ML20052B639
| ML20052B639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1982 |
| From: | Sinderman R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052B636 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8205030397 | |
| Download: ML20052B639 (8) | |
Text
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4/26/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD IN THE MATTER OF
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Docket No. 50-155-OLA CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
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(Spent Fuel Pool
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Expansion)
(Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant)
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TESTIMONY OF ROGER W.
SINDERMAN CONCERNING O'NEILL CONTENTION IIE-4 My name is Roger W.
Sinderman.
I am employed by Consumers Power Company as Director of Radiological Ser-vices.
My business address is 1945 West Parnall Road, Jackson, Michigan.
I joined the Company on May 9, 1966, and I have held various positions of increasing responsibility since that date.
My educational background and work _experi-ence are detailed in a Statement of Professional Qualifica-tions that is attached to my testimony.
I have had over fifteen years of experience in calculating and determining radionuclide source terms and the attendent radiation dose levels associated with routine operation of nuclear power reactors as well as the radiological consequences calculated for hypothetical accidents as required by the NRC's regula-tions in 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
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, Based on my educational background and work experience, I believe I am qualified to answer O'Neill Contention IIE-4:
In the event of an accident which results in a substantial release of radioactivity from the expanded fuel pool, the containment building does not provide adequate shielding to protect the public health and safety.
Contention IIE-4 questions the adequacy of the three-quarter-inch steel containment shell at Big Rock Point to shield and protect the health and safety of the public from the effects of radiation.
Gamma radiation is the only type of radiation emitted from radioactive materials in the spent fuel pool that exhibits the necessary characteristics and ability to radiate through or penetrate solid masses.
Therefore, I presume that Mr. O'Neill is postulating a sub-stantial release from the spent fuel pool to the containment of gamma-emitting radioactive material.
Thus, my testimony addresses Mr. O'Neill's concern that the three-quarter-inch thick steel containment at the Big Rock Point plant may not adequately shield the public from the effects of such gamma radiation.
For purposes of defining the " substantial release" of radioactive material referred to in the contention and in
. order to demonstrate the adequacy of the containment shield-ing capability under conditions of radionuclide release significantly greater than the design basis event for the i
fuel pool, but nevertheless measured against the two-hour boundary dose limits imposed by 10 C.F.R. Part 100, I have assumed:
1.
The spent fuel pool is fully leaded in its expanded mode (441 spent fuel assemblies).
- 2.
A hypothetical non-mechanistic accident in-volving an instantaneous loss of all cooling water in the spent fuel pool (an incredible event) coupled with an unexplained inability to refill the pool or to provide any mode of cooling.
3.
All heat generated within each fuel rod after the loss of cooling remains in the rod, i.e.,
no credit is taken for convective and radiative Of the 441 spent fuel assemblies, 84 (a full reactor core off-load) is assumed to have decayed for only five days following a full year of reactor operation.
This 5-day decay period is the minimum time it can be reasonably expected to shut down the reactor from full power opera-tion, cool the primary coolant, remove the reactor bio-logical shield and vessel head, and finally transfer all 84 fuel assemblies to the spent fuel pool.
The remaining 357 fuel assemblies exhibit decay after reactor core off-load of one year through 17 years in increments of 1/4 core (21 assemblies) added per year, i.e.,
21 X 17 = 357.
, For both overland and shoreline sectors, well over 90% of the dose in the two-hour period results from the full core off-load with only five days of decay.
None of the dose results from fuel having decayed more than three years, be-cause a period greater than two hours is required for fuel cladding perforation temperature to be reached.
Thus, since the expansion of the pool merely permits the storage of a greater number of fuel assemblies whose decay time exceeds three years, the consequences of the postulated accident are the same regardless of whether or not the spent fuel pool is operated in its present mode or in an expanded mode.
Based upon the above analysis, I conclude that the shielding afforded by the Big Rock Point containment building provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public in the event of the accident postulated by Mr. O'Neill, i.e., one resulting in substantial releases of radioactive material form the expanded fuel pool.
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STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR ROGER UILLIAM SIMDERMAN EDUCATION:
B.S. Science Engineering, University of Michigan M.S. Health Physics, University of Michigan M. P.H.
Health Physics, University of Michigan EXPERIENCE:
June 1981 -
Consumers.ower Company as Director of Radiological Present Services, responsible for all aspects of radiological 4
control at Consumers Power Company nuclear facilities.
These responsibilities include radiation protection for employees, environmental surveillance, radioactive waste, effluent control, and emergency planning.
1974 - 1981 Consumers Power Company as Corporate Health Physicist, responsible for all aspects of radiological control at Consumers Power Company nuclear facilities.
These responsibilities include radiation protection for employees, environmental surveillance, and effluent control.
1973 - 1974 Consumers Power Company as Palisades Plant Health (6-month Physicist, responsible for radiation protection, ef-period) fluent and environmental control at the Palisades Plant.
1971 - 1973 Consumers Power Company as Environmental Health Physicist responsible for environmental radiological surveillance and control of radiological effluents from the company's nuclear facilities.
1968 - 1971 Consumers Power Company as Health Physicist, responsible for Big Rock Point Plant radiological control and Pali-sades Plant construction activities related to radiation protection.
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1966 - 1968 Consumers Power Company as Associate Engineer, General Engineer, and Chemical and Radiation Protection Super-visor at the Big Rock Point Plant, responsible for Plant radiation protection activities and various en-i i
gineering tasks.
l SOCIETIES:
Health Physics Society American Public Health Association
, cooling; and as a consequence of the over-
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heating, fission products are released to the containment.
4.
Fission products available for release to the containment during this event are assumed to be as given in TID-14844, augmented by the experi-ence of the accident at the Three Mile Island reactor.
Thus, it is assumed that 100% of the noble gas fission products contained in the spent fuel are available for release, as well as 100% of the radiciodines and the semivola-tile elements of cesium, tellurium, ruthenium, and cerium.
5.
The fission product release increases linearly, starting at the time of cladding failure for each rod and reaches 100% for each rod when fully molten conditions occur.
6.
Containment isolation occurs immediately upon water loss.
7.
Individuals located at the site boundry remain.
i in place for a two-hour period consistent with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
Based on the foregoing assumptions, my calculations show that the fission product release begins 36 minutes after i
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.. the water loss occurs.
This 36-minute time period is the minimum period for the most radioactive fuel rod of the freshly off-loaded core to reach cladding failure temperature.
My calculations show further that 23% of the noble gases, iodines, and semivolatile elements are released to the con-tainment two hours after the initiation of the event.
Based on this source term, I have performed dose calculations taking into consideration the thickness of the containment shell, the shielding afforded by air between the containment and the distance to the nearest site property boundary (2640 feet for overland sectors and 206 feet for the nearest shoreline sec-tor).
Radiation attenuation caused by other structures on site; including structures within the containment building, and by forest growth, though considerable, was neglected'due to its highly varying nature as a function of direction.
The dose to any hypothetical individual located at the site boundary in overland directions is 82 millirems in two hours.
The nearest actual residence is located at 1 mile, I
at which the dose is 0.0124 millirems in two hours.
The nearest public highway, US-31, is 2760 feet at its closest approach to the plant.
At this location, the dose is 63 millirems in two hours.
These values are negligible when compared to the 25,000 millirem whole-body limit established for accident conditions in 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
. The nearest distance to the shoreline from the containment building is 206 feet.
The shoreline at this location is not used for recreational swimming and boating due to its rocky features.
Fishermen do, however, from time to time, fish from the shoreline near the plant discharge canal as well as from boats offshore.
Hence, radiation doses to members of the public using Lake Michigan resulting from the accident described herein are limited to these fishermen.
Given the assumptions of the accident scenario assumed for purposes of my testimony, a radiation dose of 25,000 yillirems over a two-hour period occurs at a distance off-shore of 862 feet (1068 feet from the containment build-ing centerline).
Fishermen located at distances less than 862 feet off-shore are in a zone in which the limits of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 are exceeded.
However, ample time is avail-able, at least 60 minutes, to warn and/or evacuate any persons fishing along the discharge canal or elsewhere within the area of interest.
Evacuation could be effected by either the Big Rock Point plant security force, or the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department through either the actuation of'the public notification system or the use of its marine patrol, or the U.
S. Coast Guard, c