ML20045H863

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-369/93-08 & 50-370/93-08 on 930517-21. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Occupational Radiation Safety & Included Exam of Organization & Mgt Controls,Training,Audits & Appraisals
ML20045H863
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/17/1993
From: Bryan Parker, Rankin W, Shortridge R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20045H856 List:
References
50-369-93-08, 50-369-93-8, 50-370-93-08, 50-370-93-8, NUDOCS 9307220032
Download: ML20045H863 (13)


See also: IR 05000369/1993008

Text

"

/ g ""'D(g

UMITED STATES

o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COENisslON

[-

' '7go

REGION 11

S

,y

101 M ARIETTA STREET, N.W.

f

ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

\\

/

J11N 171933

Report Nos.:

50-369/93-08 and 50-370/93-08

Licensee: Duke Power Company

P. O. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

Docket Nos.:

50-369 and 50-370

License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted:

May 17-21, 1993

Inspectors:

[.

~

'

Ddte S'igned

[ /0,

3

R.'B. Shortridge

Y b.

h

4

& C3

P

B. A. Park (r

y

Ddt S'idned

Approved by:

/

' MW

M

& y W. H. Rankin, Chief

f

Date Signed

Facilities Radiation Protection Section

Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of occupational'

radiation safety and included an examination of organization and management

controls, training, audits and appraisals, external exposure control, internal

exposure control, surveys and monitoring, control of radioactive materials and

,

contamination, instrumentation, maintaining occupational exposures as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA), and a review of inspector followup items

l-

(IFIs).

l

l

Results:

Based on interviews with licensee management, supervision, station personnel,

and a records review, the radiation protection program appeared to continue to

>e effective in protecting the health and safety of the workers and the

publ ic.

Two violations were identified:

(1) failure to label radioactive

mtcrial in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, and (2) a failure to review and

approve a procedure required by Technical Specifictions (TSs) 6.8.1 and 6.8.2.

l

9307220032 930617

PDR

ADOCK 05000369

O

PDR

l

-

.

.

. _ ,

.

..

.

.

,

REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

-

  • J. Boyle, Superintendent, Work Control
  • W. Byrum, General Supervisor, Radiation Protection
  • J. Foster, Manager, Radiation Protection
  • G. Gilbert, Manager, Safety Assurance
  • B. Hamilton, Acting Station Manager
  • N. Pope, Superintendent, Instruments and Electrical
  • J. Puckett, Radiation Protection /ALARA
  • D. Scearce, Manager, Commodities and_ Facilities
  • R. Sharpe, Manager, Compliance

Other licensee employees contacted during the inspection included

technicians, maintenance personnel and administrative personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  • K. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector
  • T. Cooper, Resident Inspector
  • Denotes attendance at the exit meeting held on May 21, 1993.

2.

Organization and Management Controls (83750)

The inspector reviewed chanses made to the licensee's organization,

staffing levels, and lines of authority as they relate to radiation

1

protection. At the time of the inspection, the licensee was

approximately 65 days into a 84 day refueling / maintenance outage. The

licensee contracted 83 health physics (HP) personnel to assist in

providing radiation protection during the eighth Unit I

refueling / maintenance outage. The contractor breakdown was: 55 senior

HP technicians, 20 junior technicians, and eight other administrative

personnel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

.

3.

Training and Qualifications (83750)

10 CFR 19.12 requires the licensees instruct all' individuals working or

frequenting any portion of the restricted areas in the health protection

aspects associated with exposure to radioactive material or radiation,

in precautions or procedures to minimize exposure, and in the purpose

and function of. protection devices employed, applicable provisions of

the Commission regulations, individuals responsibilities and the

availability of radiation exposure data.

!

I

,

__

---

-

-.

2

The inspector reviewed selected portions of the licensee's training

program, including ALARA training, digital alarming dosimeter (DAD)

,

training, procedure training, and parts of General Employee Training

(GET). No problems were noted.

During tours of Unit I containment, the inspector inquired of personnel

their work area dose rates and the operational aspects of their

monitoring equipment. All personnel were wearing DADS and all personnel

were knowledgeable of the dose rates in their immediate work area and

the functions of their DADS.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Audits and Appraisals (83750)

The licensee's quality assurance (QA) department periodically conducted

audits of various program areas within the plant.

The inspector

reviewed the most recent QA audit of the Radiation Protection (RP)

program, Audit N-93-06(MC), which was conducted March 29 -

April.7, 1993. The audit covered all aspects of the RP program and

included record and procedure review as well as

observation / surveillance.

In general, the audit was found to be

well-planned and documented and contained items of substance relating to

the RP program. A variety of findings and recommendations were

presented by the auditors and adequate corrective actions in response to

audit findings were taken in a timely manner.

In addition to periodic audits, the QA department conducted periodic

surveillances. These surveillances, or " mini-audits," generally

consisted of a performance-based inspection of a certain area or

activity. The last surveillance in the RP area, MC-92-9, was conducted

August 13 - September 1, 1992, and focused on receipt and storage of

radioactive material.

From review of the surveillance, the_ inspector

noted that the scope of the surveillance appeared. appropriate and there

were no significant findings.

The licensee maintained a Problem Investigation Process Report (PIPR)

system that was accessible to employees plant-wide and provided a means

for identifying, tracking and trending all significant concerns, issues

and problems within the plant. The inspector reviewed selected

RP-related PIPRs and no significant adverse _ trends were noted since the

last inspection. An issue regarding the licensee's procedures for

receipt of radioactive material was noted by the inspector due to three

occurrences in which radioactive material was not properly received

since July 1992. The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding

each occurrence and determined that the safety significance was minimal

and that appropriate and timely corrective actions were taken by the

licensee. The inspector discussed possible additional long term actions

to prevent recurrence with licensee representatives. No other problems

were identified.

No violations or deviations were identified.

~

te

.

.

_

.

.

~

.

3

,

5.

External Exposure Control (83750)

,

a.

Personnel Dosimetry

10 CFR 20.1201(a) requires each licensee to control the

,

occupational dose to individual adults, except for planned special

exposures under 10 CFR 20.1206, to the following dose limits:

(1)

An annual limit, which is the more limiting of:

(i)the

total effective dose equivalent being equal to 5 rems; or

(ii) the sum of the deep-dose equivalent and the committed

dose equivalent to any individual organ or tissue other than

the lens of the eye being equal to 50 rems.

(2)

The annual limits to the lens of the eye, to the skin, and

to the extremities, which are:

(i) an eye dose equivalent

of 15 rems; and (ii) a shallow-dose equivalent of 50 rems to

the skin or to any extremity.

10 CFR 20.1502(a) requires each licensee to monitor occupational

exposure to radiation and shall supply and require the use of

individual monitoring devices by:

,

(1)

Adults likely to receive, in one year from sources external

to the body, a dose in excess of 10 percent of the limits in

10 CFR 20.1201(a);

i

(2)

Minors and declared pregnant women likely to receive, in one

year for sources external to the body, a dose in excess of

10 percent of any of the applicable limits in 10 CFR 20.1207

or 10 CFR 20.1208; and

(3)

Individuals entering a high or very high radiation area.

!

10 CFR 20.1502(b) requires that each licensee shall monitor (see

10 CFR 20.1204) the occupational intake of radioactive material by-

,

and assess the committed effective dose equivalent to.

,

(1)

Adults likely to receive, in one year, an intake in excess

of 10 percent of the applicable Annual Limit of Intake (ALI)

in Table 1, Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix B to 10 CFR 20.1001-

20.2401; and

(2)

Minors and declared pregnant women likely to receive, in one

year, a committed effective dose equivalent in excess of

0.05 rem.

During tours of the Unit I containment, the inspectors observed

plant personnel wearing DADS. As previously indicated, all

personnel were knowledgeable of their dose and the operation of

their dos 1 metry.

However, the inspector noted that all personnel

were observed to place their DADS in the pocket of their

!

-

._

. - _ _ _ _ _

-

'

.

t

4

protective clothing which made frequent reading of the DADS

somewhat difficult. The licensee indicated that they were working

on implementing changes which would make it easier for the workers

to monitor their dose.

The following RP Directive Procedures were reviewed during the

inspection concerning personal monitoring and external exposure:

11-1, Radiation Area Access and Monitoring Devices, Revision

-

(Rev.) 2, dated March 1993;

III-1, Use of the Radiation Work Permit, Rev.1, dated April

-

1993;

III-3, Posting of Radiation Control Zones, Rev. 1, dated

-

March 1993;

III-4, Use of Alarming Dosimeters, Rev. O, dated January

-

1993; and

III-13, Steam Generator Work, Rev. O, dated January 1993.

-

Based on discussions with licensee representatives and review of

the above procedures and selected records, the licensee was found

to be in compliance with the aforementioned requirements.

The

inspector noted that RP Directive II-1, Step 5.3.5, did not

require the worker to read his or her self-reading pocket

dosimeter (SRPD) or DAD except at the beginning and end of a job

in the radiologically controlled area (RCA).

The inspector

previously noted during a review of Dose Assessment Due to Unusual

Dosimetry Occurrence Reports that the root cause of a number of

the problems identified in the reports was the failure of plant

personnel to read their SRPD or DAD frequently during the

performance of their job in a radiation area. The licensee agreed

to consider expanding the scope of the requirement in the

procedure for reading personnel monitoring equipment more

frequently. This same point was previously discussed by the

licensee in the occurrence reports and the licensee had agreed to

incorporate the guidance in GET.

t

No violations or deviations were identified.

b.

Personnel Contamination Events

The inspector reviewed the licensee's personnel contamination

events (PCEs) to date in 1993.

PCEs were tracked as either skin

or clothing events and, according to the licensee, some overlap in

total numbers did occur. The inspector noted that when potential

PCEs involved licensee-supplied modesty garments only with no skin

contamination, a PCE report was not generated. This is an

acceptable industry practice.

.

_

.

.

5

The 1993 PCE targets were 60 skin and 85 clothing. As of May 18,

1993, a total of 76 PCEs were documented, 20 of which were skin

and 56 of which were clothing. The maximum calculated skin dose

was 3090 millirem, due to a hot particle on the skin of the neck.

No regulatory limits were exceeded and no other problems were

noted with the licensee's methods or procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

,

6.

Internal Exposure Control (83750)

10 CFR 20.1701 requires that the licensee shall use, to the extent

practicable, process or other engineering controls (e.g., containment or

ventilation) to control the concentrations of radioactive material in

the air.

10 CFR 20.1702 requires that when it is not practicable to apply process

or other engineering controls to control the concentrations of

radioactive material in the air to values below those that define an

airborne radioactivity area, the licensee shall, consistent with

maintaining the total effective dose equivalent ALARA, increase

monitoring and limit intakes by one or more of the following means: (a)

control of access; (b) limitation of exposure times; (c) use of

respiratory protection equipment; or (d) other controls.

10 CFR 20.1703(a)(3) requires that if the licensee uses respiratory

protection equipment to limit intakes pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1702, then

the licensee shall implement and maintain a respiratory protection

program that includes: (i) air sampling to identify the hazard;

(ii) surveys and bioassays to evaluate the actual exposures; (iii)

written procedures regarding selection, fitting, issuance, maintenance

and testing of respirators; supervision and training of personnel;

monitoring; and recordkeeping; and (iv) determination by a physician

prior to the initial fitting of respirators, and at least every

12 months thereafter, that the individual user is physically able to use

respiratory protection equipment,

,

The inspector reviewed the licensee's respiratory protection program

'

with regard to medical qualification for respirator users. The licensee

evaluated designated individuals as to their physical ability to wear

respiratory protection equipment on a frequency not_to exceed 12 months.

l

The scope of each examination varied with age and included check-ups and

spirometry tests, as well as comprehensive physical . examinations. All

results were reviewed by the licensee's physician.

Physician

specialists were also on contract for extra coverage and consultation.

The inspector noted that the licensee provided the medical services to

Duke Power employees only.

Contractors only had to provide

documentation of their medical qualification, but were required to meet

the same criteria. According to licensee representatives, approximately

130 - 200 medical evaluations were conducted each month, including all

respiratory protection users onsite (rad workers, firemen, asbestos

workers,etc.).

No problems were noted.

-

.

.-

-

.

.

6

The inspector reviewed the licensee's efforts to reduce the numbers of

respirators issued as well as their efforts to increase the use of

engineering controls. The inspector noted during plant tours that-

special ventilation units and tents were used in various areas.

It appeared that the licensea was issuing roughly half of the number of-

respirators and bubblehoods during this Unit 1 outage as compared to

previous outages of similar scope. These efforts were noted as

-

-

significant ALARA initiatives. Also, during plant tours, a number of

self-contained breathing apparatus strategically located throughout the

plant were randomly checked by the inspector. All were found to be

-

fully charged and ready for use.

,

Based on a review of selected records and respirator issuance, no

concerns were noted.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Surveys, Monitoring, and Control of Radioactive Material and

Contamination (83750)

a.

Procedural Review

The following RP Directive Procedures were reviewed during the

inspection concerning control of radioactive material and

contamination:

III-1, Use of the Radiation Work Permit, Rev. 1, dated April

-

1993;

III-5, Airborne Radioactivity Control and Accountability,

a

Rev. I, dated February 1993;

III-7, Use of Protective Clothing and Related Equipment,

Rev. O, dated January 1993;

III-8, Personnel Contamination Monitoring, Rev. O, dated

January 1993; and

III-9, Tool, Equipment and Area Decontamination, Rev. O,

-

dated January 1993.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b.

Contaminated Area

As of May 20, 1993, the licensee was maintaining 2,905 square feet

of contaminated area within the RCA. This equated to

approximately 2.6 percent of the total RCA area. At the end of

1992, the licensee had only 160 square feet contaminated, which

.

-

e

+

e y

y

.

7

was well under one percent of the total RCA.

The licensee

continues to have an aggressive program to control contamination

at the source.

No violations or deviations were identified.

c.

Surveys and Posting / Labeling

10 CFR 20.1501(a) requires each licensee to make or cause to be

made such surveys as (1) may be necessary for the licensee to

comply with the regulations and (2) are reasonable under the

circumstances to evaluate the extent of radioactive hazards that

may be present.

During tours of the plant, the inspector noted that the licensee's

posting and control of radiation areas, high radiation areas,

airborne radioactivity areas, contamination areas, radioactive

material areas, was adequate. All doors posted as locked high

radiation areas were found locked and the keys were controlled.

During tours of the plant, the inspector observed HP technicians

performing radiation and contamination surveys. The inspector

performed independent radiation / contamination surveys in various

areas including Unit I upper containment and the Auxiliary

Building.

No radiation or contamination beyond allowable limits

was found.

In addition, the inspector made direct observations of

individuals exiting Unit I lower containment and other sections of

the RCA with regard to disrobing and frisking the whole body and

hand-carried items (lunch boxes, tools, etc.) and no concerns were

noted.

10 CFR 20.1904(a) requires the licensee to ensure that each

container of licensed material bears a durable, clearly visible

label bearing the radiation symbol and the words " Caution,

Radioactive Material," or " Danger, Radioactive Material." The

label must also provide sufficient information (such as

radionuclides present, an estimate of the quantity of

radioactivity, the date for which the activity is estimated,

radiation levels, the kinds of materials, and mass enrichment) to

permit individuals handling or using the containers, or working in

the vicinity of the containers, to take precautions to avoid or

minimize exposures.

Technical Specification (TS) 6.11 requires that procedures for

radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the

requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be a9 proved, maintained,

and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation

exposure.

<

-

.

.

8

RP Directive IV-2, Labeling and Marking of Containers, Rev. O,

dated January 1, 1993, step 5.6, requires that drums or containers

used inside the RCA for collecting contaminated items be labeled

as follows:

5.6.1 - At a minimum, place labels on the center section of

-

the drums or containers at two locations 180 degrees apart.

5.6.2 - Use standard 2" wide yellow and magenta " Caution

-

Radioactive Material" tape to encircle the top third of the

drum for radioactive containers.

During radiological tours of the Unit I containment, the inspector

conducted brief interviews with personnel regarding immediate work

area dose rates and radiological techniques observed at the job

site. No discrepancies were noted and all work observed was

performed with good radiological work practices.

Continuing with

the walkdown, the inspector noted that all vacuum cleaners in the

Unit I lower containment were not labeled as containing

radioactive material nor did they have any other markings other

than a station housekeeping tag.

Radiation levels taken around

the vacuums revealed levels comparable to containment background

l

levels of 5 to 10 millirem per hour.

The vacuums were used as wet

vacuums to collect potentially radioactive water and discharge it

'

to the floor drain system. One of the vacuums had a clamp loose

which held the top of the canister to the vacuum cleaner. body.

The inspector noted that only two clamps were used for this

purpose and discussed with the HP technician the potential for

inadvertent separation of the head of the vacuum from the body and

loss of contents in containment. The technician indicated that he

did not know of any problems like this occurring at the station.

Later this same issue was discussed with management and the

'

inspector informed management that the failure to label containers

of radioactive material in accordance with requirements was a

violation of 10 CFR 20.1904(a) (VIO:

50-359/93-08-01).

.

TS 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established,

implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced in,

among others, Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, dated

February 1978.

Section 7.e.(4) of Appendix A requires RP

procedures for contamination control.

TS 6.8.2 requires that each procedure of TS 6.8.1 above, and

changes thereto, shall be reviewed and approved by a group

,

manager, superintendent / manager, or one of their designated direct

.l

reports prior to implementation and shall be reviewed periodically

-

as set forth in administrative procedures.

>

l

.-

. _

_

--.-.

.___

-

-

--

-

.

.

9

K-Mac Services Procedure KM/D/0015/01, Contro; and Use of Vacuum

Cleaners in the RCA, dated March 25, 1991, contains pertinent and

applicable requirements that are accepted industry standards for

vacuum cleaners containing radioactive materials.

Upon requesting the licensee to provide requirements for using

vacuum cleaners for containing radioactive material, the inspector

was informed by HP that this responsibility had been turned over

to a vendor approximately 18 months prior. However, HP provided

the aforementioned vendor procedure KM/D/0015/01, Control and Use

of Vacuum Cleaners in the RCA and a vendor employee training

program task training and qualification standard titled, D0P

Testing of HEPA Filters for RCA Use Vacuums.

Both documents

contained accepted methods for controlling vacuum cleaners

containing radioactive materials.

For example, the aforementioned

K-Mac procedure contained, in part, the following elements:

All vacuum cleaners shall be identified by visible marking

to designate areas of use, i.e., contaminated and non-

contaminated.

Vacuum cleaners used in contaminated areas shall be emptied

-

in a controlled environment under RP guidelines.

All canister vacuum cleaners shall be equipped with a

-

,

locking device which prevents inadvertent opening of the

i

unit.

Sleeve all vacuum cleaner hoses.

Seal between the head and body, hoses and extensions shall

be firmly connected to prevent accidental disconnection.

The inspector discussed .several problems observed with licensee

.

'

HP, Maintenance, and Plant Management regarding vacuums. The

first being that requirements of the vendor procedure

,

KM/D/0015/01, Control and Use of Vacuum Cleaners in the RCA, were

in several instances, not being met. The most safety significant

of the items was the fact that the vacuum cleaner heads were not

secured such that inadvertent opening was precluded.

Further

investigation showed that the licensee did not require any of the

various types of vacuum cleaners to have the head secured to the

body to prevent inadvertent opening. The primary concern is that

a vacuum cleaner is frequently handled and being lifted in the RCA

and the risk of loss of the radioactive contents is increased

'

because of this.

The inspector also discussed that procedure KM/D/0015/01 did not

appear to be approved by the licensee.

Licensee HP

representatives indicated (1) that they did not consider the

vendor's procedure to be accepted plant procedure, (2) that they

had never experienced a vacuum separation problem, and (3) that

-.

.-- _-

-

.

.

.-

.

4

10

economical considerations had also played a factor in not

formalizing the handling of vacuums. The inspector informed the

licensee that the failure to review and approve the procedure by

appropriate authority was a violation of TSs 6.8.1 and 6.8.2

,

(VIO: 50-369,370/93-08-02).

Two violations were identified.

8.

Instrumentation (83750)

During tours of the plant, the inspector noted that friskers and

contamination monitors had up-to-date calibration stickers and had been

source-checked as required.

In addition, the licensee appeared to

possess an adequate number of survey instruments and related equipment

with only a small number out of service and in need of repair.

The licensee reviewed and discussed the licensee's increased usage of

DADS for all entries into the RCA. The inspector reviewed the issuance,

tracking, calibration and maintenance of the DADS as well as the

calibration system and the computerized DAD reader system. The licensee

maintained approximately 1600 DADS.with a certain fraction out of

service for calibration / maintenance at any given time. An issue was

also discussed regarding a problem identified by a major DAD vendor in

which certain hardware / software combinations caused double dose to be

reported. The licensee was aware of the problem and had taken

appropriate action. No problems were noted with the licensee's methods

or procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Program for Maintaining Exposures As low As Reasonably Achievable

(ALARA) (83750)

10 CFR 20.1101(b) requires that the licensee shall use, to the extent

practicable, procedures and engineering controls based upon sound

radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses

to members of the public that are as low as reasonably achievable

(ALARA).

During tours of the lower level of Unit 1 Containment Building, the

inspector noted that the entry to containment was posted as a high

radiation area.

But very few areas in the lower level would meet the

true definition of an area with dose rates greater than 100 millirem per

hour (mrem /hr) at 12 inches.

In addition, there were no signs

signifying radiation dose rates in dose-intensive areas.

The licensee

had posted hot spot areas and some heavily shielded components bore a

sign that read "significant dose contributor." However, dose rate signs

to inform the worker were not evident.

In discussions with the

inspector, licensee representatives indicated that the difficulty of

providing barriers in an ice condenser containment was too great

regarding radiation versus high radiation areas. The inspector

discussed with the licensee the potential dose reduction benefits of

.

.

I

11

providing additional dose information for the worker in the way of dose

rate signs to better inform workers not only of dose rates in their

immediate work area, which all people when questioned responded

properly, but of increased dose rates in areas between 5 and

100 mrem /hr, and in areas to/from their job site.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's collective site dose. As of

May 19, 1993, the licensee had accumulated approximately 185 person-rem

for the year, well below the to-date projected dose of 227 person-rem.

The licensee's outage dose goal was 250 person-rem, which was

established after all of the outage job dose estimates were added to

give a total estimate of 277 person-rem for the outage.

Essentially all

of the dose accumulated thus far in 1993 was due to the outage, and a

Unit 2 outage is planned for later in the year.

The licensee's 1993

total collective dose goal was 502 person-rem.

Barring any unforeseen

-

problems, it appeared that the licensee would end 1993 well within their

dose goal. No problems were noted with the licensee's dose estimating

,'

or tracking.

The inspector reviewed and discussed other ALARA-related topics and

initiatives. These included " soft shutdown," temporary and permanent

shielding, ALARA awareness training, ALARA planner training, and ALARA

procedures, in general. The ALARA group was allowed time as needed

(approximately 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) at the beginning of an outage to maximize the

'

effectiveness of using peroxide shock / lithium injection for soft

shutdown and crud removal.

Shielding packages were more " standardized"

for easier approval as well as installation / removal.

No problems were

noted with the licensee's procedures or methods and, overall, the

licensee appeared to be saving significant dose due to ALARA efforts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Followup on Inspector Followup Items (IFI) (92702)

(Closed) IFI:

50-369,370/92-17-01, Provide ALARA pre-job planning

familiarization training to newly assigned job planning personnel.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken in response to the

'

IFI and found them to be adequate.

The licensee incorporated the ALARA

familiarization training into the Station ALARA Manual.

Department

supervisors, technicians, engineers and others who may be involved in

the ALARA aspects of job planning were required to receive the training.

In order to better communication and tracking, the ALARA training

program and implementation was added to the responsibilities of the

plant Training Department.

No additional concerns were noted by the

inspector and this item is considered closed.

11.

Exit Meeting (83750)

At the conclusion of the inspection on May 21, 1993, an exit meeting was

held with those licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 of this

report. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the

_

_.

_

.

'

.

.

12

inspection. The inspector discussed the two violations listed below and

identified and that one IFI was closed as discussed in Paragraph 10 of

this report. The inspector received no dissenting comments; however,

the Radiation Protection Manager did not feel that procedures were

needed for vacuum cleaners utilized for radioactive materials because no

problems had been experienced to date.

Item Number

Descrintion and Reference

50-369/93-08-01

VIO - Licensee failed to label

radioactive material containers in

Unit I containment (Paragraph 7.c).

50-369,370/93-08-02

VIO - Licensee failed to implement

safety significant requirement

regarding control of vacuum cleaners

and failed to have appropriate

authority approve procedure

(Paragraph 7.c).

,

t

b

e

s

-

--

.

.

.-

, _ _ _ _