ML20045B348
| ML20045B348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1993 |
| From: | Mike Franovich Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Miraglia F, Murley T, Russell W NRC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9306170219 | |
| Download: ML20045B348 (6) | |
Text
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?g UNITED STATES
[%Y 3 # T7 E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Q3g j
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555#J01
%; % j' June 11,1993 Docket No.52-002 MEMORANDUM FOR:
T. Murley G. Lainas R. Zimmerman F. Miraglia J. Roe B. Boger W. Russell J. Zwolinski R. Gallo J. Partlow E. Adensam F. Congel-D. Crutchfield B. Grimes E. Butcher W. Travers J. Richardson W. Bateman, ED0 A. Gody B. D. Liaw A. Vietti-Cook S. Varga A. Thadani Operations Center J. Calvo H. Virgilio C. Rossi THRU:
R. W. Borchardt, Acting Director Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:
Michael X. Franovich, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
DAILY HIGHLIGHT - FORTHCOMING HEETING WITH ABB-COMBUSTION l
ENGINEERING (ABB-CE) FOR SYSTEM 80+ (SEVERE ACCIDENTS)
DATE AND TIME:
June 17, 1993 (8:30 a.m. - 4:45 p.m.)
LOCATION:
Duke Engineering & Services, Inc.
230 South Tryon Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1004 PURPOSE:
Meeting to discuss the status of the severe accident issues for the System 80+ standard design.
Specific discussion related to hydrogen generation and removal post accident will be conducted. A proposed agenda and questions for discussion are enclosed.
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I June 11, 1993 PARTICIPANTS *:
NRC ABB-CE M. Franovich S. Ritterbusch J. Kudrick R. Schneider M. Snodderly T. Oswald OriginalSionadB :
f Michael X. Franovich, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Meeting Agenda cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
- Meetings between the NRC technical staff and applicants or licensees are open for interested members of the public, petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as observers pursuant to "Open Meeting Statement of NRC Staff Policy," 43 Federal Reaister 28058, 6/28/78. Members of the public who wish to attend should contact me at (301) 504-1121.
DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File PDST R/F SBajwa, 12G18 PDR JNWilson TVWambach RBorchardt TBoyce MXFranovich PShea OPA EJordan, MNBB 3701 GGrant, ED0 ACRS (11)
MMalloy NRR Mailroom, 12G18 P0' Dell, PTSB JMoore, 15B18 J0'Brien, RES RBarrett, 8D1 JKudrick, SDI MSnodderly, 8D1 RPerch, SDI 0FC:
LA:PDST:ADAR PM:PDST:ADAR SC:PDST:ADAR NAME:
PShea 7j MXFr ch:tz TEssig hh DATE: 06/j)/93 06[d[9Y 06/16/93 0FFICIAL DOCUMENT COPY: CM0617.MXF-
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ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Docket No.52-002 cc:
Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road t
Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 l
Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
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1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U. S. Department of Energy i
NE-42 Washington, D.C.
20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C.
20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037-1128 Mr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President Nuclear Systems Development ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 i
)
i
s CE System 80+
Severe Accidents Proposed Meeting Agenda June 17,1993 Charlotte, North Carolina 8:30 - 8:45
- Introductions / Meeting Overview 8:45 - 11:30 - Discussion of Hydrogen Control Concerns t
- Uncertainty in Hydrogen Distribution
- Stratification Data from the HDR Facility
- Timing of Containment Sprays
- Impact of Cell Detonation Width i
- Actions Planned by NRC
- Actions Planned by ABB-CE
- Discussion of Attached Questions 11:30 - 12:30 - Lunch i
?
12:30 - 2:30 - Discussion of Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- Summary of PRA Results 2:30 - 4:15
- Materials Required by NRC i
- Cavity Walls Structural Analysis
- CORCON Analyses for the Containment Sump
- Discussion of Attached Questions 4:15 - 4:45 Summary of Agreements and Commitments i
Enclosure
s QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION DURING MEETING OF JUNE 17,1993
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1 HYDROGEN GENERATION AND CONTROL 1.
The Severe Accident Analysis Report states that ignition will occur between 4 and 7
6 percent. The absolute lowest threshold is 4 percent, and that is with a strong ignition source and no steam. To what extent will flame propagation occur under realistic conditions? For example, can you describe the best estimate atmospheric compositions, and then provide a best estimate of the threshold considering the ignitor as the ignition source? Also, can you address whether or not the burn will result in final concentrations below the threshold?
1 2.
What type of ventilation survey will be performed, and how will the results be applied to the actual loss-of-coolant accident conditions? For example, doesn't the rate of hydrogen production have a lot to do with the mixing potential? It is an interesting concept, but we need to know how helpful it will be for closing the issue.
I 3.
What is the basis for the statement that the hydrogen will not vary by more than i
3 percent? Also, does it mean that the concentration will vary by plus or minus 3 percent in concentration or 3 percent of the bulk average concentration?
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4.
Does the calculation using the adiabatic, isochronic complete combustion method also produce a temperature? If so, what is the value and can the equipment survive this pressure temperature environment?
5.
Is the Acurex study applicable to System 80+? Also, have you identified the equipment that must survive?
6.
How far away from the ignitor is sufficient, and on what basis is the statement made?
In other words, what is the criteria that will be used for separation and radiation i
protection of equipment?
7.
What size local detonation can the containment as well as equipment survive? Should the size of the detonation should be based on the separation between ignitors?
8.
Surveillance testing of the ignitors was indicated to be a problem because of the need to exceed the design temperature limit by about 100 "F.
We are most interested in hearing what the ice condenser experience has been. Details such as the operating time prior to failure, the rate of failure, the average lifetime of the installed ignitors, etc., would aid the staff in better understanding your concern.
9.
Discussion should be provided on the appropriateness of reducing the ignitor's surveillance temperature, and the basis that would be used to determine operability.
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- 10. ABB-CE should perform calculations of the resulting loads due to a local detonation.
These calculations would be intended to support the structural analyses of question 7.
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t-e CORE CONCRETE INTERACTION
- 11. It is stated that the pressurization failure of the containment is not to occur until 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. What is considered as the failure pressure? Service level C or ultimate?
What is the temperature of the shell at the time of failure?
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- 12. The use of an upward heat flux of 500 Kw/m is probably unacceptable. However, we need to understand ABB-CE's basis for the selection. What are the varying interface temperatures during this process?
How does the corium penetrate the basemat? For example, as the corium ablates into the concrete, will the radius of the melt increase, decrease, or stay about the same?
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