ML20044D368
| ML20044D368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1993 |
| From: | Scarano R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Conway W ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| EA-93-065, EA-93-65, NUDOCS 9305190051 | |
| Download: ML20044D368 (7) | |
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NUCLEAR REGUULTORY COMMISSION i
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Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, and 50-530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74
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t Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 53999, Station 9012 l
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999
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Attention: Mr. William F. Conway Executive Vice President, Nuclear
SUBJECT:
INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE NRC 0FFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS l
(CASE N05. 5-91-009, 5-92-011, AND 5-92-012)
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This refers to three investigations into Palo Verde security conducted by the l
NRC Office of Investigations (01) from July 22, 1991, through February 26, J
1993, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, j
The investigations consisted of interviews of personnel and review of selected documents, and appear to confirm, as indicated in the enclosed synopses, that:
(1) members of the 1991 initial security training classes A and B were not trained to perform, before assignment, all crucial security tasks identified
'j for their assignments, under the conditions and to the standards specified in t
your approved Training and Qualification (T&Q) Plan; and (2) critical task t
training forms retained in your security training files for these classes were not accurate in all material respects, reflecting a false level of skill, in.
violation of 10 CFR 50.9.
During interviews, several members of your 1991 initial security training classes A and B stated that their overall initial security training did not
.j adequately prepare them for performing the required security crucial tasks.
The subsequently reported increasein security officer human errors in 1991 appeared to confirm these statements. Also you acknowledged in a February ll, 1
1992, Enforcement Conference that training during this period had contributed j
to security violations. Additionally, these investigations appear to confirm that security events on June 17 and July 20, 1991, involved failed I
compensatory security measures in violation of your approved. security plan, l
improper recording of these events (or portions thereof).in violation of 10 l
CFR 73.71, and failure to properly protect safeguards information in violation l
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of 10 CFR 73.21.
While our recent security inspections have found.no indications that these l
deficient conditions now exist at Palo Verde, the situations identified during l
the investigations constitute apparent violations of the above regulatory requirements. These apparent violations are being considered for escalated i
enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and l
Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy),10 CFR Part 2, l
Appendix C.
Because this matter is being considered for escalated action,;no l
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2 Notice of Violation is presently being issued for these investigation findings.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations may change as a result of further NRC review.
An enforcement conference to discuss these apparent violations has been scheduled at the NRC Region V Office, Walnut Creek, California, for May 7, 1993. Please confirm promptly that you can support this date. The purposes of this conference are to discuss the apparent violations, their causes and safety significance, and to discuss any other information that will help us determine the appropriate enforcement action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, including the level of APS management that may have been aware of the conditions underlying the apparent violations.
You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
No response regarding these apparent violations is required at this time.
As part of the enforcement conference on May 7,1993, please also be prepared to discuss:
(1) the manner in which you conduct (and document) your security officer annual requalification program; (2) the meaning of the statement in Section 3.4 (Requalification) of your approved T&Q Plan that, " Security personnel at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station shall be requalified...on those tasks which cannot be evaluated through normal job performance or noted on the critical task. sign-off sheets;" and any information you have concerning members of the 1991 initial security training classes A and B being allowed to attempt to qualify up to six times with their assigned weapons, rather than the maximum three qualifying attempts, in violation of your security training procedure 20DP-0TR01.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, Jh%
n I Ross A. Scarano, Director
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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosure:
Synopses of 01 Reports of Invest.)ations, Case Numbers 5-91-009, 5-92-011, and 5-92-012 cc:
Mr. P. Caudill, APS Mr. T. Bradish, APS Mr. F. Kroll, Security Manager, APS Mr. Steve Olea, Arizona Corporation Commission
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3 Mr. James A. Beoletto, Esq., Southern California Edison Company l
Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager, ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power i
Mr. Aubrey Godwin, Director, Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency l
Chairman, Maricopa County Board of Supervisors
~l Mr. Jack R. Newman, Esq., Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
l Mr. Curtis Hoskins, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Palo I
Verde Services l
Mr. Roy P. Lessey, Jr., Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld Mr. Bradley W. Jones, Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld i
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SYNOPSIS OF 01 REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS 01 Report of Investication. Case No. 5-91-009 On July 22, 1991, the Regional Administrator, Region V, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested an investigation to determine whether Arizona Public Service (APS), an NRC licensee, failed to follow the requirements of its NRC approved security plan and training and qualification plan. The request referenced several examples of alleged failures and indicated that training records at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) are being fabricated to reflect a false level l
of skill for " temporary officers."
The Office of Investigations investigation found that the training of the " temporary officers" (also known as contingency force (CF) officers) at PVNGS was not in compliance with the licensee's NRC approved training and qualification plan (T&Q). The licensee, through its instructors, i
sergeants and supervisors, certified these officers as having performed tasks and being qualified for post assignments at PVNGS, without the officers having met all the conditions set forth in the T&Q. CF officers signed training certifications which attested to task performance demonstration which had not been accomplished.
l The Critical Task (CT) forms for security officers were retained in the licensee's files and generally reflected a false level of skill for
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security officers. The licensee failed to maintain records with I
complete and accurate information in all material respects, contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.9. There is insufficient evidence to establish that this was intentional and deliberate.
01 Report of Investication. Case No. 5-92-011 On July 22, 1991, the Regional Administrator, Region V, requested the Office of Investigations (0I) determine whether there is intimidation of security officers at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS),
Wintersburg, Arizona, by Arizona Public Service Company (APS) security l
management which prevents the officers from reporting safety concerns to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
In one particular case an individual involved in a labor management negotiation alleged he was threatened and told not to go to the NRC.
The 01 investigation determined that numerous security officers at PVNGS believed there might be some form of retaliation by management if they brought concerns to the NRC.
Investigat' ' of the alleged threats against a security officer in relation tu contact with the NRC was not substantiated. There is insufficient evidence to support a violation by APS/PVNGS of the provisions of 10 CFR 50.7.
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01 Report of Investigation. Case No. 5-92-012 l
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Administrator, Region V, requested the l
Office of Investigations (01) determine whether records of equipment f
failures are being expunged at the Arizona Public Service (APS) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Wintersburg, Arizona. The alleger reported that PVNGS was not complying with the Security Plan t
requirements by:
(1) Not taking compensatory measures for failed security equipment; (2) Not providing adequate mobile patrols; and (3)
Failing to log safeguards incidents.
During the course of the investigation numerous examples of alleged r
violations of the licensee's U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved security plan were reviewed. The investigation did not i
substantiate the allegation concerning inadequate mobile patrols and did i
not find sufficient evidence to substantiate alleged failures to take adequate compensatory measures for failed security equipment.
Several allegations of a failure to log safeguards incidents were substantiated. 01 found that APS did not appropriately log the improper l
posting of a compensatory officer for two zones on June 17, 1991; the abandonment of security post orders on July 20, 1991; and the subsequent failure to log the abandonment of a security post within the required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
This has resulted in the violation of 10 CFR 50.9 and 73.71. However, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that these violations were l
done willfully.
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