ML20044C446
| ML20044C446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1993 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044C442 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-070, REF-GTECI-094, REF-GTECI-NI, TASK-070, TASK-094, TASK-70, TASK-94, TASK-OR GL-90-06, GL-90-6, NUDOCS 9303230047 | |
| Download: ML20044C446 (27) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. Docket No. 50-423 B14375 P i Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Reactor Coolant System - Relief Valves Reactor Coolant System - Overpressure Protection System Reactor Coolant System Vents Markup Pages t U T March 1993 3 og AD P
-b .i October 25. 1990~ -l ' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-All; power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated b '8oW j 3.4.4 valves M11 be OPERABLE. i APPLICABILITY: ' MODES 1, 2, and 3. M g aa 94%Vag,y g;4 n (>we# gioc k j ACTION: g,4 g,;$ mom,J qded l c, 3 With one or @ife PORV(s) inoperabl,khcMaa af avressive - seet [ a. t 1eekage, within I hour either restore he PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve (s.; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. and not-cebic. 4-le day rnww<dly ('t 'y y b. With one PORV inoperableNue t: ::nt: Oth:r th:r. exce::ive seat--- T+ek?;e, within I hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or. j -l close the associated block valve and remove power from the block -J valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following l 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY StW1 the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the foll #ng 6 hours, wiin". n and w
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c. With both / ' associated block valve (A and remove q p ged L ur either restore =24 af +A* PORV6fto_ seat R:hge, w thin 1 cena.- OPERABLE status or close power from the block valve and be in HOT STANDBY within the next l 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. i 1 f bok With one or -mere block valve (s) ' inoperable,. within I houre i
- d. gl > restore the block valve (s) to-OPERABLE status, cr ch;; the N
'i b]::k v2he(s) :nd ' re-e"a nnver_fram t'e t h:k V: he(s), r c h @ i f the P02" ;r.d.ca.vve pvwer ii um ;t; ::::'::ted 10hr i e..c, .m I (?) 2;;1y th: 'ITIC" b. ec c. eLeve, ;; :ppr:prf2ta (0* t h% l iselsted PORV(:). O l Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these I Y { e. ACTION requirements. V j s g $ (4 h e (di4 b {g' bl 4 o k vni*c a opm euE sw 6.. I gep cd l%A4-on4 g g,, w m A h oi.n-il ' b ON M S'k V 'VH ' " P '** b\\> bt ook val % b' CU ^bl' E f 'h< &hjvb n O pClarkg g G j wrndyg cm gg% y iMw. 7 Ahau oth&WOjb owN g u s.co m sy a, w w a cu ad " (l n wn ~. AMENDMENT NO. 57-MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-12 Io I f
3 i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ~ ' JAN 31 P/06 RELIEF VALVES \\ SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV l 4.4.4.1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by: ~ Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and r a. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel,cAuvin3 f y b. monEs 3 cn 4 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 4.4.4.2 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of-full travel unless the block valve is closed with power removed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b. or c. in Specification 3.4.4. The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be 4.4.4.3 demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel. i i E i i t e i 3/4 4-13 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 (:?//,/ 8
October 25, 1990 ~ l t N @' A g j REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS \\CC / l O$ fd [ llMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I y / } ~ 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following Ovefpressure Protection systems snail be OPERABLE: I a. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a f; setpoint of 450 psig, or f i b. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings which j do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4a or Figure 3.4-4b, as appropriate, or The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of c. greater than or equal to 5.4 square inches. APPLICABit1TY: MODE 3 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than t or equal to 3500F, MODES 4 and 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on. ACTION: a. With one required PORV inoperable or one required RHR suction relief valve inoperable, restore two PORVs or two RHR-suction relief valves to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch vent within the next 8 hours. b. With both required PORVs inoperable, within the next 8 hours either restore both RHR suction relief valves to OPERABLE status or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square i inch vent. i c. With both required RHR suction relief valves inoperable, within the next B hours either restore both PORVs to OPERABLE status or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch l vent. d. In the event the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS I vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent [ { recurrence. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these e. ACTION requirements. l MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-38 AmendmentNo./3,57 i hkh
pos s pcr h' Pap 16u REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDIT10ff FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 An Overpressure Protection System shall be OPERABLE with either a or b below: a. Two relief valves, as follows: 1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings which do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4a or Figure 3.4-4b, as appropriate, or 2. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a setpoint of 450 psig, or 3. One PORV with lift settings within the limits specified in Figure 3.4-4a or rigure 3.4-4b, as appropriate and one RHR suction relief valve with a setpoint of 450 psig. 1~-~~ b. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of d greater than or equal to 5.4 square inches. APPLICABILITY: MODE 3 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg-is less than or equal to 350'F and MODE 4; MODE 5, and MODE 6 when the headis on the reactor vessel ACTION: With one of two required relief valves inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, a. restore two relief valves to OPERABLE status within 7 days - or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch vent within the next 8 hours, b. With one of two required relief valves inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, either (1) restore two relief valves to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch vent within a total of 32 hours. c. With both of the required relief valves inoperable, complete depressurization and venting the RCS through at least a 5 4 square N inch vent within 8 hours. d. With the RCS vented per ACTIONS a, b or c, verify the vent pathway at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve (s), that is locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the open position; otherwise, verify the vent pathway every 12 hours. In the event the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS e. vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-38
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' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM f l OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM i t LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) - -- - p i Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report-shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, the RHR I suction relief valves, or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence. I I f. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements. i 'I i i P i 'i i .i i r i i MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-38a i
1 .N REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM JAN 31 1986 i .DV_I H..l.'.Ri ', t H 'l IT"II C 1 ION,M,11 M 4 SURVL1Li ANCL 10 Ol!!RLMI N15 ) 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: i Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days a. prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE; Perfcrmance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel b. at least once per 18 months; and Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours c. when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection. Eacn RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when 4.4.9.3.2 the RHR suction relief valves are being used for cold overpressure protection as follows: For RHR suction relief valve 3RH5*RV8708A, by verifying at least once a. per 12 hours that 3RHS*MV8701A and 3RHS*MV8701C are open; For RHR suction relief valve 3RH5*RV8708B, by verifying at least once b. per 12 hours that 3RH5*MV8702B and 3RH5*MV8702C are open; and Testino pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. c. venu s j sheli De verit i~eTIo be open at least once per l .2.4.9.: ; <ne nLa 12 hcurs" when tne vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection. f \\ \\ \\ vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed % capt when t or otherwise secured in the cpen position, then verify these valves open at / least unce per 31 days. _-l ,',5 c2 ceve) w b gelek 5 ""' I gw 3/4 4-39 MILL 5TENF - UNIT 3 [.i / / ?
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM JAN 31 G86 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION gPcmMe.t +rcan s w4% b,c vnIvc At least one Reactor Coolant System vent path consisting of two h * .ualvcO) cad-one Moek valve-powered from emergency busses shall be OPERABLE 3.4.11 and closed %t each of the following locations: h<. v ed Reactor vessel head, and a. b. Pressurizer steam space. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. 9e.4 w vus d. heal V ed' Ped b l ACTION: 4 gg, p %Deactor Ccclant Systcm vent--paths inoperable,, 3 With one of-the above l STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable train a. vent path is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuatorSof all un[ valves a+bipt yaiw#in the inoperable t*" vent path; restore the inoperable veet-peth to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. .t n s 4 1 N. R wh< s/ css d w eJ V eJ Pa b bg l l With both ReactMeelant -System-vetrt paths inoperable; maintain #e l b. incpe"ble vent paths closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all tfie vents valves and $1ccP valves in the inoperable W" t - b uin s vet paths, and restore at least one of the ve+Y% to OPERABLE [ status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and l COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l t rc s E ar '1' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS eF4c b b WMdbeed i DLif f sey, hon tr cu o 'h5FG Each.!karrtw Ceclent System vent path bleek valve not required to 4.4.11.1 be closed by ACTION a. or b., above, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel from the control room.og su.wa% veud kd sin 4.4.11.2 Each[ Peer +ee CoMent:-System vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by: Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked a. in the open position, Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle of b. full travel from the _ control room, and Verifying flow through the Reactor Coolant System vent paths during c. venting. sWM h-c. eE% h4dtw.s\\-con s pg <_ Vt.n\\ g% k m*4 4. y. p.3. E,c h 4rr.u n 6 ' cg odac. wew u clem n sS.&_A o eEc A hE pu Ag NM b S N O $ /Y 4-3 YMk hgg P . MILLSTONE - U, NIT 3 M ra % Oll? wm -ce~M vm ebu e: , m an peense venu praw uig cs e "q.mt % be. ch3 - v e% SAw f M Peru be v Am u
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I REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WUSN 81 1336' BASES l 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES ~. The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve Setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Cold Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures. During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip until the first Reactor Trip System Trip Setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves. Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code. 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation i assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 32-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant-to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation. 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to i relieve RCS pressure during all design transients.up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes I the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. Each PORV'has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positi.ve snutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. Requiring the PORVs to be OPERABLE ensures that the capability for depressurization during safety grade cold shutdown is met. D t Es tE ELT )< HILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-2 1 O//Lj
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~, ~ March 6, 1990 l t REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM f BASES i PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued) Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a i point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate. data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to~be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration., j The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup i limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over,the l course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis ] of the most critical criterion. Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate. data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature. sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves. t Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are _j provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis 1 performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements. w_AA 4 vn\\m ctr crm Pt@/ ! - cv hv o N G. % cu m 'I COLD OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION c M tw (h n. h c b @ W M rt. The OPERABILITY of two _ PORVshor an RCS vent opening of at least 5.4 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which I I could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350*F. Either PORV has adequate-i relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: (1) the start of an idle RCP with the l Asmondary_ water te,mperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 508 V above the RTS70ldVtemperature/, or (2) the start of a charging pump and its J injection into a water-solid RCS. -*=- T N.W FJT 'Y ' l The Maximum Allowed PORY Setpoint for the Cold Overpressure Protection System -l (COPS) _ is derived by analysis which models the performance. of the COPS j assuming various mass input and heat input transients. Operation with a PORV Setpoint less than-or equal to the maximum Setpoint ensures that Appendix G l criteria will not be violated with consideration. for ~ a maximum - pressure-t overshoot beyond the PORV Setpoint which can occur. as a result of time delays 'j in signal processing and valve opening, instrument uncertainties, and _ single. failure. To ensure that mass and-heat input transients more severe than those assumed cannot occur, _ Technical Specifications require lockout of F ht h: -{ l "in p=p :nd-all but one-centrifugal charging pump while in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head installed and disallow start of: an. RCP if secondary temperature is more than 508 above-primary temperature. The Maximum Allowed PORY Setpoint for the' COPS will be updated based on ' the. results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance l specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in i accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5. i B 3/4 4-14 AmendmentNo.l M1()LSTONF UNIT 3 ( ll$- a r +
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= i March 6, 1990 i ^ l PEACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES i 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, t and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with ( Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code and applicable Addenda l as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Comission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i). Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access l to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME i i Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 80 Edition and Addenda through Winter except l where specific written relief has been granted pursuant to 10 CFR l 50.55a(g)(6)(i). j t l 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS l Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPEPABILITY of least one Reactor Coolant System l vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space ensures that the capability exists to perform this function..e-io ner' r' j i I The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while I ensuring that a single f ailure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. l The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor l Coolant System vents are consistent with the requirements of item II.B.1 of i NUREG-0737,
- Clarification of TM1 Action Plant Requirements," November 1980.
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v Docket No. 50-423 B14375 Y ? Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Reactor Coolant System - Relief Valves Reactor Coolant System - Overpressure Protection System Reactor Coolant System Vents t s 1 L t March 1993
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4. Both power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ) ACTION: a. With one or both PORV(s) inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within I hour either restore the PORV(s).to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve (s) with power maintained to the i block valve (s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. b. With one PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, within I hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY wtihin the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. c. With both PORVs inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, within I hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status J or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. d. With one or both block valve (s) inoperable, within I hour restore the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or place its associated PORV(s) control switch to "CLOSE." Restore at least one block valve i to OPERABLE status within the next hour if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to operable status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within i the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. e. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements. I MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-12 Amendment No. E7 0111 i i
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by: a. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and-b. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel during MODES 3 or 4. 4.4.4.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed with power removed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b. or c. in Specification 3.4.4. 4.4.4.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be l demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves i through a complete cycle of full travel. t h P i -i i l f ) i i MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-13 0111 i c.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.4.9.3 An Overpressure Protection System shall be OPERABLE with either a or b below: l a. Two relief valves, as follows: I 1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift. settings which do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4a or Figure 3.4-4b, as appropriate, or l 2. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a setpoint of 450 psig, or i 3. One PORV with lift settings within the limits specified in Figure 3.4-4a or Figure 3.4-4b, as appropriate and one RHR j suction relief valve with a setpoint of 450 psig. b. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of i greater than or equal to 5.4 square inches. l l APPLICABILITY: MODE 3 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is les.s than or equal to 350*F and MODE 4; MODE 5, and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel. j ACTION: f a. With one of two required relief valves inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, i restore two relief valves to OPERABLE status within 7 days or i depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch -i vent within the next 8 hours. 4 b. With one of two required relief valves inoperable in MODE 5 OR 6, j either (1) restore two relief valves to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS l through at least a 5.4 square inch vent within a total of 32 hours. J c. With both of the required relief. valves inoperable, complete -l depressurization and venting the RCS through at least.a-5.4 square l inch vent within 8 hours. l d. With the RCS vented per ACTIONS a, b or c, verify the vent pathway i at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve (s), that is locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the open position; otherwise, verify the vent pathway every 12 hours.- i 1 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-38 Amendment No. JE, A7 0112 -1
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ) OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) e. In the event the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Rgert shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to l Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence. j f. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements. SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: a. Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE; b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection. 4.4.9.3.2 Each RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when the RHR suction relief valves are being used for cold overpressure protection as follows: a. For RHR suction relief valve 3RHS*RV8708A, by verifying at least once per 12 hours that 3RHS*MV8701A and 3RHS*MV8701C are open; b. For RHR suction relief valve 3RHS*RV8708B, by verifying at least once per 12 hours that 3RHS*MV8702B and 3RHS*MV8702C are open; and c. Testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-39 0112
i l i i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 At least one Reactor Coolant System vent path consisting of two parallel trains with two valves inseries powered from emergency busses shall be OPERABLE and the vent closed
- at each of the following locations:
a. Reactor vessel head, and b. Pressurizer steam space. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: a. With one train of the reactor vessel head vent path inoperable, i STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable train is maintained closed with power removed from the valve i actuators of all valves in the inoperable train; restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. b. With both trains of the reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable; maintain both trains closed with power removed from.the valve t actuators of all valves in the inoperable trains, and restore at least one of the trains to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in l H01 STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. c. With any valve (s) of the pressurizer steam space vent path inoperable in MODES 1, 2, or 3, follow the ACTION requirements of l Specification 3.4.4. d. With any valve (s) of the pressurizer steam space vent path inoperable in MODE 4, follow the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.9.3. SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS l 4.4.11.1 Each train of the reactor vessel head vent path isolation valve not j required to be closed by ACTION a. or b., above, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel from the control room. j l For an OPERABLE vent path using a power-operated relief valve (PORV) as the vent path, the PORV block valve is not requird to be closed. MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-43 Amendment No. 0113 l
~ i i i 1 SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued)__ F 4.4.11.2 Each train of the reactor vessel head vent path shall be i demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by: a. Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position, b. Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle of full i travel from the control room, and c. Verifying flow through the Reactor Coolant System vant paths during i venting. 4.4.11.3 Each train of the pressurizer steam space vent path shall be l demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable requirement of Specifications 4.4.4.1 through 4.4.4.3 and 4.4.9.3.1. In' addition, r flow shall be verified through the pressurizer steam space vent path during venting at least once per 18 months. ~ t I i f f I i i t I i i t I MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-43a Amendment No. I 0113 l 1
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES l t 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES e The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being i pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve Setpoint. The i relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that i no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Cold Overpressure Protection System ~ provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures. During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the [ maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip until the first Reactor Trip System Trip Setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves. Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during i shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI l of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code. 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER j The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation l assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter l is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant j to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation. 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES f The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the J design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. Requiring the PORVs to be OPERABLE ensures that the capability for depressurization during safety grade cold shutdown is met. 1 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. 0114
1 = REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES { RELIEF VALVES (Continued) Action statements a, b, and c distinguishes the inoperability of the power operated relief valves (PORV). Specifically, a PORV may be designated inoperable but it may be able to manually open and close and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small-break LOCA. for these reasons, the block valve may be closed but the action requires power to be maintained to the valve. This allows quick access to the PORV for pressure control. On the other hand if a PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it must be either restored or isolated by closing l the associated block valve and removing power. The prime importance for the capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck-open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve (s) cannot be restored to operable status within I hour, the remedial action is to place the PORV in manual control (i.e. the control switch in the "CLOSE" position) to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential of a stuck-open PORV at a time that the block valve is inoperable. The time i allowed to restore the block valve (s) to operable status is based upon the remedial action time limits for inoperable PORV per ACTION requirements b and j c. These actions do not specify closure of the block valves because such action would not likely be possible when the block valve is inoperable. l 4 i l 4 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-2a Amendment No. c124
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i BASES l PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued) Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are j produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a l point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable _ pressure is taken to be the lesser i l of the three values taken from the curves under consideration. i The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative hertup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion. Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves. Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements. l COLD OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or two RHR suction relief valves or one PORV and one RHR suction relief valve or an RCS vent. opening of at least 5.4 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of-Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350*F. Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the_RCS from i overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: - (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50* above the RCS cold leg temperature, or (2).the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water-solid RCS. The-l relieving capacity of each RHR suction relief valve is more than adequate to relieve the combined flow of two centrifugal charging pumps. The RHR suction relief valves provides this protection only when the RHR suction - valves are open. The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the Cold Overpressure Protection l System (COPS) is derived by analysis which models the performance of the COPS assuming various mass input and heat input transients. Operation with a PORV Setpoint less than or equal to the maximum Setpoint ensures that Appendix G criteria will not be violated with consideration for'a maximum pressure overshoot beyond the PORY Setpoint which can occur as a result of time delays in signal processing and valve opening, instrument uncertainties, and single failure. To. ensure that mass and heat input transients more severe than those assumed cannot occur, Technical Specifications require lockout of all but one centrifugal charging pump i MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-14 Amendment No. /E 0115
~. .. =. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES (Continued) while in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head installed and disallow start of an RCP if secondary temperature is more than 50* above primary temperature. The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the COPS will be updated based on the results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5. 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY [ P The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(1). Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide l access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 80 Edition and Addenda through Winter i except where specific written relief has been granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i). .j 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit i natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of least one Reactor Coolant System vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer 1 steam space ensures that the capability exists;to perform this function. The reactor vessel head vent path consists of two parallel flow paths with redundant isolation valves (3RCS*SV8095A, 3RCS*SV8096A and 3RCS*SV80958, 3RCS*SV8096B) in each flow path. The pressurizer steam space vent path. consists of two parallel paths with a power operated relief valve (PORV) and PORV block valve in series (3RCS*PCV455A, 3RCS*MV800A and 3RCS*PCV456, 3RCS*MV8000B). The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to a minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of-the vent path. F The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor. Coolant System vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plant Requirements," November 1980. 2 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-15 Amendment No. /E .i 0115 !}}