ML20049J000
| ML20049J000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1982 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Gilinsky V NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203110153 | |
| Download: ML20049J000 (2) | |
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NGCgg N g, flAR 3 1993 A
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Commissioner Gilinsky g
g FROM:
Victor Stallo, Jr., Deputy Executive Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements
SUBJECT:
COtMISSIONER GILINSKY'S SEPARATE REMARKS ATTACHED TO THE MARCH 2, 1982 LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN UDALL The discussion concerning my conclusions about withholding of information during the THI-2 accident in your separate remarks attached to the March 2,1982, letter to Congressman Udall are incorrect and therefore I feel obliged to provide a response for the record.
j The second paragraph in your separate remarks states:
Recently, at long last, the Staff, in the person of Mr. Stello, finally conceded that significant ir. formation about the severity of the accident had been withheld " knowingly" by the Company on the day of the accident. But, Mr. Stallo added, in what can only be described as an Alice-in-Wonderland departure from the dictionary meaning of the words, this involved no " intent" or "w111 fulness" on 4
the Company's part.
The first sentence says that my views regarding information flow regarding the severity of the accident has recently changed. This is incorrect.
My views now and at the conclusion of our investigation, as reported in i
t NUREG-0760, " Investigation Into Information Flow During the Accident at Three Mile Island," dated January 1981, remain unchanged.
I have recently reiterated my conclusions to you in a memorandum dated January 28, 1982, which stated-i
...the real issue is the conclusion I draw as to intentional withholding of information by the licensee. You will recall one of the issues to be examined in the IE investigation of the information flow during the accident (NUREG-0760) was whether or not information was intentionally withheld. Conclusions Number 5 and 6 state i
clearly that infonnation was not intentionally withheld; i.e.,
5.
Information was not intentionally withheld from the State on the day of the accident.
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MI o3 6
Information was not intentionally withheld from the NRC on the day of the accident.
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.e Comissioner G111nsky The second sentence in the excerpt from your separate remarks which attributes to me a departure from the dictionary definition of words in i
my conclusions is equally objectionable. The departure from the usual 1
meaning of words in the transcript of the December 21,1981 meeting, which is the source of your coment, arose from your request to me to leave aside certain concepts in our discussion. My memorandum of January 28, 1982 points out the unusual context in which certain words were used in your questioning of me. You began a line of questioning for which you asked me to " forget about the word intent."
I tried to be responsive to your questioning using that assumption. Thus, I believe the Alice-in-Wonderland departure from the dictionary meaning of words was taken at your initiative not mine.
You are, of course, free to reach any conclusion you choose regarding the flow of information during the TMI-2 accident.
I assume you want me to reach independently my conclusions based on my understanding the facts. I have done so. Until such time as new facts arise I am not prepared to change my conclusions.
1 Original signed by Victor St013.Q,7 i
Victor Stello, Jr.
Deputy Executive Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements cc: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Bradford Comissioner Ahearne Comissioner Roberts EDO SECY OGC ELD OCA Service List DISTRIBUTION Central File PDR DEDR0GR I
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 i ^ 't, y
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March 2, 1982 omannans
'The. Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chaiman i
"Subccanittee on Energy and the Environment Caussittee on Interior and Insular Affairs
- United States House of Representatives Washin3 ton, D.C.
20515 t
Dear $kr.' Chairman:
l This is,in response to your February 4,1982 letter. You expressed deep
' dissatisfaction with our handling)of the investigation of information flow accident.
durifigi.the Three. Mile. Island (TMI As, Chairman of the Comission, I could not help but be troubled by your letter Of even though.I was not on board when the events in question took place.
particular concern to me was your use of the term " inaction" with regard to Hence I felt obligated to reexamine the actions taken by the this matter.
. Nuclear' Regulatory Comission (NRC).
Frem'.this reexamination it appears to me that considerable time and energy was expanded.by the NRC on this matter.
Although the conclusions reached by these actions-differ from your views, the use of the tenn " inaction" does not appear.
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appropriate. Let me recount where it appears to me we have been and where.we are today:
iWe have examined this issue several times, and devoted extensive funds;
' staff resources, and Comission time to this effort; i
Not only did the Commission direct the NRC Special Inquiry Group to study l
.:this ~ question, but, in response to your dissatisfaction, we extended the l
.Ragovin. effort to examine your issues in greater detail; l
l This. matter has been investigated by our staff and by your staff,
'The. Director of IE worked closely with your staff during development of yourEreport, to include providing rapid access to our investigation
. : transcripts;
. - 1 awe [have addressed this matter in meetings with our staff, and have had,a i
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' number of communications from your staff on this matter; The final conclusions of your staff investigation and of our investigation The only place we appear to disagree with you is over Jare consistent.
- the statement in your letter that the company willfully violated our
.freporting requirements;
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The.HonArable Morris K. Udall 2
. A.. notice of violation was issued, which is enclosed; and Both your report and our report have been referred to the Department of Justice.
We share your view that continuing dialogue on this matter no longer serves.
any<useful purpose. We would rather turn our efforts toward implementing lessons. learned from past experience to improve the flow of infonnation.
.With' regard to information flow, it is vitally important that personnel at all licensee facilities be aware that we cannot tolerate reporting deficiencies.
.and.that. sanctions - including referrals to the Department of Justice -- will be putsued as needed against such conduct. We are planning to prepare a pol. icy statement clarifying in no uncertain tenns the expectations of this i
agency for. complete and candid communications with us at all times by all licensees. The policy statement would also emphasize our intent to deal forcefully with licensees or their personnel when these expectations are not
- net.. The statement would be distributed to all licensees and published in the Federal _ Register.
In.'a related context, we are now considering steps that can be taken to improve. our investigative program.
It is clear that we must possess the capability to perfonn thorough and timely investigations which command the Jrespect of knowledgeable persons inside and outside the agency. We intend
.that.our investigations actively pursue indications of intentional violations of our' regulations, and we intend that our staff be candid in discussing the conclusions of such investigations with us. I also appreciate the comments in your,Feb~ruary 26 letter discussing our investigative activities.
I will carefully consider your suggestions.
We are fully aware of your interest in the flow of information during the accident.. I am personally grateful for your staff's help since my becoming
- Chainnan,of the Conrnission in highlighting their report to assist me in i
understanding the issues involved. With your continued help, we look forward
,to addressing the current major challenges facing nuclear regulation.
Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford disagree with this letter.
Their views are enclosed. Commissioner Ahearne's views are also enclosed.
Sincerely,'
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Nunzio3[.Palladino
Enclosures:
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- c'c': ' Rep. Manuel Lujan,
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COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSU1.AR AFFAIRS A"o c m st'
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M-February 4, 1982 l
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, b'.This.. Honorable Nunzio Palladino i
.%lchairman fl United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Dear..Mr. Chairman:
.[h:Ibwant to express deep dissatisf action with the manner in
' Which the Commission has handled one important aspect of the T L'rhree Mile Island accident. This concerns reporting failures
'that occurred on March 28, 1979.
The initial inquiry
',"iconducted by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E)
- -did'not address the issue; the inquiry conducted by the NRC
.' /Special Inquiry Group was incomplete; and the most recent I I4B investigation undertaken af ter my repeated urging was
., :.g wholly inadequate.
d ou.did not respond to my November 4, 1981 request for an
'Jexplanation of I&E's failure to conduct a comprehensive i~quiry with regard to reporting of information to State n
v' officials.
Recently we have observed the sorry spectacle,of
< +-lhigh lev.el Commission staf f seeking to make a distinction
.'.'.'t.between " knowingly " and " willfully" withholding information
. : required to be reported by NRC regulations., a distinction that appears acceptable to a Commission ma-jority.
. 'yjThis history does little to inspire confidence in the l
fCommission's ability to confront situations involving an
'-[".M,pparent willful violation of its regulations.
, '.;P'or my part, I do not accept your staf f 's tortured
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." distinctions between " knowingly" and "willf ully. "
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.. J. :) Notwithstanding the fundamentally flawed cha'racter of the i-t l
l W- 'NRC investigations, the record is such that a f air reading
.'. 'of it leads to the conclusion that significant information.
.:.was ivillf ully withheld f rom State and Federal of ficials on i
'.. /the first day of the accident at Three Mile Island.
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,C on. Nunzio P,alladino February 4, 1982 I.f I. believed that continuation of our dialogue on this
. matter would lead to a satisf actory resolution, I woula
~ continue.to press for a response, particularly to the
- question as to whether the Commission believes that persons, 3
. ho acted as stated in the conclusions of the House Interior !
w Committee staff report, did willfully violate the
- Commission's regulations. But given the Commission's
. apparent determination to avoid confronting the issue ldirec'tly, I have concluded that further requests for a clear
\\ resolution are destined to result only in more obfuscation.
has done more than to
.a,71nally, your inaction on this matter traise questions about the Commission's credibility.
Your fresponse to this. serious violation of NRC regulations
'...bonveys to your staf f the notion that circumstances exist J where the. interest of the greater good dictates avoidance of
. findings that would force administrative actions t at imply h
'. commission of a criminal act.
Moreover, in permitting staff
- to' conceal a problem with obfuscatory language and with Lwords having meanings dif f erent f rom those in common usage, f
{you set a poor example for your licensees.
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- iderely, lII RRIS'K. UDALL
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COf4falSSION i
.t WASH mCToN. o. c. 2osss January 27, 1981 aa,.o.
3ket No. 50-320 *
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l f81-17 i
~ Metropolitan Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. R., C. Arnold
. Senior Vic~e President i
~250 Cherry. Hill Ro~ d a
Parsippany, NJ,07054
. Gentlemen:' -
. 'On. April 1,19hD, the 'Odice of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) resumed its investigation into the flow of information on March 28, 1979 surrounding the.
accident which occurred at ypur Three Mile Island Unit 2 facility (THI-2).
That sffort has now been completed and a copy of the report (N11 REG-0760) i is. enclosed for your use.
' Two' items of noncompliance identifi,ed' during this investigation are set for.th.
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in Appendix A.
These items relate to the failure of the licensee to implement an adequate system to obtain; evaluate' and communicate information within the
' cnsite organization and between the onsite and responsible offsite agencies.
It:is.ne. responsibility of each ' licensee to ensure that iriformation is adequate.ly transmitted to management personnel during normal, as well as l
' emergency, conditions.
Each licensee is responsible that procedures provi.de l
.for~ and. are implemented to assure that information and interpretation of it are immediately available to plant managers as well as responsible offsite, i
agencies:during emergency conditions.
l Our ' decision to take enforcement apti'on based on the findings of this.
. investigation reflects the judgmentthat Metropolitan Edi' son Company as a licensee lhas a unique and direct respon'sibility for protecting the health and I
safety o.f the public during an emergency.
While other entities play a signi-j ficant role.in responding to an emergency situation, it is the licenses who
'must effectively gather data and analyze the incident for its own emergency response,.as well as those of supporting local, state and federal agencies,. to
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be ' effective.. It is in this particular area that on the day of the TMI-2 accident,'there was a clear failure in Metropolitan Edison Company's-response.
Tha attached Notice of Violation specifies the items of noncompliance involved.
Because; of s'tatutory limits in effect at the time of the accident, no further civil penalties are proposed.
Since your corrective actions will be assessed
- i by the NRC Staff in conjunction with the issues related to restart of your THI-1 facility, no response to the Notice of Violation is required.
A copy of this letter?and our investigation report will be forwarded to the Atdmic Safety and Licensing Board for use in that proceeding.
Should you wish to respond.to my. office with respect to the identified. items of noncompliance, your comments will cer.tainly be considered.
2-January 27, 1981 j-hEtropo1 Nan'Edisen Company In accordancec ith Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
. Title 10, Code.of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and.the w
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cnclosures vill be placed in the NP.C's Public Document Room.
Sincerely, y.g.y or Stello,' '.
Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosures:
~ Appendix A - Notice of Vie,*,_ *; ion l
1,7. Investigation Report - NUREG-0760 2.
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APPENDIX A
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.iH Docket No. 50-320 Katropolitan Edison Company EA-81-17 i
Three Mile,I'sland Unit 2 A.
Operation.of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 facility is authorized by.
License No. DPR-73. which requires that the facility be operated in
.accordance with its Technical Specifi' cations and the Rules and
-Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.'Section IV,10 CFR 50, Appendix E, " Content of Emergency Plans," requires that emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to:
"A. The organization for coping with~radiati-on emergencies, in which specific authori. ties, responsibilities, and duties are defined and assi gned... "
Section 6.8.1,. Thr'ee Mile Island Unit 2 Technical Specifications, requires that written, procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering Emergency Plan implementation.
1 The' Radiation Emergency Plan for Three Mile Island, Section 3.2.1,
" Responsibilities and Duties," defines the responsibilities and duties of' Under the terms plant personnel 'ssigned to the emergency organization.
a of this section, the Station Superintendents or Shift Supervisor will,
'upon being notified of any emergency,
...b.
Obtain, necessary inf,ormation to properly evaluate the si tuation. "
Contrary to the above requirements, on March 28, 1979, following the trip of Unit 2 and the subsequ.nt degradation of plant conditions, examp'les of
. i~nsta:Tes where information.was not obtained and evaluated by responsible indiviuuals, include:
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-1.
Information concerning the extended period during which the EMOV was open and the changes in system status associated with closure of the.
block valve was available to plant personnel before 8 a.m., but was either not gathered or not adequately evaluated in a timely manner
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by responsible licensee supervisors.
2.
Reading., taken from the core exit thermocouples (which co.uld indicate some temperatures in the range where the zirconium water reaction is of concern) were improperly evaluated by responsible licensee.
supervisors at the time.they were measured.
3.-
The occurrence and, validity of the containment pressure spike was not communicated to responsible individuals in a timely manner, nor
'was the information on the pressure spike properly evaluated by subordinate's. -
This'is a violation.
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, 'Appendi$c A'(Continued)
~ January 27, 1!81 Onsite supervisory ~ personnel contributed to the above-described f ailur'es in implementing the facili.ty emergency procedures.
Howev'er, in particular, the Emergency Director, in his uniq..? position t
as overall coordinator, and the responsible'. individual for managing L,
the 'esirgency, feilEd to effectively utilize cnsitE and-efinte-resources to.
t 1.-
Obtain accurate information describing the hccident and plant i
- status, l
2.
Analyze. acquired information to plan corrective action, and l
3.
Ad,equately notify federal and state officials.
Finally, while the Emergency Director did take prudent actions to I
erisure continued ' management of the er.,ergency prior to leaving the site to brief the Lieutenant Governor, on balance, he should not have j
left.the site during' an ongoing accident.
i B.
Section 6.8 of Three Mile Island Unit 2 Technical Specifications
. states that written proce'dures shall be established, implemented and
' maintained covering Emergency Plan Implementation.
Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.3, which implements the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Emergency Plan, states that, in a General Emergency, it shall be the responsibility of licensee personnel "...
to provide maximum,
.. assistance and information possible..." to the NRC (among others).
Contrary to the abov_e requirement, the following dre examples of issues which were not' reported to the NRC or to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
1.'
Uncert'ainty of core cooling and potential for degradation.
2.
Pressure spike.
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3.
Incore thermocouple readings.
4; EHOV status durin.g the initial phase of the accident.
Be'cause this item was caused by the violation in Item A, it is considerid to be an infraction, in this case.
Under other circumstances, such a i
failure, in itself, would be a serious violation.
ii rp;- } c d
.V ctor Stello,-
Director Office of' Inspection and Enforcement L
. Dated at Bethesda, Maryland' this 27th _ day. of January',1981 i
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD'S SEPARATE REMARKS i would like to reiterate.the conclusion of my February 24, 1981 letter on this matter.'
In particular, I believe that the conmittee staff view is probably correct.
I see no useful distinction to be made between " knowingly"
. _and "will ingly. " Both Commissioner Gilinsky and I voted unsuccessfully in Octobr 1979 to revoke rather than suspended the TMI licensing precisely because we felt that -wil' fulness need not be proven in view of the importance of the information that did not flow.
Nonetheless, I continue to feel that enforcement action against the individuals would fail.
liy conclusions are not altogether free from doubt.
The investigative groundwork is inadequate to support such a proceeding. The investigators and enforcers have no heart for it.
An action that failed would be worse than nothing, for that result would appear to condone a state of '
I affairs that the Commission has already condemned in other ways.
I For these reasons, I see nothing further to be gained from actions against individuals involving charges of deliberately withholding infonnation. However, this subject is a legitimate area of concern in the TMI-restart proceeding.
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. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY'S SEPARATE REMARKS I.do not share the Commission's assessment of its handling of GPU's reporting failures during the Three Mile Island accident.
The first NRC investigation of this question was superficial.
After that, the Commission pursued this. matter only at the insistence of your Committee. Each step was taken reluctantly and grudgingly.
Just as. the Company was too weak to level with the State and Federal authorities on the day of the accident, and too weak to confront that failure afterward, so NRC has been too weak to carry out its' resp'onsibilities. Both the Commission and the Staff have hidden behind every ambiguity to explain away any wrongdoing connected with the reporting failure. The Commission has, thus, avoided facing the implications of,this failure for the finding it has to make in the TMI-l case on the adequacy of the Company's~ management'.
At the outset of the TMI-1 hearing, the Commission refused to deal itself with the issue of the
. competence and integrity of the Company's management, and instead turned the matter over to a hearing board, which is inherently
.unsulted to deciding this type of issue.
Ironically, this f
I delegation has been the chief cause of the extraordinary.
prolongation of the hearing.
j Recently, at long last, the. Staff, in the person of Mr. Stello, L
finally conceded that significant information about the severity of the accident had been withheld " knowingly" by the Company on.
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the day of the accident.'
But, Mr. Stello added, in what can only s
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be described as an. Alice-in-Wonderland departure from the I
dictionary meaning of words, this involved no " intent" or
' willfulness" on the company's part.
If tha Commission does indeed take the reporting failure teriously, it shows little sign of doing so in connection with the possible restar,t of TMI Unit 1.
Even more serious than the reporting failure itself is the continued unwillingness or inability of the top management of the Company to face up to the
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wrong'oing in their ranks on the day of the accident.
So far.as d
I am. concerned this disqualifies that management from operating-nuclear plants'in the future.
I would not authorize GPU to operate a nuclear power plant until important changes have been made at the top.
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' Additional Comments of Commissioner Ahearne in Response to Congressman Udall's-letter of February 4, 1982 I would have added the following to the Commission i
response:
"Your letter state's that
.. "that record is such that a fair reading of it leads to the conclusion that significant information was willfully withheld from State and Federal officials We did not reach that con-clusion.
However, if you have, it would appear. appropriate for you to request'the Justice Department to follow up on
~your conclusions."
In addition, I cannot allow Commissioner Gilinsky's criticism to go without a response.
Here the Commissioner describes the NRC as having "been too weak to carry out its responsibilities," the " Commission and the Staff" as having " hidden behind every. ambiguity," and i
the Commission as having " avoided facing the' implications."
He goes on to critisize Mr. Stello for an " Alice-in-Wonderland" use of words.
This criticism coincides with. Congressman
'Udall's' description of " staff's tortured distinctions," the.
" Commission's apparent determination to-avoid confronting i the issue directly," and " permitting staff -to conceal a
. problem with' obfuscatory language."
Over the last several years, there has been one issue here:
Did Metropolitan Edison people on the day-of the
'.Three Mile Island accident deliberately not give a clear picture in order to mislead official people (NRC and State) into believi6g.that the accident was less severe than it Commissioner Gilinsky and the Udall staff have con-was.
cluded the answer to that is "yes."
As Commissioner Gilinsky points.out in his comments, he therefore believes that
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chan~ges should be made at the top of Met.Ed before the plant should be allowed to operate.
l I agree with the Commissioner in that if I had reached the same conclusion he did, I would also believe that changes-l should be made.
The' difficulty is that the investigations l
have not shown that conclusion to be valid.
The problem l
that both the Commissioner and the Udall staff have.with the Commission's position is that our conclusion differs; from their conclusion.
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l There apparently is a willingness on the part of the outside to perceive our staff, and therefore the Commission,
!4 cs hiding, as avoiding inescapable evidence.
It is unfortu-j nate that most of those criticizing have not gone through
'the lengthy reexamination that the rest of us have.
Our position has been and remains consistent with the. result of the investigations.
We have investigated and re-investigated end the result remains the same -- the investigators did not find that there was a deliberate - willful - withholding of information.
They have resisted, admirably so, being pres-sured into taking a position that is different from the one that they reach honestly.
Over the past several years the NRC staff has attempted, in particular,'Mr. Stello, with remarkable forebearance, to repeat over and over again the conclusions that were justified on the basis of the investigations.
.They nave attempted to indicate the uncertain state of information that was available
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at the time of the accident and the confusion that reigned.
As a result, yes, they concluded there was information that was not transmitted..However, they found no basis for con-cluding this resulted from a deliberate attempt to mislead.
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As is well known to those following these episodes, the Udall staff conclusion that appears in the final report is different from the Udall staff conclusion that appeared in the' draft report.
The draft report conclusion was unacceptable.
to the NRC people who had been working with the Udall staff and were most familiar with the details of the investigation.
The report conclusion was changed.
The report conclusion became acceptable to the staff because the revision reflected the staff i
. concerns and was consistent with the staff position.
The critics of the staff position have tried to use other words to describe.it.
.When we disagree with thair interpretation, they say "Ah-ha, you are now hiding behind cloudy words."
I disagree.
I believe we must reach our judgment on the basis of the facts.
The information indicates the Commission's position is correct and the staff's position is correct.
It is not Alice-in-Wonderland language.
It is not obfuscatory language.
It is clear:
we did not conclude that the licensee personnel willfully misled the off-site people on the day of the accident.
This is different from the concl'usion of Commissioner Gilinsky and of the Udall staff.
I regret that, but it is different.
I doubt my remarks will be interpreted as attempting to deplet the true case.
.They will undoubtedly be depicted as an. attempt to blow further smoke over the issue.
I also regret that.
However, the staff is being unfairly vilified.
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