ML20045H626
| ML20045H626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045H224 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9307210056 | |
| Download: ML20045H626 (4) | |
Text
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'o UNITED STATES
~,i, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
l WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATI0t]
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.191 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW Y0E JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET N0. 50-333
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated April 16, 1993, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would modify TS 4.12.F.1 to require a visual inspection of all fire barrier penetration seals for each protected area once per operating cycle, in lieu of' once per 1.5 years.
In addition, the modification would delete the footnote to TS 4.12.F.1 that was added under TS Amendment No. 177, that allowed a one-time 3 month extension of the surveillance interval for visually-inspecting the fire barrier penetration seals.
Removal of the footnote is administrative in nature, since the footnote is no longer applicable to the facility.
2.0 EVALUATION The Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, " Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,"
requires that each nuclear power plant establish a fire protection program that extends the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire areas important to safety, with the following objectives:
1.
To prevent fires from starting; 2.
To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur; 3.
To provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
Fire barriers are just one feature of the FitzPatrick fire protection program.
The functional integrity of these fire barrier penetrations ensures that fire will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to an adjacent portion of the facility.
This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single 9307210056 930707 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
. fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment.
The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.
The facility has proposed two modifications to TS 4.12.F.1.
First, the facility proposed to change the visual inspection requirement for all fire barrier penetration seals for each protected area from once per 1.5 years to once per operating cycle. The modification would account for the time-the unit is shut down, providing added flexibility to the required testing schedule.
For example, the modification would permit access to penetration seals in radiation areas during outages when radiation levels are generally lower, which would minimize personnel radiation exposure incurred during the inspections.
With the modification, the start date of the current fire barrier penetration surveillance interval would be reset from September 27, 1991, to January 3, 1993.
Resetting the start date is acceptable for several reasons.
First, the licensee verified that the fire barrier penetrations were in excellent physical condition at the end of the 1992 refueling outage, which '
ended in January 1993, as a result of the inspection, repair, and reinspection programs conducted during the outage on the fire barrier penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers.
For the fire barrier penetration seals, a baseline inspection was completed during the 1992 refueling outage.
During this baseline inspection, detailed data on the physical configuration of the penetration seals was collected.
Deficient seals were repaired and subsequently reinspected and baselined.
Future routine seal inspections will visually verify that the seal configuration has not changed from the baseline and visually verify that the surface of the seal has not degraded.
Second, the fire barrier penetration seal baseline inspection was more detailed than the regular visual inspection. The baseline inspection documented the following information for each of the approximately 7200 fire barrier penetration seals:
- Penetration details (location, size, shape, orientation, serial number, presence of label, applicable Fire Areas / Fire Zones, applicable penetration design drawings, and applicable penetration location drawings).
- Barrier (wall / ceiling / floor) construction details.
- Number, size, and distance between pipes or conduit passing through the penetration.
- Type and depth of seal material.
- Type and location of damming material.
f
. Third, because of the design and materials used in the construction of fire barrier penetrations, they do not degrade rapidly. Degradation normally occurs due to the long term effects of moisture, heat, radiation, physical wear, and dirt. Therefore, the small amount of degradation the fire barrier penetrations may undergo prior to their inspection is insignificant, and will not significantly reduce a fire barrier penetration's ability to prevent the spread of fire from one side of a barrier to the other.
Fourth, the fire protection system is designed with the defense-in-depth concept outlined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, to assure that a fire in the vicinity of a fire barrier penetration will be promptly detected and extinguished.
The defense-in-depth concept at FitzPatrick, which is not compromised by the amendment, includes the following detection, suppression, and protection features:
- Automatic suppression and/or detection systems in many fire areas, including carbon dioxide systems, halon, sprinklers, and water sprays.
- Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers installed throughout the plant.
- A trained fire brigade on site to respond to a fire.
- A local fire department available to respond to a fire.
- Fire protection systems periodically inspected and tested to assure that they are capable of performing their intended function.
- Fire barriers which separate safety-related components and reduce the potential for the spread of fire between fire areas or zones.
- Remote / alternate safe shutdown panels, procedures and operator training that assure the plant can be safely shut down and maintained in a shutdown condition for a fire in the Control Room, the Relay Room, the Cable Spreading Room, the North Cable Tunnel, or the Battery Room Corridor.
- A dedicated emergency lighting system and a communication system for remote / alternate shutdown.
The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed amendment and concludes that the degradation that may occur, as a result of changing the surveillance requirement from once per 1.5 years to once per operating cycle, will be minimal, and thus will not significantly reduce the ability to prevent the spread of fire from one side of the barrier to the other, should seal degradation occur as a result of the change, the current levels of fire detection, suppression, and protection at FitzPatrick are adequate to ensure maintenance of safe shutdown capability and provide reasonable assurance of prompt extinguishment of postulated fires.
i The second proposed modification to TS 4.12.F.1 would delete the footnote to the TS that was added under TS Amendment No. 177, that allowed a one time three month extension of the surveillance interval for visually inspecting the fire barrier penetration seals.
Removal of the footnote eliminates information that is no longer applicable, and therefore, the staff finds the change acceptable.
In conclusion, the NRC staff has reviewed the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and finds the changes acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 30198). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for i
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such 1
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
K. Shembarger Date: Ju?v 7, 1993
f Docket No. 50-333 Mr. Ralph E. Beedle Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation Power Authority of the State of New York 123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601
Dear Mr. Beedle:
SUBJECT:
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC NO. M86324)
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.191 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated' April 16, 1993.
The amendment modifies TS 4.12.F.1 to require a visual inspection of all fire barrier penetration seals for each protected area once per operating cycle, in lieu of once per 1.5 years.
In addition, the modification deletes the footnote to TS 4.12.F.1 that was added in TS Amendment No. 177. The amendment, which allowed a one-time 3 month extension of the surveillance interval for visually inspecting the fire barrier penetration seals, is no longer applicable to the facility.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Reaister notice.
Sincerely, Original signed by:
John E. Menning, Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1.
Amendment No.191 to DPR-59 2.
Safety Evaluation cc w/ enclosures:
See next page Distribution:
See attached sheet
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name:
FIT 86324.AMD