Text

Safety Evaluation Accepting Topical Rept NEDC-31677P, Tech Spec Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
	ML20043H563
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Issue date:	06/18/1990
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EFCLOSURE 1 SAFETY EVALVAT10fl BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR' REGULATION REVIEW 0F BWR OWN:!R5 6ROUP REPOET NE00-310D F -

CL JUSTIFICAT10h FOR EXTEU5]ON OF SUFYEll'.AN;E lEST INTERVALS

~ AhD ALL0hED OUTAGE T]PE5 FOR BWD ISOLATION Ih5TRUMENTATION

~

NOT COMk0li TO RPS OR ECCS ll45TRUMLilTAT10N i

1.

Sul0ARY The hf C staff has reviewed the Ceneral Electric Company (GE) Topical Report NEDC-31677P, " Technical Specification Iniprovement /nalysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation." This topical report provides the bases for proposed changes to certain Technical Specifications for the isolation actuation instrumentation not common-to RPS or ECCS instrumentation.

In particular, bases are provided for extending these non-common instrumentation surveillance test intervals (STis) from 31 days to 92 days.

Additional bases are provided for extending allowed outage times (A0Ts) for test from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and A0Ts for repair from I bour to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for these items.

The NRC staff has concluded that the analyses presented in NEDC-31677F are bounding and-provide an adequate basis for Technical Specification (TS) changes to extend the STIs and A0Ts for BWR isolation actuation instrunientation not common to RPS and ECCS instrumentation, subject to the limitations and conditions presented herein.. The staff has previously approved STI and A0T extensions for EWR isolation actuation instrumentation con. mon to RPS and/or ECCS instrumentation (Ref. 1).

2.

BACKGROUNC Item 4.E.3 of Generic Ietter 83-28 (Ref. 2) recuested that all licensees and

. applicants review the existing on-line functional test intervals required by the Techrical Specifications. This review was intended to ensure that current and prorcsed intervals for such testing are consistent with a goal of achieving high RPS availability.. Subject to plant-specific conditions which must be met, extensions to RPS STIs have been granted.

Similar extensions to RPS A0Ts have also been granted, allowing more suitable time intervals for repair and test procedures.

Extending STis for isolation actuation instrumentation has the potential for reducing wear due to excessive equipment test cycling and better optimizing the use of plant personnel, with resulting improver.ents in plant safety anc operations.

3.

APPROACl!

.The BWR Owners Group decided to attenipt to resolve this issue generically.

It couraissioned GE to perform generic comparative analyses for further application to the individual boiling water reactor (BWR) plants. Analyses were done to determine the-effect on isolation function f ailure probebility of extending the Sil. Additionally, the sensitivity of the isolation function failure probabilit3 values to allowea outage times for test and repair was exaniined. This analysis was performed for each of the four boilirt water reactor product line groups.

BWR-6 (solid state), BWP-5/6 (relay), BWR-3/4, and BWR-2.

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f A GE topical report was issued:

NEEC-31677P (Ref. 3), in which fault trees were developed for the isolation functions of interest. These fault trees included factors that could cause failure of the isolation function on demand.

The fault trees were then evaluated to ceterniine the impact of the proposed TS changes. The isolation function failure frequencies were evaluated using the appropriate initiating event. frequency for each isolation function.

Upper-bound demand isolation failure frequency changes of 1.0E-7/,yr, on an absolute basis or 10% on a relative basis constitutec acceptability criteria for proposeo STl/A0T extension inipacts.

4.

MCACTION The NPC staff engaged the services of Science Applications International Corporation-(SAIC) to review the nethodology used in the GE report. This review was perfornec tc determine the adequacy of the approaches used to establish the technical bases for the modifications of STIs and A0Ts for BWR isolation actuation instrunentation not comon to RPS or ECCS-instrumentation.

For purposes of this review, a detailed analysis of the BWR-3/4 MSIV isolation function (the most complex presented in the topical report) was performed using the FEANTIC ABC con:puter coce, a user-friendly extension of NRC's FRANTIC 111 code.

Cased on the fault tree model and the SOCRATES code input file furnished by GE, SAIC performed a set of calculations of the in. pact of the proposed ST1/A0T changes on the MSIV isolation function f ailure frequency, using the same con.ponent and cornon cause failure data, as well as the same testing scheme as that used by GE. There was close agreement between the StIC and GE calculational results.

Based on the CF analyses ano the Salt audit calculations, the NRC staff agrees with SAIC-that the proposed STI and A0T changes for the isolation actuation

- instrumentation not common to RPS and ECCS would have a very small impact on isolation function failure frequency.

SAIC issued a technical evaluation i

report (Enclosure 1 to this Safety Evaluation) presenting the details and results of its reviews.

5.

M USIONS The agreer.ent between the results of the SAIC and GE analyses is very gocc.

In Loth cases, the magnitudes of the changes in MSIV isolation function failure i:

frequency are very small -- less than 1.5 E-08/yr.

Because the failure frequency L

in.ract is mirinial, the HEC staff concludes that the proposed TS changes are L

acceptable' sub.iect to-the conditions stipulated in Table 1.

The accepted TS changes are, for isolation actuation instrumentation not comon to RPS or ECCS, 31 days to 92 days (nonthly to quarterly) for STis, P hours to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for test t

l

'A0Ts, and I hour to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for repair A0Ts. It should be emphasized that l

these conclusions are' based upon analyses of changes in isolation failure frequency, but the loss of isolation function was not factored into the e va lyses.

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6.

REFERENCES 1.

Safety Evaluation by the Of fice of huclear Reacit; Regulation.-

" Review of DWR Owners Group Report HEDC-30851P, Supplenient 2 on Justification for Extension of Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Outage Times for BWR lsolation Instrunentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation,"

January 6,1989..

j 2.

Eisenhut, D. G., NRC Letter to all licensees of Operating Reactors.

Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits,

" Requested Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events,"

l July 8, 1983.

3.

Sullivan. W.

P., Eftimie. C.

C., Glazier J. R., Kingston, P. B..-and Patel, M. R., " Technical Specification improvement Analysis for BWR lsolation Actuation Instrumentation", GE'Huclear Energy, NEDC-31677P, June 1989.

4 k

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o TABLE 1 C0FCITIONS TO CLOSE-0UT PLANTS For plent-specific application of the TS changes for isolation instrumentation not common to RPS or ECCS instrumentation that are proposed, the licensee nost:

(1) Confirm the applicability of the generic analyses to the plant.

(E) Confirm that any increase in instrument drift due to the extended STis is properly eccounted for in the setpoint calculation methodology.

(For additional information on this issue, see letter from C. E. Rossi to R. J. Janecek, dated April 27,1988.)

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TA8tE*4.3.2.1-1 (Continued)

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SHR SYSTEM _ ISOLATICII (Continued)

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' e.A h handling Irradiated feel la the primary or' secondary contalasent and during CWHE ALTERRil0NS and eperattens with a potential for draining the reacter vessel.

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- 1he low condenser vacuen M58V closure may be meneelly bypassed during reactor 52 30180 or for reacter STARTUP when condenser escusa is below the tr!p setpelat to allow epening of the M51Vs.. The manual bypass shall be removed when condenser vacuum enceeds the trip setpoint.

0uring CORE ALTERAi10N and operettens with a poteattel for draining the reacter sessel.

1. With any centrol red withdrawn. IIet applicable to control rods renewed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.19.2.

(a) Manuel initiatten switches shell be tested et least once per 19 anoths during shutdown. All other circuitry associated with manuel initiatten shall receive a Oselsett TWIICTIceIAL TEST st least once per days as part of circuitry regelred to be tested for setematic systee isoletten.

(b) Eac train er logic channel shall be tested at least every other 31 days.

k (c) Ca Ibrate tely unit at least once per 89 days.

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lifACTOR WRTFR CLEAfEIP SYSitM ISOLATICII (Continued)

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1 INSTRumtWT& TION TABLE 3.3.2 1 (Continued) w 150LAT10h ACTUAT]QN INSTRUMENTATION m

$GE E

ACTION 20 Se in at least NOT SHUTDOW within M hours and in COLD SHVfDOA within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 21 Close the affected system isolation valve (s) within one hour'or:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CQND] TION 1, 2, er 3, be in at least NOT SHUTDOW within~ the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD $NUTDOW within the fo11owing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION

suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, j

i handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

ACTION 22

- Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within i

L 48 hours er be in at least NOT SHUTDOW within the next U hours and in COLD SHUT 00W within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . -

ACTION 23 Se in at least STARTUP with the essociated isolation valves closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months er be in at-least HDT SHUTDOW within U hours and in COLD SHUTDOW within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Se in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

L ACTION 24 ACTION 25 -

Establish SECONDARY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment system operating within one hour.

ACTION 26 Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or close the affected system isolation valves within the next hour and declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 27 Close the affected system isolation valves within one hour and declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 28 Within one hour lock the effected system isolation valves closed, er-verify,ly disarmed, or isolate the penetration (s) and declare by remote indication, that the valve is closed and electrical the affected systes inoperable.

ACTION 29 -

Close the affacted systes isolation valves within one hour and declare the affected system er component inoperable er:

S.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 be in at least NOT SHUTDOW.

within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

6.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION f suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and opera-tions with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

ACTION 30 Declare the affected SLCS pump inoperable.

irradiated fuel in rimary or secondary containment and durin When handlinf0NS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor ves CORE ALTERAT The low condenser vacuum M51V closure say be manually bypassed during reactor SHUT 00W or for reactor STARTUP when condenser vacuum is below the trip setpoint

'to allow opening of the MSIVs. The manual bypass shall be removed when condenser i

4 vacuum exceeds the trip setpoint, f

Ouring CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

H W'th any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per.5pecification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

6 (a) See Specification 3.6.4, Table 3.6.4-1 for valves in each va group.

(b) A channel may be placed h an inoperable status for up to hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in'th tripped con-dition provided at least one other CPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

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Revisions to Isolation Actuation j

Instrumentation Technical Seecification W Insert A to Section 3.3.2b Delete Section 3.3.2b and replace with the following:

l With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimun, j

i CPERABLE Channels per Trip Systen-requirement for-one_ trip system:

1. If placing the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition i

would cause an isolation, the inoperable channel (s) shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ""

1 or the ACT10N required by Table 3.3.21 for the affected trip function shall be taken.

OR

2. If placing the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition would not cause an isolation, the inoperable channel (s) and/or l

that trip system shall-be placed in the tripped condition within a) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for trip functions common to EPS Instrumentation, I

and b) 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s-for trip functions not common to RPS

.l Instrumentation.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Insert B to Mete Referenced in Section 3.3.2 Action e Delete Note and replace with the following :

Place one trip > system (with the most inoperable channels) in the tripped q

The trip system need not be placed in the' tripped condition condition.

when this would cause the isolation to oc, cur.

4 hfee-s to oilbelatim de% tim Indeumutatim com.en to

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I IN$TRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 150LAT!0N ACTUATION INSTRUMEWTATION i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The isolation actuation instroentation channels shown in Table 3.3.31 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set sensistent with the values shown in the Trip 5etpoint solumn of Table 3.3.2-2 and with !$0LAT30N SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.2-3.

As shown 'n Table 3.3.2 1.

APPLICABILfTY:

i ETIM:

a.

With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less senservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values solumn of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted sensistent with the Trip 8etpoint value.

6.

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. With the number of OPERABLE channe s less than-required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Syste requirement for both trip systems.

-place at least one trip systea* in the tripped condition within one-hour and take the ACT30N required by Table.3.3.2-1.

SUtyt!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS y;

M 4.3.2.1 fach isolation actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance-of the CHANNEL CNECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST-and CHANNEL CALISRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1.

4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all shannels shall be performed at least once gier 18 months.

4.3.2.3 The !$0LAT10N SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each isolation trip function shown 4

in Table 3.3.2 3 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 sonths. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all shannels are tested at least once every N times 18 sonths, where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific isolation trip systaa.

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1 INSTRU4tNTATION 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION IN$TRUMENTaTION j

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.21 shall be OPERA 8LE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2 and with !$0LAT10N $YSTEM RESPONSE

?!NE as shown in Table 3.3.2-3, 1

APPLICABILYTY: As shown 'in Table 3.3.2-1.

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With an isolation actuation instrumentation thannel trip setpoint j

less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2*2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel l

18 eastored to CPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted i

consistant with the Trip Setpoint value, b.

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With-the number of CPERABLE channe a less than required by the Minimum CPERA8LE Channels per Trip Syste requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system

in the tripped condition within one bour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

j SUtyt!LLANCE REQUIRfMEWT$

4.3.E l fach isolation actuation instrumentation channel sht.11 be demonstrated CPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CNECK, CNANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CMA'M L CALitaaTION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in T&;,le 4.3.2.11.

4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TE$T$ and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once p'er 18 eenths.

4.3.2.3 The !$0LAT!0N SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each isolation trip function shown in Table 3.3.2 3 shall be demonstrated to be within its liett at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 sonths, where N is the total. number of redundant channels in a specific isolation trip system.

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.Z~r?$&l'*bd GRAND GULF-W IT 1 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 13 s.

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