ML20045D911

Notice of Receipt of Petition for Director Decision Under 10CFR2.206

ML20045D911
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	06/22/1993
From:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20045D910	List: ML20045D909 ML20045D911
References
2.206, NUDOCS 9306300207
Download: ML20045D911 (3)

Text

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7590.j UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No. 50-293 j

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY Pilgrim Nuclear Station RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 ~

Notice is hereby given that by letter da'ted May 26,_1993, Mr. Ernest-Hadley submitted a Petition on behalf of We the People, =Inc., of the United States (Petitioner) to' the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC)'. pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 regarding the Pilgrim Nuclear. Station of the Boston Edison Company (Licensee). The Petition has been referred to the Office of Nuclear.

Reactor Regulation for preparation of a response.

Petitioner requested immediate action by the NRC.to' delay the scheduled startup of the Pilgrim Nuclear. Station or, in the alternative, to order its i

immediate shutdown if the Pilgrim Station is permitted to start up before the.

4 Petition can be acted upon.

l Petitioner requests that the Pilgrim Nuclear Station;not be permitted to operate until the Licensee coinpletes-hardware modifications designed to I

eliminate reactor water level measurement errors.

Petitioner contends that the system in place at the Pilgrim facility does not adequately measure the water level of the reactor vessel and thus constitutes an immediate threat-to the health and safety.of the public.

Specifically, the Petitioner alleges'that the'NRC. staff based its determination that continued operation of boiling water reactors (BWRs) such

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- as, the Pilgrim facility did' not pose a safety threat on generic studies performed by the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG).. These; assurances

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were.given, Petitioner. alleges' despite the fact that on January 21,'1993,

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Washington Nuclear 2= reported a:significant event in.which a water level errorm I

was observed that.was more than'1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1,n: duration.

It is:furthef al.1eged 1

that.the error observed was significantlyl larger than those previouslyL l

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observed.

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Additionally, Petitioner alleges that'it has' requested,Ifrom the NRC,-

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{-l informationusedbythePilgrimlicensee-tomakeitsoperability; determination.

4 for the water l'evel measurement;; system;as required by the Technical; Specifications for the Pilgrim facility. Basedonthe'NRC'sIfhilur~e.to

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q Jprovide this information, Petitioner concludes,that such,information either

'doesnotexistorwouldnotwithstand: independent;scruliny[

Finally, Petitioner refers;to.a meeting o'ftheAdvisori,Committeeon=

Reactors. Safeguards held on May;12,:1993, which-inc'auded.the BWROGh !It is.

Petitioner's understanding that1during a' closed session oflthat meeting,,the BWROG and the NRC staff confirmed that water measurement errors could beJon.

the order of 27 feet'and that neither.the BWROG nor'.the NRC' staff:any longer

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believi the error will correct itself withlthe passage _of! time.

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-On May 27, 1993, members' of the NRC staff contacted Mrt. Hadley by.

y telephone to inform Petitioner that_the NRC' staff h~ad considered the.

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information presented in the-Petition and thatIit had been determined not to?

grant the immediate relief sought..Mr. Hadley was further informed that 1

Petitioner would receive a written response documenting the NRC staff's reasons for this decision.

L In accordance with 10 CFR 2.206, appropriate' action with regard to the "

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specific issues raised in the-Petition willLbe:taken within a reasonable time..

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,g A copy of the Petition is available for_ inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street, NW., Washington,.DC-20555 and at the Local Public Document Room for the Pilgrim Nuclear Station located at Plymouth Public Library,11 North Street, Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360.

f FOR THE NUCLEAR' REGULATORY C0PetISSION

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Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this22ndday of June 1993.

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j Dear"Mr.2Taylors. -

On behalf oftWe{the' People,--Inc.,nofEthe? United (States 9("Weithe

- People")', this letter constitute's !atformallpetiti6nipursuantf to"10 :

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. C.F.R.oS2.206Lforjimmediate"acti'onito delay'the scheduled! start-up;s

.fa of.. Pilgrim" Station in s Plymouth,. _. Massachusetts,1 Lork 3 tin l:Jthe:

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alternative,-.to order itsiimmediatefshutdowntif itiisTpermitted,toi start-upibefore;this petiti6n can be MctedEupon.;;Forfthe1 reasons'-

l set iforth 'belowk Wel : the' TPeopl'e1 (believes ithatithe :Teontinued::

, operation of Pilgrim Station'representsian unac'ceptable riskito thei

.public health and: safety.

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By way "of background, JI" am' sure your are ; awarei thatDITwrote(to Chairman -'Ivan Selin Lon n July - 21, :19921 bringing !to (the f personal

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attention of the Commissioners theLproblemiof0noncondensable' gas:

build-up'in;thetwater. level measurementTsystems ofLBoilingIWater' 1

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Reactors-("BWR's"). )(Exhibit 1): While my letter to ChairmanlSelinL also dealt with the. problem in generic terms a's?itiapplies3to all'~-

BWR's, it specifically' relied uponLouriknowledge of'theTdocumented' problems with the water'l'evel measurementisystem-atsPilgrim.-

.i Although it'was not' filed as?such,-my letterito-Chairman Selin was.

_ reated: as 'a:-petition ~;for a'ction e under? 110 C.F.R.r :52'.206: and t

referred to the attention of," Thomas" Murley, Director, '.;Of fice L of '

Nuclear-- Reactori Regulation,. for1 action.. On E August >11,11992,CI:

ire ~ceived Mr.:Murley response. -(Exhibit [2)f That response'deniede s

thelpetitionc insof arf as

it1 allegedly asked $ fore theMimmediate.

. shutdown' of' all BWR's and indicated that thelCommission.would!"take; action' with L regard cto. specificlis sues i raised 1ini the L Petition: within '

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a reasonable time."

(Id.)2 On August 19, 1992,-the Commission issued Generic Letter 94-02.

This Generic Letter, issued while the. issue was receiving a great deal of public attention, requested all BWR operators to take corrective action at the next shutdown that occurred 90 days af ter issuance of the letter.

As I' indicated to Chairman Selin in my letter of-September 4, this action would be wholly without effect since it " requested" instead of " required" action.

I cautioned that the BWR Owners' Group'was already gathering its collective forces and considerable resources to-delay implementation of any corrective action.

Unfortunately, my prophecies proved true.

In November 1992, the Commission, far from the public limelight, voted to rescind the corrective mandate of Generic Letter 94-02 and to give the'BWR Owners' Group several more months to simply study the problem.'

The Commission has repeatedly defended its action, or lack thereof, on this issue by contending that any water level errors would be small in magnitude and limited in duration.

'With respect.~to Pilgrim Station, the NRC has maintained that -"a 29 inch spike (error) of continuous duration (in water level measurement]

would be required to uncover the core."'

The NRC.has further contended that such an error is highly unlikely.

For example, the NRC has further concluded' that "over 20 feet of reference leg volume.

. must be voided and not recovered to'cause a continuous 2/ I would note that my letter of July 21 did not make a unilateral-call for the shutdown of all BWR's.

It specifically requested that the Commission shut-down.any BWR that could.not demonstrate its water level measurement system was operable, and could not further demonstrate that-it had an adequate backup system in place.

The Commission has.never acted on my request for plant specific operability determinations, nor has it required any BWR to demonstrate that it has an adequate backup system for measuring water level in place.

It is my. understanding that any BWR which could not demonstrate its water level measurement system was operatable would be required to shutdown under its own licensing specifications.

Indeed, I pointed all of this out in a letter to Chairman Selin, dated September 4, 1992.

(Exhibit 3) 2/ It should be noted that the extension was granted even though.the Owners' Group only proposed to study the nature of the problem and not to study corrective measures.

Further, the NRC staff expressed doubt about the nature of the studies and whether they would produce any practical data.

8/ Letter from Charles Hehl, Director of Reactor-Projects, NRC, to Roy Anderso'n,. Senior Vice President, Boston Edison (April 8, 1992).

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14 inch level error.

At a public meeting with NRC staff held in Plymouth in February

1993, the public was informed that the NRC_ had based' its determination that continued-operation of all BWR's did not pose a safety threat on a generic analysis conducted by the Owners' Group.

According to NRC staff, that analysis concluded that the errors would be measured in inches, not feet, and that the errors'would be self-correcting within a short period of time.

These assurances were given despite the fact that on January 21, 1993, Washington Nuclear Power, Unit 2,

reported a significant event in which it observed a. water level error that was more than one hour in duration.5 The error that was observed also was significantly larger than those previously observed.

Also during the public meeting of February 1993, I specifically requested that the NRO provide the information used by Pilgrim to make an operability determination _on its water level measurement system as required by plant - technical ' specifications and NRC Generic Letter 91-18..

I indicated my desire to have this information made available so an independent analysis of that operability determination could be conducted. This information has never been provided despite that the fact'that a' local' advisory committee, appointed by town officials from communities in close proximity to Pilgrim, made a formal request for this'information under the Freedom of Information Act.

I only can conclude from the NRC's failure to provide this information that it either does not exist, or it would not withstand independent scrutiny.

An even more alarming revelation occurred.on May 12, 1993 when the Owners' Group met with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety

("ACRS")-an independent group that advises the Commission on matters related to ' nuclear safety.

During a closed session of that meeting, it is my. understanding that the Owners'- Group and NRC staf f confirmed that water level measurement ' errors could be on the order of 324 inches, or 27 feet.'

It is further my understanding that neither the Owners' Group, nor the NRC staff, any longer believe that the error will correct itself with the passage of time.'

4/ NRC Inspection Report, Pilgrim Station, No. 92-28 (January 28, 1993).

5/ Event Report No. 25094 (January 21, 1993).

'/ ACRS Transcript at p. 107 (May 12, 1993).

'/ Unfortunately, I must base my conclusions here on only the public portions of the record.

Some portions of the meeting were conducted in executive session based on the Owners' Group assertion 3

e Given these developments, I am requesting that the startup of Pilgrim be delayed until such time as Boston Edison completes

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hardware modifications designed to eliminate the water level measurement errors.

As I am sure you are aware, Northeast Utilities implemented corrective action last year _ to eliminate the -

problem.

Through subsequent testing, the NRC has confirmed that the corrective action taken at Millstone I works.

According to Ashok Thadani, Director, Divisions of Systems Safety and Analysis,

NRR, the Millstone modifications are both -inexpensive and effective.

There is no reason that Pilgrim should be permitted to' continue to operate without making these modifications.

Based on _the availability of current information, including

'information disclosed at the May ACRS meeting, there is now substantial reason to believe that water level errors are of such a magnitude as to lead an operator to believe that core is covered when, in fact, water level in the reactor core is dangerously low.

On behalf of We the People, as well as on behalf of all the people who live in close proximity to Pilgrim,

'I request that the Commission not permit Pilgrim to restart until-the appropriate hardware modifications are.made.

In the' alternative, I request, that if Pilgrim is permitted to restart, that.the Commission order its immediate shutdown until the appropriate hardware modifications are made.

Si re le cc: S. Comley Gov. William Weld Sen. Edward M. Kennedy Sen. John F. Kerry Rep. Edward J. Markey David Williams, IG Ben B. Hayes, OI enclosures as noted that the information being discussed, generic analysis, were somehow

" proprietary" in nature.

The ' terms

" generic" and

" proprietary" would appear to be mutually exclusive.

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July _21, 1992 Ivan Selin, Chairman-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission one White-Flint. North j

11555 Rockville' Pike Rockville, MD: 20852:

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Dear Chairman Selint

'f I am. writingi to H you in my n capacity - as 3 ~1egal Lcounsellto We The People, Inc.,.of the' United. States ("WelThesPeople"):and: Paul M.-

Blanch, Supervisor of Instrumentation and ' Control Engineering, Northeast Utilities to request the limmediate; and. personal-intervention of-you.and your fellow: Commissioner ~s:in a-matter with-potentially-catastrophic dimensions if 'it' continues -t.o ~gorignored.-

For.over three ? years,- the Commission 'has been aware 'that-4 significant' errors may occur,in the-pressurizer level measurement-due to deficient condensate pots in Pressurized Water Reactors _

("PWR'.s").

Despite. numerous reports toithe.NRC'on:the potential dangers, posed by-this problem,~the Commission-has refus'ed'to:act.

The. Commission's ' failure to act was1 brought"to the attention of th' e

NRC Inspector General Office in December _~1991, as well as April and June?1992.

The problem with condensate pots,..when coupled.with~an' existing-problem with ~ Rosemount. transmitters on' Boiling Water' Reactors l

("BWR's"), Lrepresents a significant risk toithe public. _For: the 1

r reasons set forth below, I believe'that the only. responsible action the Comnission can take' on this' issue is to ' order all: utilities (PWR's c.nd BWR's)' to immediately determine the operability of their level instruments If the-utilities cannot. determine: the operability of the level measurements in light:of the most recent data, they must declare the instruments Linoperable and comply with plant-specific technical requirements.-

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As.you undoubtedly know, the condensate 1 pot.is a section:of. pipe approximately ten inches 11ong and _ three inches in diameter..

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The-pot)is connected to the reactor ~in a BWRLor the-pressurizer 7in a PWR: by a _ one. inchi connection.

The purpose. of ' the -: pot.is to

- condense steam'from the. reactor; core'or; pressurizer to provide;a; constant. reference for ' level measurement.

The levelo in this-1 reference ~ leg is'comparedLto(the' actual water levelEin the BWR1orL

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L PWR and is converted.to an electronic. signal'by;a-device, which is:

l typically a Rosemount transmitter. ;A decrease in the reference. leg j

level will, in turn, cause a false high. level' reading-of the_ actual l

reactor water level.

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The output of the-Rosemount transmitter on'a BWR provides a signal 3 L

which.is used to l initiate reactor protection -.(.."RPS".), f emergency -

core cooling systems

("ECCS_"),

informationL toJthei operator to -

.i determine if the core is covered and thel final'. backup system called:-

1 ATWS.

All of the protective functions ~.relyLon an accurate level j

indication and are initiated upon4the:detectionfofianlowilevelyin3 the reactor.

For the pastithree years, the;nuclearfindustry and'theLNRCIhave-

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been aware that the gases in the. condensate pot will-beiabsorbedt in.

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- the reference legs over time;. The end result is that:when' pressure.

i is rapidly released during an accident,a..large'~ amount of ' liquid?is it also released causing a sipij icant. loss Lof the' reference legs.

7 This loss of-the reference tegs. causes_. thei false Jhigh11evel 1

indication noted above.

The' errors :in this loss: are so great that, l

during an event or accident, L all indicators.would.tell the operator -

that the core is ' fully covereds when Li'n ' f act. 'aCmeltdown may be' occurring. In BWR's.in particular, there i.sano.'other s'ystem;whichi

- will-indicate - that-the. core Lis' noti covered'.c Furth6r, L operators :,~

l have not been trained..to deal with such a? situation.

The NRC has been fully aware ofJ.this situation ^sinceLFebruary 1, 1989, - when Westinghouse, informed all-. itsf reactornoperators. that j

7 significant errors.may-occur'in pressurizer level measurement due-to the absorption'of gasses. ' Absolutely no action was taken bylthe :

Commission at'this time,-even though otherLreactors,'suchfasTthose designed by General Electric, use the_same type of; condensate > pot-l configuration.

4 In March 1991, Northeast 4 Utilities,'.the operatorfof'MillstoneiUnit' 3,

confirmed ' that, the 1 problem L existed and Levaluated1its' safety 1

significance.

Due-to'the' safety significance andithe; fact.'that-j the. pots. were - not operatinge as. designed,, Northeast.1: Utilities eliminated the. condensate: pots: and Jinstalled1a configuration ~to.-

prevent the absorption s of gases.

.Annidentical -situation was determined to. exist at Connecticut Yankee and:the condensate' pots

i also.were eliminated at that 11ocation.

The cost' to Northeast i

Utilities for these modificationswas in excess?of $1.million atta time of-costacontainment.-

.j On March 18,'1991,_ a' Licensing: Event Report-("LER"):was~is' sued by.

i Northeast: Utilities : to'.. the NRC L under.10 ' C.F.R.~ S50;73.: ~During-

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approximately-the' same time

frame, Mr..iBlanch ~inforned. the J

Millstone resident NRC inspector that the problem was_ indus try-wide

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.and that other utilities 'must be informed.-

iMr. -Blanch t also.

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'telefaxed a - copy of- ;the ' LER ' to 'ScottENewbury, 'NRC.Shie'f2 'ofJ l

Instrumentation and Controls, _ and. further all'eged that;the problem; 2

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was generic and again stressed that the industry must be informed.

Mr. Newbury indicated to Mr. -Blanch - that he saw. the potential safety significance of the problem and assured Mr. Blanch thattthe situation would be handled promptly and properly.

In the late spring of 1991,.'_ Northeast Utilities issued a notice to all nuclear power plants in the-world through-INPO Nuclear' Network:

3 alerting them to the potential. safety - problem =. posed. by : the condensate pots.

As of this point in time,-the NRC had taken-no:

action, despite the fact that.both Westinghouse and.one utility utilizing the condensate pots had taken actions to' notify-other operators of the problem.

During the summer of 1991, Mr. Blanch made numerous telephone; calls to personnel-in NRC, Region 1, and the-Office.of Nuclear" Reactor Regulation reiterating his concern about.the safety-of.PWR's and the condensate pot' problem.

_Still no action was 'taken :by..the Commission.. 'On October 15, 1991,:Mr. Blanch met with Region 1-technical personnel as well as Eugene Kelly and Ed'Wensinger in King of. Prussia, Pennsylvania.

During this meeting, Mr. ' Blanch '

explained the technical issue and his continuing safety concerns to-NRC Region 1 personnel.

As I am sure you are well aware, during this:same period ofitime, Mr. Blanch also brought to the attention of the-NRC'the fact'that there was a high failure l rate - among Ro'semount transmitters.

Although the actual failure rate'of'.the Rosemountl transmitters and the condensate problem are not related,ithe required' interaction of those systems combines to greatly.

increase the risk of

'a significant accident.

In late November 1991, Mr. Newbury, Robert Perchi and Guy Vissing of the NRC met with officials at Northeast Utilities to _ explain' the status of their review of the Rosemount. issue!and to.obtain a more detailed technical assessment of the condensate pot problem.

During this meeting, Mr. Blanch'again expressed his concern that n6 action was being taken on either a.ssue.

Mr..Newbury indicated that-a draf t Bulletin would be issued by the end" of the year ~on the Rosemount transmitter situation and that the NRC would continue to evaluate the condensate pot problem.

.1 On December 19, 1991, Mr. Blanch gave testimony,'at the offices'of Northeast Utilities, to agents from the. Office of Inspector

General, NRC.

During this interview, once again ' Mr.

Blanch 1

expressed his concern ~ that NRC staf f_ was ignoring major = safety j

issues.

He specifically referenced both_the-Rosemount issue and the condensate _ pot problem, along with other issues.

In late February or early March 1992, Mr. Newbury called Mr. Blanch and stated that the NRC had reviewed the condensate. pot' issue-and had decided that it did'not pose a' safety problem, and that there would he no further action.

Mr. Blanch has been informed that-Mr.-

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-l Newbury initiated a telephone conversation with General Electric on or about February 11, 1992 during which this issue was discussed.

Certainly, an informal telephone call is not an appropriate means of dealing'with a significant safety issue.

In April 1992, Mr. Blanch met with Leo.Norton and Kent Walker of the NRC Office of Inspector General in my offices..

'Mr.

Blanch again reviewed the situation with the Rosemount transmitters and the condensate pot problem.. During this meeting, Mr. Blanch also provided the Inspector General with specifics relating to possible Commission tampering with safety investigations.

On May ' 22, 1992, Mr. Kelly, NRC, Chief, Reactor Projects for-Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee,. met with~Mr. Blanch and asked him if he was aware of the problem with condensate pots at Pilgrim Station in -

Plymouth, Massachusetts.

Mr. Blanch contacted technical staff members at Pilgrim and received data from L Pilgrim regarding ' the problem.

From his review of the data provided by Pilgrim, Mr.

Blanch concluded that the cause of the problem was the absorption of gas in the reference legs.

In mid-June 1992, Mr. Blanch. relayed this conclusion to Mr. Kelly.- During this conversation, Mr.= Kelly asked Mr. Blanch if Pilgrim was'" flying. blind."

-Mr. Blanch agreed that indeed it'was.

Later that same week, Mr. Blanch sent ' Mr...

Kelly a note' indicating that, in his opinion, all :BWR's may be

" flying blind."

Also during this same time period, Mr. Blanch called. William Russell at NRR and informed him' of his. concern that the level measurements in BWR's and PWR's will not work;in depressurization-events.

It-is Mr. Blanch's understanding that,.from a technical standpoint, Mr. Russell agrees that if the condensate'~ pots 'are elevated above the vessel penetration,.as they are-in most.'BWR's and PWR's, they will become bound with noncondensable gases. 'It is also Mr. Blanch's understanding that Mr. Russell' agreed that it would be appropriate for the NRC to inform utilities of this problem.

To our knowledge, no such. notification has ever occurred.

On june 26,<1992, Mr. Blanch and I had a telephone conversation with Special Agent Kent Walker. of the NRC Office of Inspector General.

Once again,'we expressed our concern that the Commission was taking a b s o l u t e l y.- n o action to address this. problem..

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particular, I indicated to Mr. Walker that~I understood the actual =

. problem with condensate pots'was not within the jurisdiction of his Office but that I. firmly. believed. that it was within the jurisdiction of his Office-to determine the reasons for delay in Commission action..

-l On July 15, 1992, Northeast-Utilities. completed 'an. evaluation of-the impact of the condensate pot problem on' Millstone Unit 1.

It was determined that reactor < level indicators will read almost 20 feet greater than the actual water level in ' the 1. reactor. during.

. accident. ' conditions.

For' most BWR's, this' reading would.

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,T effectively defeat many safety systems and emergency core cooling-systems and the operator would have_ no indication that. the core;was uncovered.

At the present moment, Millstone Unit

-1 is on a scheduled shutdown for other reasons.

It is my understanding.that it is the intent of Northeast Utilities to take actions to correct the problem during this shutdown.

It is further my understanding-that had a shutdown not been scheduled, it_was'the opinion of Mr.

Blanch and Northeast Utilities that.the = condensate pot problem alone would have warranted-shutdown for correction.

The NRC is fully aware of the problem at Pilgrim.

In fact, the NRC is further aware that the problem at Pilgrim is enhanced by the f act that a few years ago the YARWAY backup level monitoring system was removed from Pilgrim'because of problems with~that.sys_ tem..In the event of a mishap, there is virtually a 100% chance at Pilgrim

-f that the' condensate pot.' problem will result'in-a failure of the emergency-core cooling system and that'all measurements will tell the operators that'the core is' covered when in fact a' meltdown may be underway.

It is now summertime on Cape Cod just a few short miles from Pilgrim.

Thousands of families with their children and senior -

citizens are currently' enjoying their vacations on the-Cape.

The.

l Cape is connected to the mainland by only two small-bridges. _ In the event of accident at Pilgrim, who will decide whose children and parents are among the privileged few to cross those bridges and travel out of harm's way?

4 The people of_ Connecticut are indeed fortunate that' management at Northeast Utilities has taken a responsible course lon. its own initiative with respect to_the problem.

You.are well aware that Mr. Blanch was the individual to identify the Rosemount transmitter issue and the-fact that the failure rates of those devices violates' NRC regulations.

In contrast to the Rosemount issue, it'is neither the obligation. or responsibility-of Mr.

Blanch or-Northeast-Utilities to-inform the industry of a significant safety issues.

That is the obligation and responsbility of the Commission.

I note that in the Yale Alumni Magazine, (Summer 1992) you were' quoted as saying, "[t]he only way to restore public confidence in [ nuclear) technology is to insist on safety, safety and-more safety."

It is not just the technology in which people have lost confidence; it is the Commission.

Confidence'will not be restored as long as people like Mr. Blanch are required to_ suf f er - the turmoil, harassment, personal embarrassment, and legal expense of pursuing safety issues which the Commission continues to ignore.

Must those of 'us who live in the-shadow of Pilgrim wait for Boston Edison to follow the lead of Northeast Utilities? 'And what of the people who live.near Vermont. Yankee, Nine Mile. Point, Fitzpatrick and all other reactors in.the world?

Must they-also wait for-the-utility ~. ' companies that operate these f acilities to place safety _-

over profits, while the Commission, which has a congressional' 5

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mandate to protect the public health and safety,-stands idly'by?

-l On behalf of We. the People, I. calli uponL you and your. Ef ellow Commissioners to -take immediate action.. The.only prudent courseLof'

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action ' is to-order the.immediate' shutdownM of any reactor that.

cannot affirmatively demonstrate.:that it.has-operable condensate j

pots or has in place an adequate; backup system that will accurately ~

j measure the' water-level in the core in?the event of a mishap.. Any'

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lesser action 'is nothing short of. la! gamble' tthat pits' utility--

profits'against public health and. safety.

Three years has been more than adequste time 3for the: Commission.to-deal with this-i'ssue.. During that Ltime,LMr;; Blanch:has taken'every

+

reasonable measure to -havelthe problem addressed through1 proper?

channels.

Urgency. brings the' time for; working through channels to:

an end. 'It?is Lfor this reason that1I' bring. this appeal directly' to'-

l you.and your fellow. Commissioners.

1 I~ await,your prompt-response.

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ours,

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Erne y-cc:

K. Rogers,.NRC-

.I J. Curtiss,.NRC F. Remick, NRC G. DePlanque, NRC:

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Pres.

G.-H. W. Bush.-

Sen. J. Glenn' Sen. J. Lieberman-1 Sen. C..Dodd-j Sen. E.' Kennedy 1

'Sen.

J.' Kerry Sen. A.. Gore

J Rep. P..Kostmayer Rep. J.'Dingell

~i Rep. E. Markey; Rep. G. Studds Rep. B. Frank.

I Rep..T. Andrews Gov. W. Weld-Gov. L...Wiecker s

Gov. B.-Clinton:

. Gov.-M. Cuomo i

Gov. H;' Dean?

W..Sherman,7St.Lof'Vt.-

(L..Norton,7NRC, IG

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W..Ellis,~ CEO-NU.

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY-' COMMISSION

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o, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 "i

August 11, 1992 Mr. Ernest C. Hadley i

414 Main Street P.O. Box 3121 Wareham, Massachusetts 02571

Dear Mr. Hadley:

I have received your letter of July 21,1992,sto the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)' on behalf of We The' People, Inc.,,

and Mr. Paul M. B1anch_(Petitioners), concerning inadequate monitoring'of-core coolant level at many power: reactors nationwide. Though your letter does-not invoke 10 CFR 2.206, it was. referred to my: office for consideration'as at petition suomittea pursuant to 10. cry 2.206.-

The Petitioners allege that many reactor-licensees rely:on; condensate pots'as;

- part of reactor level instrumentation:to monitor core coolant level;:that 'many:

of these licensees have no alternative:means to monitor coolant level; that' non-condensable gases in the condensate pot'will bel absorbed in:the reference legs.over time; that'when pressure 11s rapidly released during'an accident, a :

large amount of liquid is pushed out of the reference leg, causingla_-

significant decrease.in reference leg level l and a" false high coolant-level:

indication; that for most boi. ling water reactors (BWRs),'the'. false indication would effectively defeat' many safety-systems and emergency core coolingL systems (ECCSs); that operators have:not"been trained toL dealEwith Lthe: false.

1 indications; and that, in_ an ' accident, operators would be" unable to accurately' i

assess core coolant level because of the above.

Moreover, the Petitioners-assert that Rosemount transmitters, which are commonly relied onias part of coolant level monitoring systems, are highly? unreliable, Land their. interaction with "the condensate ~ pot problem" greatly increasas the risk ofla-serious accident. The Petitioners assert tha.t the'NRC has~. ignored repeated warnings:

of these problems since at' least early.1989, failing tol notify _. licensees 'or to '

take-other' appropriate. action.

1

- On the basis of these allegations,'the Petitioners request 1that :the NRC' order :

ths W # iato cheth wn of any reactor (BWR rnd cressurized water reactor (PWR)) whose licensee cannot affirmative;y demonstr:te tnattit has: opercble'.

condensate pots o'r has in place an' adequate measure the water level in the core in case: backup system that willl accurately of a mishap.

The NRC staff held _ a public meeting with_ the-Regulatory Response Group- (RRG)'-

of the Boiling Water Reactorsi0wners Group (BWROG).on July 29, 1992, to '

discuss the effect of inaccuracies in the reactor vessel level: instrumentation.

system in BWRs. During the meeting,. the.BWR0G and its1 cons Jitant,'Oeneral' Electric Company-(GE),4 pr2sented the results of: analyses assessing thetsafety

-implications of.the postulated error in. level indication.

Thel analyses consisted of-tua basi.c part :

(1) nan assessment of the mechanism and potential magnitude of errors in the level instruments, and (2) a review ofL

. the relevcnt licensing-basis transients and accidents to determine the effect-nf this error lon plant response, including _ post-accident; operator actionsi 1

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a Mr. Ernest C. Hadley August 11, 1992 The BWROG analyses indicated.that significant errors in level indication can occur as a result of the evolution of non-condensable gas in the. instrument-reference leg if the reactor abruptly depressurizes well below 450 psig.

The NRC staff reviewed the relevant design basis accident scenarios which. lead to lowering reactor vessel water level and has concluded that ' automatic' safety l

l system initiation.will occur at pressure levels well above 450 psig, even for the postulated worst-case non-condensable gas concentration in the. reference legs. Therefore, the.NRC is confident that 'all emergency cooling systems will initiate as they were designed to do.

In addition, the BWROG discussed.

diverse signals which would also initiate ECCS for reactor water level lowering events. The NRC staff reviewed the backup. systems'and concluded-that the ECCS would be initiated by diverse signals as analyzed by the BWROG.

After ECCS actuation,- reactor water level. indication is used by the operators for long term actions (i.e., maintaining adequate reactor water level and ensuring. adequate ' core cooling). Several factors led to the NRC staff l

judgment that-the operators would take appropriate actions to'maintaini adequate core cooling.. First, the expulsion of water from the reference leg.

l column requires nearly total instantaneous depressurization'.

Operators would not utilize only reactor vessel level indications to' determine accident mitigation actions for design basis accident scenarios which involve totalcor instantaneous depressurization.

In this case, operators ~would also. utilize other indications such as containment pressure,. temperature, and humidity to determine accident mitigation strategies.. Design basis: accident scenarios i

characterized by gradual depressurization would^1ead to a reducedcexpulsion of the liquid from the reference ~1eg: column-(1.e., reduced error in the indicated level).

Second,- therelare two or four reference ~ leg columns' in 'each plant, depending on plant design. The amount of non-condensable gases dissolved in each depends. primarily upon leakage. and geometry.

Therefore,.it is unlikely r

that two or more level indications would behave erroneously-in the same.

manner.

Finally, emergency procedure guidelines (EPGs) state that when' reactor vessel water level is indeterminate, operators shouldf flood the reactor vessel using at least one pump guided by the' unaffected diverse.

instrumentation (i.e., high containment pressure indication).. Reactor i

operators are trained to deal with these situations should they occur.

For the reasons stated above, the NRC staff concludes that it is not necessary to I

immediately. shut down any~BWR facilities. However, the NRC= staff noted at the public meeting with the RRG of the BWROG on July 29, 1992, thatithiscis an important issue which needs to be addressed promptly both generically and on.a plant-specific basis. The NRC staff concluded that the following timeframe I

was reasonable for addressing these issues:

1.

Within.7-days of the July:29,.1992 meeting-(August 5, 1992), the BWROG l

should review the meeting' transcript, submit a written statement of. all

-actions to be taken by the BWROG, and confirm the acceptability of the approach described in items ~ 2 to 4 below to resolve this issue. -The-

- BWROG responded.on August' 5,1992, and the -response lis currently. under NRC' staff review.

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Mr. Ernest C. Hadley -August. 11, 1992

- t 2.

Within 14' days (August 12,.1992), the BWROG 'should provide its plan and' schedule for addressing each item.

1 3

3.

Within 30 days (August 28,1992), the BWROG should submit;a generic-j report containing responses to questionst related to' EOPs,' commitments to training, or.other items that:were. part of the BWROG rationale as to why?

l there is no short term safety issue.

4.

Within 30 days of receipt of the generic; report-(September 27,;1992),-

each licensee, on a docket-specific-basis, should' confirm that its..

plant-specific configuration is within the generic: envelope > and thatt

. : t the generic analyses-apply.

If the analyses do not, apply, 'the license ~e should describe what actions are being taken toiaddress'the: issue.

The' Petitioners assert that.sig'nificant errors may occurfin the pressurizer level measurement ' system duerto deficient condensate pots' in PWRs.

Westinghouse and: Combustion Engineering performedfengineering:evaluatio~nsiand-concluded that during 'a. rapid depress' rization of. the reactor coolant system 1

u (RCS) during certain design basissaccidentss Ltheireleas' 'of non'-condensable e

l

. gases could result in a level. indication error of about140 percent of:fulli scale. The NRC staff evaluated the effects ofs this' error and' concluded that:

0 the only potentially unacceptable. actions,that could. be. taken by ' operators as.

a result of-this error.are prematurely. terminating safety: injection.or faili.ng-to re-initiate safety-injectionfiff required. (The NRC staff further concluded that the pressurizer level instrumentation is 'nott used as the primary..

parameter by operators for safety injection termination'and that PWR E0Ps~l

. direct operators to consult other instrumentation'and parameters !(reactor.1 1

vessel level monitoring system, RCS subcooling, and.aistable-or1 increasing RCS pressure) priorLto' terminating safety injection. The NRCLstaff-concludes, for; the reasons discussed.above, that the' safety significance'of this error is'

~

l small and that it is not necessary to immediately.. shutdown: any.'PWR: facilities.

The Petitioners also 'asse'rt that Rosemount transmitters, which are commonlyL l

relied on as part of the coolant level monitoring system,:are highly:

unreliable.. In March 1990, the NRC issued NRC Bulletin:90-01, " Loss of Fill-

'011 in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount,";to'allLholders of o'perating i

licenses or construction permits for. nuclear? power reactors. 'In that

-bulletin, the NRC requested that specific groups of transmitters that hadLbeen identified by' the manufacturer as more: susceptible toToil loss: failure, or identified by the licensees as suspected of.. oil loss, be replaced in' the j

critical safety systems. ' The NRC also requested that enhanced surveillance q

programs be; established for'the remaining Rosemount transmitters subject to the bulletin. -The NRC considers"the actions taken by the licensees forf.

w operating reactors.to_ address the important safety concerns.1 Since the'NRC'

'issuedBulletin90-01,the.NRChascontinuedtoreviewthisissueextensiveiy l

to-ensure that these pressure sensors will' perform reliably. :The NRC staff-issued a draft Bulletin Sup'plement for'public' comment on' April 7,1992.;;The?

j comments received have been reviewed and evaluated by the:NRC staff and a

~

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meeting with' members of the public' was held on. July. 23,5 1992,'at the'NRC a

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1 Mr. Ernest C. Hadley August 11, 1992

~

offices in Rockville to describe how the Bulletin Supplement would be modified.

In addition, several areas were_ identified that-required further:

clarification. While _the Bulletin Supplement will identify. additional; licensee actions which should be taken, the:NRC staff has' concluded that' licensee actions to date'have reduced the-likelihood of this' type lof failure-by improving surveillance-testing. to detect this' failure and.by replacing, transmitters in critical safety systems thattwere' identified as' being1

-susceptible to oil loss. failure 'such that the:immediate shutdown of ~all facilities that use them is unwarranted.

The NRC also. issued an Information Notice No'. 92-54,. dated. July 24, [1992, to alert licensees to potential inaccuracies in water level indication in BWRs' and PWRs after rapid'depressurization events..The Information Notice stated!

that the NRC expects' recipients to review the-information ~.for applicability 'to ~

t their facilities and consider actions,las appropriate,'to' avoid similar

~

problems.

On the basis of the RRG presentation on the effect' of< reactor. vessel. level instrumentation system inaccuracies in BWRs and-the.NRC, staff; independent analysis, the NRC staff concludes that:thessafety significance-of-this; error is small and that it is not necessary to immediately shutdown any BWR:

facility.

In addition, the NRC staff: concludes :that the inaccuracies in the -

pressurizer level monitoring system caused byLrapid depressurization events in:

PWRs and errors' related to Rosemount transmitters have: limited safety -

significance and, therefore, do :not warrant immediate plant. shutdown.:

Accordingly, the. Petitioners' request for immediate' action regarding shutdown-of BWRs and PWRs is denied.

As provided by 10 CFR'2.206,Lthe NRC willltake action with' regard-to the specific issues raised in the Petition within a-reasonable time. iFor:your information,'I h' ave -enclosed a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Office 'of'the Federal _ Registe'r for-publication.

-Sincerely, f

W Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Enclosure:

Federal Reaister Notice a

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7590-01 U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ALL LIGHT WATER REACTORS RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR'2;206 Notice is 'hereby given that the.V.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~(NRC)

'has received a letter l to NRC Chairman Ivan Selin, datedEJuly 21,~1992,<from'

-Ernest C. Hadley,- on behalf of We The People, Inc., and Mr. Paul Blanchi (Petitioners). The-Petitioners request' "immediate. shutdown of anyLreactor (boiling water reactor-(BWR)'and pressurized wat'er reactor (PWR)) that cannot affirmatively demonstrat'e_ that it;has operable condensate pots.or has in olaces an adequate backur system that will-accurately-meashre the water -level 'in the'-

reactor core in the event'of a mishap." The Commission is treating the letter-as a' Petition. requesting action under 10 CFR'2.206.

The Petitioners allege that many.-reactor licensees rely on condensate q

pots as part of reactor vessel instrumentationtto' monitor core cool' ant level; that many o'f these licensees have no' alternative means to monitor coolant level; that gases in the condensate pot will'be absorbed in the-reference legi a

over tiine; that when pressure _is rapidly. released:during an-accident, a large-amount of liquid is. pushed out of ~the reference leg, causing (a'significant; decrease in reference leg level and a. false high coolant _ level indication; that for most boiling water.' reactors?(BWRs). the. false indication would -

effectively defeat many safety. systems and emergency core cooling systems;

.that operators have not been trained to deal with the fal'sp indications; and that,-in;an accident ~. operators would be unable to _ accurately assess core?

coolant 'leve1~ because of the.above. Moreover, the Petitioners assert that Rosemount. transmitters, which are commonly-relied on 'as' part cf coolantilevel monitoring. systems, are highly: unreliable, and that their' interaction withi "the condensate pot; problem" greatly increases ~ the risk of'a serious accident.

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On the basis of these allegations, the Petitioners reque:t that the NRC~

order the immediate shutdown of any reactor whose licenseeLcannot affirmatively demonstrate that it has operable condensate pots or has in place an adequate backup system that will accurately measure-the' water level in the-core. in. case of.a mishap.

The Petition was referred to the Director of.~the Offic'e 'of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for the preparation of a respons'.. By-letter' dated.

e August 11,1992,'the Petitioners' request for immediate actio" regarding' BWk and PWR siiutdown was denied. As.provided by 10 CFR 2.206, appropriate action :

with regard to the specific issues raised'in.the Petition will be taken within' a reasonable time.

A copy of the Petition is available for' inspection'at;the Commission's' Public Document Room located 'at: the~ Gelman Building, 2120. L ' Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20555.

FORTHENUCLEARREGblATORY' COMMISSION rfn 2/

Tho' mas E.-Murley, Director,.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 5.

-Dated at Rockville, Maryland

- this 11th' day of. August 1992-9 i

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. AM MAIN STREET ADMITTED:MA,DC e

P.O. Box 312t.

WAREHAM, MA 0257:

508 291-1354-September 4, 1992 Ivan Selin Chairman U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory CommisFion-One White Flint North 11555 Rockville' Pike

. Roc'kville, MD 20852

Dear Chairman Selin:

I.am disappointed, though :not? surprised, byI t 1992~

response from Thomas Murley,' Director, Office '.he_ Augustfil, of-Nuclear' Reactor.

Regulation, to my' letter to'you ofl July) 21,._1992'on~ behalf'of We The People, Inc.,.of the United States and Paul _M. Blanch regarding:

significant errors that may occur.in : water. leve1' measurement in--

both Pressurized Water Reactors!("PWR")~'and Boiling: Water Reactors

("BWR").

I am writing this. letter / toiyoui on' behalf - of' We - The

^

i People.

The views expressed in the ' letter ' are those. ' of :the -

organization, as well as my.own! views. -

1 Frankly, I believe your lack of a response and the response ^of.Mr.

~ Murley demonstrate the contemptJin which the Commission holds the.

public.

Obviously, the Commission believes that;the issues) raised i

by nuclear power. are too'Icom ignores, plex ^ for: the. ; general' public. to -

understand and, thus, comments.

. minimizes 1 ' and belittles those i

Let me make it clear that asfa lawyer.who,.over"the past'several:

years, has had-some substantial dealingsfwith the Commission,--I ame fully aware of 10iC.F.R. S2.206._:Had I wished toEfilesaLpetition' under that'section, I am fully capable of doing'so.: iI 'specifically -

chose: not to do so because I believed the :issuesL raised by my L

-letter were,significant_enough that--they should not continuelto-be dealt with-'by staff, but should.receivestheidirect~andipersonals attention of. = the Commissionimembers who ar' Lappointed ibyf thef e

President;with the. advice and consent'ofithe. Senate,.and who are directly responsible to the publiciwhich.they~ supposedly serve.

I believe that any. fair reading: ofL my; letterito E you raised ' two

-significant _' issues:l first,. the.-letter raisesDia:. significantc safety}

-concern - regarding: thej. ability ' of! nuclear _ - plant operators : to::

' accurately: determine the' water? level 1in reactors in. the event of-an-accident; also, -my-letter raises the even 'more )important: issue; of J 1 --

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Exhibit 3

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the fact that the Commission has long term knowledge-of this problem and has done absolutely nothing about it.

By treating my letter as a petition under Section 2.206, the Commission has, once

again, attempted to sidestep the issue of its complicity in ignoring significant safety concerns within.the industry.

Please let me explain my conclusion that the Commission views members of the public with contempt to be dealt with as annoyances, radicals, and reactionaries.

As I am sure you are aware,10 C.F.R.

S2.206 provides that requests to modify, suspend, or revoke a license shall specify the action requested and set forth the facts that constitute the bases for that request. It certainly seems to me that if the Commission had determined that my July 21 letter should be treated as a petition under Section 2.206, that I should have' been informed of that fact and given the opportunity to set forth the specific facts-and supporting evidence for any request-under that section.

Obviously, I

. as never given such an w

opportunity. -The first time I became aware that my-letter was being -

treated as a petition was when I discovered that Mr. Murley had denied that petition.

Could it be that Mr. Murley and this Commission are apprehensive about.what facts may actually be presented if I were given the opportunity? Or,~could it be that Mr.

Murley and this Commission. simply think that, as a layman, I -am not capable of cogently presenting a factual basis for a Section 2.206 petition?'

It is further my observation that the Commission was 'far more interested in receiving publicity than in making any cogent response to my letter.

I first learned of Mr. Murley's letter of August 11, 1992, when I began receiving calls from newspapers and wire services asking me to comment on the letter.

Those reporters informed nie that the NRC had telefaxed copies of the letter '. to their respective newspapers and news services.

I, however, did not receive a copy of Mr. Murley's letter until August 17, 1992.

Surely, in the age of'telefax machines and express mail,-it would have been a simple courtesy to insure that I had received a copy of Mr. Murley's letter prior to its public release, 'or at least.

simultaneous with that release.

I.was in attendance at the meeting of July. 29, 1992, where the Boiling Pater Reactor Owners Group ("BWROG") made its presentation to NRC te chnical staff on the problem of non-condensable gases and its'eff(;t on water level measurement.

Please let me take issue 1 /

Where, by contrast, it is interesting J to - note '. that' a letter I wrote to you on August 14,: 1992 ~ requesting. enforcement.

action on behalf of another client ~of mine also has been treated as a petition under 10 C.F.R.S2.206.

By letter dated August 31,1992, from James'Lieberman, Director, Office of. Enforcement, I have been given the opportunity. to present evidence in support of the=

petition.

2 l

L II-

with a few statements in Mr. Murley's letter with regard to that meeting. First, Mr. Murley characterizes that meeting.as a "public meeting." No one should suffer under the misconception that the public in any way participated in that meeting.

The meeting,' plain and simple, was a " dog-and pony show" put on by the BWROG. One of the very first statements made at that' meeting. by Ron Eaton, Project Manager for Pi'. grim' Nuclear Power Station, was that the public would not be allowed to' participate in the meeting.

Many, including myself, had traveled ' to this meeting at great expense under the clear impression, pursuant to the meeting notice, that members of the public would be " participants" in the meeting..

Frankly, most of us could not hear what was-going on.in' ' the meeting.

The meeting was held in a room with. abysmal acoustics and spea,kers continually refused to make any effort to' speak. loudly enough so they could be heard.

At one-point' in the meeting,- I approached Mr. Eaton'and I specifically requested that he ask the panel to make an effort to speak louder, since many persons'in the room could not hear the presentation-or the questions by the NRC.

staff.

Mr. Eaton refused to do this on the basis that it would do no good.

When the public'can neither participate nor effectively observe the proceedings of a meeting, _.

I do not believe that meeting can fairly be characterized as "public."

It further appears to me that Mr. Murley has created a " straw man" by mischaracterizing my letter of July 21,_1992, as.a request for-the immediate shutdown of virtually all reactors, and then denying l

that request. Clearly, my letter of July 21' calls for a three step' process:

first, I requested-that the Commission, require each i

utility to affirmatively demonstrate that its: condensate pot system works > second, if a utility could not make such a demonstration, I requested that the Commission require.the utility to affirmatively demonrtrat~e that it has backup system which would accurately measure water level in the event of-an accident; and finally, I-requested that the Commission shut down any reactor that'could not-meet either of the first-two criteria.

Indeed, it'is my. belief that most of the plant-specific technical license requirements of utilities would require them to go to-cold. shutdown w.ithin a short neriod of time after determining that their level measurements are lnoperable. I referenced that' fact in the very first page'of my letter.

I None of this, however, was addressed in Mr. Murley's response.- By-1 I

focusing only on that portion of my. letter maintaining that reactors which could not meet the-established criteria should be shutdown, Mr. Murley attempted to make it. appear as.though We.The-People was a reactionary. group; seeking to close down'the nuclear =

industry, rather than a responsible, safety advocacy' group seeking -

to be a

constructive part of-any' resolution.-

Such

~

characterizations do little to bolster the public's confidence that any constructive dialogue will ever occur-with this Commission-.

As far as.I am aware, to this date, the Commission has failed to 3

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request that a single utility make an operability determination of its water level measurement instrumentation. Could this be because o

the Commission believes, as I do, that not a single utility, with the exception of Northeast Utilities which' has made hardware modifications to correct the problem, could demonstrate that-it has l

an operable water level measurement system?

1 l

At page two of his letter, Mr. Murley indicates that the BWROG.

analysis was reviewed by NRC staff, which concluded that automatic i

safety system initiation would occur even for the " postulated worst-case non-condensable gas concentration in the reference legs.,"

Lest anyone suffer under any illusions, it should be made l

clear that the staff analysis took all of fifteen minutes.

This was ppproximately the amount-of time that the meeting.was re. cessed ter the BWROG presentation for the staff to consider course of tion it would take.

There are some of us who would believe that ignificant errors in the level measurement ' systems of. reactors

require more than fif teen minutes of the. Commission's attention.=

The fifteen minute review was particularly surprising given the number of questions that the Owners' Group.seemed. unable to answer.

during its presentation;of July. 29,.1992.

For example, Mr. Murley indicates in -his. letter of August ~ 11 that significant errors in the -

l 1evel indication do not occur above 450 psig.

However, as Mr.

Russell pointed out during the July 29 meeting, this assumption is based on data reviewed from plant. shutdowns where.there is only a l

gradual depressurization.

It seems to me that a logica1' conclusion from Mr. Russell's comments and questions is that the level of the error would likely increase if the depressurization was rapid such as in an accident.

1 In his letter of August 11, Mr. Murley goes on at some length to explain how operators will ignore the. faulty reading;given by the water level instruments and take appropriate action in any event.

First, he notes that the operators would use other indications aside from water level measurement :to determine.-the. appropriate course of - conduct.

It is true that operators look at several readings to determine what should be done next.

Supposedly,.these numerous readings are required because no single reading, standing alone, gives the operator sufficient information'on.which to base a decision.

To say that there are multiple systems, does: not address the question of the.effect on the operator's judgment when one of those systems does not function properly..

Mr. Murley also takes-comfort in the' fact that there are usually two or four reference leg c alumns in each plant and "it is unlikely that two or more level indications would. behave ~ erroneously in.the same manner."

Somehow, I do not take the-'same. comfort in knowing that an operator-may be faced with multiple erroneous. readings.

Which one is the operator to believe?.

i

' Finally, Mr. Murley relies on the. f act that if water level is i

'" indeterminate" then operators are instructed to flood the reactor.

1 4

u

a 2

c vessel using at least one pump.

Since the water level instruments will continue to give measurement readings, albeit erroneous ones, o

it is unclear to me how an operator is to know that the reading is erroneous and, therefore, the water level is indeterminate.

One of the most incredible things about the Commission's response to this problem is that no one seems to dispute that the phenomenon of non-condensable gases will give. rise to false high level readings.

I have not heard a single person, including anyone.from this Commission, even vaguely suggest that the phenomenon described by Mr. Blanch does not occur.

Moreover,.it seems that everyone is in agreement' that there are circumstances.under' which this phenomenon can result in significant errors in water ~ level meas,urement.

Given these facts, I find it very. difficult to understand the Commission's apparent. philosophy ' that the public should be required to demonstrate that. nuclear power plants are unsate.

It seems to me that things should be.the other way around;

that is, the operators of power plants should be required to affirmatively demonstrate to the public'and;this. Commission.that their plants are. safe.

Subsequent to Mr Murley's letter to.me on August 11, the Commission' issued Generic Letter number 92-04.on AugustE19,.1992. 'According to the Generic Letter, the effects of the non-condensable' gases in the level-instrumentation system could result in --BWR's not' satisfying ~ 10 C.F.R.

Appendix A, General Design Criterion 13,."

Instrumentation and control,"

GDC.

21,

" Protection system reliability and testability,"

GDC' 22,

" Protection system independence," and 10 C.F.R. S 50.55a(h).

Despite these findings, the Commission has ordered no corrective action.

According to the Generic Letter:

Each licensee should provide its plans and schedule for corrective actions, including any proposed. hardware modifications necessary.

to insure-the.

level-instrumentation system design. is of 'high. functional-reliability for long term operation.

Since this instrumentation plays an important role in plant safety and is required for both normal and accident conditions, the staff recommends that each utility implement, its l

longer term actions to assure a4 level instrumentation system of high functional reliability; at the first opportunity but prior - to starting up af ter theinext refueling outage-commencing three months after the'date-of this letter.

It is unclear why, if the Commission has determined that the l

problem' of non-condensable gases potentially. violates-three regulatory design criteria and one other regulation, that these are merely " requested" actions and not required # actions.

1 1

It is further unclear why this " requested"' action was not included-

.l 5

g

0 i,,

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i as part of Mr. Murley's dispensation of my letter which was treated as a Section 2.206 petition.

Could it be that the Commission does r

not want to acknowledge the role of the organization that-I represent in bringing about changes that are important to plant safety?

Already, the Owner's Group has seized upon the " actions" outlined in the Generic Letter and expressed its clear intent to do nothing to correct the hardware deficiencies unless compelled to do so.

In a response to William T.

Russell, Associate Director,. Inspection Technical Assessment, dated August 12, 1992, and available in'the NRC Public Document Room, the Owners have outlined an approach to the problem which requires additional study until June 1993.

The owners clearly indicate their intent to resist any hardware-

. modifications, unless and until, all of its. studies can make the problem go away.

Lost in this maze of studies is the reason why water level measurement instrumentation was initially mandated by the Commission.

As you may recall, inadequate information on water level led to operator errors that significantly. compounded the accident at Three Mile Island' Additional studies will not change the chemistry or physics which leads to problem of non-condensable gases.

Additional atudies will only further jeopardize the public by delaying corrective action.

Also, the Commission continues to ignore the problems. identified with the respect to pressurizer level on PWRS.- As identified by Westinghouse in its letter of February 1, 1989,.this failure may result in a loss of.the primary system pressure boundary due to the fact that the pressurizer heaters may not be de-energized.

This is one of th~e principle safety barriers which is in jeopardy, yet the-NRC continues to ignore this potential problem.

Of course, none of this addresses the' issue-that is.at the heart of my letter of July 2 The Commission and its' staff.have clearly known of this potential problem for some time. ~However, it took no action whatsoever.

In doing s o,- it has forced - Mr. Blanch, a dedicated employee of Northeast Utilities and a respected engineer, to go to extreme. lengths to insure'that this problem is. addressed.

He has.been required to risk his-career and his credibility simply in an effort to see to it that this Commission.does-the job'which Congress had directed it to do._-I note that.inlan interview with the Boston Globe you were quoted as indicating that the " tenacity

[of Mr._ Blanch) in bringing up-these issues has. certainly been justified...and in large part through his tenacity, they've been taken-seriously. sooner.than they otherwise would have been."

I - ask. you,- Mr. Selin, when a: nuclear worker needs to be as tenacious as-Mr. Blanch.in order to. raise a'significant safety.

concern with.this Commission, is something not wrong? What of the l

worker.with concerns.who-lacks the courage of Mr._ Blanch?

What of I

______._m.m____-___m c

-~ ' ' ' - - ' ' ~ ' - " ' - ' - '

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f the worker with concerns who lacks the credentials? How many problems are not receiving the attention of the Commission simply a

because they have no champion, such as Mr. Blanch?

The scientists and the engineers can figure out a way to correct l

the problem with non-condensable gases.

Can we, the public, rely l

on you to figure out a way to correct the. problems at the.

l.

Commissi-on?

I-Ver tru

ours, i.

/

l n st

..Hadl y cc:

l K. Rogers, NRC.

i J. Curtiss, NRC F. Remick,.NRC G. DePlanque, NRC Pres. G. H. W. Bush Sen. J. Glenn Sen. J. Lieberman l

Sen. C. Dodd Sen.

E. Kennedy Sen. J. Kerry Sen. A. Gore Sen. G. Mitchell Sen. W. Cohen Rep. P. Kostmayer Rep. J. Dingell Rep. E. Markey Rep. G.

Otudds Rep. B. Frank.

Rep. T. Andrews Gov. W. Weld Gov. L. Wiecker Gov. B. Clinton Gov. M. Cuomo Gov. H. Dean W.

Sherman, St. of Vt.

L. Norton, NRC, IG W. Ellis, CEO-NU J. Opeka, Ex..V.P.-NU P.' Blanch 7

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