ML20049H721

Discusses Proposed Rule for Documentation of Differences from Revised Srp.Nrr Has Suggested Changes to Proposed Rule & Has Declared SRP Would Not Be Treated as NRC Requirement. Addl 30-day Comment Period Recommended

ML20049H721
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/01/1982
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20049H724	List: ML20049H721 ML20049H728 ML20049H737
References
NUDOCS 8203030483
Download: ML20049H721 (2)

Text

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J MAR 011982 p I i <a

't o9 b, :,?a-MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino

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Commissioner Bradford 1

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William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operatiens

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED RULE - DOCUMENTATION OF DIFFERENCES FROM THE REVISED STANDARD REVIEW PLAN In transmitting the subject memo (SECY-81-648), I recommended that the Commission take no action until the safety benafits and resource estimates were reviewed by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR).

I also indicated a concern that the promulgation of this rule might cause affected license applicants to conclude that the various aspects of the Standard Review Plan would be considered as NRC requirements.

The CRGR has completed its review of the proposed rule (Enclosure 1) and has recommended that the rule as proposed in SECY-81-648 not be approved.

At my direction, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has reviewed the matter, and the Director of NRR has suggested changes to the proposed rule which would lessen its impact (Enclosure 2). This proposed revision would result in a further reduction in the impact of the rule because it reduces the number of plants to which the rule would apply.

In addition, because the proposed rule would apply to only those operating license l

applications docketed after the effective date of the rule, it would permit a coordinated development of the FSAR with the documentation needed to comply with this rule and should thereby result in a further reduction in resources.

On balance, I have concluded that the proposed rule should be revised to reflect changes proposed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (Enclosure 3). The table of plants for which this proposed rule would not apply is listed in Enclosure 4, and a table of plants to which the rule may apply is listed in Enclosure 5.

With regard to the concern that this rule could have the effect of creating the impression that the Standard Review Plan will be viewed as an NRC requirement, I have the assurance from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation that they do not intend to treat the Standard Review Plan as an NRC requirement. To assure that this objective is met. I intend to direct the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to implement

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m The Comissioners SECY-81-648 was based on the premise that the proposed rule would be issued as a final rule. However, I believe that it would be desirable to obtain public coments focused on the details of the rule as now pro-posed since it clearly represents a significant reduction in the scope of the rule from that originally proposed and since there is still some question whether even this rule might have an adverse impact on safety.

I therefore recommend that the rule be issued as a proposed rule for an additional 30-day comment period.

(Signed) William J. Dircks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations Enclosures :

1.

CP.GR Review of Proposed Rule 2.

NRR's Suggested Changes to Propos d Rule (Denton Memo) 3.

NRR's Suggested Changes to Proposed Rule 4.

List of Plants to Which the Rules Would Not Apply 5.

List of Plants to Which the Rule May Apply i

cc: SECY OPE OGC Distribution:

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FEB 2 61982 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM:

Victor Stello, Jr., Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements

SUBJECT:

CRGR MEETING #7 Enclosed are the minutes of CRGR Meeting #7 dated February 18, 1982.

Appended to these minutes are additional comments received from the following members:

Joseph Scinto Darrell Eisenhut Clemens J. Heltemes, Jr.

Ed Jordan For your convenience and ready reference, I have also enclosed copies of the material received from Harold Denton and several industry comments on cost estimates on the impact of the proposed Standard Review Plan Rule.

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1ctor Stelle,

., Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements

Enclosures:

As stated cc: CRGR Members Office Directors Regional Administrators G. Cunningham, ELD Commission (5)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM:

Victor Stello, Jr., Chairman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING #7.

The Committee to Review Generic Requirements met on Wednesday, February 3, 1982 from 9:00a.m. to 3:00 p.m.

A continuation of the meeting to further discuss item (3) below, was held on Wednesday, February 10, 1982 from 9:00a.m. to 11:00a.m.

A list of the attendees are enclosed.

The actions of the Comittee are described below:

1.

NRR (Hanauer) described the status of their activities in prioritizing Generic Safety Issues, including TMI Action Plan items under development.

The Committee noted the progress in these activities and suggested that subsequent briefings would be appropriate to keep CRGR informed concerni,ng NRR's actions to incorporate prioritization into their plans for dealing with.the Generic Safety Issues.

2. 'In conducting the survey of mechanisms for communicating new requirements to licensees, the DEDROGR staff noted that new requirements were apparently being imposed by means of frequent changes to the Standard Tech.nical Specifications (STS) in a manner that was not adequately controlled.

In his briefing on this subject, Dr. Hanuaer stated that NRR recognized tne problem and he described draft office procedures designed to limit the frequency of changes to the generic STS and to better control the case-specific application of the generic STS.

Mr. Novak of NRR discussed the practice of changing Tech Specs on Operating Reactors, noting that the staff frequently imposed parts of the latest version of the Standard Tech Specs on licensees applying for license amendments.

The Comittee suggested that NRP, develop and implement office procedures to control the retrofit of current STS on operating reactors licensed to earlier Tech Specs.

3.

At the request of the EDO, the Comittee reviewed the proposed final rule concerning documentation of differences from the current Standard Review Plan (SECY 81-648).

NRR (E. Case and C. Grimes) briefed the i

Committee on the background of the proposed rule and NRR's estimates i

of the costs and safety benefits.

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William J. Dircks,

The primary safety benefit identified by NRR was that the staff would be able to focus its review on the differences from the SRP and spend less time searching for the differences. Consequently, resources could then be concentrated on the evaluation of the specific differences from the SRP-criteria, rather than independently reviewing the SAR in order to identify such differences.

It was noted that an audit review of the descriptive SAR material would still be required to provide confidence that the licensee's identification of 1

differences from SRP criteria was complete and accurate and to develop j

a proper understanding of the design.

Further, it was acknowledged i

that in a theoretical sense, the staff would only have to audit the i

identification of differences, but in a practical sense, it would be j

necessary for the s.taff to detemine that each difference was l

acceptable because of the need to make and defend the necessary staff l

findings and because any identified difference in an acceptable SAR would set a precedent for other applications.

Although NRR was unable to quantify the safety benefit associated with the proposed rule, they believed that the concentrated evaluation effort i

would be more likely to identify design deficiencies and, thus, could enhance the overall safety of the plant. While acknowledging that this might have a potential for some safety benefit, the Committee tried to get specific examples of matters that might have had significant safety improvement, had the proposed rule been in place.

It was hard to identify specific examples where the audit reviews now being conducted have proved inadequate with regard to safety and, consequently, where important safety matters embodied in the SRP criteria were being missed or improperly addressed by the applicant and by the staff.

Thus, it was difficult to obtain a sense of the degree, if any, of specific.

safety improvement that may result from the proposed rule.

With regard to the costs in terms of manpower required to implement the proposed rule, there were wide divergences between estimates by the NRR staff and by industry.

Based on discussions with industry representatives, NRR estimated that it would require about 10 licensee staff-years per plant to comply with the rule and an additional one to two staff years per application required on the part of NRC.

The Atomic Industrial Forum,

estimated that it would require about.10 licensee staff-years to identify and describe differences from the SRP, but that the manpower needed to justify and defend the~ differences could be an additional 30 or more staff-years per plant during the OL review.

NRR disagreed with this l

estimate on the basis that much of the work of identifying and justifying differences from the SRP is part of the normal OL review process.

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I William J. Dircks

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NRR believed that the' effort was only that of documentation and that no substantial efforts to justify each difference were needed. On the other hand, the^ industry believed'that the SRP contains numerous acceptance criteria that allow subjective interpretation by the staff, and thus, while the staff may know the specific intention, purpose and scope of each criterion, the' industry would have to conservatively identify all potential differences and to present analysis sufficient to justify how the proposed alternative is acceptable for each difference no matter how trivial.

Further, the AIF was concerned that essentially all project documentation such as drawings, specifications, analyses, contracts, letters, etc. would have to be specifically reviewed in the context of the' rule to assure all differences are properly identified, described and justified.

In an attempt to reconcile the differences in the resource estimates provided to the CRGR, a meeting was convened with the DEDROGR staff,

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NRR and industry representatives.

While some progress was made during the meeting, it was decided that a DJrther analysis would be made of a recently completed review for which it was estimated that approximately 60% of the SRP was used during the audit review process.

Based on this'

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analysis, the AIF staff estimated that an additional resource commitment of about 41 staff-years would be required ~ to implement the rule.

For

.the plants listed in Enclosures.1 and 2 of SECY 81-648 this estimate -

cou.1d require the efforts of hundreds of industry safety staff during

.the year after implementation of the~ rule.

Based on the results of the NRC survey' reported in NUREG 0839 and the vacancy rates (7-24%)

currently existing in the industry, it is expected that a significant adverse resource impact would result.

Attempting to balance costs and benefits on an individual case-by-case basis suggests the rule would not be cost beneficialf* Furthermore, considering the balance on an industry-wide basis, the Committee believed that the potential exists for a negative impact on safety because the resource needs approaching the magnitude projected for imposing this rule would detract from current safety prograns imposed as a result of the THI follow-up activities.

Based on this review, the Committee reached the following conclusions:

No clear safety benefits have been articulated for the proposed a.

rule.

Principally due to a lack of recognizable safety benefits.

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b.

The industry resources needed to comply with the rule would probably fall in the higher part of the 10-40 staff-year per plant estimate range.

c.

Implementation of the rule would adversely impact other ongoing priority safety work and could thereby have an adverse impact on overall nuclear safety.

In view of these conclusions, the Comittee recommended that the EDO propose to the Comission 'that the rule not be adopted.

During the Committee discussions, it was pointed out that the rule, as proposed in SECY 81-648, has an internal inconsistency with j

respect to second units, which the paper asserts are uncontested.

This is incorrect for most of the second units identified in

! of SECY 81-648.

Nine units are currently part of contested proceedings, and their inclusion in the rule can affect the contested hearings.

The paper indicated that a principal goal in the proposed rule was to assure that the licensing process, including the hearing boards, would not be on the critical path.

The inclusion of contested units under subparagraph (f)(1)(b) would be inconsistent with this goal. The Committee noted that this inconsisten'cy would have to be

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reconciled in any event.

4.

The Committee met with the Directors of NRR and IE.to discuss resolution of the Emergency Response Facility issues.

Mr. Dentor (NRR) concurred with the January 29, 1982 draft of.the~ Emergency Response requirements prepared by the DEDROGR staff.

Mr. DeYoung (IE} asked for additional time to review the draft document.

The following day, Mr. DeYoung con-curred in the proposed document with suggestions for editorial improve-ments.

The Comittee agreed to recommend to the ED0 that he concur in the adoption by the Directors of NRR and IE of the proposed Emergency Response Requirements and instruct the Director of NRD to implement them.

Victor Stello, Jr. / airman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements

Enclosure:

List of Attendees

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CRGR MEETING NUMBER 7 Attendance.(2-3-82)

,CRGR Members Vic Stello Ed Jordan K. Goller (Rep. R. Bernero)

Jack Heltemes Don Mausshardt Darrell Eisenhut Joe Scinto Others Walt Schwink Steve Hanauer Frank Schroeder Warren Minners Mal Ernst Tom Murley John Austin Tom Cox Mat Taylor P. McKee

. Tom Novak P. Wagner ~

Ed Case Chris Grimes Steve Stern

' Don Skovholt Tom Rehm Chris Grimes T. Gibbon Harold Denton Richard DeYoung EXECUTIVE SESSION ON 2-10-82 (Followup discussions on Doucmentation of SRP Differences - References Mtg. f7)

Others CRGR Members Tom Murley V. Stello Walt Schwink Joe Scinto Tom Cox Bob Bernero Beth Hayden Jack Heltemes Bob Purple (Rep. D: Zisenhut)

Mat Taylor

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February 19, 1982 l-MEMORANDUM FOR:

Victor Stello, Jr., Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements

'FROM:

Joseph Scinto, Deputy Director Hearing Division, OELD

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF CRGR HEETING #7 I have the following coments en the subject minutes.

The minutes with respect to item 3, the SRP rule, do not reflect the discus-sions concerning the potential for limiting the proposed rule to facilities whose FSAR has not yet been prepared.

For these facilities, there was some discussion that the costs, in terms of manpower, might be substantially less than those discussed with AIF and those based on the recently completed review; there might also be benefits not directly related to safety, such as procedural benefits in hearings, etc.

In the absence of information with respect to the benefit or cost of the rule, if limited to plants whose FSAR had not yet been prepared, the Committee did not attempt to reach a conclu -

sion on the matter of a limited version of the proposed rule. Nonetheless, I think the minutes should reflect this discussion.

The minutes with respect to item 4 should more clearly state that the proposed Emergency Response requirements which have been adopted by the Office Directors (and which we are recommending that the EDO concur in) are those attached to Mr. Stello's February ll,1982 memorandum.

The January 29, 1982 draft referred to in the prior paragraph was generally accepted in principle with various comments which were incorporated in the February 11,1982 draft. The February 11, 1982 draft is the draft sent to the CRGR for review and that is the draft which the Office Directors should have adopted.

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l February 24, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Victor Stello, Jr., Chairman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements FROM:

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING #7 Having reviewed the minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 7 dated, February 18, 1982, I offer the following coments:

1.

RE: SRP Rule I note that the minutes do not reflect that the CRGR had discussions concerning:

a.

The safety benefit to utilities through an SRP standardized, systematic design verification

review, i

b.

That CRGR members discussed several options or variations to the Rule as proposed; for example,

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applying it to " future" applications only, or limiting it to " safety significant" SRP items, and c.

The credibility of the industry estimates of up to 134 man-years additional resources required per plant.

In addition, I note that the tone of the minutes puts too much emphasis on the issue of resources and not enough on the benefits, particularly when recognizing that the benefits from any Rule of this type would be hard to quantify and that almost any new Rule will require resources. The question therefore is not just how many additional resources are required; rather its whether the benefits warrent the expenditure of such resources.

For future plants several years away, I believe the balance to be in favor of having an SRP Rule - for out-plants the expenditure of such resources will be minimized and the resources will less likely need to be diverted from other on-going upgrades at operating reactors.

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RE:

Emergency Response Facility Issues I believe the minutes may be misleading.

The January 29, 1982 document was concurred in by the Office Directors with comments.

Your February ll,1982 memorandum transmitted a revised final version of that document which you characterized as "a reconciliation of NRR, IE, CRGR, DEDR0GR and industry comments."

I therefore believe that you shouldn't characterize it as the document carrying Office Director concurrence unless you later request such concurrences.

L-Darrell G. Eisenhut, Dire'ctor Division of Licensing cc: R. Bernero J. Heltenes E. Jordan D. Mausshardt T. Murley J. Scinto W. Schwink 9

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O FEB 221982 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Jr., Chairman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements FROM:

C. J. Heltemes,.Jr., Member Committee to Review Generic Requirements

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING NUMBER 7 The draft minutes of the CRGR meeting Number 7 dated February 18, 1982 reflect the general discussion and conclusions associrJed with the proposed rule on documenting SRP differences under the proposed implementation schedule. However, the draft minutes do not reflect the discussions regarding the possible application of the proposed rule to only future. plants whose FSAR is in the early stage of development. As noted in my previous oral and written comments, I favor further analysis to determine whether the proposed rule would be justified if applied to only future plants in light of the greatly reduced resource commitment that would result if the SRP differences were documented

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as an integral part of the FSAR development.

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Member C

ttee to Re Mew Generic Requirements cc: RBernero, RES DEisenhut, NRR EJordan, IE DMausshardt, HMSS JScinto, ELD TMurley, DEDORGR WSchwink, DEDORGR Zwm=e456m?? -

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rj WASHlh GTON, D. C. 20555 FEB 2 61982 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Jr., Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements FROM:

Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Engineering ~ & Quality Assurance, IE

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING H My comments related to the subject minutes are directed toward the final version of the Committee's r.ecommendation on Emergency Response Capability which was transmitted by your memo dated February 11, 1982.

My comments do not affect my position of endorsement expressed during the February 3,1982 meeting. The comments are intended as further improvements to a complex document which has the potential for far-reaching impact on the NRC staff and industry actions on Emergency Response. A brief explanation of the purpose or reason for each proposed modification and a comparative text revision is provided in the enclosure.

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or' dan, Director.

wa Divisi of Engineering and Qual y Assurance Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosure:

Proposed Modification to Emergency Response Capability cc w/ enclosure:

R. C. DeYoung, IE B. K. Grimes, IE D. G. Eisenhut, NRR D. B. Mausshardt, NMSS R. M. Bernero, RES C. J. Heltemes, AEOD

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Enclosure Proposed Modification to 'Emeroency Response Capability 1.

The wording of the policy statement may diminish the value of REG Guides and NUREG reports as a side effect of removing the ratchet effect. The following rewerding is provided:

p. 3 The following NUREG documents are to be used as information or guidance only, and the ' Regulatory Guides are to be con-sidered as guidance or as an acceptable a-pessible approach.

to meeting formal requirements. Under-no-efreumstanees-should The items by virtue of their inclusion in these documents shall not be misconstrued as requirements to be levied on licensees or as inflexible criteria to be used by NRC staff reviewers.

2.

Item 4.d., page 4 may be misunderstood to argue against centralizing functions for the SPDS. ' A preferable wording is as.follows:

p. 4 Acquisition, processing, and management of data for SPDS, control room improvements, and emergency response facilities should be coordinated but-need-net-be and centralizedi to~the

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. extent practical.

3.

W'hile I fully support the proposed function of negotiating " reasonable and achievable" schedules by agreement between the NRC Program Manager and each individual licensee, the boundary conditions for such agreements should be provided by the responsible NRC program office.

I propose the following modifications to make that provision:

p. 2 When the basic requirements for emergency response capabilities and facilities are finalized, they should be transmitted to licensees by a generic letter from NRR, promulgated to NRC staff, and be appropriately incorporated as regulatory requirements (e.g.,

in the Standard Review Plan or by regulation or Order, as needed).

The letter to licensees should request that licensees submit a proposed schedule for completing actions to comply w;th the basic requirements.

Each licensee's proposed schedules would then be reviewed by the assigned NRC Project Manager, who would discuss the subject with the licensee using ceneral implementation goals of the NRC program office and mutually agree on schedules and completion dates. The implementation dates would then be forma-lized into an enforceable document.

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p. 5 5.

Genera. Molementation goals'should be provided by the respontible NRC' program ~ office.

Specific implementation

. plans and reasonable, achievable schedules should be established deftned by agreement between the NRC Project Manager and each individual licensee. 'The NPC office responsible for implementing each requirement should develop procedures identifying the following:

p. 5 6.

The NRC Project hnager for each nuclear power plant is assigned schedule' coordination program-management respon-sibility for NRC staff actions associated with implementing emergency response initiatives. The NRC Project Manager is the principal contact for the licensee regarding these-initiatives.

p. 8 Integration Although prompt implementation of an SPDS is a desired goal, the schedule for implementation should be based on the licensee's judgment as to overall integrati.on of SPDS, control room design review, and development ~of symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures, as well as the general 3 implementation goals provided by the NRC program office.-

For this reason, licensees should develop and propose a schedule for imalementation of all three items.

If reasonable, this schedule siould be accepted by NRC.

p.12 Integration Although prompt implementation of an SPDS with other aspects of cortrol room design review to follow is a desired goal, schedules l

for implementation should be based on the licensee's judgment as to overall integration of SPDS, control room design review, and development of upgraded emergency operating ~ procedures; as well as the general implementation goals of the NRC program "oTfice.

For this reason, licensees should develop and propose a schedule for implementation of all three items.

If reasonable.' this schedule should be accepted by NRC.

4.

The description of indicators, equipment and circuitry as being of " reliable design" needs a little more explanation.

I recommend describing the instrument quality as control grade as stated. in the' proposed revision:

p.13, item 2.b.

The indicators and associated circuitry shall be of reliable design equivalent to control grade but need not meet Class lE, single-failure or seismic quali-fication requirements.

I l p.13, item 3.b.

The EOF data indications and associated circuitry shall be of reliable-design (control grade) but t

need not meet Class 1E, single-failure or seismic qualification requirements.

5.

The environmental control and radiological protection required in the TSC should be expressed more precisely:

p.19 4.

Environmentally controlled to provide normal room air temperature, humtdtty and cleanliness + appropriate for personnei'and equipment.

p.19 5.

provided with radiological protection and monitoring equipment necessary to assure-that-radiatien-expesure te-any-persen-werking-in-the-TSE-weeld-net-exceed-F-rem whel e - be dyre r -i t s e e qu i v al e n t-t e - a ny-pa r t-e f-t he - bcdy, fe ra t he -d u ra tie n-e f,th e-a ee fd e n t - meet radiological

'haoitability'reauirements of the control room under accident conditions as described in GDC 19, SRP 6.4.

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The " current plant records" needed in the TSC and EOF should emphasize drawings, schematics and diagrams as follows:

p. 20 8.

Provided with accur, ate, complete and current plant records (drawings, schematics and diagrams) essential for evaluation of the plant under accident emergeney conditions.

p. 23 7.

Provided with up to date plant records (drawings, schematics, diagrams) procedures, emergency plans and environmental information (such as geophysical data) needed to perform l

EOF functions.

i 7.

Since radiation protection is not required in the OSC, provisions for relocation of the functions should be included:

p. 21 1.

Located onsite to serve as an assembly point for support personnel and to facilitate performance of support functions and tasks 'If the OSC is not habitable under accident conditions, emergency plans shall provide for relocation of l

OSC functions at other onsite locations.

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 y 2 71982 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Dep.uty Executive Director for Regior.a1 Operations & Generic Requirements FROM:

Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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SUBJECT:

PROPOSED RULE CONCERNING DOCUMENTATION OF DIFFERENCES FROM THE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN In SECY 81-648, a final rule was proposed which would requir'e certain pending applicants and all future applicants to document differences from the Standard Review Plan (SRP) acceptance criteria. The Executive Director for Operations recommended that the C'ommission take no action on the proposed rule until the safety benefits and the staff and applicant resources required to implement the proposed rule had been reviewed by the Committle for the Review of Generic Requirements.(CRGR). The enclosure provides the estimate of th'e resource hquiremehts 'and our perception of the safety benefits for the committee's consideration.

t Briefly stated, we estimate that each applicant may.. require.up to a maximum of approximately 10 person-years to prepare the documentation required by the proposed rule and answer staff questions concerning the. documentation.

We expect that this will decrease as the industry develops experience with this effort and it becomes part of the normal application preparati.on process.

In addition, we estimate that on the first plants reviewed the staff will require up to an' additional 1 to 2 person-years to. review this -documentation for each application but. that in the longer term this approach will result in a net decrease in staff review effort. We consider these estimates to be somewhat pessimistic and, therefore, they should be considered as maximum resource requirements.

The safety benefits evolve frcm the staff's audit-type review; by requiring' the applicant to assess conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria the staff can concentrate on the differences and, thus, there is a greater likelihood.that design deficiencies will be identifi ed.

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JAN 2 71982 Victor Stello.

We also note that the plants affected by this proposed' rule may need l

to be slightly revised because of the passage of time since the.ru e was first proposed.

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Harold' R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Resource Estimates and Safety Benefits for the ' Proposed SRP Rule' cc:

E. Case D. Eisenhut R. Vollmer R. Mattson H. Thompson S. Hanauer T. Murley E. Jordan D. Mausshardt*

R. Bernero C. Heitemes J. Scinto R. Tedesco C. Grimes-e O

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ENCLOSURE RsSOURCE ESTIMATES AND SAFETY BENEFITS

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FOR THE PROPOSED SRP RULE In SECY-81,648, the staff proposed a final rule which would require cer.7tain pending applicants and all future applicants to document differences from the Standard Review Plan (SRP) acceptance criteria, in response to a request by the Commission in SECY-COMP B 81-4A.

The proposed final rule would require that applicants describe and evaluate all differences in design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for a i

unit with the corresponding features, techniques, and measures given in the SRP acceptance criteria.

The proposed rule further identified an implemen-l tation schedule for pending and future applications.

In forwarding the proposed final rule, the Executive Director for Operations recommended that the Commission take no action on the rule until the newly formed Committee for the Review of Generic Requirements (CRGR) had an opportunity to review the resource and safety benefit. estimates associated with the rule.

Such estimates were previously described in SECY 81-13 in tthe-context of the original version of the rule which applied to the Systematic Evaluation Program for operating reactors.

We have discussed the present version of the proposed final rule with both the staff and i.ndustry r.epre-

' entatives and have developed the following estimates.

s Staff Resource Estimate The staff has been reviewing current applications in accor$ance with the procedures and acceptance criteria in the SRP (NUREG-0800). There is a wide range of views on the extent. to which that, review is complete, i.e., the.

staff's review is only intended to be an audit, but the degree to which a reviewer assures conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria will vary from branch to branch and, occasionally, between applications.

n.

The amount of a'dditional resources that would be needed would depend on the extent to which the review' remains as an audit; however, on the whole, we estimate that up to an additional one to two person-years of effort would be required for the first several applications. In time, the impact of the proposed rule would result in a resource savings for the staff, as reviewers learn how to use the infccmation provided by industry.

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g' Industry Resource Estimate ihe industry representa'tives uniformly estimated that a significant effort would be required to provide the documentation required by the proposed final rule.

This is principally caused by the anticipated difficulties associated with interpreting the SRP acceptance criteria. The industry believes that it should be sufficient for an applicant to make a proposal

.and let the staff judge the relative acceptability.

Further, the industry believes that the proposed rule elevates the SRP to the status of a regulation.

The resource estimates provided by the industry representatives are based on pending applications and, like the staff, appear pessimistic due to the interpretation difficulties and the change to their routine process.

Their estimates

• of the additional resources that would be required on each application are:

Commonwealth - seven person-years TVA - ten person-years AIF - ten to fifteen person-years Here again, the resource estimate may only affect the short-term or pending applications.

As the industry becomes accustomed to providing such documentation, the additional resources may no longer be necessary.

Safaty Benefits 0

The safety benefits of the proposed rule depend en the extent to which the required documentation would uncover deviations that would not otherwise be uncovered by the staff in the' normal review process. The staff's review of an application is termed an audit review, i.e., the staf,f~ reviews only part of the application to all of the SRP acceptance criteria. The proposed rule would not alter the staff's review, but would supplement it by having one party (the applicant) review all of the ' application to all of the SRP acceptance criteria, and subsequently,-

e-J report the results of their review to the staff. Deviations would be identified and justified.

This would assure that a systematic assessment of the proposed' plant design has been made to the SRP acceptance criteria and, by virtue of the bases for those criteria, to the Commission's regulations.

In addition, the staff would be able to focus on the differences and spend less time searching for them.

Such a concentrated review effort would be more likely to identify design deficiencies and, thus, would enhance the overall safety of the plant.

CThese estimates were provided verbally and are.not intended to be

' precise because of the judgements involved.

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Impacts of Implementing SECY-81-648 Man-hour estimate to fully, add,ress_SECY-81-648 o

Man-Hours (Man-Years) Per Plant i

Task l

i

- Identification and 20,000(10)to 30,000( 15) description

- Justification of deviatio~ns 52,000(26)to200,000(100)

- Defend and support positions 1,2,,,0,0',0 ( 6),t o_ 38, 000 ( 19 )

84,000(42)to268,000(134)

TOTAL Considerations in manpower estimate:

- Interpretation of Acceptance Criteria difficult;

- Multi-discipline ' review required to address certain Acceptance Criteria applicable to several areas of the plant;

- Requires re-evaluation of criteria used in plant design and licensing, which is subject to change throughout life of plant.

Additional impacts to be_ considered e

- Rule would compete for applicant's manpo.wer resour.ces at a time when allocation of industry manpower is crucial; additionally, could affect directly completion of the facility and associated iciensing activiti,s (completion of e

SER; ACRS; ASLB hearings, etc.);

- Competing projects for NRC' staff manpower resources could direct attention from safety as well as schedule for the NTOLs under review;

- Reversal of role, with the ap'plicant having to review the facility against the SRPs rather than the NRC staff '

h perf orming this.funtion would inject a major change in

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regul.atory philosophy;'

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- Status of earlier units, which are not being reviewed, could be brought into que'stion;

- Activity can be expected to adversely impact licensing schedule f or many plants-proposed SECY-81-648 schedule is

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questionable;

- Hearings could be reopened on the basis of "new information" available to presently or newly. admitted parties;'

- Reference to the SRP in the regulations will result in unwarranted escalation of its authority--will institutionalize the SRPs;

- Unwarrasted emphasis on "diff erences" from SRP criteria could confuse staff priorities in review of applications.

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' IMPACTS OP PROPOSED SRP RULE I

The proposed rule requiring certain applicants to document f

differences from the revised SRP will result in numerous impacts.

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1. Significant' industry resource for each docket, 84,000 to 268,000 man-hours (Attachment A).

a. Identification of differences:

(1) Subjective - Acceptance criteria are of ten non-specific in nature, and therefore, will require interpretation.

Example: SRP, Rev.2-July 1981, Page2.2.1-2; " Sufficient statistical data with respect.o hazardous materials are t

provided to establish a basis for evaluating the (2) potential hazard to the plant (emphasis added)". Complex - Many S tomany areas of the plant; the issue may not yet be a requireme t)SRP, page 3.10-3, " Tests and analyses are Example:. 1

. required to confirm the operability of all mechanical and electrical equipment during and after an eartEqdike 6f dignit6de'66 to and including the 033 and SSE...(emphasis added)".

(3) EV51utionary - Criteria have changed throughout the life of each plant, an assessment for work, completed at one point in time may not be valid for similar work done at

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a different point in time.

2. a.

The specific activity is one of documentation, and is an approach that has little, if any safety merit, but could have, large manpower resource impacts.

In a memo from.the former Director of the 0.ffice of Nuclear Rea; tor Regulation, Ben Rusche, to his division directors of January 3, 1977, he decided to alter-the-review program based on "the conviction' ~~

that the singular, issue is one of documentation and not safety".

This was also reficcted in an early' version of the staff p'roposed systematic safety evaluation program, addressing Section 110, SECY-80-414: "The Documentation of the extent to which r'egulations of particular significance are met is required by law, but may not be particularly useful or necessary in evaluating the overall safety of the plant".

In the report of the President's C'ommission on the Accident at TMI, the following points were made:

(1) "Indeed, once regulations become as voluminous and complex as those regulations now in place, they can serve as a negative f actor in. nuclear safety." (Page 9) 4 e

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ALF (2) "This Commission believes that it is an absorbin'g concern with safety that will bring about safety--not just the mee. ting of narrowly prescribed and complex regulations." (Page 9)

(3) "The existence of a vast body of regulations by NRC tends to focus industr meeting of regulationsy attention narrowly on the rather.than on a systematic

. concern for safety." (Page 20) 2.b.. The SECY-81-648 proposal which focuses on the highly detailed and constantly evolving staff interpretive guidance will consume hundreds of staff man-years and thousands of industry man-years and are, in fact, counterproductive to safety.

The manpower resources utilized would be key personnel at a time when the industry is strapped for manpower and whose time would otherwise be applied to activities of value to improving safety.

Example: (1) Kenneth A. Strahm, INPO, AIF Workshop, Chicago, Illinois, October 18-21, 1981, "The nuclear industry faces a major manpower problem, as I have just described.

Nearly 15 percent of our management, professional and technical positions are vacant; we lost over 5 percent of these people from the industry last year."

(2) Nuclear News, November 1981, " Nuclear Employment: More People Needed" In responding to how serious the shortage is, " Red" e

Thomas, Director of Training and Education for INPO, said, "I would say it's probably the industry's number one problem today."

e "Some statistics from the upcoming DOE report to Congress do confirm that the utilities are experiencing some real shortages.

For example,.as of. March 1, 1981, the following were the utility vacancy rates for engineers: chemical, 11.4 percent; civil, 7.0 percent; electrical and electronics,

~for an.r and reactor, 6

• 14.1 percent; mechanical, 13.8 percent; nuclea l

24.3 pe.rcent; all. others, 24."0 pe~rcent; average rate l

of 17.2 percent." (Page 52) 2.c.' The NRC staff manpower resources required to review the information, make determinations, and. write the SER could also direct attention from safety as well as schedule for the NTOLs being reviewed.

An example based on a I

presentation to the Commission in October 1981 is given in This activity, if performed during 1982, would coincide with NRC plans to submit 10.SERs, support 14 ASLB hearings which should have an initial decision, and support C6= mission plans to make decisions on 17. operator license applications during 1982 (Table 1 of Chairman Palladino's letter of November 27, 1981, to Representative l

Bevill, U.S. House of Representatives).

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3. The activity could adversely impact the status of earlier units.

First units on a site; otherwise exempted by the rule, g

could be brought into question through the activities on subsequent units.

Likewise, plants which have been replicated, although otherwise exempted, could be called into question.

The standardization between units could be in jeo,pardy.

For duplicate or replicate plants, it icay require a second review of many designs already reviewed by the NRC and for which SERs

have been issued.

The second review may result in different findings because of the revised SRPs and different staff reviewers.

Changes could be required on the first unit.

4. This activity can be expected to adversely impact licensing schedules for many plants.

a. Rule would compete for the same manpower presently working on SERs, support of ASLB hearings, etc., at a time when the industry is experiencing critical manpower shortages.

b. The manpower resource needed wi'11 just not be available to hold' schedules in the~ time frame required.

c. Manpower will be diverted from oth'er required activities for licensing.

d. Hearings could be reopened on the basis of "new information" available to presently admitted parties.

Could introduce

.new issues based on the use of "sua sponte" by the ASLB.

e. Additional' parties could petition for admittance on the basis-of "new information" not previously available at the' time of notice.

f. The NRC schedules in SECY-81-648 do not provide for

" question / response" interaction between NRC and applicants.

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5. Reference to the SRP in the regulations will result in L.

, unwarranted escalation of its authority.

7

a. By implication, SRP acceptance criteria will become requirements.

b. By refe'rence in.SRP acceptance criteria, other NRC guidance documents (Regulatory Guides, NUREGs, etc.) will become requirements.

c. By association, othe portions of the SRP which discus means to satisfy acceptance criteria will become re-requirements.

d. NRC facility to revise the SRP to improve its review process may become restricted.

6. Unwarranted emphasis on " differences" from SRP criteria could

" confuse" Staff priorities in review of applications.

Identifying differences is interpretive.

What an a?plicant considers not to be different may not be true for the NRC staff.

With limited resources, the staff review is likely to be " guided" by identification of differences.

The staff may be l

unhappy with the results.

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l/Ntz In addition to these impacts, the basic nature of the rule must be objected to, the acti'vity results in documentation, not improved s

safety.

The SRP is an internal guidance document for the NRC, and should remain as such.

Applicants shouldn?t be identifying doviations or differences from guidance documents.

Applicants

?

provide information to show compliance with regulations.

Differences of the kind discussed cast an unwarranted negative light on acceptable alternatives'.

Judging compliance with j

regulations is an NRC staff function'and responsibility.

[

Applicar.ts obviously believe they comply.

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Attachment A

/42:F NfC2.-

s MAN-HOUR ESTI, MAT,E This estimate is intended to be typical of an applic,ation which is l

already submitted to the NRC.

The following tasks are considered:

Task M,an,'H,o,u,r,s, (Man,-Y,e,a,rs)_ Per Plant e Identification and descriptions of all differences in design fea-tures, analytical techniques and procedural measures proposed for a unit and those corresponding fea-tures, techniques and measures given in the SRP acceptance 20,000(10)to30,000(15) criteria..

~

e For deviations identified., provide evaluations and justifications which provides an acceptable meth-od of complying with those rules or. regulations of the Commission.

This includes (1) providing miss-ing inf ormation and/or data, (2) performing additional analyses where necessary, and-(3) justi-fying the use of existing data and

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analyses,not literally in confor-mance with the SRP and design approaches which differ from the

' SRP.-

Document and submit the-

~~'

52,000(26)to200, BOO (100) required information..

e Defend and' support the submittal in expected discussions with the 12,000(6)to38,000(19)

NRC 84,000(42)to'268,000(134)

TOTAL e

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Proposed Resource: for SEP Support In Fiscal Year 1982

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t During an October 1981 presentation to the Commission, the fiscal

. year 1982 budgeted staff years was 23.

This is in support of ten plants.

Since 1982 was the integration phase and drafting the SER for each plant,.the review of the applicable topics against the present regulatory requirements should be complete.

Therefore, the documentation of the deviations are basically complete.

This represents approximately two staff years per plant to complete the integration and write the SER.

Using this as a guideline for staff' support for SECY-81-648, this would represent 60 staff. years for thirty plants.

Since it is scheduled to be completed in six months,_ this would require 120 h7C staff reviewers for 30 plants.

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Quantification of Man-Hour Estimates Required to Address SECY~81-648 The do11owing man-hour estimates were developed based on recent experience in defending the PSAR submittal including responding to first and second rounds of questions from the staff, informal meetings with the staff through SER submittal.-

Respondent Man-Hours (' dan-Years)

NSSS Scope 60,000 (30) - 80,000 (40) 32,000 (16) - 52,000 (26):

BDP Scope Total 92,000 (46) -132,000 (66) 4 '

Assuming the NRC staff uses 60 percent of the depth of detail of the SRP a:cep.tance criteria and accompanying references to complete its review of the applicants' submittal, to justify the remaining 40 p(ercent of detail may require an additional 61,000 man-hoursapproxima

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31 Assuming that this represents task 2 (justification of deviations) and

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task 3 (defend and support positions), task 1 is estimated to.take an additional 10 man-years.

Therefore, the total estimate would be between 41 man-years and 54 man-years using this approach.

41 In determining these estimates, it shou 1d also be noted that:

1. The revised SRPs of September 1981 have additional acceptance criteria which may not have been used by the staff in the original review;

2. The 60 percent assumes that the staff reviewer reviews the submittal point by point against the acceptance criteria and accompanying references in determining acceptability;

3. The SRP acceptance criteria used by the staff is not subject to interpretation by the applicant different from that of the staff.

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$]C F A

>lYW Impact on Recent. Industry Manpower Regarding the question of to what degree SECY-81-648 would impact the present manpower situation, a recently completed plant review had the following statistics:

There were 1,083 formal and informal staff questions addressed e

by.the applicant; The breakdown for the first round of questions was:

o 104 17.8%

Civil 59 10.2%

Electrical 160 27.4%

Mechanical 148 25.4%

Vendor Scope 112 19.2%

Miscellaneous Total 583 In the November 1981 issue of Nuclear News, Page 52, the DOE's report to Congress gave the following statistics regarding the utility vacancy rates for engineers:

Percent Field 11.4 Chemical 7.0 Civil 14.1 Electrical 5 Electronics 13.8 Mechanical 24.3 Nuclear and Reactor 24.0

.All Others assuming the first round of questions are representative of Therefore, the differences to be addressed and the DDE statistics are aaplicable, this means that 27 percent of the. differences would have to be addressed by the mecha'ical discipline which is experiencing a utility n

vacancy rate for engineers of 13.8 percent.

In addition:

The individuals needed to address the differences, develop a

1. basis for'still meeting the regulatory requirements and perform any additional analyses, if required, are the same acceptance criteria to support plant startup and operation, finalizi'ng the as-built documentation and closecut of QAIn ad findings.

NRC (IGE inspectors, staff reviewers, etc.);

The number of plants to receive operating licenses over the next,

2. two years is requiring a major support effort by the industry;

3. Other areas, such as establishing the Independent Safety Engineering Group and' Shift Technical Advisors,.are placing

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NUCLEAR UTILITY BACKFITTING i

AND REFORM GROUP suTc200 l200 SCVENTCENTM STR ECT, N.W.

WASMf MCTON, D. C. 20036 TELEPHON E (202) 657-9 8t?

1 February 4, 1982 1

f Mr. Victor Stello, Jr.

Chairman, Committee to Review Generic Requirements U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissiori Washington, D.C.

20555 Re:

SECY-81-648

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Dear Mr. Stello:

The Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group

("NUBARG") hereby submits the following comments on SECY 648, the proposed rule to require documentation of. deviations NUBARG from the' Revised. Standard Review Plan ("SRP").

- consists of 28 power reactor licensees 1/ and the EdisonWe appreciate Electric Institute.

th'ese comments and trust that you will consider them when evaluating SECY-81-648.

Our comments will. address two areas, viz., the process -

through which the Staff developed the proposed rule and the m,erits of the rule itself.

i Alabama Power Comaby, Arkansas Power & Light Company,

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Baltimore Gas & Elec;tric Company, Boston Edison Company,

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1 Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Commonwealth Edison Company, Co.nsumers P>wer Company, Detroit Power,

Company, Duke Power Company, Duquesne Light Company, Florida Power & Light Company, Houston Lighting & Power C6mpany, Long Island Lighting Company, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Northeast Utilities.,. Northern States.

Power Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Portland General Electric Company, Power Authority of the State, of New York, Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Rochester Gas and Electric Southern California Edison Company, Texas C,orporation, Inc., Toledo Edison Company, Washington Utilities Services, Public Powe'r Supply System, Wiscon' sin Public Service Corporation, Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

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Development of th'e Proposed Rule For the reasons set forth below, NUBARG is concerned that adequate attention be paid to the process through which the Staff has developed the proposed rule..A case in point is the proposed rule, Which has developed eyer h period of time,with disconnected bases.

Specifically, NUBARG believes that insdfficient consid-eration has been given to the underlying purpose of the pro-posed rule.

The rule was initially proposed for two rea-sons.

First, it was to result in the documentation of all deviations from the SRP, thereby improving the Staff's ability to understand and subse,quently evaluate the safety significance of such deviations.

Second, it was't.c satisfy the requirements of Section 110 of Pub. L. No.96-295, the FY 1980 NRC Authorization Act, Which required NRC to develop and implement a comprehensive plan for the systematic safety

' evaluation of all currently operating power reactors.

See 45 Fed. Reg. 67100 (1980).

apply to currently operating reactors, it can no longer be Because the rule now proposed by the Staff does not intended to satisfy Pub. L. No.96-295. 2/

Thus,,if,its remaining purpose is to improve the Staff's ability to under-stand and subsequently evaluate the safety significance of all deviations from the SRP, then the 5taff should assess Whether this purpose remains adequate justifi. cation.for the rule.

The Staff shor.ld also consider. Whether less' burdensome alternatives can achieve the same result.

In short, although the apparent purpose of the proposed ' rule has changed signi-ficantly, the Staff has evidently not reconsidered the need -

for the rule in light of such changes.

Further, we have doubts that the Staff has adequately performed the quantitative analysis needed to determine whether and to what extent the proposed rule will result in

" additional protection to the publi,c health and safety.

In this regard, NUBARG agre'es with the comments submitted by

-2/

In any event, because Pub. L. No.96-295 expired at the end of FY 1980, NRC no longer is under any legal obli -

gation to perform th2, study contemplathd by Section 110 of that Act.

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the Atomic Industrial Forum outlining the potential impacts I

of the proposed rule.

We trust that the Staff and the CRGR I

will fully review and resolve these comments when evaluating the need for and impact of the proposed ru{e.

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j In light of these concerns, we recommend that the

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• • • CRGR require the Staff to focus more directly on the cur-j rent purpose of the proposed rule.

We also suggest that CRGR require the Staff,to perform quantitative analysis to

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determine if such rule is the most efficient means to meet the articulated purpose.

Lastly, we recommend that CRGR l

cmphasize to the Staff the importance of allowing affected licensees an opportunity to scrutinize such analysis, in accordance with CRGR procedures.

If CRGR requires these d

we believe actions before it acts on the proposed rule,

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that the staff will more fully appreciate the importance of developing a sound basis for its proposals from the outset.

II.

Merits of the Proposed Rule The proposed rule is an improvement over earlier drafts especially bec.ause it excludes operating reactors. Nonethe-the rule is troublesome for.severa1' reasons.

First,

1ess, Section 50.34(f)(2) as currently proposed would re' quire that-4'

, hen deviations from the SRP are identified, the applicant l

" dis. cuss how the alternative proposed.provides an acceptable w

method.of complyirig with those rules or regulations.of the

. that underlie the correspond'ing SRP accep-

' Commission.

Such provision could be construed as re-tance. criteria,"

quiring en applicant to perform extensive analysis not only.

to show that its proposed method is adequate to satisfy specific NRC regulations, but also to relate that m'ethod.to If such is interpretative guidance set forth in the SRP.

then it improp'erly elevates the SRP to a g facto the case, Since the SRp tas not been proposed as a regu-regulation.

it cannot be lation nor subject to public comment as such, In addition, the elevated to the status of a regulation.

rule would place considerable demands.on the resources of applicants.

Secon'd, we do not believe that the proposed rule is The proposed rule assumes an efficient use of resources.

that an examination of all deviations from.the SRP will lead to substantial improvements in safety, apparently because It is our guidance se't forth in the SRP relates to safety.

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i understanding that the SRP is simply a guideline for meet-ing regulations and that alternative means for meeting the

• regulations are available.

We believe that it would be a more efficient use of resources for NRC itself to determine which changes in current guidance set forth, in the SRP f

involve a substantial improvement in safety.

Applicants could then' focus on those guidance documents to assess whether deviation from them is actually of safehy signi-fii:a'nce for their facility.

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Lastly, we believe the Staff should reconsider the schedules reflected in SECY-81-648 Unless expeditious action is taken on the proposed rule, it may actually delay future licensing proceedings by imposing unrealistic time limits on both applicants and the Staff to complete 'the evaluations called for in the rule.

Indeed, when developing the proposed rule, the Staff assumed it would become final i

on January 1, 1982.

See SECY-81-648 at 2.

Accordingly, if the rule is promulgated, the proposed schedules should be revissd to reflect the delay in issuing,the ule.

Sincq e y,

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arWilli Counsil Chair r,

tility Backfitting Nucle ::

And 3 orm Group e

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ENCLOSURE 2 i

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