ML20050E469
| ML20050E469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1982 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SBN-254, NUDOCS 8204130313 | |
| Download: ML20050E469 (4) | |
Text
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SEMOM STATION IPUBLIC SEAVICE Engineering Office:
Companyof NewHampshw e 1671 Worcester Road Framingham. Mossochusetts 01701 (617) - 872 8100 O
April 9, 1982 4
SBN-254 p
q T.F. B 7.1.2 RECggygD a;
"APR13199gg :s Wrm g United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission kW 88 Washington, D.
C.
20555 g
g Attention:
Mr. Frank J. Miraglia, Chief g
g Licensing Branch No. 3
-1 Division of Licensing
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSN11 Letter, dated April 8,1982, " Response to 460 Series RAIs; (Effluent Treatment Systems Branch)," J. DeVincentis to F. J. Miraglia
Subject:
Response to 460 Series RAls; (Effluent Treatment Systems Branch)
Dear Sir:
We have at tached responses to the following RAIs:
460.23, 460.27, 460.36 These were not included with the Reference (b) responses.
Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY JJar J. DeVincentis Project Manager j
Attachment 8204130313 820409
/[
PDR ADOCK 05000443 A
PDR i
o 460.23 Which control panel monitors the discharge flow from the PAB filtered exhaust system?
RESPONSE: Low flow in the PAB filtered exhaust system is alarmed on the main control board.
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Sect ion 11.3.2. 2 states tha t some cubicles of the RCU3 will be continuously monitored for H2 and that in the event of high H2 concentration:
a) the af fected components of the process stream will be isolated and/or the af fected component purged with N 32 b) the af fected cubicle will be ventilated to reduce the H2 concentration; and i~
c) unnecessary personnel will be evacuated from the a rea.
It appears that the ventilation to reduce H2 concentration could result in the addition of air in the ventilation systems in the ambient carbon delay bed and the hydrogen surge tank area, thus resulting in a potentially explosive mixture.
Another potential source of 02 could be the air conc stioning
- units.
Provide an analysis to show that the addition of air in these cubicles of the FCWS would not result in a deflagration' or an explosion.
RES PONSE 1
liydrogen analyzers will be set to alarm at less than 4%.
In the event of a 4
hydrogen leak f rom the RGWS, the defective equipment will be isolated and/or purged with nitrogen, diluting the 112 concentration.
The effected cubicle will be ventilated with air.
!?e do not believe-the ventilating with air 'to an existing air and hydrogen mixture will increase the risk of deflagration or I
explosion.
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i 460.36 Does the design of the process and effluent monitoring systems meet the guidelines of Appendix ll.5-A of SRP 11.5, Regulatory Guide 4.15 (Position C), Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Position C and Table 2) ?
RESPONSE: The design of the radiation monitoring system conforms with the guidelines of Appendix 11. 5-A of SRP 11.5 and Regulatorv Guide 1.97 (Position C and Table 2).
The design is sufficient to support the radiological monitoring program (Regulatory Guide 4.15).