ML20043D018

FEMA - Final After Action Report V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Date: August 27, 2019

ML20043D018
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	01/29/2020
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Region 2 Administrator
References
Download: ML20043D018 (86)

Text

1 Final After Action Report I

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V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: August 27, 2019 I January 29, 2020 I

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1 Final After Action Report I V.C. Summer Nuclear Station I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: August 27, 2019 I

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January 29, 2020

After Action Report I,

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Table of Contents Page Table of Contents............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview......................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Exercise Details............................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership............................................................................. 7 1.3 Participating Organizations........................................................................................... 8 Section 2:

2.1 2.2 2.3 Section 3:

3.1 3.2 3.3 Exercise Design Summary........................................................................................... 11 Exercise Purpose and Design....................................................................................... 11 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities...................................................... 12 Exercise Scenario......................................................................................................... 13 Analysis of Capabilities............................................................................................... 15 Exercise Evaluation and Results.................................................................................. 15 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation............................................. :...................... 15 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation............................................. 17 3.3.1 State Of South Carolina................................................................................... 17 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Cen!er.............................................. 17 3.3.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility..................................................... 19 3.3.1.3 Dose Assessment........................................................................... 20 3.3.1.4 Field Teams................................................................................... 22 3.3.1.5 Mobile Operations Center.............................................................. 23 3.3.1.6 Joint Information System............................................................... 24 3.3.1.7 Mobile Radiological Laboratory.................................................... 28 3.3.1.8 Waterway Warning/ Clearance...................................................... 29 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions............................................................................................. 30 3.3.2.1 Fairfield County............................................................................. 30 3.3.2.2 Lexington County.......................................................................... 34 3.3.2.3 Newberry County........................................................................... 40 3.3.2.4 Richland County............................................................................ 44 Section 4: Conclusion................................................................................................................... 49 Appendix A: Exercise Timeline..............................................................................................,.... 51 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders.................................................................. 53 Appendix C: Extent-of-Play Agreement...................................................................................... 55 3

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Executive Summary On August 27, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a full participation exercise for the plume exposure emergency planning zone of the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. V.C. Summer Nuclear Station is located in Fairfield County, approximately 26 miles north of Columbia, South Carolina and is operated by Dominion Electric. The V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station emergency planning zone is divided into 13 emergency response planning zones. The plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone encompasses parts of Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, and Richland Counties, with a total population of approximately 14,175.

The evaluations of out-of-sequence activities for the risk counties are included in this report.

The out-of-sequence activities included protective actions for schools and waterway clearance.

Waterway clearance was evaluated during the week of June 17th, 2019. Protective action for schools was evaluated for Fairfield, Lexington and Richland Counties during the week of June 17th, 2019, with Newberry County schools evaluated during the week of August 26th, 2019.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in response to a radiological emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. This exercise was conducted in accordance with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's policies and guidance,concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on October 31, 2017. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted November 1981.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, and support development of corrective actions. During the exercise, two level 2 findings were identified. The first finding concerned the lack of early coordination by Fairfield County, and the second finding concerned inaccurate emergency alert system messages and information given to the public through the Joint Information System. A level 2 finding from the 2018 Oconee Exercise concerning the State Emergency Response Team and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's failure to implement clear guidance concerning use and ingestion of potassium iodide was resolved.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report.,

2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Section 1: Exercise Overview 1:1 Exercise Details 1.2 Exercise Name 2019 V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Evaluated Exercise Type of Exercise Full Participation Exercise Exercise Date(s)

August 27, 2019 Exercise Off Scenario/ Out of Sequence Dates June 17-21, 2019 and August 26, 2019 Locations See the Extent of Play Agreement in Appendix D for a complete listing of locations.

Program United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Mission

Response

Scenario Type Plume Phase Full Participation Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Planning Team Leadership Lawrence Robertson Central Section Chief FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 7

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station 1.3 Joseph Harworth South Carolina State Lead FEMA Region N 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 Quintin Ivy Site Specialist FEMA Region N 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 Nathan Nienhius FNF Preparedness Manager SCEMD 2779 Fish Hatchery Road.

West Columbia, South Carolina 29172 Donneith Beaufort FNF Preparedness SCEMD 2779 Fish Hatchery Road West Columbia, South Carolina 29172 David Thachik FNF Preparedness SCEMD 2779 Fish Hatchery Road West Columbia, South Carolina 29172 Participating Organizations State Agencies:

South Carolina Emergency Management Division

• South Carolina Department of Health and Environ.mental Control South Carolina Highway Patrol

• . South Carolina Dep~ment of.SoeiaI-Services **

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division...

South Carolina Department of.Natural Resources.

Soµ_th Carolina Department of Transportation 8

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report..

2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Risk Jurisdictions Risk Counties:

.I Fairfield County Fairfield County Emergency Management Fairfield County Fire Service Fairfield County Sheriff's Office Fairfield County Public Works Fairfield County Procurement Department Fairfield County Transit Department Fairfield County Tax Assessor Fairfield County Administrators Office Fairfield County Emergency Medical Services Fairfield County Information Technology Services Fairfield County Human Resources Department Fairfield County School District Lexington County Lexington County Emergency Management Lexington County Fire Service Lexington County Sheriffs Department Lexington County Public Works Department Lexington County Planning and Geographic Information System Lexington County Emergency Medical Services Lexington County Procurement Department Lexington County Community Emerg~ncy.ResponseTeam Lexington & Richland County School District Five Newberry County Newberry County Emergency Management Newberry County Emergency Services School District of-Newberry County -'*:

Newberry County Sheriff's Office;'

South Carolina Guard Newberry County Department of Health and Environmental Control Newberry County Hazmat *

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• Newberry County Graphical Information: System. -

Newberry County Public Information Newberry County Special Services Newberry County Community Emergency Response Team Newberry County Damage Assessment 9

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Newberry County Department of Social Services Newberry County Emergency Medical Services Newberry County Coroner

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Newberry County Department of Transportation Newberry County Memorial Hospital*

Newberry County 9 IT Communications*.

Richland County

• Richland County Emergency Service Divisiorr Richland County Sheriff's Office Richland County Fire Department Richland C~unty Offi~e of, the Fire Marshal Richland County Public Work Service Richland County O~partment of Transportation Richland County Environmental Health Richland County Social Services Richland County Human.Resources Richland County 911 Communicati<:ms Richland County Department of Social Services Columbia City Police Department Columbia City Emergency Management Private Organizations:

Domipion Energy American Red Cross **

Salvation Army

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.Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station 2.1 Section 2:. Exercise Design Summary Exercise Purpose and Design i.*

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/ I The Federal Emergency Managemer;i.t Agency.administers the R.adiological Emergency Preparedness Program :rursuant tq the reg1:,1lat.~ons Jound.in,Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation parts 350, 351 and 352. Sixteen planning standards, codified in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations part 350, form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for state, tribal and focal govern.ments.in;ipacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plarit ~ite)n the United States.. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulatiops also*.codify the sixteen planning standards for the licensee. 44 Code of Federal Regulat~on~* 350 sets forth the mechani&ms for the formal review and approval of'state, tribal, arid local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by the Federal Emergency Management Agen.cy. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Prograni cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite. response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the nuclear power plant.

The results of this exercise, together with review of the radiological emergency response plans, and verification of the periodic requirements set*forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, along with supplements through the annual letter of certification and staff assistance visits, enabled the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that the affected state, and local plans and preparedness are: ( 1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station to the Federal Emergency Management Agency by the State of South Carolina and involved local jurisdictions occurred on April 18, 1981. Formal approval of the radiological emergency response procedures was granted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency on November 13, 1981, under Title 44 CPR 350.

A Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise was conducted on August 27, 2019 and included evaluations of the out-of-sequence activities held in April 2019. This full participation plume scenario exercise was held in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency's policies and guidance as specified by the Radiological Emergency Prep.aredness Program Manual and the approved *extent-of-play agreement.

The design incorporated exercise objectives with preparedness doctrine to include the National Preparedness Goal and related frameworks and guidance.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 201_9 VC Summer Nuclear Station 2.2

, FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives.and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

Using the Homeland Se~urity:Exercise and Evaluation Program. methodol6gy,:*the

. exercise objectives meet the Radiological Errier'gency *Preparedness Program:

requirements and encompass the emergency preparedness evaluation are'as;

• Tlie critical

• tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of South Carolina and the participating counties.

• The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

• Operational Coordination:. Establish and maintain a unified and coordihated::

operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

. Situational Assessment: Provide all decisioll'makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and.extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Public lnfor~ation and W.afping: Oeliv~r coordinated, prompt, re.liable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any thr.eat or haJ;ard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Cond,uct appropri.ate measures. to ensure

the protection and the health and safety of the public. and emergency workers, and the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.

On-Scene Security, Protection;and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and s*ecure environment through l~w enforcement and related security and protection operations 'for

' people and coinmunities locat~q' within affected areas and' also for response personnel

. engaged inlifesavin 1g'and life:;*sttstiining operations'.. '. *,,,*... - :

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Critical Transportation: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and

accessible transportation servtc~s).for response priority obj~ctives, includir,ig the'*

evacuation of people and animalsj and the delivery. of vital response perso11-nel, equipme),lt, and services ipto the affected are~s.*

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station 2.3 These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives.

The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide direction and control and make protective action decisions through the state emergency operations center, county emergency operations centers, and field activities by exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and make protective action decisions affecting state and county emergency workers and the general public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to perform plume-phase field measurements and analysis utilizing State field teams through exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system utilizing the primary notification system and the emergency alert system through exercise play.

Objective 6: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures in the joint information center for public and private sector emergency information communications.

Objective 7: Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projection and protective action decision making for the plume phase.

Exercise Scenario 0800 Exercise begins.

0804 A seismic event greater than operational basis earthquake (OBE) occur. Conditions exist to declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) emergency classification level (ECL) based on emergency action level (EAL) HU2. l.

0819 Utility declares an NOUE ECL by this time.

0834 Utility notifie OR Os of the NOUE ECL by this time.

0836 Various fault cause lo of all but *one AC power ource. Conditions exi t to declare an Alert ECL ba ed on EAL SA l. 1.

0851 Utility declares an Alert ECL by thi time.

0906 Utility notifies ORO of the Alert ECL by this time.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station 0955 An after hock re ults in a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Radiation levels and pressure in containment increase.

1010 Containment pre sure reaches "Hi-3" and containment spray fail.

Conditions exist to declare a Site Area Emergency ECL based on EAL FSJ.l.

1025 Utility declare a Site Area Emergency ECL by this time.

1040 Utility notifies ORO of the Site Area Emergency ECL by this time.

1100 Containment fails, re ulting in a rapid drop in containment pres ure.

Utility field team report radiation levels > 1000 mR/h at the ite boundary. Condition exi t to declare a General Emergency ECL based on FG 1.1. A radiological release is occurring.

1115 Utility declare a General Emergency ECL by this time.

1130 Utility notifies OROs of the General Emergency ECL by thi time.

Expected PAR from the utility will be to evacuate zones A-0, A-1, F-l, and F-2 and consider use of KI in accordance with state plan and policy.

1300 Exercise is terminated for utility 14 I

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I Raqiological Emergency.-Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station 3.1 3.2 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities Exercise.Evaluation and Results

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• This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the August 27, *2019 plume exercise, and the out-of-sequence (OOS) intervie'-':S and demonstrations, conducted during the exercise week and the week.of June i 7th, 2019.

• Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated b_ased on Its demonstration of capabilities arid equivalent Radiological Emergency P,reparedness criteria as delineated in the Federal Emergency Management AgencyRadiofogical Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

M: Met (no level 1 or level 2 Findings assessed and no unresolved findings from prior exercises) 1: Level 1 Finding assessed 2: Level 2 Finding assessed or an unresolved Level 2 Finding(s) from a prior exercise P: Plan issue N: Not demonstrated Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. The previously described core capabilities form the foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability.

Each jurisdiction's stand-alone capability summaries are listed in Section 3.3 of this report.

Operational Coordination: Key leadership personnel established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure, which provided effective and responsive direction and control. Critical stakeholders were appropriately integrated in the overall decision-making process, which enabled protective action recommendations to be evaluated in a sensible and timely manner. This process included input from.both 15

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station relevant critical'stakeholders and support personnel and took into account the safety and

• well-being of the general *public. From there; protective action' decisions as a whole were made without undue delay.' O,verall, officials at the county-level-played critkal roles in decision making throughout the exercise.

Situational Assessment: South Carolina Department*of Health and En~ironmental Control personnel successfully-accomplished its mission in making 'recommendations to protect the public. Decision makers were provided with relevant information regarding assessed radiological and plant conditions. :This information allowed decision'tilakers to understand the extent of the hazards, and cascading effects and to make the appropriate protective action decisions.

Public Information and Warning: The jurisdictions demonstrated with challenges the_*

ability to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community. Alert and notification of the public and media was completed in a* timely

• manner by simulated sounding of sirens and emergency alert system messaging. The second emergency alert system message contained an erroneous reference to the reception center for some of the evacuation areas. Information and follow-on instructions were provided with the formulation of news releases and press briefings generated from the state emergency operations center joint information system. All messages were reviewed by each county's emergency management director and released through the state emergency operations center joint information system. Public information was consistent with protective *action decisions and contained applicable *and specific instructions relative to those decisions. Some of the public inquiry calls received at the state emergency operations center public inquiry section were answered incorrectly.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety: The availability of guidance and

• resources to address hazardous materials was integral in support of the responder

• , operations.- Emergency workers were' issued the appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and procedures, and properly managed their radiological exposure during out-of..,

sequence activities. The counties also discussed the ability to monitor and* decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers, and their vehicles.

, The South Carolina Department of Healthand Environmental ontrol deployed radiological monitoring field-teams-to characterize the-radioactive plume. The.field team members effectively carried out their mission:

On-Scene Security and Protection:* State and local law *enforcement agencies discussed

-* the capability to ensure a safe' and.s*ecure envfronment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people traveling within the emergency planning zone. The implementation of traffic and access control points was discussed

• . during exercise play' at the state emergency :operations center a:nd 'by risk comity emergency operations 'center representatives who described the'process by which traffic and access control points could be established in a timely mariner.

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.Radioiogical Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

. Soµth.Carolina Departrµent of Natural Resources*officers demonstrated the capability to

conduct.waterway warning and lake clearance on Lake,.Monticello. They had plans and

, proc,edm;es.. in plq.~f! to launch.boats ~nd notify the public., The officers knew about radiological exposure control.

,:~ritical TranspQrtaJion: Representatives fromth~.Lexington/ Richland School District

,.~,,the Fairfield Coun,ty,School District, and, the Newberry County School District

~ff~ctively discussed.implementation of protective actions for affected local schools. The

..,.sheltering and e:vacuation. of students and staff; reunification center locations and

.,.~c;:tivities*, staff duties and responsibilities, security, equipment and communications, and transportation, were successfully discussed during out-of-sequence activities.

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... Jurisdictfonal Summary Results of Exercise..E-valuation 3.3.1 ;. State, Of South Carolina 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The.South Carolina State Emergency Response Team successfully demonstrated the ability to est<l,blish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that integrated all.state agencies and risk counties to support a response to an event at'the VC Summer Nuclear Station.

The emergency operations center staff was successfully alerted and mobilized. The state warning poiq.t used a, mass calling system to notify emergency operations center staff.

Emergency operations center participants had access to an appropriate amount of

, equipmen,t, supplies, and maps to support their needs. All participants had plans and proc,:edures avail~ble and had situational awareness 9f their required assignments. Maps,

.overhead displays, and a.computer-based tracking.~ystem were used to keep staff informed and aware of plant conditions.

Redundan,t communication systems ensuredthe emeJ,"gency operations center had the

.* ability tocqmmuni.cate with other agencies. The pri_mary.commm1icationssystem in the emergency operations center was landline telepbone*with backup communications systems readily available. All systems were fully functional and demonstrated during the exercise'. Throughput tq.e exercis.e, colllil}unicfl,tion. checks with counties via 800-;

rn,egahe,rtz radio and satellite.were observed. All notifications from the'V.G. Summer Nuclear Station were received over a dedicated line with no failures.observed.

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The technical officer and, chief of operations directed the State Emergency Response

.Team throughout the*ex~rcise and ensured all emergency support function staff were taking appropriate actions: The technical officer facilitated conference calls with the risk counties that participated on the conference call decision line. Fairfield County 17

Radiological Emergency Preparedness* Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station emergency management did not fully activate their emergency operations' center until the declaration of a Site Area Emergency and did not staff the co.nfer~nce b.ridge line until the Site Area Emergency declaration was received. Fairfield County missed coo!dination with the State, Lexington, Newberry and Richland C:ounties during the earlier* emergency classification levels. The chief of operations c.on.ducted briefings in, the emergency operations center and kept staffinformed.of.piari.temergency c,lass1rication.ievels changes.

During the Alert emergency classification lev.e( the technical officer and Newberry, Lexington, and Richland Counties made a proactive deci.sion to activate the sirens and broadcast a,"stay tuned" emergency ~lert system message once a Site Area Emergency was declared. However, because Fairfield County,was not oi;i the coordination call, they were unaware of this decision and found out about it once a Site Area EJ)lergency was declared. This decision allowed the state and counties to b~tter prepare for reviewing protective action recommend~tions without delay and to set.up siren activation times and message content. When a General Emergency was declared the technical officer, the emergency response coordinator, and the public health physician, from the Department of Health and El).vironmental Control began discussing protective action recommendations prior to starting the decision line conferepce call. This allowed the state response team to be better prepared to discuss t~e recommendations with the counties.

The public health physician was involved in the decision-making process for making the potassium iodide protective action recommendation to the counties. A new public health recommendation letter was used to document the recommendation. Once all counties agreed on a recommendation the agreement was made into a p~otectlv~ action decision and was included in the Governor's Executive Order for mandatory evacuations. This process was very clear and ensured all parties were knowledgeable of th,e fina~ decision concerning potassium iodide ingestion.

South Carolina Highway Patrol troopers and South Carolina Law Enforcement Division personnel were presented with ~ultiple s,in~ulated impedirp.e~ts, t? evacuattor,i r.outes.

These impediments involved an overturned truck, a fire, and a train derailment.

Management of waterway clea,ripg, and of the imple.1p.entation of a hµnting and fishing ban, were also addressed during th~ cxerc,ise. The state law enforcement personnel in the st~te emergency operatioris c~pter? witq.,coqrdination of county rypresentatives.and the

. South Carolina Department ofTiansportation, were able tq,res9lve impediments, re-route

• traffic, ccmd1:1ct water clearing, :an.c;l. impkment a hunting ban. Law enforcement kept public information staff inforn,1.e4 'of the incidepts ancl any re-:routing of evacuation routes if necessary.,

. For this capabiiity, the foUo;i~g REP, cdter~a were MpJ: La.l, l.c.1, l.d.J, i.eI 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

a.. Level 1 Finding: None 18 I

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Radiological,Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

.J>. Level 2 Finding:,None

,. ' *c. Not'Demohstrated: None

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• PriorLevel2 Eindings-Res9lved:,A2:-18-:2.b.2-L:2:-0l;_

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• , *, Condition:

• The State Emeige'n¢y R~sponse T~~m and the South Carolina *

• -DepfutinerirofHealth ahcf Envir&nmentai'Conti-bi' failed to implement a clear, concise decision-making process with the necessary coordination to the risk counties regarding the protective action decisioQ. for the public to use/ingest potassium iodide.

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T Resolution: The pubilc heatth physician' and the state emergency response team developed *a: new process for* recbnimending the' u*se of potassium iodide and ensuring the implementation of the potassium iodide recommendation. During this exercise

'. the public health physician made the recommendation for all individuals located

• • within or evacuating from an evacuation zone to fake one dose of potassium iodide as sdort as possible. This,recommendatiori was documented on a Department of Health and Environmental Control letter and signed'by the physician. Once this recominendation was presented to the state emergency response team all counties were made aware of the recommendation and requested to concur with the recommendation or decide to not follow the recommendation. All counties concurred with the physician's recommendation. This recommendation then became a protective action decision and was included in the Governor's Executive order for

• mandatory evacuation.

. This process was very clear, and all*parties were knowledgeable of what actions

• should be taken.

• e>. Prior Level 2 Fiiidings - Unresolved: None 3.3.1.2 Emergen~y Operations Facility.

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, Operational Coordination Capability Suirimary: '.

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• The South Carbliil~ E~ergency M£inagem~ni Division and the South C.arol1na' '

Department-of Health & 'Environ~ental Coptroi s Pivision of Emergency Response effectively deployed liaison's to'the near-site einergeµdy operations facility for the v.c.

Summer Nuclear *station located in Ballentine;; Sduth Carolina.: The 'presence of state

• '1ia_is'onsin theemergericy operittions fa:cilitfenh'*rt.c~clt,he flo~ of informatioli be~ween the utility arid the dffsite response org'ilnfaatiorts Mid facilitated discussions. of plant conditions and utility recommendations. Both state liaisons followed applicable '

procedures and performedJheir respective duties. in an efficient and professional manner, enstiring'that state and'countydecislon;~akers"wei-e kepfup t~ date with accurat~ and timely information. Utility EOF personnel sounded the sirens at the request of South Carolina Emergency Management Division liaisons and reported tha~ system polling that indicated that 100% of the sirens sounded with no failures.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer.Nuclear Station The state liaisons worked, closely with the Dominion Energy personnel in the einergency operations facility to obtain the current plarit'cotiditions at the 1YC. Summer Nudear Station and to provide thatinformation:, on*'a timely basis, to the *state' emergency'*

operations certter,,and the risk counties: The"South'Carolina Emergency,Ma:rtagement Division liaison 'effectively facilitated the flow *of information to varimis querie~ and requests between the utility arid state and county agencies. For example; the S6bth Carolina Emergency Management Division liaison promptly coordinated exchanges of information between the utility and the counties' on the impacts* of two simulated'

'hazardous material events on potential evacuation routes and othefinfrasfructure' related issues. Likewise, the South:Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control liaison ensured that state personnel involved in dose assessment activities were kept apprised of plant conditions and that the utility was informed of state field team a~tivities and results. Both liaisons provided substantive informationto the state 'emergency operations center, and in turn, to the risk counties, on the basis for the utility's protective action recommendations:

Throughout the entire exercise, the state liaisons effectively and professionally communicated with utility personnel in the state emergency operations center and with state and county decision makers, thus ensuring those decision makers had sound information on 'which they could base their protective action decisions.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: 2.b.2. and 5.a.l

a. -Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c.. Not Demonstrated: None * *

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-1,{es_olve~: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.1.3 Dose Assessment

... 1_,,.*

.i

. Situational Assessment South Carolina Department of Health.::md ~nvir~nmental,G~ntrol_ personnyl successfully demonstrated the ability to assess plant conditions and to provide sound recommendations to decision m:akers in response to a radiological incident *at the V. C.

Summer Nuclear Station. Staff members were pre-positioned near the state emergency operations center in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement and responded promptly when notified of the incident, staffing emergency support functions 8 and 10.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Staff members frequently requested plant status information and clarifications from the

. utility liaison atthe. state emergency, operatiop.s ce,iter*.a°'d received updates from state

. persoO

• Oel.at the utilitf s emergency om~~ations.facjlity.,,T'be emergency response

• com:dinator prq;ided Hm~ly.update& on *plant con4itions to t.he state's technical officer

...., arid qperations cl:µef: The. <;lose; assessment GOQrdin~to11 used. available information on

• ; r;J?~'ant c::on4itioµs to,ca~yul~te,dose proje~tions usin;g, \\! dose assessment software program.

. :~e then.:c0II1p~Jed the resµlts to utility dose project~ons.and field monitoring team data.

Th~1 ~11).ergency s1:1ppqrt function. leaders ensured c:lepartment leadership was kept L in.f 9.rnH:~d of th,e in<;tde11t_.. Emergency support.func,tion 8 staff coordinated the distribution

,ofpotassi1,1m,iodide supplies, and tlle public bealth.physkian designated to make recommendations on the use of potassium iodide. closely monitored the situation *.

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Staff 111.embers participated in conference calls with state and county decision makers,

. providing appropriate technical information and advice during discussions of protective actions. Following the utility's declaration of General Emergency based on high radiation levels at the site boundary, the public health physician consulted with the emergency response coordinator. She then recommended that all individuals in the zones being evacuated ingest potassium iodide. The physician drafted and signed Public Health Recommendation regarding ingestion of potassium iodide by the general public,.

institutionalized individuals, and emergency workers and provided it to State Emergency Response Team leadership for final approval.

.Landline and cellular telephones, email, a chat group, and the state's emergency management software system were used to communicate.with department staff at other locations. A handheld radio on the state's radio system was also available. The state emergency operations center had sufficient computers, office equipment, and supplies to support the emergency response. Staff members also brought and used laptop computers.

For this capability the following REP critic~l tasks ~ere MET: 1.a.l, 1.d.l, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, and 2.b.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

• • ,',_; ;d. 'Prior Level'2 Findings:"'.'"-Resolve<<;I: None' '. '.' *..

• 1 :

, ; t >. f..~

• I *f* ~ (

~... frio,r Level 2)tindings_- Unresolve~: None '1-.J,

'. i

.. ' !..* ~

- ~..

21

RadiologicalEmergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station 3.3.1.4 Field Teams Environmental Response and Health and Safety Capability

• South Carolina Department of He~th and_ Eq.yi;rpn~ental Control personpel, stafJ:1ng two field monitoring teams successfully denionstrated-tl:ie ability to take ambient radfation measurements and collect air samples in response to a radiologicfl,, incident.at,tQ-y V. C.

Summer Nuclear Station. The teams convened at and were dispatched from.the ---

department's mobile operations c~nter in.Columbia, South ~arolina. Terun p;iembers were pre-positioned at the facility 1n accordance with the extent-of-play agieement but described how they would be nqtified to respond through qse of a mass_me_ssagiqg

' system.

The teams primarily used the departmenfs emergency response team channel on the state's radio system to communicate with the mobile operations center. Cellu:Jar telephones were available as. a backup. Teams also used a data entry and tracking application to send monitoring and sampling results to the field team director.

The teams had sufficient sampling and monitoring resources to accomplish their tasks.

Team members properly prepared survey meters for operation. The use of newer personal radiation detectors allowed for early detection of the plume. Teams.used global positioning system navigators)ri the vehicles,with'pre-loaded sample points for easy navigation between locations. However, some confusion occurred while* tryfog to find those locations on the printed maps and on the maps included in the data entry and tracking application.

The teams were briefed prior to' departure o*n radiological and g~ner~l safety iss~~s. The briefing included reminders ori administrative dose ltmits, dosimeter use, and erid~of-shift monitoring and decontami~atJo~ pioc::edures. ~ach team member was issued a,ppr~priate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and recqrdkeeping forms to trackany radjationdqse received during the' emergenc:/\\Vhen directed, team members sirii~l~ted the ingestion of

_potassium iodide.

f

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During the radiological releas~, ~achte*m demonstrated tlie ab+/-Hty tcdocate the plume

. and collect 'an air sample ~faii appropr~~te)~ca~fon. Tealll #1embers th~n,inovefl-to a low background,area to field count tp.e 'sanjp~e medi_a. At points during the ai~ saµ1pliQg

. 'procedure, unfamiifaiity witll ~1Jt~rfrig.4'~tainto the data entry andfra~lcip.g ap)llication caused soine delays. Both teams deniciiistrated proper contamination.control during survey and sampling activities. Samples were properly documented, packaged, labeled, and sealed for transfer via a c011ri~r to the 111obile radiological laboratory.

.., i

)

j For this capability the follbwilig REP cri~ical ta~ks were:MEr: l.a.l, i.dj,_ t.

1

~i3.a.l,

.*4:a.3.

a. Levell'Finding: None 22 I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report *..

• 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

• . 'e. ' Prioi-Level 2 Finding:5* ~ Ulir~~olved: None i-,

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3.3.1.5 Mobil,{ Operations Center i*

r*

Environmental Response and"llealth and Safet{Cap~bility:

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel staffing the mobile operations center successfully demonstrated the ability to manage field monitoring teams and the mobile radiological laboratory in response to a radiological

• incident' at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Staff members were pre-positioned at the facility, located in Columbia, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, but described how they would be notified to respond through use of a blast messaging system.

Equipment, maps, displays, instrumentation, dosimetry, and potassium iodide were sufficient to support emergency operations. Communications capabilities consisted of radios, satellite telephones, cellular telephones, landline telephones, facsimile machines, arid internet connected computers. No communications failures were observed during the

' exercise'.

The site safety officer and field team director provided briefings to the field monitoring teams and other staff members prior t() deployment.. Dosimetry use, potassium iodide

• ingestion;*exposure* lhmts,*and safety topics'were th9roughly discussed. The state

' emergency* operations center authorized pc;,tassiuni iodide for the field teams following

• *the*oriset of the radiological releiise*. Throughout tp.e exercise, th~ mobile operations center 'trac~ed the ekposure of the field 'monit~r~ng team menibers.

I

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The field team director positioned the field teams in the downwind locations within the plume emergency planning zone. The field team director and mobile operations center chief primarily used' electron1c maps' inchlded in a data entry and tracking application to

• detehmne placement of the field moriitoririg team~: However, these maps did not;have

' sp'ecific road details to be effe~tive without the use* of otp.er sources. There was not a

, single map available that provided the compass rose' f~r wind direction, road details, and

< )sampling points irt one product.

Once each field monitoring* teafu located the in~irriufu exposure during a* fraver~e, the field team director requysted an air sample at that lo(::_ation. Field data was. ~ommunicated

• by radio, cellutar telephone, or through the data entry and tracking appl1caticin. There were some difficulties in transmitting and receiving air sample results from the field teams. Once the air sample results were received, there was some uncertainty as to who 23

Radiolo'gical Emergency Preparedness Prdgram After Action Report 2019 VC Sumnier Nuclear Station was responsible for performing' the' particulate and radioiodine* concentration calculations.

The evaluation of the air' sample 'feStilts was performed at the state emergency operations

. center.

For this capability, the following REP criteria -were MET: l.d. i,' l.e.'1, 2.'a. l, 3'.a.1 and 4.a.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Levtrl 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None *

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.1.6 Joint Information System Public*lnformation and Warning Capability Summary:

The State of South Carolina used a joint information system to keep the media and the

• public informed of the situation at the V. C Summer Nuclear Station. The State bf South Carolina and the affected counties had representatives at the joint information center at the state emergency operations center. They interfaced with representatives from Dominion Energy who were at their emergency i.lews'ceriter, which was collocated with the emergency operations facility. The personnel represented in the South Carolina Emergency Management Joint Information Center demonstrated with challenges their ability to deliver coordiriated,'prompt and reliable information fo the.public in the'event of art emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear'Station.

On April 2, 2019, South Carolina Emergency Management Division conducted a successful test of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's 'Integrated Public Alert and Warning System and Wireless -Emergency Alert (IP A WS-WEA) system'within the V.C. Summer IO-mile emergency planning zone.

The South Carolina Emergency Management Division Director activated the state emergency operations center ih accordance with the South Carolina Opei"atiortal -*

• Radiological Emergency Response Plan; Foll'owing activation*,~ the state warning point

• used a mass calling system td notify and mobilize staff, including the state: lead public information officer. The activation message was sent via cellular telephone by means of

• a call, text, and email. The county *public information *officers were notified by-their

• *

• respective counties.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report :

.. :. ~ '

2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

...The primary communications system in the jotnt.inf9rmation center work area was the

.. ;,.,cqrµm~rc:i,al landline t~lephone.network. A joint infoi;rp.;ition, system conference *

• telephomtbridge line, and a dedicated press conference bridge line to the Dominion Energy Joint Information Center and risk counties was open and effectively used by

• , 1, particip~nts t~oughout the e~erGis~..

Traffic impediment information, provided by controller inject, was coordinated with county public information liaisons, entered in the computer repprting system, and reported to the public information officers in the Dominion Energy Joint Information Center. Discussion of public messaging of the impediments was completed* with a decision to wait for any utility protective action recommendations resulting from further escalation in emergency classification level.

The ability to deliver coordinated, prompt, and actionable information to the public was demonstrated with challenges through-two alert and notification sequences, completed in a timely manner. Two Emergency Alert System (BAS) sequences occurred with messages selected and agreed to by all key participants using the South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center, Emergency Management Network conference decision line. However, the second BAS message contained an error regarding the location of the reception center for several of the evacuation zones. The messages were prepared in the

. new integrated public alert and warning system message format by th,e public information staff..Upon c}pproval, tµe messages were delivered to the warning point communications ceq.ter apd entered into the integrated public alert and Wc:J,rning system test environment yia a m~s.s notification system. 'J;'h~s.e -actions w~re simulated, and not transmitted.

.. : Six ~puth Carolina.Emergency Man,~gement Division news releases were produced and

.,, di~tributed. ~?ring. the exercise. Using pre~scripted news releases for timely news release production, information coordination, autnori;zation, and distribution procedures were closely followed by the public information staff as part of a joint information system.

,j. £'

., J\\press,confere11ce room on the east s.ide of the.state e_mergency operation c.enter was

, used to. condupt one State Emergency Respqnse Teap1 press conference.

• Information presented was accurate and current. All media questions were adequately answered.

E(fective,and unified.emergency in(opnation coordinatio.n and collaboration occurred us\\ng. the joint information system col).ference br.jdge. Participants using the conference

• . bri4ge incluqedrepresentatives from the Soµth Ou:q}ina State Emergency Response

,: : J~atl1, F~irfielq, Le:x;ington, N~~berry ~nd R,.ichliinq Counties, q11d Dominion Energy.

i: :- ~.-. / :

,* Media,bri~fs at the Dominion.Energy EmtlrgencyNews G:'.enter were cra,fted with input from the utility and messages were prioritized for presentation to.the media.. Prior to the two media briefs that were presented, *public information staff discussed and prioritized the messages being presented at the briefs. Following each brief, staff critiqued the presentation to improve the next brief. Question and answer sessions were concise and informative.

25

RadiologicalEmergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC SummerNuclear Station For this capability, the following REP criteria were*MET: l.a.:l; l.d. l, and Le. l.

L.... *.

a. Level 1 Finding: None.'*.,.

b. Level 2 Finding: 61-19-5.b.l-L2-01 Criterion: 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner..

Condition: Incorrect information was disseminated to the public by the joint information system staff. *:

After news release #2, Joint Information Center Activated, was released at 1044, staff discovered 5 minutes later that they identified the wrong nuclear plant in the news release. The 1044 version of news release #2 indicated* at the' end of the first paragraph:"... an Alert at the Robinson Nuclear Plant,-located near Hartsville, S.C."

The correction, issued at 1052, stated: "... an Alert at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, located near Fairfield County."

At 1209, a second Emergency Alert System activation and message sequence approval process occ;urred for evacuation of zones A-0, A-1, E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2.

The sirens were activated at 1220 and the BAS message was broadcast at 1223. The approved and transmitted Emergency Alert System message #2, however,

.erroneously indicated that Dutch Fork High School would serve as the reception center for evacuees from zones* E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2. Newberry High School should have been listed as the reception center. The State did not issue a *c'orrected EAS message, news release #6, which gave the evacuation.areas and the correct reception center locations, was distributed at 1231..

• r*

While each public inquiry was answered, there were at least three instances in which incorrect information was relayed to the caller.

Possible Causes: The possibl~ causes to this issue include but are not limited to:

1. Lack of standard.. operating procedures*for use within the joint information system

• that includes radiological emergency preparedness considerations.

2. Inefficient operational processes

3. Lack of proper training.for joint information,system staff.

Several new public information officers staffed the joint information center.

Positions and roles were not clarified for these public information officers; nor any

• available resources noted.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action. Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Although at least two public information officers attended the executive group Jlleeting, the information discuss.ed was* not relayed 0back to the joint information system staff. This lack of information sharing and training on their functions led to at least three public inquiry calls where the operatorprovided incorrect information to the caller.

,, ~,

't,.

..According to-the call log, inquiry #13,the caller asked what the difference was between go,inside/stayfaside and shelter in place.. The call taker informed the caller there was no difference. Page 16 of the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station 2019 Calendar

,.. annotates the.difference between go inside/stay inside and the protective action shelter-in-place. The caller for public inquiry #21, asked about a radiological release. The call taker informed the caller there was no release occurring, even

• , thoqgh the most current press release stated there was a radiological release. In

. ipublic inquiry #22, the caller asked.about hospitals being evacuated. The call-taker

contradicted information briefed during the press conference regarding nursing homes, hospitals, and other facilities being directed to shelter in place.

References:

1. Program Manual: Radiological Emergency Preparedness, January 2016, Part II:

REP Program Planning Guidance, NUREG Criterion P.4'-P.7

2. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101:

• Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans, Version 2, November 2010 3.-.South Carolina Emergency Management Division Emergency Alert System/

IP AWS Message #2; Sent August 27, 2019 at 12: 12.

• 4.,. South Carolina Emergency Management Division-State Emergency Response

,. Team New Release #2, Released at-10:32 >

5. South Carolina Emergency Management Division Public Inquiry LOG, created August 27, 2019 Effect(s): The incorrect identification of the involved nuclear plant could have caused confusion in the media and public about which area of the state was being impacted by an incident:at a nuclear power plant* The provision of incorrect information in EAS messages and news releases and giving incorrect information to

tJ:ie public throughthe public inquiry'systerp.'.could:cause confusion of the public and potentially: inipact their safety because, they,were not sure what action to take.

Lack of coordination among :spokespersons prim to a press conference could lead to providing conflicting information to the news media and public.

~e~ommendation(s):

• ,. * * )

• 1. Develop a standard operating guide for-the implementation of the joint information system for the State of South Carolina.

2. Ensure all staff assigned to the joint information system are properly trained on its operations and procedures.

27

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

3. Revise the emergency alert message approval process to ensure niistakes are corrected prior to: release, to the general ;public,' if an error 'in ari BAS message is released ensure that tt"*corrected EAS me~sa:ge is broadcast. ' *

4. Ensure the radiological emergency preparedness* specific usage of terini{and protective actions (go inside/stay inside and shelter in place) as related in the emergency public iilfoimatibn'calertdars"are,iricluded in the*state sfariclard' operations guide for ESF-15.

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.1. 7 Mobile Radiological Laboratory Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel staffing the mobile radiological laboratory successfully demonstrated the ability to perform radiological analysis of air sample media in response to a radiological incident ~t the V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station. The mobile radiological laboratory and its personnel were pre-positioned near the mobile operations center-in accordance with the extent.:.of-play agreement.- The mobile operations center director described how they would be notified

. to respond through use of a mass messaging system.

Mobile radiological laboratory personnel'had-assembled all equipment and supplies specified in their procedures prior to deploying froni the South Carolina fixed radiological laboratory., The mobile radiological laboratory* had adequate eg_uipinent to

' perform radiological analysis and to perform sample and* contamination -control.

The mobile radiological laboratory staff successfully set up and calibrated the equipment to facilitate analysis of radiological samples. Detailed procedures for t:iquipmerit quality assurance and quality control were followed, and analysis of air samples taken in the field during an emergency exercisewasperformed. Analysis 'results were'hand deliverbd to mobile operations center staff in hard-copy and electronic formats to be made available for dose assessment and decision making.

The mobile operations center director issued dosimetry and instTIJctions qn its _ust? to the mobile radiological laboratory staff. Staff members also had access to potassium iodide, should its use be required. The mobile operations center directorprovided information on plant conditions, and general safe~yyrocedures,.:

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program AfterAction Report, 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

, Mobile radiological laboratory personnel maintain~d c:.ommunications with the mobile

- openitiqns,center µsing cellular tdephone~ and radi.m; operating on.. the state's radio system. The radios proved effective during the _er;nyrgency exercise, and no

. ~omp1unication~ failures were _experie1;1ced.

I:'or ~his. capabiiity the follo;idg ~p :c~itical,tasks, we;e MET: l.a.1, l.d. l, l.e. l, 3.a. l, 4.c.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.1.8 Waterway Warning/ Clearance On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

South Carolina Department of Natural Resources Officers demonstrated their capability to warn personnel on Lake Monticello in the event of an emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear;Station in a timely manner. *Participants of the demonstration included a department of Natural Resources supervisor and two other officers responsible for driving the boats. Department of Natural Resources officers received a thorough briefing whic,;b in,clud~d discussions on safety, dosimetry, potassium iodide, and exposure limits.

Department pf Natural Resources personnel*had sufficient equipment, communications, an.ct instructions to support warniQ.g and.clearing of occupants in and around Lake Mo11ticeJlo. Officers checked th~ir dosimetry after, fifteen minutes and demonstrated that they could warn personnel in and around the iake within forty-five minutes. The officers deJI1oµs~rat~d professiol1alis_m and expertise in demonstrating, their abilities and were well

yersed _on th,eir,plans.

For this capa~ility th~ following REP critiq1I taskswere MET:* l.a.l, -1.d.l, l.e.1,.3.a.l, 1

an,d~.d.l. -

a. Level 1 Finding: None b: Level 2 Finding: None

. J.:. ;.. >~ ',.

.- *-i~~,NotUemQnstr~te_d: Npne -

d. Prior ~evel 2 Findings - Re~ofred: None 1

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 29

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.2.1 Fairfield County

. 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Operational Coordination ;Capability Summary: : *. -

.,. r ;_* ~*-.

- Fairfield County Emergen~y Management Department staff demonstrated with

. challenges their ability to respond to a radiological emergehcy. The V. c; -Summer Nuclear Station is located in Fairfield County.

Once authorized, a 911 operator used an automated electronic system to make timely notifications to activate the emergency operations center staff:,The emergency operations

• center had multiple communication systems, including internet access, computer electronic mail, commercial telephone land lines, cell phones, and other hand-held electronic devices. Electronic emergency status report systems and wind direction maps maintained situational awareness. As the emergency situation progressed at the V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station, frequent staff briefings kept the staff informed of emergency conditions, plant status, and allowed the staff to brief their action status to maintain effective coordination. Sufficient equipment, supplies, and back-up electrical power were available for extended operations as required.

Frequent conference calls provided opportunities for detailed discussions among the risk counties and the state emergency operations center. The emergency operations center manager did not participate in the initial South Carolina Emergency Management Division decision line conference call to coordinate emergency information.; This lack of initial participation hampered county coordination to support protective action decisions

. required at the Site Area Emergency level. :Subsequent decisions providinRprecautionary and protective actions were timely arid-effective.

• 1

• The Fairfield County emergency operations staff effectively demonstrated their ability to impl~ment protective actions for pe_ople with.disabilities and those* With* access/functional needs and schools within their area of the 10-mik emergency planning zone. They also demonstrated the capability to establish effective traffic and*access,control, and to.

respond appropriately to impediments to evacuation on roads within their jurisdiction.

Agency representatives were knowledgeable of appropri'ate dosimetry; *potassium iodide,

• and procedures to ensure saferndiological exposure of emergency workers. Staff

. members were knowledgeable a.nd effectively ensured the safety of the public and emergency workers..

1.!: J

~

. ~,: '

For this capability,thefollowingREP criteria were MET: '.!.a:1,Tc.l, l.d:l, l.e.l, 2.a.l,

. 2.c.1, 3.a.J, 3.b.1,. 3.c;l,:3.c'.2;,3.d;l, and 3.d.2.

a., Level 1 Finding:

• None

b. Level 2 Finding: 61-19-2.b.2-L2-02 30 I

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Radiological Emergency.Preparedness Program After Action Report..

2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Criterion: 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make precautionary and/or protective action decisions for the general public.

Condition: Fairfield County,.Emergency Ma~rngement did not fully activate their emergency operations center at the Alert emergency classification level in accordance

, with their plans and the extent of.play. They-did not assign* staff to monitor the

. conference bridge line dur.ing. the emergency. operations center partial activation and therefore missed a coordinated decision call with the state and Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties.

PossibJe Cause: Fairfield County stated thatthey did not fully activate their em~rgency operation center until a Site Area Emergency had been declared. This is

.. in direct conflict with their plans which state:.

"Emergency Classification Levels Chart Alert

1)

Provide fire, medical, or security assistance on request.

2)

Augment resources and bring emergency operations center(s) to stand-by status.

Consider activation of emergency operations center(s) downwind from the facility.

3)

Brjng alert and notification systems to stand-by status.

4) Activate siren system and emergency alert system in 10-mile EPZ if

. r~commended.

5)

Alert key personnel to stand-by status."

This excerpt from the Fairfield County plan indicates that; at an Alert emergency classification level the emergency operations center should be activated if downwind.

Since the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station is located in Fairfield County and Zone AO

• • 1

• ** includes, Fairfield County,.some part of -the county will always be in the downwind direction of the *plant,

• Therefore, the emergency management staff should consider act_ivatil}g the. emergency operations center an;ytime* an Alert classification is declared in accordance w*itl1: the plan. *.

Fairfield Coi;tnty emergency management staff failed in their responsibility to the

• *, citizen~ of.Fairfield County by not staffing: the*conference bridge line or checking with the other counties and the state concerning the situation of the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station. This failure led them to be behind the other counties and, the.state in preparing for precautionary actions and ensuring emergency response staff were ready to deploy to the field when the classifitaticim*level changed to a Site Area Emergency. All other risk counties joined the conference decision line at the Alert emergency classification level. *Prior to starting conference calls, the state polled the line to determine if Fairfield County emergency management was on the call. *.

31

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report

Reference:

1. Fairfield County BOP Annex Q 2018..

2. REP Program Manual January 2016

3. NUREG-0654/FEMA-,REP-1, D.4 Effect: The Fairfield County*Plan states:,

"D.Planning Basis 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

3. The'first three hours from notification of a radioldgical accident at VCSNS is critical to the county. The.county will be prepared to initiate ah immediate Crisis RER in reaction to the VCSNS and DHEC assessment, and by notification by SCEMD."

With the activation of the emergency operations center not occurring u~til the Site Area Emergency had been declared, some of the coordination pieces between Fairfield County, the other risk counti~s, and the state were delayed due to lack of personnel assigned to communicate With the state and other risk counties in the emergency operations center. Further delays to protect the health and safety of the pubic could have occurred because local laW'enforcement may have had to spend additional time getting their personnel to a point where they could be deployed to missions within the 10-mile emergency planning zone and other support organizations personnel not being notified until their services were needed.

In accordance with their plan at an Alert emergency classification level, the county should have: alerted key personnel to standby; had alert and notification systems in standby; and prepared for siren activation and emergency alert system message transmittals.

During this exercise the state and other counties were making proactive protective action decisions that could have impacted citizens in Fairfield County.* By the emergency management personnel deciding to not participate until the Site*Area Emergency had been declared they violated the Planning Basis from their own plan.

Fairfield County emergency management was not aware of the decision to activate siren and transmit an emergency alert system message when the Site Area Emergency was declared.

Recommendations:

1. As the site county, Fairfield County when activated to OPCON2 should ensure that they are in comrrinnicationwith the South Carolina Emergency Management Division and Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties.

2. Fairfield County emergency management should*paiticipate in exercises in the same manner that they would in a real event to ensure t~eir plans anq processes can be properly'implemented.

3. Develop a detailed checklist for activating the*emergen:cynperations center and include a list of who to call at the state level to get guiqance on con,ference_ calls 32 I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station and or decision line calls so that all counties are available and participating in the decisions. Consider developing a standard operating guide for all positions.

4. Consider updating notification,procedures tb.require that that the emergency management director or designated representative :establish communication with the South Carolina Emergency Management Division director or authorized representative upon receipt of an,initial notification of an emergency.

5. Fairfield County and the State Emergency Response Team need to participate in exercises :as tq.ey would in a real emergency. This includes making phone calls to ensµre all.affected,jurisdictions* are aware *of the emergency. *

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2* Findings - Unresolved: None Publi.c Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Fairfield County successfully demonstrated the.ability to provide accurate, comprehensible, and coordinated information to the public and the news media in the event of a radiological incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The use of permanently mounted sirens accompanied by Emergency Alert System messages effectively accomplished the initial notification of the public as to the existence of a radiological emergency. A plan was in place to supplement this procedure in the event of

. a siren failure using local fire departments to perform back-up route alerting. Routes for each siren had been established and appropriate responders trained. to complete this mission.

Fairfield. Coµnty sent a public information officer to thejoint information center upon the notification of an Alert and had an assistant public information officer within the Fairfield Coµnty Emergency Operations Center.throughout the exercise. Coordination between.th~se two.individuals was observed to be constant and comprehensive for the exercise perip4. All incoming messages to the assistant public information officer were transmittedjmrn~diately to the Emergency Operations,Manager. Once approved, all requested information for public release was promptly transmitted to the joint information center. Rumor control was performed effectively by the assistant public information officer using current, accurate, and understandable information.. **

• For this capapility, the following REP criteria were,MET: 5.a.l; 5.a.3, 5.b.1.

a~ Level 1 Finding:

• None,

. ~-* Level 2 Finding:.None c.. Not Demonstrated:,. None,

d. Prior Level2 Findings *-Resolved: *None 33

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC.Summer Nuclear Station

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None Critical Transportation. Capability Summary~

,}';

The McCrorey-Liston Elementary School si:itcessfully-*ctiscussed implementation' *of protective actions for school children and staff durin:gan interview. School plaris addressed early release, lockdown procedures and evacuation procedures. The principal stated that notification of an emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station* would come from the district office by way,ofthe county'emergency operations center.* Notification to parents is accomplished* using a mass notification application, *a rapid notification 1?ystem, and a school messaging application. The principal stated that the school has 4 buses available to move their students and staff members. The principle stated that school staff and students would be evacuated to White Oak Conference* Center and parents would not be notified until the bus was en route to the conference center.* The principal was knowledgeable of school emergency response activities and plans.

For this capability, the following REP criterion was MET: 3.c.2.

a. Level l*Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.2.2 Lexington County

• Operational Coordination Capabiiity Summary:

The staff of the Lexington CountY'emetgency operations center*successfully* '*

demonstrated their capability to alert, notify and mobilize emergency response personnel

.:and acti,vate.the county emergency:operatioris center in*a timely manner.' This was done with excellent coordination between players and resulted in proper execution of duties by all participants.

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The primary method of communication for the county emergency operations center was the Emergency Management*Networkline that was used to col11IIlu'.riicate with the state and other risk counties. Other means of communication were available and functioned well during the exercise.

• There was sufficient equipment and space available iri the Lexington Countf*emergency operations center to support response during ah emergency atthe V:C. SummetNuclear Station. Visual aids and diagrams were displayed throughout the emergency operations center which assisted in maintaining the staffs' situational awareness.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station The county emergency operations center was* located oµtside the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Therefore, no dosimetry or potassium iodide was present, nor was it stored at this location. An inform~tiop briefing Gonc.eming the utility's status was given once the emergency operations facility was declared* operational, plus a safety briefing by

'.,)h,e ~m~rgyncy rp.anager.. :A.dp.itional personnd resoiu;ces,.acquired through mutual aid a,greements, would rece~vej~.sHn-.ti..iu..e-trainiIJ,g p;ri.or to beginning their work.

L~xi~gton Co\\lnty-Emergency Management leadership successfully demonstrated their

~bility to maµage ern,ergency operations for the county and coordinate protective action decisions. with the other risk counties, as well,as.the South Carolina state emergency opy,rations 1center.. The director of public safety.was,responsible for all emergency 9peratipns o~curring within Lexington County., **The emergency manager was responsible for th~ man_agement of the county emergency operations center and coordination of

..,prot~ctive actions with the other V.C. Summer Nuclear Station emergency planning zone risk c.ounties. The emergency manager was assisted by the deputy emergency manager.

The emergency manager and deputy emergency manager worked together to ensure the emergency operations center staff was kept situationally aware of all activities occurring concerning the radiqlogical emergency at the plant. Several update briefings were conducted following the receipt and update of emergency classification levels at the plant.

• Leadership also required staff updates from emergency operations* center personnel in order to ensure staff sections were aware of other related action occurring in response to the emergency. The utility liaison l;lSSisted in keeping the staff informed by further explaining the plant status.

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The deputy emergency manager participated in the coordination of protective action decisions with the other risk counties and the state emergency operations center, over the state conference bridge coordination line. Concurrence to decisions were made by the deputy emergency manager with-input from the, erp.ergency manager when required.

Decisions for the county took into consideration plant conditions and guidance from the emergencyrn,ana,ger and othersubjectmatter experts.within the emergency operations center.; C99rq.inatioµ calls_ occurred frequently, after the receipt of emergency notification _forms and upon the declaration _of an µpdate emergency classification level.

,.,.:-1;'... t Coordination of response activities among the emergency operations center.staff was facilitated through the emergency manager, assisted by a liaison from the South Carolina

. :.,. Em~rgency Managen;i.entDivision,: J'he.liaiso1tassiste4 in requesting and providing

. updates on additiqm_tl. rysoµrcesJrom external sources. Resources were received in a timyly rn'1pner.

Lexington County staff and leadership used the county plans and activity logs to track all

_ c::ritic::a). *emergency activities during the, exercise.,<Jopies of plans were provided,for each

-*. ~mergency support functions_ at each wmkstation, and available in electronic format.

.. Both 4a.ndwritten and,computer-based activity-logs were used by the staff.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Leadership within the emergency opetatioris'centerwere experienced and work well together to ensure appropriate emergency actions were taken tq protect the public in accordance with their plans. The partidpation of the Director of Public Safety during most of the exercise,* furtJlt{.cl,epionstrated ~he poµ:µty,leadership~' dedicatiqn to., i' radiological emergency i~sporis~ and preparedness. '..

Lexington c;ounty had six sp~ci~l'facilities other tha~'schools.'in their.zone o{.:'.

responsibility within the 10;-ini'ly eip.ergency planning zone.' There was also *a *ust of 37

• persons with disabilities anc;t *access/functional needs kept.on file. The faciiities and persons Oii the list were sim'ulated b~ing contacted. If eyacqation had become n~cessary, the staff in the emergency operatlc:ms center would have ensured there wa,s adequ~te transportation for them, as was* shown in the county plans. These evacuees would have been taken to the Crossroads Middle School reception center or local hpspfral i{ 11eeded.

Once an alert emergency classification level had been declared, the possibility,of:

relocation of schools was discussed. Of immediate concern was the relocation of Crossroads Middle School, ~ince it wpuld be used as a reception center if need~d.

Keeping the parents of scho9l children informed of what was occurring was also an important issue that was discussed. Lexington County had an adequate number of radio-equipped buses and drivers on hat1d to evacuate all three schools within the Lexington County 10-mile emergency plan~ing zone if re_quired.

The emergency operations centyr law enforcement representative coorqinated the decisions concerning having emergency workers and equipment ready in the event it was decided to staff the traffic coritrol points.. All agencies concerned WQrki4 ;well together to ensure this Would happen in a rapid manner (?nCethe decision to establish,tp.em was made. This included not only personnel, bµt the preparation of equipment _necessary to perform traffic control duties at the seven traffic control points in tµe COUIJ,ty's,

jurisdiction, inside the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

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• The staff in the emergency opy,ratiQns,center was knowledgeable, of l,io';" t9 locate rescmrces that might be rieeC,e4.tq J;ielp dear any* impediment& to ~ya~uation: They were

'experienced and proficient afpliµ1.p.ing arid executing detours caused by simulated impediments, 'the staff ensure~ Jli.e'emergency workers ori~scen'.e haq the necessary resources to set up detours: 'rernov~ 'impediinents; _ and provid~ inf9rmation to the public in a timely manner.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.1, :l.c. l, 1.ct: 1, 'i:e.i, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.l, 3._b.l,, 3.c), ~.c.2, 3.d.l, and 3.d.2.

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a. Level 1 Finding: None

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b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None 36 I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

d., Pdor Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

• e., Prior Level 2 Findings~* Unresolved: None Public Information and Warning C~pabiliiy°Stlmniary:

t.*.;

Lexington Coun~y successfully discussed the capability to activate the prompt alert and notification systerri,_the backup route alerting procedure in the event of a siren failure,

. and the provision of accu'rate emergency inforniation.to the public and news media with a

'sense of urgei1cy and without undue delay. These* activities were accomplished through coordination of information between the' state, the risk counties, and the utility, over a

. teiephone conference ca.IL Lexington County p~icipated in the approval of two

• ei:nergency alert system messages~ seven news releases, and one media briefing during this exercise.

Using a system of sirens, the general public was alerted via an initial alert and notification sequence. The activation of the Emergency Alert System was coordinated over the state telephone conference with Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, and Richl,,md Counties, who jointly concurred with the decision. Once the decision was made, the utility executed the siren portion of the alert and notification procedure. The initial Emergency Alert System message was distributed 'by the state warning point, located adjacent to the state emergency operations center workroom.

The Lexington County Sheriff's Office had the responsibility for conducting backup route alerting. A deputy sheriff was* interviewed and discussed the procedures for completing backup route alerting, establishing the staging area, use of dosimetry for

,* *exposure control, obtaining resources such as vehicles and equipment, obtaining copies of messages to be conveyed, and the role of the' mass calling system, which included audio c'a.pability of emergency instructions. ',

The public information process was accomplished by the county lead public information officer who \\\\ras located in the county emergenc;y operations ceriter, while a county public information iiaiS01i'was dispatched to the joint'infqrmation center. Connectivity from the county publfo irtforillation,officer to the state:joihf information center was accomplished by a conference line and by celf phone1. The co'.unty l~ad public information officer collaborated throughout the county emergenty ophations *center and coordinated, appropriate information with the county liaison at the joint information center to repr_esent the county.

• '*.. : -~ *~

.t.-; \\

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.l., 5.a.3. and 5.b.l.

a. Leyel 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None 37

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findin~* ~ ~nres!Jlv~d: None Critical Transportation Capabjlity Sum1n~ry;..

School officials and staff frmp. Di~trict Fiv~ of.Lexington and Richland Coµnty >:

successfully discussed implementation of protective actions for school children and staff.

School safety officers and the district transportation director attended the interview.

Safety officers from each.effected school explained how notification of an emergency would be received by th.eir schools and how emergency information is diss~minated to parents. School officials discuss~d early release, shelter in place, and relocation.*

procedures thoroughly, and specif1ed staff and agency responsibilities duriQ.g the implementation. Officials stated precautionary schoo~ dismis.sal and relocation would be conducted at the Alert emergency classification level.. Communication and transportation assets and capabilities were 04tlined by the District Five Transportation Direct.or. School officials also discussed care for children with disabilities and access/functional needs during implementation, mass calling and web-based communication systems, and reunification locations. The district had sufficient buses to ensure students could be transported to reception centers and ~eunification centers. School and district officials were knowledgeable on the district nuclear emergency response plans and procedures.

For this capability, the following REP criterion was MET: 3.c.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings -.Resolved: None

_ e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

On Scene Security and ~rcite~tion Capability *summary:

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I Lexington County law enfor~~ment ~fficers successfully disc,ussed their ~bility to establish traffic contrql points duriµg ~ rapiological incident a( the V.C. ~rummer Nuclear Station. When the Lexington County Emergency Operations Center received an Alert notification from V.C. Summ.er Nµ~le<;tr Station, the law enforcement representative simulated notifying emergen~y\\v~~kers to go to the Crossroads Fire Department to receive their dosimetry and potassium iodide in case they were sent to staff a traffic control point. The emergency workers would have received a rac;lioJogical safety,.

briefing, and had their equipment double-checked prior to.deployment. Communications equipment available to the emergency workers included an*soo..:megahertz tw6-way radio, and a cell phone. All methods of communication would have been tested prior to going to the traffic control point.

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I Radiological Emergency. Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station The briefing the traffic control point te,an;is would hc:1.ve received at the Crossroads Fire Department would have ensured the'y had the proper eqi11pinent to staff their traffic control point. Their first response vehicle had ligp.ts aµ,d sirens and had.a public address system mounted on it. Other equipment that w*6uhfhave been'provided included reflective vests, traffic cones, barrier tape,, flares and light wands. If more supplies were needed mice oh site, they would have been delivered from the Crossroads Fire

** Department.

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, Since no emergency workers were sertt to a traffic*cbhtrol point or staging area during this exercise, the twcY-person emergency*worker'teams that would have staffed a traffic control point simulated receiving a radiological safety briefing which ensured they knew how to use the dosimetry they would be issued at that location, and information about

• potassium iodide. They also *would get information acceptable exposure limits and what form to record the dosimeter readings on. The same form would be used to record the

. ingestion of a potassium iodide tablet during theidriission. Turning in of dosimetry

• • equipment after the mission was also be discussed.

• The interview with the emergency operations center iaw enforcement representative discussed what actions a law enforcement officers assigned to a traffic control point would take. Once a law enforcement officer assignid to a traffic control point had received their radiation safety briefing and picked up their dosimetry plus potassium iodide at the staging area, they would have waited to be dispatched to their 'assigned location by the fire chief at Crossroads Fire Department. Once the area was evacuated, the law enforcement officers would know by prior training and the briefing not to allow anyone back into the evacuated location without proper identification and permission from the county emergency operations center.

During an interview concerning impediments to evacuation

• the emergency operations center law enforcement representative explained that law enforcement personnel assigned traffic control points would be nof1fied 'o{ dction:s to take to ensure the route was either cleared with a minimal lo~s of time, or that they enforced the decision t,o set up a detour around the impeciirriertt' in 'a timely manner:; biice a decision ~as made to re-route traffic, the law enforcement officers would have coordinated with their county einergericy operations cbnter representative and hh:d the equipment required to establish

the alternate* route delivered to theni or the location' if they didn't have it 'already on hand.

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'.', I For this capability, the following REP*criteria we'~e MET: 1.;.1, '.1.d.1, 1.e.1, ia.l, 3.d.l,

' and 3'.d.2. :

a.: Level.1 Finding: None_*

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. b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated:. Norte***,..

39

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report

d. Prior Level 2 Findings..:. Resolved: None

e.

• Prior Level 2 Findingii - Unresolved: N~rn~

('

3.3.2.3 Newberry County Operational Coordination,C~p~bility Sum-.µary; 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Newberry County Emergency Sirvices succ~ssfully'dem~nst~fited the ability\\o' mobilize personnel and manage an emergency operations center during an emergency at the V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station. The emergency management direC:tor effectiveJy.directed mobilization and response actjvitie~ upon receiving the Aiert notification. The staff efficieU:tly communicated with *the: V.C. Summer Nuclear Station and the Vl;lfious participating state, regional and local governments to provide current information and updates on the status of the utility, agency and utility briefings, and protective action decisions. Under the guidance ofthe emergency management director, the eµiergency operations center staff performed actions appropriate for each emergency classification level and copsistent with their standard operating proced~res.

Emergency operations staff ha~ adequate equipment and supplies to support emergency response operations. Pr1mary and secondary communications systems were in operation and permitted continuous communications with the nuclear power plant and all other offsite response organizations.' The prim.my communications system used Wa$ a landline telephone, with secondary system's supplied via facsimile, portable and individual two-way radios, laptop computers with e-mail capability, a web-based tracking and coordination program, and cell phones. There were no failures of any comm.unications systems utilized during the exercise.

Direction and control were su9cessfully demonstrated by the,Ne:wb.~n:y County Emergency Management Director. The erp.ergency management director effectively synchronized situational awareness among county emergency operations' center staff through frequent situation briefs,. 9901,"dinated, decision line calls, and coordinated protective action decisions with. state an.d focal officials. The pro;ective: action de9ision making process involved coordinat1iig all available information to.wake timely, well informed protective action detisions,' which included water clearing for Lake 'parr and Broad River, placing livestock under shelter and on stored feed, activation of the '

emergency alert system, approv?:l aqd dissemination of inform~tion to t.he pµblic.,

coordination for evacuations, ~riq ~oor~i!}ation foi implementation of traffic c01;itrol and impediments to evacuations:. -:*: (.'

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t The Newberry County Emergency Management Director S,ucces~f\\Illy demonstrated prqtective action decision coordination and con~urrerice for Newberry County through coordinated dec~sion-iµal(,ing, consideration of.relevant factors, and by appropriately corresponding with off site response organizations during the 'response. the director was knowledgeable of emergency worker equipment, exposure limits, and exposure control.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report..

2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station He made decisions concerning exposure control and potassium iodide based on the current situation and available information. It was det~rmined, through int~rview, that he authorized the staff to manage and *contact emergency W 16rkers for d~cision.

implementation.

Protective action decisions were successfully discussed, coordinated and agreed upon among the South Carolina Emergency Managehierit Division and the o'rfsite response organizations over the conference line. The public notification process was comprised of

• two utility sir~n'acttvatitms and two simulated Emergency Alert System activations

• directed to the affected populace.. The initial protective action decisio.n was a "Stay

• tuned" mess*age. The s,econd protective action decision was to evacuate zones: AO, Al,

. El, E2, Fl, and F2. Emergency workers entering the '10-mile emergency planning zone were ordered.to ingest potassium iodide prior to' eritry.

Tlie Newberry'County Emergency Management Director based the decision to relocate the disabilities and access/functional needs population on degrading plant conditions.

• ' 'The director of the Newberry County Special Needs_ Disability Board discussed the care of the special needs' population in the county, the* notification process, and evacuation procedures in the event they were required. The director outlined the coordination or resources for transportation and shelter activitie~ for dis.placed individuals.

• He began relocating the disabilities and access/functional needs populace during the Alert to ensure safe and expedited movement. The N~wberry County Sheriff, the county department of soci'al services representative, and emergency medical services representative coordinated the move when directed to by the emergency management director..

The emergency management director discussed school notification, transportation, and relocation procedures. At the Alert; the schools we~e instructed to prepare for relocation,

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. which coinmericed at Site Area Emergency.

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Th~ Newberry Comity Sheriffs senior deputy pres~nt, was prepared to establish pre-detenrtined traffic and access control p6i11ts _in ~ccqr~ancy with their standa1~d op~rating

• procedures. ~ublic wotks staff and law, enforcement :officials explaine~ the ability to resolve traffic impediments quickly and efficiently in the event of an evacuationi

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. Stafr°assigned to the Ne\\:\\iberry County Em:~igen~y* C>pe~ations Center discussed the

.. abllity' to identify and resolve an impediment hy re~rou'dng traffic a~ayfroni a primary evacuation route within their county. This capability was explained v1a interview after an exercise inject regarding a dump,truck acci~ent \\\\;(!S r~ceived in the Newberry County

' ' Emergenby Operations Center...

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For this ~apabilitf, the following REP criteria we;e MET: l.a.l, 'i.c.l,, l.d:1,' l.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.i', 2.c.l, 3.a.1,3.b.1; J.c.i, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, and 3.d.2.

41

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

a. Level 1 Finding: None *

b. Level 2 Finding: None.

c. Not Demonstrated:

• None,. :

d. 'Prior Level2 Fi11dings ~Risolved: NoJe.

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e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:*,,

Newberry County Emergency Operations Center staff demonstrated the capability to perform activities associated with primary alerting and notification. of the public' in a prompt, coordinated and repeatable manner. Emergency workers were prepared and capable of conducting backup alerting in the event of a failure of the primary alert and notification system and were able to provide accurate emergency inform'ation and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner..

• The circumstances that would initiate backup route alerting and the process of how Newberry County would clear designated areas and inform the public, were demonstrated by interview.

Several actions were demonstrated by Newberry County Emergen~y Operations <;:enter leadership that supported the Public Information and Warning core capability. These actions included participating in the coordination and concurrence of siren activations and Emergency Alert System messages to alert and notify thy public in a prompt fashion, and generating and approving press releases that were timely, clear, accurate and consistent with the precautionary and protective actions that were in place. The public information staff maintained contact with a liaison located at the state joint information center located in the state emergency operations center and*actively fielded calls from the public relative to the situation at the plant.

For this capability the following REP criteria "7ere MET: 5.a. l, 5.a;3; and 5;b.L

a. Level 1 Finding: None *

• b. Level 2 Firiding: None c.. Not Demonstrated: None, *,., *

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e.. Prior Level 2 Findings,~ Unresolved:; None :.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparednes$ Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

The principal of the Pomaria-Garmany Elementary School, adririistrators from the Newberry County School District including the transportation director and the assistant superintendent, and a school resource officer fr(?m ;the Ne_wberry County School District successfully described, through interview; the abii:fty"to implement protective actions for school children and staff.

School officials discussedthe district process for initiating precautionary and protective actions, notifying parents in the event of an emergency, and how transportation assets would be employed to transport students and staff to a reception center and identified communications capabilities that are available to coordinate actions within the school and

. district-wide..

School officials also discussed a rapid notification smart phone application within the county that would allow for expedited notification of emergency events to emergency personnel. School officials were knowledgeable and well prepared.

.

• For.this capability, the following REP criterion was MET: 3.c.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None b.* Level 2 Finding: None

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.. c. Not Demonstrated: None*

• d. *' Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: Norte r'

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• . _e..Prior Leyel 2 Findings - Unresolved: None On Scene.. Security and Protection-Summary:..

A Newberry County Sheriffs Office representative successfully demonstrated the ability to mobilize and.manage emergency workers from the emergency operations center. The emergency management director effectively directed mobilization and response activities.

The sheriff's office representative demonstrated situational awareness by participating in agency and power plant briefings, as well as protective action decisions. 1Jnd~r tl}e guidance of the emergency management director, the Sheriff's office representative performed actions appropriate for each emergency classification level consistent with their standard operating procedures.

The sheriff's deputies had adequate equipment and, supplies to support emergency response operations. Primary and secondary communications systems were in operation and permitted continuous communications between the sheriffs representative and deputies in the field, along with county public works personnel. The primary communications system used consisted of portable two-way radios. Secondary communication systems included individual two-way radios and body camera systems, 43

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station laptop computers with e-mail capability, and cell phones. There were n() failures *of any communications systems utilized during the exercise. The sheriff's representative participated in periodic briefing*s and conference calls held iri the emergency operations center and would have conveyed relevant information to his deputies in the field via two-way radio.

1 Calibration and testing procedures for radiological monitoring equipment, the *use' of potassium iodine for exposure control, and radiologioal.briefirigs for emergency workers and traffic control *officers*, were conducted during staff assistance visits held.oh April 3-4, 2019. A copy of the topics *covered under the radiological briefin*g was supplied during the evaluation.

l The Newberry County Sheriff's senior deputy demonstrated his awareness, through interview, of pre-determined-traffic and access control points in accordance with their standard operating procedures:; Public works staff and law enforcement officials demonstrated, through interview,.the ability to resolve traffic impediments quickly and efficiently in the event of an evacuation.

For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a. l, l.d. l, l.e. l, 3.a.1, and

• 3.c.l, 3.d.l, and 3.d.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. L~vel 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings -:- Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.2.4 Richland County Operational CoordinationCapability Summary:

• Through the use of a joint command through the Incident Command System, Richland

. ~ounty leadership, county. emergency services division staff, arid'key personnel' successfully demonstrated the abiilityto respond to a: radiological incident at the* V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station. The executive group, in cbotdination with the comma.rid staff within the operations room of the emergency operations center, provided overall direction and control in a timely rn:annerthroughout the exercise. The presence of.multiple*key county leadership attributed to a seamless decision-making process foraction'sthat could affect both emergency workers and the general public throughout the exercise. The radiological threat'did not directly impactthe county; however; discussions were held**

within the executive group regarding emergency worker exposure control; potassium iodide for emergency workers and the general public; and protective action decisions for the general public and persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. The 44 I

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.Raciiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

.. emergency. services. director, along with the incident commander and staff, maintained co,DJ1I1unications and,coordinaticm w:ith the other counties and. state in order to make

• . appi

  • opriate protective actions toJprptect cou,nty.res_idents. Through in-depth discussions

.,.

• within the exe9utive group, key co.unty :leac;lership.was *postured to respond to changing conditions that could potentially impact their emergency workers and residents.

it

_ Ri~hland GountyE:n:iergency ~ervice_s,Division staff used effective procedures to alert, noHfy, and mobilize. emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

• Although personnetwerein.close proxiIQity toJhe.*emergency operations center; the

• jncidept cm;nmander de~onstrated how the county's reverse calling system operated and how the backup process would work in the event key personnel could not be reached.

The Richland County primary and backup communication systems were available to maintain.cpntact with relevant stakeholders, with no, failures identified. The primary

.,communication system was a dedicated communication link between the risk counties, state, and utiljty. Backup communications consisted of telephones, a local government radio system, 800 MHz radios, cell phones, email, web-based tracking and coordination tools, and facsimile machines.

. The emergency operations center had sufficient space, supplies, and equipment to support operations. Each staff position was provided an Incident Command System form 214 log sheet to record actions taken during the exercise. The staff did a good job performing their tasks and were aware of what actions to take according to each emergency classification. The Richland County emergency services staff demonstrated. considerable knowledge of procedures and plans, as well as the ability* to* coordinate with relevant stakeholders for response activities.

The Richland County Sheriff's Lieutenant demoilst;~ted through interview, that he was knowledgeable of the procedures for managing traffic control points. The lieutenant explained how he would inform his deputies of where to receive their mission brief. He was also familiar with radiological equipment, to include its use, administrative exposure limits, and instructions for use of potassium iodide. He was also familiar with maps that identified traffic control point loG~tions and i;outei,, of responsibility for the sheriffs deputies. All procedures explained were consistent with plans and procedures.

I, The_ ;R.icbla:qd Couµty Sheriff and Richlanc;l. Coun..ty, Department of Transportation staff successfully,demonstrated, via interview, ho;w they would c.oordinate to remove trn.pedirp.ents. Ther~_w;oulµ,be numerous resourc~s available to alleviate impediments to

,ip.,jude a listing of towjng services, availctqle s.taff,; and.equipment from the county public

.. works _d~partIIJ.ent., In.the event 9fa prolonged.impediment, traffic,control points could be aJtered as necessary.

45

Radiological Emergency Preparedness-Program After Action Report 2019 VCSummer*Nuclear Station For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.1,. l.c. l, l.d.1, l.e.1, 2.a. l, 2.c.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3;d.l, 3.d.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None*

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Richland County Public Information Officer within the county '.emergency operations center demonstrated the capability'to provide accurate, tiII1ely,'and coordinated information to the public in response to a simulated emergency at V. C. Sum.Iiler Nuclear Station. Richland County continuously participated in a state-directed conference call with the utility and other counties and concurred on the times of siren activation aJ}d Emergency Alert System broadcasts. Emergency alert messages and news releases were reviewed prior to release if possible, and in all cases after release. Ari error in the second message was discovered by the Richland*County Emergency Management Division Manager, and appropriate state'personnel were immediately notified. Review of the news releases was timely, with concurrence coordinated within the emergency operations center by the public information officer, and confirmation was* sent by email or text to the county liaison working in the State joint information center. The initia:1-Eniergen:cy Alert System message contained all required Federal Emergency Management Agency elements.

There were no reported siren failures in Richland County during' ~ither of the two siren activations. It was discussed through interview that in the event of a,~iren,failure, Richland County would use reverse calling system notifications to inform the population in the affected area. The county could deploy available resotirces'fiom the-'fi;e department, sheriff's office, or emergency medical services to conduct backup route alerting, following the pre-identified route maps in county pianning documents.

Richland County activated a public inquiry telephone line and responded to twenty-nine public inquiries. Responses were eitherimmediate to the caller ff the* information requested was known and could be disseminated, or forwarded, to appropriate emergency operations center personnel for 'attibn: *By interview, the public information offi~er explained she would= issue a county press release if there was specific information that needed to be sent to county residents: Because the radiological threat did 'not directly impact Richland County, no* county press releases were *drafted or disseminated.: * *

• Additionally, social mediawould be used to disseminate eve*nt'informaticiri tc/the public

. as needed; however, this was*ilot demonstrated 'at th'.e county level. The public iriguiry staff did not observe any trends* in the inquides.

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.Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a,1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None. **,

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None, Critical Transportation.C~pability Summary:.,.

• Sch~:,ol o:ffi~ials and staff from District Five of Lexington and Richland County successfully discu~sed implementation of protective actions for school children and staff.

. Officials from District Five, Chapin Middle School and Springhill High School attended the \\riterview. Safety officers from each effected school explained how notification of an emergency is received by their school and how.emergency information is disseminated to parents. School officials discussed early release, shelter in place, and evacuation procedures thoroughly, and specified staff and agency responsibilities during the implementation. Communication and transportation.assets and capabilities were outlined

. by.the District Five TransportatiQn Director. Schoql officials also discussed care for children _with disabilities and acc~ss/functional needs, mass calling and web-based communication,systems, and ryintegration locations. School and district officials were knowledgeable on the district nuclear emergency plans and procedures.

).

For this capability, the following REP criterion was MET: 3.c.2.

.a. l,evel 1 Fb1ding: None

b. Level 2'Finding: None

c. 'Not Dem~mstra.ted: None.

• d. *, Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

• 1* ;r. -*

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• on Scene Security ai1d Pi;otection Summary:;.*; *,.

',,I The, ability to effectively establish and maintain tr~ffic control points was demonstrated

.duripg an i:o.te,rview inside ~JchlaJJ.d Coµnty.Emergency.Operations Center.* The deputy

.,. interviewed was. well-versed in the law. enforcem~nt aspects related to traffic control point establishme,nt anq. management. The uqique aspect of support in the event of an incjde:µt at.V._C.. Summer Nuclear Station would be emergency worker radiological exposure pi;otection and infprmatic;m th.at the public.may require. The deputy was well-trained arid exhibited sufficient knowledge of dosimetry, personal protective measures, 47

Radiological Emergency PreparednessProgram After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station and pertinent aspects related to the* ingestion of potassium iodide. The deputy provided good insight on how officers would be well-equipped with information that could assist them in responding to queries from evacuees regarding shelters and reception centers. * *

.1 * ' ~ :

The deputy explained, through'interview, that. personnel would be'Well aware of various -

methods to overcome impediments to an evacuation aiid implementation-of alternative.

• routes if necessary. In addition, the Richland County Public Works Department would be available for assistance with removing impediments and blocking roads to redirect traffic.

For this capability the follow.ing REP criteria were MET:.l;a.:1, l.d.l, l.e.1, 3.a.l, and 3.c.1, 3.d.1, and 3.d.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None.

d.

• Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I*.

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. Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Aft.er Actiop. R~port,

2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Sectipn 4: Conclusion Emergency response activities and imple:r;nentation of protective actions by emergency responders in response to a radiological emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station was successful.. Officials and.representatives from the State of South Carolina; the risk counties of Fairfield, Lexington, Richland, and Newberry; Dominion Energy; and numerous volunteer organizations participated in the exercise.

State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated the core capabilities identified for the exercise, as well as their knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures.

State, county, private, and volunteer personnel implemented their plans, maintained coordination, and made decisions to protect the public. The state and county leadership provided effective direction and control throughout the exercise.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency did not identify a~y level 1 findings during this exercise. Two level 2 findings were identified. The first finding concerned the lack of early coordination by Fairfield County, and the second findi~g c9ncerned inaccurate EAS messages and information given to the public through the joint information system.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who dedicated their time and effort, and made this exercise a success. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Appendix A: Exercise Timeline Emerge.ncy *... _.

-Classification;;

Level -.or :Event.

Tim~ '. ;TiriJeTh_~f~fo~QtatiO~fWas*rcei~~for ~di~n;~~.

T~~~~.*.~:

.lLl~ilitf

/_

Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emer2encv General Emer2encv Simulated Rad. Release Be2an Simulated Rad. Release Ended Facilitv Declared Operational Declaration of State of Emergency Local SEOC/Dose Fairfield County Lexington County D~cfared, Richland County 0811 0816 0825 0829 0821 0841 0848 0854 0848 0852 1040 1044 1048 1048 1047 1149 1156 1159 1158 1158 1124 1124 1139 1138 1124 Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing 0855 0951 1055 1026 0930 1130 1030 0855 1045 1158 1143 Ongoing 0855 1110

---

*--------------------~--*---------- -----------+--------------- ---*--------11 State 1045 1045 1045 1045 1120 Exercise Terminated 1430 1353 1346 1338 1350 Precautionary Actions:

1022 1021 1022 1107 Ban hunting/fishi,!!g, clear waterways*****---*------**--***--*----***********---****-***--****--*********-*-****--* *****-*--*---**--***** **-*----**---**-****-**-*--*-*-**---* **--********- *****---***--*--**-*************-*--* **-**-**------*------**-***

Stored feed and water 1116 1116 1116 1116 pt Protective Action Decision:

Stay tuned 1028 1105 1028 1028 1028 1st Siren Activation 1100 1105 1100 1100 1100 pt EAS Messa2e: Stay Tuned 1103 1105 1103 1103 1103 2nd Protective Action Decision:

1209 1209 Evacuate Zones: AO, Al, El, E2, Fl, F2 1209 1209 1209 2nd Siren Activation 1220 1220 1220 1220 1220 2nd EAS Message 1223 1223 1223 1223 1223 KI Ingestion Decision:

Emergency Workers 1216 1216 1216 1216 1216 General Public 51

After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2019_ VC Summer Nuclear Station

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report.,

2019 VC Summer Nuclear Station Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair: Randall L. Hecht Section Chief: Lawrence Robertson Site Specialist: Quintin Ivy Lod1tfori>'.

• ., ~.

,Evaiu:ationTeaitr*.

Core*'Gapability: '

EOF John Pelchat Operational Coordination Tom Gahan Public Information and Warning

• • State ofSoµth:Carolhia: Dfrecti:>r,::,:: Kim Stensctn..

Joe Harworth Operational Coordination SEOC David Ortman Roy Smith Public Information and Warning JIC PJ. Nied Public Information and Warning Eric Houghton (OJT)

Dose Assessment John Fill Environmental Response/Health and Safety Situational Assessment Mobile Lab BradMcRee Environmental Response/Health and Safety MOC Jill Leatherman Environmental Response/Health and Safety Field Teams Bart Ray Environmental Response/Health and Safety Jim Hickey TCPs Lorenzo Lewis On~Scene Security and Protection

• Faii"fieid:Co11,µty:.,Direc.t9i- :-fonnifer M¢Qriff,,,

DeShun Lowery EOC Mike Dolder Operational Coordination Mark Dalton Public Information and Warning Gene Taylor (OJT) t,exington Cou11ty: Director-Wendy Jeffcoat.. '

Quintin Ivy Operational Coordination EOC Henry Christiansen Danny Loomis Public Information and Warning

,.Newberry,{:ounty:. Director~ Tomrny'.L9ng Gerald Mclemore Operational Coordination EOC Bob Princic Bill McDougall Public Information and Warning Schools (Pomaria-Garmany ES)

Gerald Mclemore Critical Transportation August 28, 2019@

1000 Ric4land

• Coin1ty: M~n.ager ""'}1ich~el Ka,lec:,,

\\, '

,{

Elizabeth Adkins EOC Robert Nash Operational Coordination Gary Goldberg Public Information and Warning Russell Bergmann (OJT) 53

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