ML20043C153

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 161 to License DPR-59
ML20043C153
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/24/1990
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20043C152 List:
References
NUDOCS 9006040131
Download: ML20043C153 (3)


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SAFETY. EVALUATION.BY.THE.0FFICE.0F NUCLEAR. REACTOR. REGULATION RELATED.TO.ANENDMENT.NO..isi..TO. FACILITY.0PERATING. LICENSE.WO. 0PR-59 POWER. AUTHORITY 0F.THE. STATE 0F.NEW. YORK JAMES A..FITZPATRICK. NUCLEAR POWER. PLANT

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INTRODUCTION By letter dated January 12, 1990 and amended by letter dated May 4, 1990, the

' Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY or the licensee) submitted an amendment for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The changes would remove two Traversing.

Incore Probe (TIP) penetrations, X-35A and X-35E, from the list of penetrations shown in Table 3.7-1, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves" and Table 4.7-2

" Exception.to Type C Tests." The only changes made to the original proposal in the May 4, 1990. letter reflected a change to the penetration numbers and a change -to the format of Table 4.7-2 to incorporate. changes approved previously in Amendment No. 150. These changes do not. affect the Notice and-proposed finding of no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register on March 7, 1990 (55 FR 8234) and which was based on the original submittal.

' EVALUATION Each of the four TIP channels consist of a detector attached to a-flexible drive cable so that the detector can be inserted and withdrawn from the reactor core and its axial position accurately determined. An indexing mechanism allows positioning of each detector at any one of ten core locations. The signal from a detector is used to periodically calibrate its associated Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) channel by correlating the TIP signal to the LPRM signal as the appropriate TIP detector, once inserted, is withdrawn from the core. The LPRM system, in turn, monitors reactor core power level and supplies signals to other nuclear instrumentation.

Since the drive mechanism for each of the four TIP channels is located outside of the primary containment, there are four primary containment penetrations for routing of the drive cable. Another penetration is used for the TIP purge

piping.

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o During the 1990 refueling outage, the four-channel TIP system is being replaced with a new three-channel TIP system which is expected to increase reliability, availability, and accuracy. Because of its design, the new TIP system will not require use of purge piping. As a result, one of the TIP penetrations (X-35A) and the purge penetration (X-35E)'are being capped and the TIP valves associated with them removed.

The remaining TIP penetrations are or will be labeled X-358 (TIP Machine A, t

Penetration Isolation Valves 07SOV-104A and 07EV-104A, X-350 (TIP Machine C, Penetration Isolation Valves 07S0V-104C and 06EV-104C, and X-35D (TIP Machine B, Penetration Isolation Valves 07S0V-104B and 07EV-104B. The proposal also changes the valve labels from NM (e.g., 07NM-104B) to 50V for " Solenoid Operated Valve" and EV for " Explosive Valve" to better identify the operation of the valves.

Following the modification, and as a scheduled outage test, the licensee will perform a Type A Primary Containment Leak Rate Test in accordance with Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 (with a visual inspection of the penetrations associated with this modification) prior to reactor startup to ensure that the penetration is intact.

SUMMARY

The modifications being made to the TIP system reduce the total number of primary containment isolation valves by four (two per penetration), which results in substitution of active components (valves) with passive barriers (seal-welded caps). Thus, the penetration will be more reliable. Also, the testing following modification, and routinely thereafter, will ensure continued reliability. Thus, the basis for the conclusions reached in the

. Final Safety Analysis Report and the Plant Safety Evaluation are not changed.

Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes are acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL. CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area t

as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in 1

the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no I

significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the L

eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9).

l Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

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,,. l CONCLUSION l

i We have' concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be i

endangered by operation in-the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: May 24, 1990 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:

l D. LaBarge

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