ML20052B158
| ML20052B158 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1982 |
| From: | Bradley Jones, Swanson D NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052B140 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204300094 | |
| Download: ML20052B158 (11) | |
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4/28/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC AND SAFETY LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )
NRC STAFF'S UPDATED ANSWERS TO NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE SIERRA CLUB REQUEST TO APPLICANTS AND STAFF FOR ADMISSIONS DATED AUGUST 13, 1976 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff (Staff) hereby updates its September 28, 1976 response to the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club Request for Admissions filed on August 13, 1976.
Attached hereto are the Staff's answers to NRDC's and the Sierra Club's Request for Admissions, together with the affidavit of Mr. Robert J. Dube and Mr. Cardis L. A11en.1/
In the April 14, 1982 Order following conference with Parties, the Licensing Board renumbered NRDC's contentions. When an old contention number appears in the request for admission or answer, the new contention numb, r will be indicated in parentheses.
Respectfully submitted, Daniel T. Swanson Counsel for NRC Staff l
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Bradley W. Jones Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 28th day of April, 1982
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The affidavits of Mr. Dube and Mr. Allen are unsigned. However, their signed and notarized affidavits will be filed shortly.
W2043000M4
NRC STAFF'S ANSWERS TO NRDC'S AND THE SIERRA CLUB'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS The NRC Staff has determined that previous responses to request for admissions 4-7, 9-13, 17, 22, 26, and 29-33 concerning Contentio. 5 (renumbered as 4), and admissions #1 through #5 concerning Contention 2 (renumbered as 1) are still applicable and need no updating.
Contention 5 (renumbered as 4)
Statement 1 For a nominal or baseline threat with respect to safeguards, it is reasonable to assume that the internal and external threats are two and six persons, respectively. The range of numbers suggested by threat researchers, expert opinion, and partisan comments generally lie within a factor of two, up and down, from this baseline specification.
Response
The Staff denies these statements. Neither is correct as written.
They are incomplete paraphrases of statements ~. hat appear in Carl Builder's internal memorandum of January 19, 1976. That memorandum discusses, among other things, hypothetical threats which were then being explored in the context of the draft safeguards supplement to the GESMO as a possible basis for the design of safeguards for plutonium recycle.
Statement 2 l
l The lowest level of design threat for safeguards is an internal threat, one person and, an external threat, three persons.
No one has seriously suggested that these levels are too high and that we should consider even lower levels as design threats for adequate safeguards.
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Response
The Staff denies these statements. Neither is correct as written.
They are incomplete paraphrases of statements that appear in Carl Builder's internal memorandum of January 19, 1976.
That memorandum discusses, among other things, hypothetical tiireats which were then being explored in the context of the draft safeguards supplement to the GESMO as a possible basis for the design of safeguards for plutonium recycle.
Statement 3 To estimate the credible threat, the office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards researched 19 relevant studies and conducted 9 interviews with individuals and groups of professional analysts from the FBI, the intelligence [ community., the Department of Defense and State and local law enforcement agencies.
Response
The Staff admits this statement as it concerns some earlier research activities of the NRC Staff.
Statement 8 In general, the internal threat to nuclear facilities is:
One person operating alone will probably remain undetected.
Instance of collusion involving 2-3 persons have been
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encountered in industry.
Most hijackings involve internal collusion.
Key internal persons can be influenced by threats against their families or other forms of blackmail.
Response
The Staff denies that this statement describes the internal threat to a nuclear facility.
This statement is an inaccurate paraphrase of an
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opinion expressed in 1975, by one Staff member in an early uncoordinated working draft Executive Summary of the Security Agency Study.
It did not then, and does not now represent an NRC Staff position.
Statement 14 The adequacy of the CRBRP security program is judged against regulatory requirements, rather than threat capabilities or a range of threat capabilities.
Response
The Staff admits this statement.
Current regulatory requirements include a design basis threat in 10 C.F.R. 73.1.
Statement 15 The nature of the internal (diversion) threat considered in establishing current licensing requirements is the diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by one person.
Response
The Staff denies this statement.
Current regulatory requirements -
include a design basis threat in 10 C.F.R. 73.1.
Statement 16 The nature of external (assault) threats considered in development of current licensing requirements was the prevention of theft or sabotage by one or two armed individuals or a group of unarmed individuals.
Response
The Staff denies this statement. Current.'egulatory requirements include a design basis threat in 10 C.F.R. 73.1.
5-Statement 18 The Staff does not evaluate security programs against specific threat scenarios or -threat capabilities.
Response
1 The Staff denies this statement. During the CRBR licensing process security programs will be evaluated against regulatory requirements, which are designed to provide protection against a design basis threat.
The Staff will consider the Applicant's design basis threat as part of the CRBR environmental review.
Statement 19 The adequacy of the CRBRP security program is being judged against the existing regulatory requirements and. guidance.
Response
The Staff admits this statement.
Statement 20
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It is possible that a CDA could be initiated by sabotage conducted by one or two insiders who could gain access to vital equipment.
.Re s20,n,s_ e, The Staff admits statements,20 and 21 to the extent that both of the above events are! conceivable.
See Response to III-2, interrogatory set 8.
Statement 21 It is possible that a CDA could be initiated by sabotage conducted by a group of outsiders aided by one or~two insiders.
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Response
The Staff admits statements 20 and 21 to the extent that both of the above events are conceivable. See Response to III-2, interrogatory Set 8.
Statement 23 Former Chairman Ray cited "a theoretical standard involving an attack by 10 terrorists armed with light weapons." The 10 cited by i
Chairman Ray may now be more appropriately described as a threat of a smaller group of well-trained outsiders armed with automatic weapons and assisted by a single insider.
Response
The Staff admits that Chairman Ray cited "a theoretical standard involving an attack by 10 terrorists armed with light weapons." We do not admit that this reflects the current threat as stated in 10 C.F.R. 73.1.
Statement 24 The CRBR will be subject to NRC license and construction requirements.
Response
l The NRC has licensing and related regulatory authority for the CRBRP as stipulated in Section 2020 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (PublicLaw93-438).
Statement 25 The fuel fabrication facility for CRBR, presently not designated, will also in all probability be subject to NRC license an inspection requirements.
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Response
The Staff denies this statement. The Applicant's Environmental Report states that DOE plans to fabricate fuel for the CRBR in the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility, and assemble fuel pins into fuel assemblies in Building 308 on the DOE Hanford Reservation. Both of these are DOE facilities and will not be licensed by the NRC.
Statement 27 The Applicant has not defined the " design basis threat" with respect to safeguards.
Response
The Staff denies the statement.
Statement 28 Guard forces should be engineered to meet the credible external /
internal threats.
Response
The Staff admits this statement to the extent that for nuclear facilities, including the CRBR, guards are but one part of the total physical security system. The Staff assumes that " credible external / internal threat" means the threat levels currently used by NRC as a basis for physical security regulations.
4 Statement 34 Following the successful theft of sufficient plutonium, an atomic bomb explosion with a yield of 100 tons (TNT equivalent) would be a possibility.
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Response
The Staff admits those statements to the extent that detonations with yields greater than 100 tons (high explosive equivalent) are possible utilizing plutonium. There is, however, considerable debate as to the case or difficulty of fabricating a nuclear explosive device, with a wide range of authoritative opinion on the subject.
Indeed such a device, constructed by a small non-national group, could be a total failure because of either faulty design or faulty construction.
Statement 35 Following the successful theft of sufficient plutonium, an atomic 4
bomb explosion with a yield of 1000 tons (TNT equivalent) would be a possibility.
Response
The Staff admits those statements to the extent that detonations with yields greater than 100 toni (high explosive equivalent) are possible utilizing plutonium. There is, however, considerable debate as to the case or difficulty of fabricating a nuclear explosive device, with a wide range of authoritative opinion on the subject.
Indeed such a device, constructed by a small non-national group, could be a total failure because of either faulty design or faulty construction.
Statement 36 The plutonium composition of the initial core loadings for the CRBR and that extracted from fuel removed from the reactor core represent preferred material for the construction of atomic bombs as opposed to that form extracted from high burn up of LWR fuel.
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Response-f4RC cannot admit or deny these statements. NRC relies upon DOE and DOE weapons laboratories for determinations on technical matters associated primarily with nuclear weapons technology.
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r Statement 37 l
The plutonium extracted from the blanket of the CRBR would be a more i
preferred atomic bomb material than the initial core loadings or that extracted from fuel removed from the reactor core.
Response
i flRC cannot admit or deny these statements. NRC relies upon DOE and DOE weapons laboratories for determinations on technical matters i
associated primarily with nuclear weapons technology.
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Statement 38 Plutonium in the initial core loading, the plutonium extracted from fuel removed from the reactor core, and plutonium' extracted from the blanket of the CRBR would be weapons-grade plutonium.
Response
l The Staff denies this statement.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA fiUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant)
AFFIDAVIT OF CARDIS L. ALLEN I, Cardis L. Allen, being duly sworn, state as follows:
i 1.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coninission as a Project !!anager, Clinch River Breeder Reactor Program Office, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
2.
I am duly authorized to participate in answering the August 13, 1976 Request for Admissions concerning contention 2 (renumbered as 1)
- 1 through #5 and I hereby certify that the answers given are true l
to the best of my knowledge.
U kDIS L. ALLEN Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of April,1982.
Notary Public My Commission expires:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGE!!ENT CORPORATION TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (ClinchRiverBreederReactor Plant)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J. DUBE I, Robert J. Dube, being duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Section Chief of Regulatory Activities and Analyses Section, Fuels Facilities Safeguards Licensing Branch, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
2.
I am duly authorized to participate in answering the Request for Admissions pertaining to Contention 5 (renumbered as 4) #1 through 38 and I hereby certify that the answers given are true to the best of my knowledge.
ROBERT J. DUBE l
Subscribed and sworn to before me i
this day of April,1982.
Notary Public ity Comission expires:
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