ML20044G828
| ML20044G828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1993 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044G827 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-93-15, NUDOCS 9306040324 | |
| Download: ML20044G828 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1993015
Text
-t
.
.
-
.
APPENDIX
,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-458/93-15
Operating License: NPf-47
Licensee:
Gulf States Utilities
l
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
)
Facility Name:
River Bend Station
'
Inspection At:
St. Francisville, Louisiana
inspection Conducted:
May 10-14, 1993
'
Inspectors:
D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Emergency Preparedness Analyst
(Lead Inspector) Facilities Inspection Program Section
Jack M. Keeton, Reactor Engineer (Examiner), Operations-
P
,
Approved:
f///f M
f
BW1 i >
rray," Chief, f a ilities
/Date
^
Inspection Programs
ction
Inspection Summary
Areas Inspected :
Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of
the emergency preparedness program, including changes to the emergency plan
and implementing procedures; emergency facilities, equipment and supplies;
organization and management control; training; and internal reviews and
audits.
A regional inspection initiative was performed to evaluate your
,
performance during a required unannounced off-hours emergency response
organization callout drill.
,
'Results:
Changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures had been
properly reviewed, approved, and submitted to NRC (Section 2.1).
tmergency response fou...mes and equipment had been maintained in an
,
excellent state of operational readiness (Section 3.1).
A good number of trained staff had been assigned to the emergency
response organization.
The emergency planning organization was staffed 1
with qualified and experienced personnel.
An Inspection Followup Item
?
9306040324 930528
ADOCK05000gB
G
..
_
-
-
-__
t
l
.
o
-
l
.
,
i
'
i
_2_
i
was opened to review the independence of audits performed of emergency
{
preparedness under the new organizational structure (Section.4.1).
,
!
The training organization has maintained an effective emergency response
training program.
Emergency response organization personnel.had been
,
trained in accordance with applicable station procedures (Section 5.1.1)
l
The performance of operating crews during walkthrough evaluations was
'
,
good.
A weakness was identified for several problems observed with the
execution of messages using the computer based Emergency, State, and
Parisn notification system (Section 5.1.2)..
j
The annual audit of emergency preparedness performed pursuant to
=
10 CFR 50.54(t) was of good scope and depth and utilized an audit team
with excellent qualifications.
Excellent audit findings were
documented, and followup to the findings was prompt (Section 6.1).
-J
?
During an unannounced drill evaluated by the inspectors, the licensee's
emergency response organization demonstrated the capability to staff and
'
activate onsite and nearsite emergency response facilities during
off-hours in a timely manner (Section 8.1).
Sunmary of Inspection Findings:
i
Weakness 458/9206-01 was closed (Section 8.1).
,
Exercise Weakness 458/9301-02 was closed (Section 8.2).
.
Exercise Weakness 458/9301-03 was closed-(Section 8.3).
_;
!
Inspection followup Item 50-458/9315-01 was opened (Section 4.1).
Weakness 458/9315-02 was opened (Section 5.1.2).
i
Attachments:
j
Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
Attachment 2 - Operator Walkthrough Scenario Narrative Summary
!
5
!
I
i
!
f
,
)
- . .
__
i
- - ~
--
-
'
.
4
-
,
l
-3-
H
DETAILS
1
1
PLANT STATUS
During this inspection, the plant was in cold shutdown for maintenance.
t
2 EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (82701-02.01)
The inspectors reviewed changes in the licensee's emergency plan and
>
implementing procedures to verify that these changes had not decreased the.
.
effectiveness-of emergency planning and that the changes had been reviewed.
!
properly and submitted to NRC.
_ ;
2.1 Discussion
The inspectors determined that only one revision to the emergency plan
(Revision 8) had been implemented since the previous inspection in this
program area.
The review and submittal of this revision had been conducted in
accordance with Procedure EIP-2-101, " Periodic Review of the Emergency Plan."
This procedure included the provisions for the conduct of reviews consistent-
l
'
with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q).
The-inspectors reviewed letters of
',
agreement with offsite response and support organizations referenced in the
emergency plan and determined that they had been maintained current.
Since the previous inspection in this program area,-a total of 27 implementing
procedure changes contained in 8 submittals to the NRC had been implemented.
"
The inspectors reviewed documentation of these changes and determined that
>
they had been submitted to NRC within 30 days of the effective date of changes
as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.V.
2.2 Conclusions
,
Changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures had been properly
.t
reviewed, approved, and submitted to NRC.
3 EMERGENCY FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, INSTRUMENTATION, AND SUPPLIES
!
(82701-02.02)
-
t
The inspectors toured onsite emergency facilities and reviewed the' licensee's
emergency equipment inventories and maintenance to determine whether
facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of operational
,
readiness.
3.1
Discussion
i
All onsite and nearsite emergency response facilities were observed to be
~
orderly and operationally ready.
Emergency equipment lockers and kits were
.
~
confirmed to contain the specified supplies. .The inspectors reviewed-
-
documentation which showed that response facilities and inventories of
.
emergency equipment had been maintained as required by Prc edure EPP-2-501,
Revision.5 " Emergency Facilities and Equipment Readiness" and
Procedure ElP-2-103, Revision 7, " Emergency Equipment Inventories."' Periodic
,
i
,
h.
i
t
1
-
!
-
.;
-4-
l
tests of communications equipment had been conducted as required by
Procedure EPP-2-502, " Emergency Communications Equipment Testing."
Emergency
!
response organization pager tests had been conducted weekly as required.
The inspectors observed the activation of the emergency ventilation system in
the Emergency Operations Facility.
It was noted that upon activation, the
.
flow was switched to the recirculation mode through a filter bank consisting
l
of HEPA and charcoal filters.
Periodic tests had been conducted of the
activation of the emergency ventilation system, but no tests had been
conducted on the performance of the emergency filtration system.
Licensee
.
representatives stated that procedures were in development that would cause
the periodic testing of the performance of the emergency filtration system in
,
the Emergency Operations facility.
3.2 Conclusions
Emergency response facilities and equipment had been maintained in an
!
excellent state of operational readiness.
j
4 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL (82701-02.03)
'
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response organization staffing levels to
i
determine whether sufficient personnel resources were available for emergency
response.
The emergency planning organization was reviewed to ensure that an
{
effective programmatic management system was in place.
i
e
.
4.1 Discussion
i
'
No changes had been made to the structure or positions of the emergency
response organization since the previous inspection. The duties and
.i
responsibilities of the positions had been clearly defined in the emergency
plan.
A review of the emergency response organization staffing assignments
which had been updated quarterly showed that a good number of trained staff
members had been assigned to each position.
'
The emergency planning staff had remained constant since the previous
'
inspection with a qualified and experienced staff.
The inspectors reviewed
Procedure EPP-2-201, " Emergency Planning Organization and Responsibility,"
Revision 3, and found that duties and responsibilities of the emergency
,
planning staff were clearly defined.
The staff consisted of a supervisor of
i
emergency planning, four emergency planners, and a full-time clerk.
About a month prior to the inspection, an upper-level reorganization was
implemented in the licensee's organization. Among the changes made to the-
facility organization were two changes effecting emergency preparedness. The
-)
emergency planning organization was placed under a newly titled Manager of
j
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification.
This manager reported to the vice
'
president.
Previously, emergency planning reported to the General Manager,_a
l
-
position which was eliminated with the. reorganization.
The second change
ef fecting emergency preparedness involved the Quality As;urance organization
which is responsible for performing independent audits of emergency
.
preparedness as required by 10 CFR 50.54(t).
With the reorganization, the
,
-
.
.
._
_
.
. _ _ _ _
. - - _
i
.
.
.
.
-5-
Quality Assurance organization was placed under the Manager of Safety-
+
Assessment and Quality Verification.
The inspectors expressed concern to
licensee representatives as to whether the Quality' Assurance organization
'
under the new organizational structure would have sufficient independence in
conducting audits of emergency preparedness to meet the requirements'of
Since no audits of emergency preparedness had been conducted-
since the reorganization, the inspectors found no information with which-to
evaluate this concern. This issue will be reviewed during a future inspection
!
as an Inspection followup Item (458/9315-01).
'
4.2 Conclusions
A good number of trained staff had been assigned to the emergency response
organization.
The emergency planning organization was staffed with qualified
1
and experienced personnel.
An Inspection Followup Item was opened to review
the independence of audits performed of emergency preparedness under the~new
organizational structure.
,
5 TRAINING (82701-02.04)
l
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response training program and
interviewed selected individuals to determine whether emergency response
y
personnel were receiving the required training to be in compliance with the
requirements of River Bend administrative procedures, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15),
.
.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F, and the emergency plan,
i
5.1 Discussion
!
,
'
5.1.1
Training Program
The program for training and qualification of emergency responders was
i
specified in procedure EIP-2-102, " Training, Drills, and Exercises "'
'
Oualification included required classroom training and practical experience
provided by required participation in drills and exercise-.
The inspectors
reviewed records of training and determined that they were being maintained
r
current.
The current qualification status of individuals in the emergency'
response organization was difficult to establish, however, in part because the
interface between the training coordinator and the emergency planning
i
.
supervisor was not fully proceduralized.
Specifically, the initial and
requalification training records which had been maintained by the emergency
,
response training organization did not indicate whether the individual had
!
received the required drill or exercise experience.
Drill and exercise
participation records had been maintained separately by the emergency planning
'
_
l
supervisor.
The procedure did not provide for maintaining a composite
.
'
t .ining ecord to clearly show when required em-.32acy .copanse train;ag-had
been completed.
A'similar procedural concern was noted in that no method was
!
identified for tracking crews or individuals who required remediation or whose
!
training was delinquent.
There was also no defined grace period for
!
establishing training delinquency.
The inspectors noted that these tasks were
,
being accomplished by experienced individuals in the ab.ence
^# procedural
3
guidance.
~
,
!
i
'
.
'k
=
-
--
, . .
m
. , .
- .
. .
. . .
.
-
, _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
-
.
.-
.
_.
..
-
-
- - .
.
~
.
.
.
.i
-6-
t
i
The inspectors noted that emergency response training of operating crews has
i
been conducted separately from the'.r dose assessment coordinators and-
!
communicators who would respond 'to the control room early in an emergency.
.
Although no problems surfaced during the walkthroughs which were related to
,
this training practice, the shift supervisors and emergency directors
i
interviewed stated that they were uncomfortable with the arrangement and would
,
be more confident in their ability to perform as a unit'during emergencies if
i
they could train together.
Some response personnel interviewed also indicated
{
that training program feedback from the trainees had been only verbally
i
communicated to training personnel with no formal mechanism for the handling-
!
of the feedback information provided by trainees.
,
The inspectors reviewed documentation of drills and exercises conducted since
E
the previous inspection to determine whether they had been conducted in
accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F and the emergency plan.
r
Section 13.3.7.1.2.3 of the emergency plan specifies schedules and types of
l
drills required of the licensee.
The inspectors found that aside from the
!
annual exercise, only one integrated drill had been conducted since the
previous inspection in March 1992.
The integrated drill documentation
contained little information indicating which of the required drills were
!
satisfied.
Licensee representatives also were unable to provide this
information.
The inspectors had to reference the drill scenario to determine
'
whether the drill satisfied certain emergency plan requirements for the
-
conduct of drills involving such response capabilities as medical emergency,
-[
and radiological monitoring. Although it appeared that drill requirements had-
been satisfied, the inspectors conveyed to licensee representatives _that
compliance with drill requirements should be clearly documented 'and should not -
[
have to be deciphered through reviews of scenarios.
!
r
In addition to the documentation concerns detailed above, the inspectors found
I
little documentation on file concerning the results of drills.
Licensee
l
representatives stated that drills had been conducted in a didactic manner
with immediate corrective instruction provided during the drills. The
'
inspectors noted however, that no records of drill weaknesses or followup
actions had been generated. Documentation referenced concerns only in general
terms.
For example, the only documentation of the results of a November 24,
1992, Post Accident Sampling drill was the statement, "The results of this
i
drill were satisfactory and no deficiencies were noted." There was no
documentation of basis for the satisfactory results. No data was recorded
relative to the time it took to complete the sampling and analysis.
No actual
-
sample analysis data was included in the drill package.
5.1.2 Walkthroughs with Operating Crews
[
!
'
The inspectors conducted a
m .es u.
emergency response walkthroughs with
operating crews to evaluate the adequacy and retention of skills obtained from
!
the emergency response training program.
A single walkthrough scenario was
!
developed by the inspectors and administered to the crews to determine whether
control room personnel were proficient in their duties and responsibilities
during a simulated accident scenario.
Attachment 2 to this inspection report
,
contains a narrative summary of the walkthrough scenario.
l
t
'!
I
-
..
.
.
.
.- __
._
_
_
__.
. _ . -
_
. __
'
t
i
.
i
l
v
'
-7-
!
The inspectors observed three crews during the walkthroughs using the cont'rol
}
room simulator in the dynamic mode.
The scenario consisted of a sequence of
l
events requiring an escalation of emergency classifications, culminating-in a
'
general emergency.
Each walkthruugh lasted approximately 90 minutes. During.
'
the walkthroughs, the inspectors were able to observe the interaction of. the
'
response crews to verify that authorities and responsibilities' were clearly-
'
defined and understood.
The walkthroughs also allowed the evaluation of the
!
crews' abilities to assess and classify accident conditions, perform dose
,
assessments. develop protective action recommendations, and make timely and
l
complete notifications to offsite authorities.
During the walkthroughs, the inspectors observed that all emergency
classifications were made in a timely manner.
The recently revised procedure
.
for classifying emergencies, Procedure EIP-2-001, Revision 6, was noted to be
user friendly and easily executed by the shift supervisors.
!
The inspectors observed and evaluated the ability of each crew to make
accurate and timely notifications to offsite authorities.
The primary method.
.
for promptly notifying offsite authorities of declared emergencies is via a-
computer-based communications system referred to as the Emergency, State,'and
i
Parish System.
The alternate notification method is a ringdown " hotline"
telephone to the State and Parishes _. A short notification form has been used
during initial notifications of an emergency classification.
A long form
+
containing additional information has been used for followup messages.
l
l
During the walkthroughs, notifications were made promptly.
The following.
' !
'
problems, however, were observed with the Emergency, State, and Parish System
notification system:
Short form notification messages transmitted of the General Emergency
'
did not indicate the Protective Action Recommendations issued by the
recovery manager.
The inspectors observed that Protective Action
l
Recommendations had been properly. entered into the message as it
appeared on the Emergency, State, and Parish System ~ monitor, but this
!
'
'
information was not part of the message transmitted.
Whea one crew's communicator entered the Emergency, State, and Parish
l
e
System computer command to gain control of the Energency, State, and
1
Parish System notification system for the purpose of making the
l
Notification of Unusual Event (Notification of Unusual Event)
i
notification, control was electronically denied by the computer system
with the message "TSC denied control access." Because of this, the
connunicator was unable to use the Emergency, State, and Parish System
notification system to make the initial Notification of Unusual Event-
notification.
During one ALERT notification, a communicator entered the required
.
information into the Emergency, State, and Parish System on the short
notification form for transmittal.
When the transmit command was
,
executed, the Emergency, State, and Parish System transmitted the long
form message instead of the intended short form message.
The long form
'
i
'
.
.- --
-n
,
7
,
'
.i
.
.
i
'
.
,
.
i
-8-
.l
!
ha'd not appeared on the Emergency. State, and Parish System monitor nor
- .
had the communicator weked with the long form during the ALERT
'l
notification sequence.
In addition,.the long form transmitted indicated'
conflicting information regarding whether the reactor was shut down.
The Emergency, State, and Parish System notification system demonstrated
j
an internal clock problem which prompted a "next message due in 6
,
minutes" message on the monitor 24 minutes before the next message was
i
actually due.
Problems observed with the execution of messages using the Emergency, State,
and Parish System notification system were identified as a weakness
.
(458/9315-02).
The inspectors observed and evaluated the ability of each crew to perform dose
projections and assessments using the dose assessment computer. The release
path established by the scenario was an unfiltered path from the steam tunnel,
to the turbine building exhaust, and out the main stack. Normally, the dose
assessment would be made by using the release rate value from the Stack-
Monitor RE*125 Channel 4 given in Ci/hr.
However, that channel was not
modeled in the simulator.
The readings on the channels that were modeled were
given in Ci/ml which requires manual calculation using a conversion factor
from the procedure.
All three crews were able to perform this conversion.
The inspectors observed that protective action recommendations that were-
issued as a result of dose assessments were accurate.
Two problems did occur with the identification of the release being filtered
versus unfiltered. One shift supervisor erroneously thought that. the release
was filtered through the standby gas system.
This resulted in a lower dose at
the site boundary.
The cause of the problem was apparently poor communication
between the operators and the shift supervisor.
The other problem stemmed
from the default setting of the dose assessment program. When the program was
initiated, the default assumption was that the release was filtered. One crew
made the determination that the release was unfiltered, but during the
calculation, the program was aborted then restarted.
The operator did not
realize that the program had defaulted to filtered when-he reinitiated the
program.
The inspectors concluded that these observations were isolated and
did not represent an emergency preparedness training problem.
The use of
nonconservative default conditions in the dose assessment program was
discussed with licensee representatives as an area for potential improvement.
5.2 Conclusion
The training organization has maintained an effective emergency response
training program.
Emergency response organi m ion pu wnnel had been trained
in accordance with applicable station procedures.
The performance.of
operating crews d_ucing walkthrough evaluations was good. A weakness was
,
identified for several problems observed with the execution of messages using
the computer based Emergency. State, and Parish notification system.
F'
t
.
b
.
-9-
4
,
6 INDEPENDENT AND INTERNAL REVIEWS AND AUDITS
(82701-02.05)
!
The inspectors met with quality assurance personnel and reviewed independent
and internal audits of the emergency preparedness program performed since the
last inspection to determine compliance with the requirements of
6.1 Discussion
'
The last audit of emergency preparedness had been conducted during the period
'
June 8-19, 1992 (Audit 92-06-I-FEPL).
The audit team consisted of a. lead
auditor, a licensee auditor, a technical specialist consultant, and two
emergency preparedness specialists from other licensed facilities.
The
training and qualifications of audit personnel was. reviewed.
Both licensee
audit personnel had been certified as lead auditors in accordance with
ANSI /ASME N45.2.23 - 1978, " Qualification of QA Program Audit Personnel for
Nuclear Power Plants." The inspectors found the audit team to have excellent
qualifications.
.
The report of Audit 92-06-1-FEPL identified 11 Quality Assurance Finding
Reports and 5 concerns.
The report stated that the identified conditions were
not considered significant but indicated a need to provide improved attention
to the finer details of the program.
Documentation of the audit plan and
procedures utilized during the conduct of the audit was detailed and
-
comprehensive. The inspectors found the scope and depth of the audit to be
.
good.
Excellent findings were identified and properly characterized.
Followup was tracked and implemented promptly with all previously identified
quality findings in the emergency preparedness area having been closed.
i
One surveillance had been performed in the emergency preparedness area since
the previous inspection.
The purpose of the surveillance was to verify on
duty shift staffing levels as specified in the plan.
6.2 Conclusion
,
f
The annual audit of emergency preparedness performed pursuant to.
10 CFR 50.54(t) was of good scope and depth and utilized an audit team with
excellent qualifications.
Excellent audit findings were documented and
.
followup to the findings was prompt.
7
EVALUATION OF UNANNOUNCED, OFF-HOURS EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION
CALLOUT DRILL (82301)
.
On May 12, 1993, the licensee conducted an unannounced drill.to test its
capabilities to staff and activate nearsite emergency response facilities in a
timely manner during off-hours
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's
'
response from the Control Room, Operational Support Center, Technical Support
Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.
';
!
.)
.
,
.
.
..
. .
.. -
.
-,
.
. . . . .
.
-
~.
_
- !
.
^ .
G
'
_
1
I
l
-10-
!
7.1 Discussion
_j
The drill was initiated during an operating crew walkthrough at the t.ime of
j
the General Emergency declaration.
Emergency Response.0rganization pager
a
activation was accomplished'from the control room at_1914 May 12, 1993.
Facility staffing and activation times'were noted as follows:
.
.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY STAFFING AND ACTIVATION TIMES'
1
UNANNOUNCED OFF-HOURS DRILL CONDUCTED MAY 12. 1993
"
Minimum Staffing
' Activat' ion -
FullIStiffing ;
Ltimes
Emini
!
Facility
. time-
min.1
time'
Jmin;
-
'
l
ISC
2018
64
2019
65
-2023
69-
j
=
n . a .-
n.a.
2015
61
n.a.
.n.a.
2031
77
2036
82-
2036
82'
l
!
The licensee's commitments for emergency response organization response
l
timeliness specified in Section'13.3.5.1 of the emergency plan states'that the-
i
entire emergency response organization could be available within 60 minutes
,
during fair weather. conditions and light traffic. At the time of the. drill, a-
thunderstorm was moving through the area. .The' inspectors observed that:the:
j
onsite emergency response facilities were staffed and activated.in about-'
4
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and the Emergency Operations Facility.in le's than 1.5' hour. The-
- .
s
inspectors concluded that the emergency response organization responded to the:
i
site in a timely manner. Emergency response facilities were. activated
efficiently and promptly after minimum staffing was achieved. Despite the-
,
successful demonstration of the overall drill objectives, the following
-
observations'were discussed with the licensee as potential areas forl
improvement:
,
Two individuals assigned to the emergency response organization who'were
'
'
on call with pagers acknowledged the drill.~ page but misidentified'the -
coded page signal as not requiring response to the site. .These.
3
individuals failed to report to the site to fill the positions of
[
radiological assessment coordinator and operational support center
chemistry advisor.
- q
.One emergency response organization staff member who was trained:and
'
- -
qualified to fill multiple response positions reported.to the' site and.
i
filled the position of Operational Support Center Chemistry. Advisor.
!
T: '
as a position she wa qualified for but .. t, assigned to fill. Her
9
assigned position, that of Technical Support Center Chemistry / Core
i
Assessment _ Coordinator, was unfilled until the problem with the vacancy
was recognized and corrected late in the drill.
..
The radiological assessment coordinator and assistant radiological
assessment coordinator are. identified in Procedure EIP-2-018,
i
. Revision 10, " Technical Support Center Activation," as required minimum
l
!
I
'!
-
- - _ - .
.
--.
i
r
a
<.
.
,
-
I
!
-11-
.. ;
!'
staf f members necessary for activation of the Technical Support Center.
Procedure EIP-2-019, Revision 10, " Technical Support Center Support
l
Functions" states, however, that these staff members report to the
Emergency Operations Facility if it is activated.
Since the drill
'i'
initiated with a General Emergency and activation of the_ Emergency
- i
Operations Facility, these individuals did not report to the Technical
Support Center.
Following the drill, the licensee identified the need
to revise Procedure EIP-2-019 to specify these two positions as minimum
staffing for the Technical Support Center at the Alert classification
!
only.
7.2 Conclusion
t
During an unannounced drill evaluated by the inspectors, the licensee's
emergency response organization demonstrated the capability to staff and
activate onsite and nearsite emergency response facilities during off-hours in
a timely manner.
8 FOLLOWUP DN PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS (92702)
8.1
(Closed) Weakness 458/9206-01: Weakness identified during walkthroughs
involved issuing erroneous or conflicting Protective Action
Recommendations
During walkthroughs conducted during this inspection, the inspectors noted'
that Protective Action Recommendations were promptly issued and were accurate
for the known plant conditions prevailing at the time.
8.2
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 458/9301-02: Timely Postaccident Sampling.
System Sample Collection and Analysis
This exercise weakness involved the failure to collect and analyze a sample
from the Postaccident Sampling System in an efficient and timely manner.
There were several items identified in the exercise weakness which caused
unnecessary delays and contributed to the inefficiency observed in the
collection of a postaccident containment air sample.
During the week of May 3-7, 1993, an inspector with the Facilities Inspection
Programs Section verified that the licensee had implemented corrective action
commitments to perform additional surveillances, on-the-job training, and
maintenance on the Postaccident Sampling System panel (NRC Inspection
Report 50-458/93-13).
On May 4, 1993. the inspector observed an unannounced drill to demonstrate the
. licensee's capability to collect 'and analyze Postacciden. Sampling System
samples within a 3-hour time frame.
For the drill, a small volume liquid
sample from the residual heat removal system and a containment air sample were
to be collected. The inspector observed that all of the delays detailed in
the original exercise weakness had been corrected to preclude recurrence.
The
Postaccident Sampling System team functioned well together and performed
effectively and efficiently.
A hardware problem was experienced when sample.
flow stopped during the collection of the small volume liquid sample. The
R
.
.
.
'
!
!
-12-
problem was identified as the failure of a valve.
The attempt to collect this
sample was suspended. The containment air sample was collected and analyzed
satisf actorily within the specified time frame.
Following repairs to-the'
.
failed valve, on May 7,1993, the licensee satisfactorily collected and
analyzed the small volume liquid sample within the specified time' frame.
8.3
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 458/9301-03:
Improper Radiological Practices
During Postaccident Sampling System Sample Collection
.
This weakness involved several examples of poor radiological . controls
exercised during the collection of a Postaccident Sampling System sample.
During the week of May 3-7, 1993, an inspector with'the Facilities Inspection
Programs Section verified that the licensee had implemented corrective action-
commitments to provide additional training to radiation protection personnel
,
on the proper radiological controls to be implemented for postaccident
sampling teams (NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-13).
During an unannounced
Postaccident Sampling System drill conducted on May 4, 1993, the inspector
observed that extra breathing air supply bottles were provided for the
sampling team in the vicinity of the Postaccident Sampling System area. The
l
radiation protection team member frequently monitored each team member's
radiation dose indicated on their self-reading alarming dosimeters and also
monitored their remaining breathing air supply. Air sampler filters were
checked for defects.
The inspector concluded that all of'the poor
radiological practices identified in the original exercise weakness had been
corrected to preclude recurrence.
..
6
i
n
i
{
.
.
..
ATTACHMENT 1
'
l' PERSONS CONTACTED
.l.1
Licensee Personnel
!
- R. J. Bachin, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Systems
- W. L. Beck, Director, Nuclear Training
J. E. Booker, Manager, Safety Assessment and Quality Verification
- D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager
'
- L.
A-. England, Director, Nuclear Licensing
- R. H. Gaylor, Director, Computer Systems
- R. Godwin, Nuclear Training Representative
,
- J. R. Hamilton, Manager, Engineering
- R. Jobe, Senior Emergency Planner
- J. W. Leavines, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety Assessment Group
,
-*D. N. Lorfing, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
,
- l. M. Malik, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance
- J. Schippert, Plant Manager
- W. M. Emith, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- K. Swanzy, Emergency Planner
- J. Venable, Operations Supervisor
,
- L. W. Woods, Shift Supervisor
l
1.2 NRC Personnel
i
- D. Loveless, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit interview
'
2 EXIT MEETING
l
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives and other personnel
indicated in Section 1 of this attachment on May 14, 1993, and summarized
the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report. The
'
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the' materials provided to, or
reviewed by, the inspection team during the inspection.
i
9
,
F
'
l
i
s
-
1
7 --
.
'
.
-
i
l
i
ATTACHMENT 2
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY
Simulation Facility:
River Bend Station
Initial Conditions:
Reactor is at 100 percent power MOL with equilibrium
Recirculation Pump B has indication of
increasing seal leakage.
A weeping SRV is keeping
,
'
suppression pool temperature sufficiently elevated to
require one loop of RHR to continuously be in
suppression pool cooling, RHR A is currently in use.
Channel 4 of RE*125 is inoperable due to a power
supply failure on the effluent flow rate monitor.
.
'
Plant management is meeting to determine the course of
action for the leaking SRV.
,
Sequence of Events:
About 5 minutes into the scenario, jet Pumps 5 and 6
fail causing loose parts monitors to alarm and fuel
failure. Offgas radiation increases by 1200 mR/hr on
D17-R604 at lH13*P600. Area radiation monitors in
appropriate areas are showing corresponding increases.
This will require Notification of Unusual Event based
on Procedure EIP-2-002 3 fuel damage indication.
As the declaration and notifications are being made,
the radiation levels continue to increase until the
MSL Hi alarms come in at 1.5 X normal. An automatic
i
scram will not occur on MSL Hi-Hi at 3 X normal, but
MSIVs will close requiring manual scram to terminate
the pressure transient.
The MSL Hi-Hi trip without
scram will require declaration of an Alert per
Procedure EIP-2-003 1.3.
Notification of upgrade must
be made.
The SRVs will cycle open because of the pressure
spike, adding more heat to the suppression pool.
At
the same time an unisolable break of the RCIC steam
supply line will occur.
Steam tunnel temperatures and
'
radiation levels will increase.
The main stack
effluent radiation levels will increase
correspondingly giving indication of loss of all three
l
fission product barriers.
This requires declaration
of a General Emergency in accordance with
Procedure EIP-2-005 2.1-5.
1
An unfiltered release path to the main stack will be
)
established such that a source term must be determined
and protective action recommendations made.
)