ML20052A353
| ML20052A353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1982 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8204280250 | |
| Download: ML20052A353 (2) | |
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DUKE Powere COMPANY PowEn 13ciu)ING 422 Sourn Cnuncu STREET, CILAHL.OTTE. N. C. ana m d
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
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C Docket No. 50-370
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
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Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report SD 370/82-02 concerning failure of E30AA switches to establish continuity.
This was previously reported for Unit 1 via LER R0-369/81-188.
Very truly yours,
'/ffffl- ? William O. Parker, Jr. PBN/jfw Attachment cc: Director Mr. P. R. Bemis Office of Inspection & Enforcement Senior Resident Inspector-NRC U. S. Nuclear P.egulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Station Washington, D. C. 20555 QQ ghQ%Q t'f f f M Ai r'Y l fj % 5 1 ' /
d Q DUKE POWER C0ANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION SIGNIPP T DEFICIENCY REPORT NUMBER: SD-370/82-02 REPORT DATE: March 12, 1982 FACILITY: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY: Failure of E30AA switches to establish continuity due to contact film buildup. INITIAL REPORT: On February 12, 1982 Frank J. Long, NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified i of the deficiency by W. O. Henry, T. C. McMeekin, and J. E. Thomas of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina. COMPONENT AND/OR SUPPLIER: The components which failed to operate properly are E30KLA3 and E30KLA4 contact blocks (on E30AA switchoperators) manufactured by Cutler-Hammer. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: On December 12, 1981 while performing testing on the Engineered Safety Feature circuits at McGuire Unit 1, several initiate and reset switches failed to estab-lish continuity when depressed. The switch assemblies consisted of E30AA opera-tors with combinations of E30KLA3 and E30KLA4 contact blocks manufactured by Cutler-Hammer. This application controls 48 vde and 15 vde circuits and are 1 exercised on an infrequent basis. (The NRC inspector onsite was notified of this problem the day of the incident and a formal Reportable Occurrence Report No. R0-369/81-188 was filed December 30, 1981). On December 23, 1981 a group of the E30 switches, including five failed units, were sent to Cutler-Hammer for evaluation. Cutler-Hammer concluded in their February 2, 1982 letter that the failure was due to an insulating film of silver sulfide on the silver contact faces. They indicated that this would normally not be a problem, but the infrequent use allowed enough silver sulfide to accu-mulate to prohibit continuity at the applied voltage. These switches are used in similar circuits at McGuire Unit 2. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS: Several switch failures could result in inoperable system level manual initiation / reset of the Engineered Safety Features. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: All contacts in safety-related applications controlling 48 volts or less which are operated on an infrequent basis will be replaced with goldplated contacts prior to fuel load. _. -.,.}}