ML20045G057
| ML20045G057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Virginia |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1993 |
| From: | Bassett C, Mcalpine E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045G052 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-062-93-02, 50-62-93-2, NUDOCS 9307120039 | |
| Download: ML20045G057 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000062/1993002
Text
.-
'
>
.
.
UMITED STATES
[#pm mig,%
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-
4
REGloN il
i
&-
?,
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
'
5
i
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303234199
%
'%...../
.!
j
Report No.:
50-62/93-02
i
Licensee: University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22901
,
Docket No.:
50-62
License Nos.: R-66
Facility Name: University of Virginia Reactor (UVAR)
l
Inspection Conducted: June 3 & 4, 1993
6Md6
[
/3
Inspector:
~
<0 ate / Signed
C. H. Bassett
Accompanying Personnel:
A. Adams, NRR
O
Approved by:
E. J. McAlpine, Chief
\\
Date Signed
Radiation Safety Projects Section
,
Nuclear Material Safety and
'
Safeguards Branch
'
Division of Radiation Safety and
Safeguards
-
SUMMARY
Scope:
!
l
This special, announced inspection involved onsite review of the-details of an
incident that occurred on April 28, 1993, and the corrective actions taken by
the licensee in response to that event. The incident is recorded in the NRC
Event Database as Event #25465.
!
Results:
j
The incident involved operation of the licensee's non-power reactor while five
automatic scram functions were" inoperable. This had occurred following the
licensee's attempts to isolate the cause of an ongoing problem with spurious
As a result of the inspection, four apparent violations were identified.
These included:
(1) operating the reactor without all.of the required safety
system channels operable, (2) performir.g maintenance on a safety system
component without subsequently: verifying that the system was operable- before
it was returned to service, (3) failure to have adequate procedures for
performing troubleshooting and maintenance, and (4) failure to follow
.
9307120039 930610
ADOCK 05000062
,
G
j
.
._
_
._
,
'
.
,
4
l
'2
a procedure by not obtaining specific approval for removing jumpers in the
'
reactor control console.
,
Following the incident, the licensee had taken various corrective actions.
'
These actions included:
(1) modifying two mixer / driver modules from the scram
i
logic drawer .of the reactor console, (2) assessing other. modules in the
!
console, (3) Tabeling the modules, (4) revising those procedures which
addressed maintenan :e or troubleshaoting activities, (5) generating checklists
to be uSed followin : -aintenance activities and following a scram that cannot
5
be explained, (6;
fdi-q a new v. amber to the Reactor Safety Committee, and
(7) having a paei :-eviev.
k
I
!
9
1
1
1
1
4
.
-
_.
.
._ __.
.
'
,
t
k
REPORT DETAILS
!
!
1.
Persons Contacted
i
Licensee Employees
- P. Benneche, Services Manager
.
T. Doyle, Reactor Operator
B. Hosticka, Seniur Reactor Operator
D. Krause, Senior Reactor Operator
- R. Mulder, Director, University of Virginia Reactor Facility
l
L. Scheid, Senior Reactor Operator
i
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
l
technicians and administrative personnel.
- Attended exit interview on June 4, 1993.
2.
Background Information (92700)
i
>
.
'
According to the licensee, they had been experiencing a series of
spurious scrams since November of 1992. The scrams were occurring
,
without any annunciator indication.
Because of the design of the scram
,
annunciator system, the licensee staff did not feel that the
unannunciated scrams were being caused by line noise. The member of the
'
'
licensee's staff who was in charge of the-electronic maintenance at the
facility reasoned that the most likely source of the problem was in the
scram logic system. Therefore, when he experienced unannunciated scrams
.
'
on April 28, 1993, while per forming the duties of the Senior Reactor
,
Operator (SRO), he independently began troubleshooting the problem to
try and isolate the source of the scrams. There was no specific
'
procedure in place to provide guidance for the troubleshooting
activities.
!
!
With the reactor shutdown, he first switched the two solid state relays
!
.
(SSRs). That action had no effect on the rate of spurious scrams so he
next interchanged two mixer / driver (MD) modules.
The MD modules had
identical part numbers and appeared to be identical from their external
appearance. After approximately 30 minutes, no spurious scrams were
received.
The SRO then briefly conferred with the Reactor Administrator
-
about the situation and was given authorization to restart the reactor.
i
Because neither the SR0 nor the Reactor Administrator recognized the
troubleshooting _ activities (exchanging the MD modules) as maintenance,
no post-maintenance testing was performed to ensure that the safety
systems were functioning as required.
!
.
The reactor was operated at full power for the next 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> with a
change in SR0s every two hours. No scram signal was received during
that period. At approximately 5:45 p.m.,
another SRO, who was present
when it was time to shutdown the reactor, decided to complete the
shutdown by introducing a spurious period scram in the system. This was
,
accomplished by moving a test switch on the intermediate range
instrument channel. Moving the switch, however, failed to produce the
'
.
-
-
-
~
-
=
.
..
I
4
c
2
'
expected period scram and the SR0 manually scrammed the reactor. The
Reactor Director was notified of the problem and an investigation was
begun into the cause of the problem.
It was subsequently determined
,
that exchanging the MD modules had caused the problem and that five
!
automatic reactor system scrams required for operation had not been
!
available during the afternoon run.
On April 29, 1993, the licensee informed Region 11 management by
!
telephone of the incident and issued a Preliminary Report concerning
this reportable event. The Preliminary Report contained a summary of
the incident and an overview of the licensee's initial corrective
i
actions.
,
A Confirmation of Action Letter (CAL) was issued by Region II on
-
April 30, 1993. The CAL stipulated that the licensee:
(1) maintain the
-
reactor shutdown until the incident was evaluated and the extent of the
'
'
effect on any circuitry on the reactor console and reactor safety
systems was determined, (2) maintain the reactor shutdown until the
Reactor Safety Committee had reviewed the incident evaluation and the
!
. . corrective actions taken, and (3) maintain the reactor shutdown until
l
the results of the evaluation and the implemented corrective actions had
!
been discussed with the Region II Regional Administrator or his
designee. The CAL additionally confirmed that UVA would notify Region
II in writing when the corrective actions stated therein were completed.
,
A team consisting of staff members from Region II and NRR visited the
!
facility on May 3,1993, to review the incident and the initial
corrective actions. As a result of that inspection, NRC Inspection
,
!
Report No. 50-62/93-01 was issued.
i
On May 12, 1993, UVA submitted a 14-day Report which contained a summary
of the incident, the initial actions taken, the results of their
investigation of the root causes of the problem, the state of the
,
console systems, an assessment of the safety significance of the event,
i
a compilation of the technical specifications and procedures violated,
!
and a summary of the corrective actions taken or to be taken to preclude
l
recurrence.
A second NRC inspection performed by staff members from Region II and
!
NRR was conducted at the facility on June 3 & 4, 1993, to further review
t
the incident and the corrective actions that had been completed by the
i
licensee.
i
(On June 8,1993, UVA submitted a letter stating that all corrective
'
actions that had been identified as being required for restart had been
taken and what actions would be taken if the cause of the spurious
1
scrams had not been isolated and corrected, i.e., the reactor would be
i
shutdown and not restarted until the console electronics had been
i
diagnosed for the source of the scrams and additional corrective actions
taken.)
.)
-
- .
-
-
.
,
,
i
3
,
3.
Operational Review (92700)
a.
Reactor Safety System Channels
l
Technical Specification 3.2, Reactor Safety System, states that
-
the reactor shall not be operated unless the safety system
,
channels in Table 3.1, Safety System Channels, are operable. The
,
'
safety system channels listed in Table 3.1 include:
two pool
water level monitor channels, one bridge radiation monitor
i
channel, one pool water temperature channel, one power- to primary
coolant pump channel, one primary coolant flow channel, one
startup count rate channel, one manual button channel, two reactor
power level channels, one reactor period channel, and one air
pressure to header channel.
As noted in Paragraph 2 above, on April 28, 1993, an SR0 exchanged
two mixer-driver modules in the scram logic drawer of the console.
1
Subsequently, the reactor was operated for 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> with the MD
-
modules interchanged. The effect of interchanging the MD modules
was that certain safety system channels were not operable. The
inoperable safety system channels included:
(1) two power-level
channels, (2) the reactor period channel, (3) the primary coolant
'
flow channel, (4) power to primary coolant pump channel. The
failure to comply with the requirement to have these safety system
.
channels operable when operating the reactor was identified as an
apparent violation of Technical Specification 3.2 (50-62/93-02-
01).
,
b.
Maintenance of a Safety System Component
Technical Specification 4.5, Maintenance, states that, following
maintenance or modification of a control or safety system
component, it shall be verified that the system is operable before
it is returned to service or during its initial operation.
As noted in Paragraph 2 above, neither the SR0 nor the Reactor
Supervisor recognized that maintenance had been performed on the
console when the MD modules were interchanged. As a result, no
'
post-maintenance testing was performed and the
'ety system was
not verified to be operable before it was returned to service.
The failure to comply with the requirement to verify that a safety
.
system component is operable before it is returned to service was
!
identified as an apparent violation of Technical Specification 4.5
(50-62/93-02-02).
-
c.
Approved Operating Procedures
'
Technical Specification 6.3, Operatina Procedures, states that,
written procedures, reviewed and approved by the Reactor Safety
Committee, shall be in effect and followed for the items listed
below. These procedures shall be adequate to ensure the safe
operation of the reactor, but should not preclude the use of
i
4
.
.
.
,
!
.
4
.
independent judgement and U. tion should the situation require
'
such.
(Procedures shall be in effect for the following:)
,
(1)
startup, operation, and shutdown of the reactor,
(2)
installation or removal of fuel elements, control rods,
experiments, and experimental facilities,
,
(3)
actions to be taken to correct specific and unforeseen
,
potential malfunctions of systems or components, including
responses to alarms, suspected primary coolant system leaks,
i
abnormal reactivity changes,
(4)
emergency condition involving potential or actual release of
l
radioactivity, including provisions for evacuation, re-
i
entry, recovery, and medical support, and
.
(5)
preventative and corrective maintenance operations that
.
'
could have an effect on reactor safety.
At the time of the incident, Standard Operating Procedure
(S0P) #7, " System Calibration and Maintenance," was the approved
i"
procedure in effect at the facility which contained the licensee's.
guidance for performing maintenance of a system. The.S0P did not
!
contain a definition of what maintenance is nor did it address
such activities as troubleshooting. Also, the 50P did not contain
any general or specific guidance for performing such functions as
j
switching the mixer / driver modules in the scram logic drawer.
The
failure to have adequate procedures for performing troubleshooting
or maintenance functions was identified as an apparent violation
'
of Technical Specification 6.3 (50-62/93-02-03).
!
i
d.
Standard Operating Procedures
Technical Specification 6.3, Operatina Procedures, states in part
that, written procedures, reviewed and approved by the Reactor
Safety Committee, shall be in effect and followed.
,
UVAR Standard Operating Procedures, Section 2, " General
Regulations," Revision dated January 1990, states in Part 2.D that
!
no jumpers or by-passes shall be installed or removed in the
-
control console unless the following conditions are met:
.
(1)
No safety system is compromised,
(2)
A record is made in the logbook, and
(3)
Specific approval is obtained from the Reactor Supervisor or
Facility Director.
When the SRO interchanged the MD modules in the reactor control
console, he was trying to isolate the source of spurious scram
signals in the console electronics. He did not, however, seek or
receive the specific approval of the Reactor Supervisor or the
Facility Director for such activities. The interchange of modules
subsequently.resulted in by-passing some of the reactor protective
systems. The failure follow procedure to obtain specific approval
,'
for interchanging the MD modules which effectively allowed removal
.
~
_
-
.
,
.
5
of various jumpers was identified as an apparent violation of
Technical Specification 6.3 (50-62/93-02-04).
.
4.
Followup of Licensee Corrective Actions (92700)
,
a.
Initial Actions
l
When it was discovered that several of the scram functions were
not operational, the licensee began an investigation into the
l
cause of the problem. During that evening and the following day,
the licensee initiated various corrective actions as a result.
'
These included
,
I
(1)
maintaining the reactor shutdown until the problem was
investigated, understood, and reviewed with the Reactor
i
Safety Committee (RSC) and with the NRC,
(2)
notifying the University, the community, and the NRC of the
.!
problem,
't
(3)
requesting a peer review from the Test, Research, and
i
Training Reactor (TRTR) national organization,
'
(4)
determining the root cause(s) of the event,
2
(5)
determining if there were any problems with the hardware,
,
schematics, and Standard Operating Procedures (S0Ps) which
j
contributed to this event, and
t
'
(6)
determining if any administrative corrective actions were
needed.
Through document review and interviews with various licensee
l
personnel, the inspector verified that the licensee had completed
the initial actions as outlined above. The reactor operations log
book revealed that the reactor had been shutdown'on April 28 and
-
had not been operated since. Licensee records reviewed by the
inspector indicated that, following discovery of the problem, the
i
licensee had notified the University administration, the
community, and the NRC. The _ inspector also noted that these
notifications had been timely and made within the time frame
.
required by regulation.
The records also indicated that a peer review of the incident had
'
been requested from the TRTR organization. This review was
subsequently conducted during May-17 & 18, 1993. The inspector
reviewed the TRTR Peer Review / Evaluation Report and noted that it
!
contained various recommendations that had been submitted for the
!
li ensee's review and possible implementation,
i
The inspector reviewed the licensee's 14-Day Report which included
!
a summary of those items that had been identified as root causes
of the event. The root causes identified were:
(1) a recent
history of " spurious" automatic scrams, (2) judgement error on the
,
part of the SR0 as to what should have been regarded as
!
maintenance of a safety-critical reactor console system, (3) error
on the part of the Reactor Administrator to rely on the greater
1
. !
.
.
6
electronic expertise of the SR0 without testing the SR0's
assumptions involved in making the MD interchange, (4) lack of
definitions in the SOPS for the terms " troubleshooting" and
" maintenance," and (5) the non-performance of a scram operability
test prior to restart of~ the reactor following the exchange of the
modules. The inspector concluded that the root causes identified
appeared to be adequate and appeared to be the root causes and/or
contributing factors.
The licensee actions to determine whether or not there were any
problems with the hardware, schematics, and SOPS resulted in a -
significant expenditure of manpower. These actions are outlined
in Paragraph 4.b below.
b.
Short-term Corrective Actions
As more information became available to the licensee, the need for
further corrective actions became apparent.
Various short-term
actions were then initiated. These actions included:
(1)
conducting a briefing of the Reactor Safety Committee (RSC)
within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of the event,
(2)
appointing a new member to the RSC with a background in
electronics and getting assistance from the newly qualified
RO who has an advanced degree in Engineering Physics,
(3)
initiating procedural improvements including:
E
(a)
generating a new checklist for maintenance _(in S0P #7)
and a new checklist to be used following every
unplanned reactor scram to check out the reactor
safety systems (in S0P #4) and modifying the
appropriate S0Ps to require use of the checklist,
(b)
revising 50P #7 to include definitions for the terms
" maintenance" and " troubleshooting" and develop a-new
Maintenance / Troubleshooting Analysis Sheet, and
,
(c)
revising and changing S0P #2 to:
'
1)
increase management control over maintenance,
2)
require that restart authorization following a
scram would take agreement of an SR0 not at the
console and the Reactor Supervisor or his
designee,
3)
make the Reactor Supervisor the " focal point"
for maintenance and all operations-related
activities,
4)
emphasize the general conditions requiring an
operator to manually trip the reactor,
5)
suggest that a manual trip be initiated whenever
there is any question about the safe operation,
and
6)
add the requirement that the reactor be taken
out of service immediately upon the discovery of
a violation of the Tech Specs,
_
'
.
.
i
,
7
!
(4)
initiating a search for similar " traps" associated with
modified reactor console modules when compared to off-the-
,
shelf modules,
(5)
checking the reactor console electronics against the
available schematics for conformity,
,
(6)
relabeling the modules so that no module could be switched
or exchanged without a check to see that it is identical to
the original,
(7)
returning the M/D modules to their unmodified state,
i.e.,
,
disconnect the unused inputs from each other,
(8)
checking the past reactor Daily Checklists for any
!
indication of non-available scrams to assure that the M/D
!
modules had not been exchanged before and the reactor
>
operated in that condition,
(9)
checking the reactor console circuitry and the reactor
circuitry and evaluate it to ensure that no damage was done
.
as a result of exchanging the M/D modules and the solid-
state relays (SSRs),
(10) checking to ensure that the reactor is operable with the
" unmodified" M/D modules back in the original locations,
(11)
searching for the source of the spurious scrams,
1
(12)
keeping the reactor shut-down until the RSC had reviewed the
~
staff evaluation of the event and the corrective actions had
i
been implemented,
(13) obtaining restart authorization from the RSC and discussing
the event evaluation and corr (clive actions with the NRC,
(14) notifying the NRC when all the actions in response to the
i
incident have been completer', and
(15) holding self-critiques starf meetings to discuss the event
and clarify what constitutes maintenance and trouble-
shooting.
Again the inspector reviewed licensee documentation of their
.,'
actions and interviewed those personnel at the facility who are
responsible for or involved in the operation of the reactor.
'
Meeting minutes of the RSC indicated that a briefing had been
provided by the licensee concerning the event within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
The RSC meeting minutes also indicated that a new member had been
added to the committee and that the new member did have a
background in electronics.
i
A review of the affected procedures indicated that they had been
revised by the licensee, the revisions had been reviewed and
approved by the RSC, and that the new procedures had been
implemented at the facility.
The inspector verified that the
i
changes / revisions (outlined above) were included and in effect in
the current 50P Manual in use at the facility. The revised
,
procedures appeared to be adequate.
i
The licensee examined the existing reactor console modules and
reviewed the schematics in an attempt to search for similar
situations that could cause a problem.
It was determined that the
,
. .
.
.
-
.
~
.
..
.
,
!
8
schematics at the facility were not up-to-date and various changes
had been made in the hardware that were not reflected in the
i
schematics. These instances were corrected in the schematics as
,
they were found. Other actions were taken as well which included
,
modifying the MD modules. The two MD modules were changed so that
they are now identical.
(Although licensee procedures now
i
prohibit it, the two modules could be interchanged and they would
,
function adequately in the switched locations.) The inspector
l
reviewed selected schematics located in a book in the Control Room
i
and verified that they had been updated.
The licensee further determined that two other situations existed
3
in which interchanging two apparently identical modules could
'
cause a problem. The licensee is currently reviewing the
advisability and necessity of modifying these other modules. Any
proposed changes will be reviewed and approved by the RSC before
.
implementation.
!
The modules in the reactor were relabeled to indicate whether or
not they had been modified and could only be used in one unique
application. And, as noted above, the console modules were
'
visually inspected to verify that they were wired as dep,cted in
the schematics. When differences were detected, the changes were
noted on the schematics. The inspector examined selected modules
and verified that 'they had been labeled as indicated.
(Following
!
the inspection, the licensee also posted a sign on the reactor
!
console indicating that the electronic modules inside were not
interchangeable.)
l
A check of the past reactor Daily Checklists, performed by the
Reactor Supervisor, indicated that the reactor had not been-
i
operated in the past with non-available scram functions. Also, a
,
calibration check of all the modules and console circuitry
.
indicated that no electrical damage had resulted from switching
l
the MD modules on April 28. A bench test of the MD modules also
l
indicated that they were functioning properly. These calibration
checks were performed with the " unmodified" MD modules back in the
original locations in the scram logic drawer. The inspector
,
reviewed the records of the calibrations that had been performed
and observed the bench tests of the modules.
The results of the
'
calibration records and the bench tests indicated that the safety
I
system would function as required.
While performing these visual inspections and checks of the
i
various modules, a " cold" solder joint was found in one of the MD
modules. The licensee determined that this cold joint, which
resulted in a variable increase of electric resistance, could have
'
been the cause of the spurious drops in voltage in the MD modules.
The licensee stated that an occasional temporary drop in voltage
could explain the problems that were occurring and that resulted
in this incident.
After the cold joint was discovered, the joint
was resoldered, the output signals in the MD modules were bench
.
.
,
.
-
.__
.iI
...
-
..
%
.
.
-
.
i
-9
i
tested, and the availability of all scrams successfully tested
.
following return of the MD modules to the console.
'
'
The issue of changing the MD modules back to their original state
and of what was causing the spurious scrams was discussed and
evaluated by NRC personnel (with backgrounds in electronics) in
Region II and in Headquarters.
It was agreed that changing the MD
modules (removing the jumpers) would not cause any adverse
effects. The NRC personnel also agreed that the cold solder joint
,
2
was probably not the cause of the spurious scrams and that further
'
evaluation would probably be necessary by the licensee.
Because
of this concern the licensee committed in a letter dated June 8,
1993, that, in the that event of two unexplainable scrams were
received over a 30-day period, the UVAR would be shutdown and not
restarted until the console electronics had been diagnosed for the
source of the scrams and additional corrective actions taken.
1
'
In an effort to have input from those staff members who were
responsible for or who helped operate the reactor, various self-
.
I
critique staff meeting were held by the licensee. The purpose of
the meetings was to discuss the event, to review the chain of
command at the facility with the Reactor Supervisor responsible
.'
for all operations-related activities, and to clarify what
constitutes maintenance and troubleshooting. Although several
i
meetings had been held, the inspector noted that a meeting with
!
all operations personnel to discuss and review the event and all
the corrective actions had not been conducted. Therefore,
i
subsequent to the inspection, the licensee held another training
,
session for all licensed operators on June 7, 1993, to review the
event, all the changes made to the various procedures, and the
correct chain of command for operation of the reactor. Also
i
reviewed was the importance of following procedures.
As indicated in Paragraph 4.a above, a review of the reactor
operations log book by the inspector indicated that the reactor
had been shutdown on April 28 and not operated again. A review of
the RSC meeting minutes for the meetings held on May 6, May 10,
May 12, May 20 and May 27, 1993, indicated that the incident and
the corrective actions had been discussed by the committee at
'
length. The minutes from the May 27 meeting of the RSC also
{
indicated that the committee agreed that all the corrective
i
actions that had been identified as being required for restart had
been taken. The RSC subsequently voted to authorize restart of
i
the reactor.
In the letter dated June 8, 1993, the licensee
verified that all corrective actions necessary for restart of the
i
reactor had been taken and that the RSC had authorized restarting
the reactor.
c.
Long-term Corrective Actions
Other actions that the licensee considered were those that
required more time for implementation. These actions included:
l
.
(
-
..
- .
.
.
.
10
i
(1)
reviewing and addressing the TRTR Peer Review Report
'
recommendations,
i
(2)
revising S0P #3 to more clearly define the Reactor
Supervisor's responsibilities and the reactor staff's
responsibilities, and
(3)
reviewing the need for modification of the other modules in
the reactor console that were found to pose a problem if
they were to be interchanged with one another.
The licensee is in the process of evaluating the recommendations
made in the TRTR Peer Review Report. All the recommendations will
)
be addressed and a response will be formulated and sent to the RSC
l
for review. With the approval of the RSC, a final submittal will
j
be made in response to the TRTR Report and will be submitted in
July.
The responsibilities outlined in S0P #3 will be the same as now
detailed in 50P #2. There will be an expansion of the details of
the responsibilities in S0P #3 but the basics will not be changed.
A licensee staff member proposed that the other modules in the
console be modified to make them identical and interchangeable.
The 1icensee is still evaluating this proposal and will make a
recommendation to the RSC. Based on the changes to the procedures
and the recent retraining, the licensee has determined that there
will be no likelihood that a staff member would switch any modules
that may appear identical. Over the long term, however, the
licensee has indicated that there may be a benefit to modifying
the modules to ensure that they are-identical rather than depend
on administrative controls.
Based upon the results of this inspection and the inspection conducted
on May 3,1993, it was determined that the licensee had completed the
actions identified for restart.
5.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 4,1993, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material
provided to or reviewed by the inspector.
i
Item Number
Descriotion and Discussion
1
50-62/93-02-01
VIO - Failure to have all required safety system
channels operable while operating the reactor
(Paragraph 3).
.
.
.
4
-
-
,
!
11
,
Item Number
Description and Discussion
(cont'd)
50-62/93-02-02
VIO - Failure to verify that the system was-
operable before it was returned to service
following maintenance or modification of a
safety system component (Paragraph 3).
50-62/93-02-03
VIO - Failure to have adequate procedures for
performing troubleshooting and maintenance
activities involving safety system components
l
(Paragraph 3).
l
'
50-62/93-02-04
VIO - Failure to follow procedures for obtaining
specific approval prior to installing / removing
jumpers in the control console (Paragraph 3).
,
i
f
,
l
1
l
'!
u