has been tentatively concluded that the hold up tanks are not structurally adequate as supported.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Failure of the boric acid cake up tanks could reduce the ability of the Chemical and Volume Control System to charge the Reactor Coolant system following a small break LOCA. Therefore, the seismic design deficiency of the boric acid make up tanks could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.
I Failure of the hold up tanks has the potential to release significant amounts of radioactive material. This radiological release may increase the previously calculated release for the postulated waste System Failure f
documented in FSAR Subsection 15.7.3.2.
Therefore, the seismic design deficiency of the hold up tanks could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.
CORRECTIVE ACTION Presently, Ebasco is in the process of determining the necessary design changes required. This will be completed by July 15, 1982. At that time, a construction schedule can be defined. An Interim Report will be sub-mitted by August 2, 1982.
.