ML20043A281
| ML20043A281 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1990 |
| From: | Bertucio R, Brown S EI SERVICES, INC., SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-1228 NUREG-CR-4550, NUREG-CR-4550-V5R1P2, NUREG-CR-4550P2, SAND86-2084, NUDOCS 9005210142 | |
| Download: ML20043A281 (686) | |
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NUREG/CR-4550 t SAND 86-2084 Vol. 5, Rev.1, Part 2 Analysis of Core Damage Frequency: Secuoyan, L nit 1 Interna: Events Appencices l>repared by it. C. llertucio S.11. Ilrown Sandia National 1.aboratories ; l'repared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 90052.10142 DR 900430 ADDCK 05000327 PDR l k_ . __ ___a
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AVAILABILITY NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Pubicabons Most documents cited in NRC publications wat be avaRable from one of the following sources:
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NUREG/CR-4550 , SAND 86-2084 Voli-5, Rev.1, Part 2 - Analysis of t Core Damage: Frequency: ; Sequoyah, Unit 1 . 3 Internal Events Appendices , I 1 hlanuscript Completed: hlarch 1990-Date Published: April 1990 , Prepared by it. C. llertucio,* S.11. Ilrown* Program h1anager: A. L. Camp Principal Inve+4ipator: W !t. Cmmond Team 1.cader: IL C, llettucio*
' Sandia National Iaboratories Albuquerque, Nh187185
- E.1, Senicca Kent, WA 98031 ,
Prepared for Division of Systems Researeli
. Orlice of Nuclear Regulatory Researcli U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 h NRC FIN A1228 l} .
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1 ABSTRACT This' document contains the appendices for the accident sequence analyses of internally initiated events for the Sequoyah, Unit 1 nuclear power plant. This is one of the five plant analyses conducted as part of the NUREG 1150 effort by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREC 1150 documents the risk of a selected group of nuclear power plants. The work performed and described here is an extensive reanalysis of that published in February 1987 as NUREG/CR 4550, Volume 5. It addresses comments from numerous reviewers and significant changes to the plant . systems and procedures made since the first report. The uncertainty analysis and . presentation .of results are also much improved. The mean core damage frequency at Sequoyah was calculated to be 5.7E-5 per year, with a 95 percent upper bound of 1.8E 4 and 5 percent lower l bound of 1.2E 5 per year. Loss . of coolant type accidents were the' l largest contributors to-core damage frequency, . accounting for i approximately 62 percent of the total. The next most dominant type of j accidents were station blackout (loss of all AC power). .These sequences j account for 26 percent of core damage frequency. No - other type of i sequence accounts for more than 10 percent of core damage frequency. The numerical results are dominated by failure to initiate high pressure I recirculation due to operator error following loss of coolant-accidents. ' Considerable effort was expended on the modeling of very small-LOCAs and station blackout sequences, including the development of a reactor l' coolant pump seal IDCA model through elicitation of expert opinion. This report evaluates core damage frequency from internally initiated l events. The consequences of these accidents are evaluated and reported g under separate cover, j i
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1 I l l CONTENTS l l 8 1 s A. PIANT SPECIFIC THERMAL HYDRAULIC CALCULATIONS. . . . . . . . A-1 B. SEQUOYAH BOOLEAN EQUATIONS AND FAULT TREES . . . . . . . . . . .B 1 C. HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - DETAILED RESULTS........C-1 D. PLANT SPECIFIC ANALYSES.................... .........D 1 E. IMPORTANCE VALUES AND CUT SETS FOR THE DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES AND PIANT DAMACE STATE CROUPS. . . . .E r I. w v/vi A-
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% 4 FOREWORD This is one of numerous documents. that , support the preparation of the-NUREG 1150 document by: the NRC Office 1 of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
Figure 11 illus trates the front-end - documentationi There are three-interfacing programs at SandiaiNational Laboratories performing this work:' j the Accident' Sequence 1 Evaluation! Programi (ASEP), the Severe Accident Risk ! Reduction . Program l (SARRP), E and the Phenomenology. and Risk Uncertainty Evaluation ' Program : (PRUEP) . The Zion PRA was= performed at Idaho National 7. Engineering Laboratory and Brookhaven National Laboratory. Table 1 is a : list of the Loriginal primary documentation and f the corresponding revised documentation. There 1 are several' items that should. < 3 be noted. First, in the original:NUREG/CR 4550 report, Volume 2 was to be a summary of the internal analyses. 'This-report was deleted. In Revision-1,-Volume 2 - now is the expert judgment elicitation covering all plants. Volumes 3 and 4 include external events analyses for' . Surry and - Peach J Bottom, respectively. '
- The- revised NURE0/CR-4551 covers the analysis included : in the original NUREC/CR 4551 and- NUREG/CR-4700. However, it--is different from.NUREG/ crc 4550 in that the results from the expert judgment elicitation are given-in i
- zj four parts to Volume 2,with each part covering one category of issues. Thel accident progression ' event ~ trees are given in the appendices- for each of -
the plant analyses, q Originally, NUREG/CR-4550 was published without the . designation "Draf t for - d Comment." ;Thus, this revision of NUREG/CR 4550 is designated Revision: l'. 1 The label Revision 1 is used consistently on all volumes except Volume 2, which was - not part of the original documentation. NUREC/CR-45511was originally published as a " Draft for Comment" - so, in its ' final form, - no~ l Revision 1 - designator is required to distinguish it from : the- previous - ! documentatation. 1 1 There are everal other reports published in association with NUREC-1150, Y These are: :I l y NUREG/CR-5032. SAND 87-2428,.Modeling Time to Recovery and Initiating-Event Frer gy for loss of Off-site Power Incidents at Nuclear Power j l Plants,' R. L.;Iman and s S . C. Hora,' - Sandia National : Laboratories, Albuquerque, hM, January 1988. i NUREG/CR 4840, SAND 88-3102, Recommended Procedures for External'EventL l Risk Analyses - for NUREG-1150, M. P. ~ Bohn and J. A. Lambright, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, November 1989. I a I L} { vil
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1 Table 1. l- NUREC-1150 Analysis Documentation Oririnal Documentation NUREC/CR-4550 NUREC/CR-4551 NUREC/CR-4700 Analysis of Core Damage Frequency Evaluation of Severe Accident Containment Event Analysis From Internal Events Risks and the Potential for for Potential Severe Accidents Risk Reduction Volume 1 Methodology Volume 1 Surry Unit 1 Volume 1 Surry Unit 1 2 Summary (Not Published) 2 Sequoyah Unit 1 2 Sequoyah Unit 1 3 Surry Unit 1 3 Peach Botton Unit 2 3 Peach Botton Unit 2 4 Peach Botton Unit 2 4 Crand Gulf Unit 1 4 Crand Culf Unit 1 5 'Sequoyah Unit 1 5 Zion Unit 1 6 Crand Culf Unit 1 7 Zion Unit 1 Revfsed Documentation NUREC/CR-4550. Revision 1 NUREC/CR-4551. Evaluation g Analysis of Core Damage Frequency of Severe Accident Risks x Volume 1 Methodology Volume 1 Methodology 2 Part 1 Expert' Judgment Elicit. Expert Panel 2 Part 1 Expert ' Judgment Elicit.--In-vessel Part 2 Expert Judgment Elicit.--Project Staff Part 2 Expert Judgment Elicit.--Containment 3 Part 1 Surry Unit 1 Internal Events Part 3 Expert Judgment Elicit.--Structural Part 2 Surry Unit 1 Internal Events App. Part 4 Expert Judgment Elicit.--Source-Term Part 3 Surry Unit 1 External' Events Part 5 Expert Judgment Elicit.--Supp. Calc. 4 Part 1 Peach Botton Unit 2 Internal Events -Part 6 Expert Judgment Elicit.--Proj. Staff Part 2 Peach Botton Unit 2 Internal Events App. Part 7 Expert Judgment Elicit.--Supp. Calc. Part 3 Peach Botton Unit 2 External Events Part 8 Expert Judgment Elicit.--MACCS Input 5 Part 1 Sequoyah Unit 1 Internal Events 3 Part 1 Surry Unit 1 Anal. and Results Part 2 Sequoyah Unit 1-Internal Events App. Part 2 Surry Unit 1 Appendices 6 Part 1 Crand Gulf Unit 1 Internal Events 4 Part 1 Peach Rotton Unit 2 Anal. and Results-Part 2 Crand Culf Unit 1 Internal Events App. Part 2 Peach Botton Unit 2 Appendices 7 Zion Unit l' Internal Events 5 Part I fequoyah Unit 2 Anal. and Results Part 2 Sequoyah Unit 2 Appendices 6 Part 1 Crand Gulf Unit 1 Anal. and Results Part 2 Crand Culf Unit 1 Appendices 7 Part 1 Zion Unit 1 Anal. and Results.. Past 2 Zion Unit 1 Appendices
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t s NUREG/CR 4772, SAND 86-1996,. Accident Seouence Evaluation Program
. Human = Relinbili ty : Analys is ' Procedure , A; i D. , Swain ~ III, . Sandia National 1 Laboratories, Albuquerque,:NM,'. February 1987.
NUREG/CR 5263,- 1 SAND 88 3100, The Risk Mananement J 7yplications of NUREG 1150 Methods and Resu11.E. A'. C ; Camp et al. .::Sandia National .
. Laboratories', Albuquerque, NM,-December.1988.; ,
~
A Human Reliabflity-Analysis for the ATWS Accident Seauence with MSIV= m
- Closure at the Peach Bottom Atomic Pcwer Station,iA-3272g W; J.
Luckas, Jr. et al,,;Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, .NY,1986.
' As brief 4 flow ~ chart for L the ! documentation ' is given - in- Figure 2; 'Anyg q
related supporting.- documents .to the- back-end NUREG/CR 4551 analyses are ' delineated' in NUREC/CR-4551; A complete listL of ithe revised .NUREG/CR-4550, volumes and parts-.is given'belowi q General NUREG/CR 4550, Volume l, Revision (1,g SAND 86-2084',-j Analysis Eof Core - 03 mane Frecuencv!'-Methodolony Guidelines for Internal Eventsc
~ NUREG/CR-4550, LVolumei 2, . S AND86 2084,i " Analysi s of' Core Damane '
'Freauency from ' Internal Events: Expert Judement Elicitation on?
Internal Events ' Issues - Part 1: Expert Panel Results: Part 2: , Proiect Staff Results. ,l Parts 'I and 2 of Volume 2, NUREG/CR-4550 are bound. together, Thisnvolume was not part of L the original documentation ~ and was fitst ' published [ini
- April 1989. and distributed in .May 1989 with the ; title: ' Analysis of Core Damage Frequency - from Internal Events: Expert - Judgmen t - Elicitation. In ,
retrospect, a more . descriptive title: would. be:1 Analysis of Core Damage -- Frequency: Expert Judgment Elicitation'on Internal. Events Issues.- l A k Surry NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 3, Revision 1, Part l', SAND 86-208/4,'Ahalvsis of'
,j Core Damage Freauency: Surry Unit 1 Internal Events;
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NUREG/CR-4550; Volume-3, Revision 1,.Part 2,' SAND 86J2084,LAnalysis of > Core-Damane Frenuenev: Surry Unit 1 -Internal Events Anoendices . NUREC/CR-4550, Volume 3, Revision 1, Part 3,, SAND 86-2084, Ana10 sis of- 1
~ Core Damane Frecuencv!- Surry Unit 1 External Events.
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I Li FRONT-END ANALYSIS BACK-END ANALYSIS . NUREC/CR-4550 NUREC/CR-4551 REVISION 1 FIANT DANACE STATE FREQUENCIES SE()tf0TAH ACCIDENT FROGRESSION SEQUOTAH : UNIT I UNIT I & MISr. REDUCTION AND AND RISK UNCERTAINTY NEASURES I I I _ NUREC/CR-4550 REVISION 1 l VOL.1 NETNODOIDCT l BACK-END SUFFORT
.l DOCUMENTATION e
l _ NURES/CR-4550 REVISION 1 l_ g VOL. 2 EXPERT OFINION ,$URRY (
,MAEN SSTign NUREC-
_ NUREC/CR-5032 ISSF 1150 ,5E000 TAN 1E FREQ AND RECOVERf .CRAND_.CUIE y ZION _ NUREC/CR-4772 NRA FROCEDtfRES b Figure 2. Sequoyah Related Documentation. _ _ _ _ . +-
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Peach Bottom NUREC/Cb4697' EGG 2464, Coneainment Venting Analvsf s for the Peach-Bottom Atomic Power Station, . D. J. Hansen et al.,-Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (EG60 Idaho, Inc.) February 1987. ) NUREC/CR-4550, Volumo 4 Revision 1,-Part 1, SAND 86 2084, Analysis of Core Damage Freauency: Peach Bottom Unit 2 Internal Events. NUREG/CR 4550, Volume 4, Revision 1, Part 2, SAND 86-2084,-Analysis of Core Damage Freauencv Peach Bottom Unit 2 Internal Events Avoendices. NUREG/CR 4550, Volume 4 Revision 1, Part 3,' SAND 86 2084, Analysis of Core Damage Frecuency; Peach Bottom Unit 2 External Events.. Seouovah. NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 5, Revision 1, Part 1, SAND 86-2084, Analysis of Core'Damare Frecuencv! Seauovah Unit 1 Internal Events, NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 5. Revision 1, Part 2, SANDE6 2084, Analysis of Gore Damare Freauenev: Seauovah Unit 1 Internal Events Annendices, b Crand Gulf NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 6 Revision 1, Part 1. SAND 86-2084 Analysis of Core Damace Frecuencv! Grand Gulf Unit 1 Internal Events, t NUREG/CR 4550, Volume 6, Revision 1, Part 2, SAND 86 2084, Analysis of Core Damare Freauency: Grand Gulf Unit 1 Internal Events Annendices. Zion NUREC/CR-4550, Volume 7, Revision 1, EGG-2554, ' Analysis of Core Damare Freauency! Zion Unit 1 Internal Events', 1 i l l xil
' w ,,., . -- - - __ _ _ F APPENDIX A r PLANT SPECIFIC TilERMAL llYDRAULIC CALCULATIONS r [
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n i Table of Contents i Page Section 1 A.1 Estimation of Break Size Leading to Spray initiation A-3
. a t Sequoy ah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
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l '. e e A-?2
y l i A. PLANT SPECIFIC THERMAL HYDRAULIC CALCULAT!ONS This appendix describes the plant specific thermal hydraulic calculations performed in the revised Sequoyah probabilistic risk assessment. There were two important thermal hydraulle analyses perfomed for this study.- A description and summary of one of these , calculations was not available for this draft publication. It will be included in the final report.: The two analyses are briefly described below. A.1 Estimation of Break Size Leading to Spray Initiation at Sequoyah An-important relationship in the Sequoyah analysis is the rate of pressure rise in the lower compartment of the con;ainment for various LOCA break sizes. This determines when containment sprays will come on, how often they will reactivate if terminated, and thus determine the time for RWST depletion. Analysis was perfomed by Sandia to determine pressure rise in the lower compartment versus break size. The analysis is shown on the following pages. ! A-3
i t ESTIMATION OF BREAK S1ZE LEADING TO SPRAY INITIATION AT SEQUOYAH A. L. Camp and L. N. Smith i March 31, 1986 o Introductiqu ' The' Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP)'is performing One of the plants'being several Level 1 PRAs for the NRC. evaluated is the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, which is a Westinghouse 4-loop PWR with an ice-condenser containment;
~
Preliminary analyses have indicated that one of the dominant sequences is a small-break LOCA accompanied by failure of core cooling in the recirculation mode - S2H. In this analysis, t' the S2 initiator includes all breaks two inches and smaller. The preliminary analysis assumes that all.S2 sequences will~ yield a containment pressure above the set point for the-containment sprays. The significance of this assumption is that-it leads to early depletion of the refueling water storage tank, resulting in the need for early switchover to recirculation cooling. It is possible that for breaks significantly smaller than two. inches this assumption is erroneous, and that.a much' if it longer time is available before If the recirculation sprays do not is initiate required, early will be required at all. for a majority of the sequences now included in the S2H
~
category, then the core-melt frequency could be significantly reduced. The purpose of the analysis below is to determine the
- break size below which the initiation of sprays is unlikely.
Containment Description The general arrangement of the Sequoyah containment is shown in Figure 1. The reactor coolant system is located in the lower compartment. During an accident, pressurization due to blowdown from khe reactor coolant system causes the ice-condenser doors ;' to open and gases to flow from the lower compartment through the ice condenser to the dome. As the gases flow through the ice regions, they are cooled and steam is condensed, thereby limiting containment pressurization. The ice condenser is essentially a cold-storage room shaped The in the form of a "C" with approximately 300 degrees of arc. inside radius is 16 m, the outside radius is 20 m,_and the-height is about 24 m. It consists of three basic regions: the lower plenum, the ice region, and the upper plenum. The normally closed lower plenum inlet doors open upon slight pressurization in the lower compartment, allowing gasesice to flow through the lower plenum and into the ice region. TheGases flow - region contains perforated baskets filled with ice. out of the ice region to the upper plenum via the intermediate deck doors. These doors close under the force of gravity to prevent downward flow, but open due to pressurization from below l-A-4 L
- w l
l Lo allow upward flow. An additional set of lightweight doors ! are located =at the top of the upper plenum. Two recirculation fans are present to maintain forced circulation from the lower compartment through'the ice condenser to the dome. The fans are actuated upon receipt of a high i J containment pressure-signal. As the fans receive this signal at-the same time-as the sprays, they will have no influence on this analysis, The containment spray system provides long-term containment heat removal; .The sprays are injected via spray rings at the top of the dome. The water drains to the refueling canal, where two- 7 drains in the bottom of the canal allow the water to drain to the recirculut 4ea sump. The spray water initially comes from the refueling water storage tank. The sprays are actuated upon a pressure signal of 2.81 paid.(19.37 kPa) in the lower portion of containment. Significant flow is assumed to occur within-30 s. Computational Method 1 The calculations presented below were obtained using two computer codes, MARCON 2.0 and HECTR 1.5 (Refs. 1 and 2). MARCON 2.0 is a combination of the MARCH and CORCON codes and is used to generate the steam and liquid' source terms into containment. The MARCON S2H calculations assume that injection works, the sprays are not actuated, and recirculation fails. By not actuating the sprays,.the time to core damage.is maximised. Reactor trip and start of injection were assumed to occur at time zero. In all cases the break elevation is assumed to be 16 ft (5 m) above the bottom of the active fuel. The break size is varied parametrically downward from two inches. The shortcomings in MARCH are well known and there is uncertainty in the calculations of mass and enthalpy flow out the break (Ref. 3). Thus, it may be more appropriate to correlate the containment response with the calculated flow rate, rather than with the break size. While MARCON produced predictions of containment response, HECTR was used to provide more detailed, mechanistic calculations. The HECTR containment model used for this calculation is shown in Figure 2. A sixteen compartment model was employed, including the dome (1), two upper plenum (2 and 3) and two lower plenum (4 and 5) compartments, two lower compartments (6 and-7), the dead-ended region (8), and eight ice compartments (9 through 16). The ice condenser is represented by 12 compartments. Compartments 2 and 3 each represent half of the upper plenum, compartments 4 and 5 each represent half of the lower plenum, and compartments 9 through 16 are eight equal volumes containing ice. The compartments are arranged as two adjacent stacks with. .- compartments 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 2 comprising one stack and compartments 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 3 comprising the other A-5
stack. Crossflow between adjacent compartments in the two stacks is modeled. Volume changes due.to ice melting are modeledzin each compartment as well as heatup of the water falling through the lower plenum. Two sumps are included in the model. One is' located in the lower plenum and collects water from the ice condenser. This sump overflows into the recirculation sump in the two, lower compartments (6-and 7). The sump models allow conservation of' . both water inventory and gas volume within containment'. Some of the flow junctions.are also shown_in Figure 2. Junctions 3 and 4 represent the two floor drains. Flow through these junctions, bypassing the ice-condenser, was allowed until the lower compartment sump volume exceeded 750 m8, _ thereby blocking the drains. The calculations are continued either to the point of core damage or until the sprays actuate, The sprays are assumed to actuate when the pressure anywhere in containment' exceeds 122.694 kPa. This value is 19.374 kPa (2.81 psi) above the initial pressure in compartment 8, where the pressure sensors are assumed to be located. In these calculations the pressure remains ~ fairly uniform throughout containment.- In all-cases-the break is assumed to be located in compartment 6. Similar
-results would be obtained if the break were located in.
compartment 7; however, different results may occur for' breaks in compartment 8 For more information on the modeling approach and results obtained for other accident sequences irt ice-condenser containments, see References 2, 4, and-5. Results The results of the MARCON and HECTR analyses are presented in Table 1 and in Figures 3 and 4. Both break size and flow rate-are indicated in the table. As shown_in Figures 5 and 6 for the steam and liquid injection rates (after flashing), the MARCON source terms generally produce.an initial peak, followed by a fairly steady-state (nominal) flow. Table IJshows both the peak and nominal values, where these values are the sum of the steam and liquid flow rates. Note that the sprays were never-actuated during the initial peak in these calculations. .In all cases, both codes predicted that the sprays would trip, but with-significant differences in the timing. This does not reflect large differences in the predicted pressure response, however, as the pressure profile is relatively flat and small pressure differences translate into significant differences in timing. This effect is seen more clearly below in the sensitivity studies. Sensitivity Studies The uncertainties in any analysis of containment response are significant and must be considered when decisions are based on code predictions. If we restrict ourselves to the consideration A-6
l of containment response given a particular source input, then there are a few key areas to consider. The areas of most uncertainty are the nodalisation used and the modeling of heat and mass transfer. Uncertainties in the latter include the mass and surface area of available heat sinks, as well as the i modeling approach. Uncertainty in the pressure transmitter I response-is also important, but will not be considered here. ' Several variationa of case 1 (2 in. break) were calculated with HECTR to try to understand the sensitivities. The first 4 sensitivity study used a more detailed nodalization (40 volumes)- than in the base case. This nodalization is described in detail in Reference 5. The next two calculations increased and decreased all of the heat transfer coefficients by factors of
- 5. Finally., the last calculation precluded any gas flow through the drains (junctions 3 and 4),
The results of these calculations are presented in Table 2 and Figure 5. As can be seen, the predicted pressure responses do not differ greatly, compared to the changes in the input parameters. However, the impact on timing can be important. Conclusions The calculations that we have performed indicate that the sprays will probably trip for most small LOCAs. The sensitivity-studies indicate that there is uncertainty in the timing of the trip, but that the end result is that trip will-occur. While these results have generally negative implications,.it appears that some relatively simple changes could prevent spray trip for small LOCAs should that be desirable. First, the relatively slow pressure rise indicates that increasing the setroint only a few psi would probably prevent trip. Second, if the_ fans were activated before the sprays, a significant reduction in pressure would result, delaying or preventing spray trip. This effect can be seen in the calculations presented-in ' Reference 4. However, there are many other factors to consider before recommending such changes. References
- 1. C. J. Shaffer, et al., "MARCON - Development and Application to Containment Loading Calculations, NUREG/CP-0057. Twelfth Water Reactor Safety Research Information Meeting, Gaithersburg, Md., October 1984.
- 2. S. E. Dingman, et al., HECTR Version 1.5 User's Manual, NUREG/CR-4507, SAND 86-0101, Sandia National Laboratories, Draft, February 1986.
- 3. J. B. Rivard, ed, Interim Technical Assessment of the MARCH QpAs, NUREG/CR-2285, SAND 81-1672, Sandia National Laboratories, 1981, A-7 I
f
- 4. A. L. Camp. V. L. Behr, and F. E. Haskin, MARCH-HECTR "
Analysis of Selected Accidents in an Ice-Condenser Containment, NUREG/CR-3912, SAND 83-0501, Sandia National Laboratories, December 1984.
- 5. S. E. Dingman and A. L. Camp, " Pressure-Temperature Response-in an Ice-Condenser Containment for Selected' Accidents,"
SAND 85-18240. Thirteenth Water Reactor Safety Research ' Information Hecting, Gaithersburg, Md., October 1985. d r A-8
t 9 TABLE 1 - RESULTS - Break Size Flow Rate.(kg/s) Time to Trip (s) Case (in) (m)- Peak Nominal HECTR MARCH
- 1. 2 .0508 164 96 169.7 102, t
- 2. 1 .0254 42 32 1131.1 1032.6 >
3, 3/4 .0191 26 22- 1761.2 2314.2 '
- 4. 1/2 .0127 12 11 3636.7 6589.8 :
- 5. 3/8 .0095 33 7 6771.1 14105.4 TABLE 2'- SENSITIVITY STUDIES (Variations on Case 1)
Case Description Time to Trio (s) S1- 40 Volume-Containment Nodalization 248.1' S2 All Heat Transfer Rates Increased by a Factor of 5 217.0 S3 All Heat-Transfer Rates Decreased by a Factor of 5 149.5 S4 Gas Flow Through Floor Drains Precluded 238,0 E i l' l A-9
S'E_OY:- S"R Y RES "S 16000 . . . . . , .
, . . .[... ;
O- HECTR 14000 --.O O. -MARCH - 12000 - - n
- 10000 - -
CL m tr H 8000 - - - i L o g , L.3 l; E 6000 - - - m l 4000 - - - 2000 - - - w - 0- ' ' 0 20 40 60 80 100 NOMINRL FLOW RATE [KGl5)
-1 A-10
1
.C ?r 9VC_ CDD V DTC em e J Le J1 J. \ 1 T s J s .-.0 16000- , ,, ,, ,, , , ,,. , ,, , ,.. ,.'. .
E 0- HECTR 14000 - - g 0 - MARCH . 12000 - - - Cn 10000 - - - Q_ i M ! Q:: ! H 8000 - - - o ' H l W i I 6000 - - - H I l 4000 - - - j i i 2000 - - - j 0 : : ,: l: : : l: : : : l: : : : v: : : . 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 BRERK SIZE (IN) A-ll
- ) .
r 4 f APPENDIX B f SEQUOYAH BOOLEAN EQUATIONS AND J FAULT TREES S B-1
.i
Table of Contents Page section Boolean Equations B-4 < B.1 Summary of Fault Tree Headings B-10 ; B.2 Front-line' System Fault' Trees B-13 B.2.1
-- Accumulator System (ACC) B-14 i
-- Auxiliary Feedwater System' - ( ATH2 ] B-15 (AFW3] B-27
-- Charging System B-29
-- Injection Mode (CHI]
B-35
-- Recirculation Mode (CHR]
---Containment Spray System (CSSCHR] B-44
-- Injection Mode (CSI] B-54
-- Recirculation Mode (CSR] B-57 :
-- Low Pressure. System
-- Injection Mode (LPI] B-64 :
-- Recirculation Mode B-68 -
-- Cold Leg (LPCHR] )
-- Hot Leg (LPHOT] B-77
-- Safety Injection System
-- Injection Mode (SIINJ) B-78
-- Recirculation Mode (SIREC]- B -- Charging Mode (SICH] B-88 Support System Fault Trees B-96 B.2.2
-- Component Cooling Water System (CCW-20] B-97
-(CCW-23] B-98
-- Electrical Power System (EPS-1AA) B-99
[EPSSIA1A] B-100 (EPSS1A2A] B-101- [EPS-1A1A] B-102 (EPS-1A2A]' B-103
.[EPSC1A1A] B-104 .
[EPS-DCI] B-105' [EPS-1BB] B-106- [EPSSIB1B] B-107 (EPSSIB2B] B-108-(EPS-1B1B] B-109 (EPS-1B2B] B-110 , ( (EPSC1B1B] B-111' j B-112 [EPS-DCII]
,i B-2 ,
Table of Contents (cont'd) , 1 Section Pace ;
-- Service Water System (SWS-1) B-113 (SWS-2) B-114 ,
(SWS-3) B-115 ; (SWS-4) B-118 (SWS-5) .B-121 r (SWS-8) B-122 [SWS-9) B-123 B.2.3 Event Tree Identifier Fault Trees B-124 1
-- Event D 3 (D3) B-125 t
-- Event L for SGTR sequences- (L-SGTR) B-116
-- Event O D (OD) B-137'
-- Event O D for SGTR sequences (OD-SGTR) B-141
-- Event W .(CCW-40) B-144
-- Event W 1 (W1) B-145 4
i t l l B-3
)
W B.. SEQUOYAH BOOLEAN EQUATIONS AND FAULT TREES This appendix (1) documents the Boolean equations used in this
' analysis and (2) presents the Sequoyah fault trees created for:
(a)_ front-line systems, (b) support systems, and (c) event tree identifiers. The fault tree _ names are found in the upper right hand corner of each printout and denoted by brackets in-the Table { of' Contents. B.1 Boolean Ecuations L8BO--Failure of auxiliary feedwater (BBO secuences oniv). Event LSBO is failure of the AFW turbine driven pump (AFWTDP) to Therefore, L ggo
. start and supply water to 2/4 steam generators.-
is dominanted by_ single failures of components in the AFWTDP train. QD --Operator fails to cooldown and dooressurize RCS.. The following Boolean equation was developed for OD 09= (RCS-XHE-DPRZCLDN) + (IAS-PTF-LF-AOV) + (RCS-CCF-CC-340BD
- CHP-AOV-CC-6284
- P1-SGTR)'
where P1-SGTR is a developed event for failure of 1 of 2~PORVs to open. That is,
+
OD= (Operator fails to cooldown and depressurize) (Loss of IAS to the MSS AOVs) + [(Common cause failure of the pressurizer spray. valves)~* (Failure of auxiliary spray) (Failure of 1/2 PORV trains to open)). Using a cut set cut off probability of 1E-7, the above OD equation reduced to:
-(RCS-XHE-DPRZCLDN) + (IAS-PTF-LF-AOV).
Note that SG water inventory is required and available for all events questioning OD* QC -BGTR--ODerator fails to cooldown and deDressurize RCS during HSTR. ' V L As with event 09, the Boolean equation-for O -SGTRD reduced to (RCS-XHE-DPRZ-TSG) + (IAS-PTF-LF-AOV). B-4 l
4 h Eg--Failure of 2/2 PORV trains to oDen-for feed and bleed. P1'= (Insufficient flow through PPS train'A) + (Insufficient flow through PPS train B) + Y (Failure of operator to open PORVs for feed and bleed). I
= ((Block valve. closed prior to initiator due to leaking PORV)
* ((Block valve-fails to open) +
(Loss of AC power to block valve) + (Plugged block valve))) !
+ [(PORV fails to open on demand) +f
.{
(Loss of DC power to PORV)] + (PPS train-B--block valve and PORV failures) + [ Operator error).
= ((PPS-MOV-FC-332 * (PPS-MOV-FT-332 + ACP-TAC-LP-1BlB +
PPS-MOV-PG-332)) + (PPS-SOV-FT-340A +-DCP-TDC-LP-I)):+ ; [(PPS-MOV-FC-333 * (PPS-MOV-FT-333 + ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A + PPS-MOV-PG-333)) + (PPS-SOV-FT-334 + DCP-TDC-LP-II)) + HPI-XHE-FO-FDBLD. P1-80TR--Failure of 1/2 PORV trains to oDen (q.develooed event t for O D and OD-SGTR). P1-SGTR = (Insufficient flow through PPS train A) * (Insufficient flow through PPS-train B) + Operator error +
={ ((Block valve closed prior to initiator due to leaking PORV) *
((Block valve fails to open).+ (Loss of AC power .to block valve)' + (Common cause failure of block valves) + . (Plugged block valve))] + [(PORV fails to open on demand) + (Loss of DC power to PORV) )
- B-5
[PPS train B--block valve and PORV failures) + (Common cause failure of PORVs to open)) + 1 (Operator error). P1-80TR--Failure of 1/2 PORV trains to open fa developed event for.OD and OD -SGTR) (cont'd).
= [(PPS-MOV-FC-332 * (PPS-MOV-FT-332 + ACP-TAC-LP-1B1B +
PPS-CCF-FT-3233 + PPS-MOV-PG-332)) + (PPS-SOV-FT-340A + DCP-TDC-LP-I)) [(PPS-MOV-FC-333 * '(PPS-MOV-FT-333 + ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A + PPS-CCF-FT-3233 + PPS-MOV-PG-333)) + (PPS-SOV-FT-334 + 5 DCP-TDC-LP-II)] + PPS-CCF-FT-PORV + RCS-XHE-DPRZCLDN.- P2 --Failure of crimary Dressure relief for RTW81 + 2/3 SRVs or 2/3 SRVs and 2/2'PORVs. P2=A+ (B
- C) where A = (Failure of 2/3 SRVs to open on demand)
=
(SRV
- BETA-SRV + SRVI
- SRV2 + SRV2
- SRV3 +
SRVII
- SRV3)
B = .(Foilure of~any 1 SRV to open on demand)
= SRV1 + SRV2 + SRV3.
C= (Failure of 2/2 PORVs to open on demand)
= (PORV1 + PORV2) + (PORV-BLK) * '
[(Block valve fails to open) + (Loss of AC power to block valve) + (Operator fails to open block valve)=). QSBO--Failure of any PORV to reclose (BBO secuences only). QSBO'= (DEM-SBO) * ((Train A-PORV fails to reclose) + (Train B PORV fails to reclose))
= PPS-SOV-OO-334
- DEM-SBO + PPS-SOV-OO-34 0A * - DEM-SBO where DEM-SBO =
(Prob of high reactor power)
- 9E-01 * >
l-B-6
1s l 1 l [1-(1-ProbPORVisnog) (PORV demand)/2. [1 - (1 - SE-01) blocked)2)** (3E-01)/2 therefore, DEM-SBO = 1.3E-1. Og--Failure of aDy POHVV to reclost. Og = [(DEMAND) * (PORV fails to reclose) * ((Loss of AC power to block valve) + (Block valve fails to reclose) + (Operator fails to closo , block valve))) + (same for opposite train) Where DEMAND = (Prob of high reactor power) * [1 - (1 - Prob PORV is not blocked)2) * (PORV demand)/2. That is, Q1 = (DEMAND
- PPS-SOV-OO-334 *
(ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A + PPS-MOV-OO-333 + PPS-MOV-TC-OPERA)) + (DEMAND
- PPS-SOV-OO-340A * (ACP-TAC-LP-1B1B +
PPS-MOV-OO-322 + PPS-MOV-FC-OPERA)). Table B-1 summarizes the values used for Q i in various sequences. Q2 --Failure of any SRV or PORV to reclose (ATWS seguences on1yl. Q2= (Failure of 3/3 SRVs to reclose) + 3(3E-2) + (Failure of 2/2 PORVs to reclose) * (Prob PORV is not blocked) 2(3E-2) (.8) therefore, Q2 = 1.4E-01. Qg--Failure of steam cenerator intecrity. Og = [(Prob ADV is blocked) * (Prob SV is demanded given blocked ADV) * (Prob SV fails to reclose) * (Number of SVs demanded)) + ((Prob ADV is'not blocked) * (Prob SV is demanded given ADV is operable)
- D-7
l
* (Number of SVs demanded)) +
(Prob'SV fails to reclose) * ((Prob ADV is. demanded)
* (Prob ADV is not blocked) f (Prob ADV fails to reclose)) + (Prob SG blowdown-line '
i fails.to close), Therefore, for successful 0 9, Og equals-QS-1 = [ PROB-ADV-BLOCKED
- DEM-SV1 *' MSS-SRV-TT-SV
- SV! !
[ PROB-ADV-NOTBLCK'* DEM-SV2 *. MSS-SRV-TT-SV
- SV):!+
[DEM-ADV1
- MSS-A0V-NOTBLOCK
- MSS-SRV-TT-ADV) + .
[ MSS-A0V-FT-SGBL) ',! and if OD fails, Qg equals QS-2 = [ PROB-ADV-BLOCKED
- DEM-SV3
- MSS-SV-0DFAILS * . Si '
- MSS-SV-0DFAILS
- SV) +
(PROB-ADV-NOTBLCK
- DEM-SV4 i f
[DEM-ADV2
- MSS-A0V-NOTBLOCK
- MSS-SRV-FT-ADV) +
[ MSS-A0V-FT-SGBL). l f I r
- d. -
P Y Y t i e i l, s j B-8
-i
Table B-1 Summary of Values Used in the Calculation of Q1 and Qs PORY Equation Sequence PORY Demand Operator error. Name Type Identifier PORY Calculation Value Identifier Value QlA T,T2 1 DEMA .9 * .96 * .1
- 1/2 4.3E-2 PPS-MOV-FC-OPERA 2.7E-3 T DCX Q1B T3 DEMB .9 * .96 * .014
- 1/2 6.1E-3 PPS-MOV-FC-OPERB 2.7E-3
? _ ~ . -.. . _ . - . _ _ . . . _ . . . _ . . s.._, . . . _ . , _ _ . . . _
i l B.2. Summmary of Fault Tree Headinas Front-line &vstems Accumulator ACC-1 Failure to deliver accumulator injection flow through 3/3 intact cold legs. Auxiliary Feedwater AF-1 Failure to provide AFW to 2/4 SGs from 1/3 AFW pumps. AF-1A For ATWS only: Failure to pro-vide AFW to 3/4 SGs from 2/2 AFW MDPs or 1 AFW TDP. Charging
-Injection CH-1 Failure to provide HPI from 1/2 charging pumps (cps) with suction from the RWST.
For ATWS only: Failure to pro-vide emergency boration from 1/2 cps with suction from the RWST.
-Recirculation CH-21 Failere to provide HPR from 1/2 cps with suction from RHR pump discharge. ,
l Containment F Insufficient cooling flow to both Spray CSS spray headers.
-Injection CSI Insufficient cooling flow to both CSS spray headers via the RWST. ; -Recirculation CSR Insufficient cooling flow to both f
CSS spray headers via the containment sump. Low Pressure
-Injection LP-1 Failure to provide LPI from 1/2 LP pumps with suction from the RWST. -necirculation --Cold Log LPR-1 Failure to provide LPR with 1/2 LP pumps with suction from the containment sump.
l l --Hot Log LPH-1 For A, Sgt Same criteria as LPR-1 with the additional requirement that flow is delivered to the RCS hot legs. l B-10
l ' Safety Injection
-Injection SI-1 Failure to provide HPI from 1/2 j SI pumps with suction from the a RWST. -Recirculation SI-10 Failure to provide HPR from 1/2 1 SI pumps with suction from LPR pump discharge. -Charging D?
For S1: Failure to provide HPI from any 2 of 4 cps or SI pumps with suction from the RWST. EMER2rt 8vsteER Component Cooling Water CCW-20 Insufficient cooling flow from CCW-23 CCW PS337 and CCW PS356. These top events are used to link CCW to developed events in front-line system fault trees. Electrical Power EPS AC and DC subsystems were modeled in a fault tree repre-sentation of Unit 1 electrical boards. All EPS top events are used to link EPS to developed events in front-line system fault trces. AC power unavailable-- , EPS-1AA ACP-TAC-LP-1AA 6.9kV Shutdown Bd 1A-A and 1B-B. - EPS-1BB ACP-TAC-LP-1BB EPSSIA1A ACP-TAC-LP-S1A1A 480V Shutdown Bd 1Al-A and 1A2-A. EPSSIA2A ACP-TAC-LP-SIA2A EPSSIB1B ACP-TAC-LP-S1B1B 480V Shutdown Bd 1B1-B and ID2-B. EPSSIB2B ACP-TAC-LP-S1B2B EPS-1A1A ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A 480V Reactor MOV Bd 1Al-A and 1A2-A. EPS-1A2A ACP-TAC-LP-1A2A Electrical Power (cont'd) EPS-1B1B ACP-TAC-LP-1B1B 480V Reactor MOV Bd 1B1-B and 1B2-B. EPS-1B2B ACP-TAC-LP-1B2B EPSC1A1A ACP-TAC-LP-C1A1A 480V Cab Vent Bd 1Al-A and ibl-B. EPSC1B1B ACP-TAC-LP-C1B1B EPS-DCI DCP-TDC-LP-I 125V Vital Bus I and II. EPS-DCII DCP-TDC-LP-II B-11
Service Water All of the SWS top events are used to link SWS to developed events in front-line system fault trees. SWS-1 Insufficient flow to SWS PS163. SWS-2 Insufficient flow to SWS PS175. SWS-3 Insufficient flow from SWS PS162. SWS-4 Insufficient flow to SWS PS155. SWS-5 Insufficient flow from SWS PS176. SWS-8 Insufficient flow through SWS PS115. SWS-9 Insufficient flow through SWS PS116. Event Tree Identifiers D3 D3 Failure of seal injection to RCPs from 1/2 charging trains. . L-SGTR AF-1 Failure of 1/3 AFW pumps to provide AFW to 2/3 intact SGs. I OD OD Failure of the' operator.to cooldown and depressurize RCS with 2/4 SGs, or Power Conversion System. , OD-SGTR OD-SGTR Failure of the operator to cooldown and depressurize RCS with 2/3 SGs. W CCW-40 Loss of CCW to RCP thermal barrier heat exchangers. W1 LPR-1 1/2 RHR loops-in shutdown cooling mode. l B-12
B.2.1 Front-line System Fault Trees
-- Accumulator System (AcC) B-14
-- Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW2) B-15 l
1 [AFW3] B-27 I
-- Charging System
-- Injection Mode (CHI) B-29 l
-- Recirculation Mode (CHR) B-35
-- Containment Spray System (CSSCHR) B-44
-- Injection Mode (CSI) i B-54 '
-- Recirculation Mode (CSR) B-57
-- Low Pressure System
-- Injection Mode
-- Recirculation Mode (LPI) B-64
-- Cold Leg B-68
-- Hot Leg (LPCHR)
(LPHOT) B-77
-- Safety Injection System
-- Injection Mode
-- Recirculation Mode (SIINJ) B-78
-- Charging Mode (SIREC) B-81 (SICH) B-88 i
i i B-13 i
fA4L 10 Tree: ACC KLIVER FLOW THRU Project: SES 3/3 INTACT COLD Page 1 of 1 im Date Lost Modified: ACC-1 Thu Jul 07 08:26:52 1995 ki , . FAILURE 10- FAILURE 10 FAILURE 10 DELIVER FLOW FROM KLIVER FLOW FROM KLIVER FLOW FROM kCruMULATOR No. 1 4CCUMULATOR #0. 3 LCCUMULAtot me. 2 , ACC-2 ACC-4 ACC-3 a Page 1 ACC FCV 63-11 F mCC CV 63-622 >CC cv 63-560 LCC FCv 63-98 mCC CV 63-623 nCC cv 63-561 PLUGGED FAILS TO OPEN FAILS To (FE4 PLUGGED FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN ACC-Mov-PG-63118 ACC-CKV-CC-63622 ACC-CEV-CC-63560 ACC-MOV-PG-6396 ACC-Crv-CC-63623 ACC-tKV-CC-63561 Q 6.5E-006 Q .1.0E-006 - Q 1.0E-006 Q 6.5E-006 Q 1.0E-006 Q 1.0E-006 y FAILURE TO
, DELIVER FLOW TROM
^ RCCUMULATOR NO. 3 ACC-4 Irons' er fran Page 1 LCC FCW 63-80 RCC CW 63-026 kCC CW 63-562 PLUGGED FAILS TO OPEg RAILS 10 OPEN ACC-MOV-PG-6380 ACC-Crv-CC-63624 ACC-Ctv-CC-63562
- Q 6.5E-006 Q .1.0E-006 Q 1.OE-006.
t, T' #rF I' T-'*f% 'r j 4
-M"T'%*b PW *it ha'
( 'rF V '4T' 'P7*9M ""W' Y"*'T'**'WM**' T' 'w$ g
- or g+yn v e-m.'.* T=%5- yd w g9- g- - .hPer-p m m a,_m- ...nu. .m -m- ._-_as - _m. _ ----dm.*----
l FAILUPE 10 Tree AFW2 FROVIDE ATV TO 2 Project: SEG DF 4 SGs page 1 ef 12 Date test Modified: p AF-1 Mort Aug 27 12:38:46 1988 hk I i l I INSUFFICIENT SIE AM BINolkG OF'" INSUFFICIENI INSufflCIENT INSUFFICIENT FLOW TO STEAM RLL AFW PLMPS FLOW TO STEAM FLOW TO STEAM FLOW T3 STEAM ENERATORS 1, 2 ENERATORS 2, 3 ENERATORk 1, 2 liNERATORS 1, 3 3 6 1 4 _ AF-2 STEAM-8INDING AF-4 AF-3 AF-8 g 1.0 Elf g Page 32 g Page 12 I I I I I I INSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIEN! INST 4 F ICIEu t INSUFFiCILNI INSUFFICIENI FLOW YO STEAM FLOW TO STEAM FLOW TO STEAM FLOW TO STEAM FLOW TO STEAM FLOW TO STEAM GENERATOR 1 GENERATOR 2 r.ENERATOR 3 GENERATOR 1 GENERATOR 4 GENERATOR 2 AF-5 AF-20 AF-24 AF-5 AF-32 AF-20 g Pag? 1 g Page 8 g Page 9 g Page 1 g Page il & Pege 5 w ~ INSUFFICIENi FLOW TO STEAM GENERATOR 1 AF-5 Iransfers from Page(s) 1 12 I I INSUF F ICIE NI INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM PS406 FLOW FROM PS418 AF-6 AF-7 hh 0 **9' 4 I FAULl3 EM INSUFFICIENI PS406 FLOW FROE PS405 AF-6A AF-12 [k O #* 2 I I I RFW IRAl4 A RFW ACV 3-164 nFW CV 3-832 r. Ope'04 CAUSE 4CTUATION SIGNAL FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN FAILURE OF AFW FAILS Ofs AFU-ACT-FA-TRNA AFW-AOV-CC-3164 j AFV-CKV-CC-3832 AFW*CCF-FT-AOV Q 3.6E-003 O 1.0E-003 G 1.0E-004 3.4E-005
INSUFFICIENI- im-AM FLOW FROM PS405 Project: SES Page 2 of 12 Date Lost foodified: AF-12 More Aug 29 12:38:46 1988 ers from Page(s) 18 4 4 Irens' l l l l FAULIS IN AC POWER UNAvAIL L;C POW 5.4 UhAvalt RFW IRAIN A INSUFFICIENI PS605 6.9kV S/D 90 1A-A 12SV VITAL sus I RCTUAfl0N SIGNAL rt0W FROM PS604 FAILS RND PS&20 AF-1241 ACP-TAC-LP-1AA DCP-TDC-LP-8 AFW-ACT-FA-TRNA AF-14 4 /g g Q 1.6E-0C3 6 Page 2 4 I l I RFW CV 3-820 4FW 90P 1A-A RFW 90P 1A-A RFW #0P 14-A - RFW MDPs 1A-A AND FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUN FOR L8NAVAll DUE TO 18-8 FAIL TO 24 MRS FEST AND MAINT START AFW-CKV-CC-38 7 AFW-MDP-FS-1AA AFu-MDP-FR-1AA26 AFW-FDP-TN-1 AA AFW-CCF-FS-1AA98 1.0E-'d C:2 Q O3 5-**' O
- z'- '
O ' 5-" 3 0 ' -"' o INSUFFICIEN I FLOW FRWI PS40% LND PS420 AF-14 transfer frtum Page 2 I I INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENI FLOW FROM PS420 FLOW FROM PS60% AF-19 AF-18 4k 6 Page 3 l- I i i i FAULIS IN RC POWER UNAVAIL FCVs 3-116A AND 'INSUFFICIENI FLOW SWS MAN OP Vtv FAIL 10 Rest Sv5 PS420 480V Rx MOV 90 3-1168 NOT FROM SUS PS162 17184 PLUGGED MAN & VLv 1718A 1AZ-A SIGNALLED TO OPEN FRM TEST /MA AF-19A ACP-TAC-LP-1A2A AFu-ACT-FA-ERCWA SUS-3 SUS-XVM-PG-1718A SWS-XVM-RE-17184 [g g Q 1.6E-003 Q 1.0E-001 Q 6.6E-006 g 8.0E-0K RFW FCV 3-116A RFW FC T6a FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN AFW-fGF-CC-3116A AFW-MOV-CC-31168 _ G 3.0E-003 0 3 '*- 'I
INSUFFICfENT Iree: AFW2 FLOW FROM PS404 Pre.iect SEO Page 3 of 12 Date Last modified: AF-15 Mon Aug 27 12:38: 4 1998 - Irarsi er from Page 2 [ I I nFW CV 3-805 EIW MAN OP VLV tuSUFFICIENI FAILS TO OPEN 3-803 PLUGGED FLOW FROM Ps403 AFW-CEV-CC-3805 AFv-xWM-PG-3803 AF-13 Q 1.0E-004 G 1.1E-004- 6 Page 3 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FIK26 PSC03 AF-13 [g Irars< ers from Page(s) 3 711 l 7 lasuff CIENT nFW nnN OP VLV 7 rLOW FROM PS401 3-800 PLUGGED LND PS402 AF-15 AFW-XVM-PG-3800 Q'1.1E-004 I I Faults in FAULis su PS401 PS402 AF-15A -AF-155 I I nFW rs401 man or nFW csi-A FAuus nFW Ps402 mmm cP nFW csi-s FAuus VLV PLUGGED WLV PLUGGED AFW-XVM-PG-AF401 AFW-INK-YF-CSTA AFW-NwM-PG-AF402 Afu-TNK-VF-CSis Q 3.6E-005 Q 3.3E-006 Q 3.6E-005 Q 1.3E-006 y
.-3_.a. 9 s. w_ g s .se e1q-. g se4, m mg- F A .g '+v
%-'W ---% ey .,nw, g yp..m. <-e*I'- t-*-Fs-- -T'W=^ "- Y W 4-N+--t--V vw w wa _ __ _am_immwhr._-seue wh _..hma ..__-
frgg; AFy2 INSUFFICl(NI Project: SEO FLOW FROM PS418 Page 4 of 12 Date Lost Modified: Mori Aug 29 12:38:46 1988 AF-7 f rans er from Page 1
.[
1 INSUF F ICIEN T FAULIS IN FLOW FROM PS415
$18 AF.9 AF-7A
[g & Pm 4 I I I RFW ACV 3-174 RFW CW 3-873 r.0MMON CAUSE RFW IRAIN 8 FAILS TO OPEN. FAILS TO OPEN FAILURE OF AFW RCTUAit0N SIGNAL 40VS FAILS AFW-A0W-CC-3174 AFW-CEV-CC-3873 AFW-CCF-FT-A0V AFV-ACT'FA-TRNB 1.6E-003 Q 1.0E-004 Q 3.4E-005 Q 1.0E-003
'. INSUFFICIENI oo FLOW FROM PS415 AF-9
[gironsfersfromPage(s)48911 1 I i FAULIS IN :7 NSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIENI l#SUF SIEAM 30 RFW TDP ROOM FLOW FROM PS414, FUR 8tNE DRIVEN PS415 COOLING 5 22 AND PS423 PUNP VIA PS426 AF-9A AF-41 AF.10 AF-35 [g g Page 6 g Page 7 g Page 5 i i I i RFW IDP 1A-S RFW 109 1A-S RFW TDP 1A-S K POWER UNAVAll RFU CV 3-864 FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUN FOR LINAVAIL DUE TO 125 Y v11AL sus FAILS TO OPEN 24 HRS TEST AhJ MAINT III AFW-CRV-CC-3864 AFW-TDP-FS-1AS AFW-fDP-FR-1AS24 AFW-TDP-TM-1AS DCP-iDC-LP-III Q 1.0E-004 G 3.0E-002 G 1.2E-06T g 1.2E-002 Q 9. E-005
INSUF STEAM 10 ife?: AN2 ItpBINE DRIVEN Projectr SEO r1JMP VIA PS426 Page 5 ef 12 Date Lest Modifled: AF-35 Mort Ag 29 12:38:46 1988 Q Irarsfer from Page 4 I I I IPN A IRN 8 DC PUWER UNAVAll FAULIS IN F AlltJRE 10 AFU ACTUATION 125 Y VITAL IPJS PS426 DELIVER STEAM 10 SIGNAL 118 PS426 JgAyp,t[Jat P AF-40 DCP-TDC-LP-III AF-354 AF-37 Q 9.DE-005 , [ l I I I I TFW 3 RAIN A RFW IR414 8 LOCAL FAULTS IN EFW IRIP VLW 1-51 FAILURE 10 FAILURE 10 RCTUATION SIGNAL ACTUAtl0N SIGNAL nFW PYDRAUtic VLV FAILS TO OFEN DELIVER STEAR DELIVER STEAM FAILS FAILS 1-52 FROM PS424 FROM PS425 AFU-ACT-FA-TRNA AFW-ACT-FA-TRN8 AFU-FDV-LF-152 ATW-MOV-CC-151 l AF-39 AF-38 Q 1.6E-003 Q 1.6E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q & Pege 5 I I I I I c AC PUWER UNAVAll ; RFW FCV 1-16 AFW ADV 3-1I5 RFW FCV 1-16 RFW CV 3-892 nFW CV 3-874 i r.80V RX Mov 80 FAILS 10 #ECEIVE FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO CPEN
$ 1A2-A DPEN SIGNAL ACP-TAC-LP-1A2A AFW-FCV-FA-116 AFW-A0V-CC-3175 AFU-MCV-CC-116 Aru-CKV-CC-3872 AFW-Ctv-CC-3874 g Q 3.2E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 1.0E-004 Q 1.0E-004 FAILURE 10 DELIVER STEAM FROM PS425 AF-38 Q Iransier from Page 5 -
1 i l nFW CV 3-89 RFW FCV 1-15 nFw A0v 3-174 ._nFu CV 3-873 FAILS TO OPEN r10GGED FAILS TO OPEN FAILS _TO OPEN AFU-CKV-CC-3891 AFU-MOV-PG-115 AFU-A0V-CC-3174 . AFU-CKV-CC-3873 1.0E-004 Q l.1E-004 Q 1.0E-003 Q 1.0E-004
Tree: AFW2 INSUFFICIENT Project: SEO RIU TDP ROOM FP9e 6 of 12 COOLING tote Lost stodified: seen Aug 29 12:38:46 1998 AF-41 . trans'er free Page & I I INSUF COULING INSUF CtJOLING FROM AC EMERueICT FROM DC ENERENCf ENNAUST FA4 ENMAUST Fall - AF-42 AF-43 [k O EN 0 I I I I RFW MAW DAMPER hfW MAN DAMPER RFW AC EMERG Fall RFW AC EMERG FM RC POWER UN4 Wall 1124 FAILS CLOSED 1682 FAILS CLOSED FAILS TO START FAltS To RUllFOR 480V RM MOV 50 5 MS 1A1-1 AFW-NDM-0C-1682 AFW-FAN-FS-T9PA AFW-F All-FR-TDPAS ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A AFW-RDM-CC-1124 g Q 1.0E-003 Q 1.0E-903 Q 3.0E-003 G 1.5E-994 C2
/3 - INSUF COOLtwG c FRtM DC EMERGENCY ENRAUST FA81 AF-43 ggfransferfromPo9e6 l l l I DC POWER peAvalt RFW DC EMERG FAII LFW CC EMERG FA4__ RFW 84488 DarFER LFW MAII DAMFTR 125 Y VliAL BUS FAILS to START FAILS 70 RUN FOR 1123 FAILS CLOSED 1683 FAILS CLOSED fil 5 MS DCP-TDC-tP-It! ,
AFW-FAW-FS-TDPD AFW-F AN-FR-TOPOS AFW m -OC-1123 AFW-NDM-OC-1683 9.0E-003 G 1.0E-003 G 1.0E-003 G 3.0E-003 G -1.5E-004
INSUFFICIENg [F LOW TR(pt PS&14, Trw: AM Project: 42 22 AND PS423 Page P of 12 l Ar-10 Cete test fedifiesf: Iransfer frae Page & som Aus 2712:38:461988 I I I 7 mSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIENI INSUFFFCIEst FLOW FPCM PS423 FLOW FPOM PS&22 FLOW FROM PS&l4 AF-17 AF-16 AF-11 [k O ## # [k I i i I 1 I FAULIS IN EC P0e4R UNAVAll 1NSUFFICIENI FLOW FCVs 3-1364, 5WS PA4 OP VtV leSUFFICitsi m 23 RFW Mme OP VtV mFW CV 3-510 G80V RE MOV 80 70 SWS PS135 3-177A,9 WOT 15208 PLUGGEO FLOW FROM PS&O3 5-809 PLUGGED FAILS TO OPEG 182-8 , SIG8tALLED TO OPEN AF-17A ACP-TAC-LP-1828 SUS-4 AFW-ACT-FA EWCWT SWS-Nyst-PG-TS205 AF-13 AFW-met-PG-3807 AFu-Citv-CC-3810 g g Q 1.0E-001 Q 1.M-003 Q 6.6E6 d Pave 3 G 1.1E-096 Q 3.0E-006 m I a asW #CV J-i774 FAILS TO OPEN nsW rCV 3-179s FAILS TO CPEG AFW-MOV-CC-31794 AFW-fp3W-CC-31799 Q 3.0E-003 Q 3.0E-003 INSUFFICIEWT FLOW Fil04 PSC22 AF-16 [gTransferfruePopeT I i i FAULi$ IN &#$Uf flCIENI FLOW RC 8MER UIORWAll FCVs 3-1364, PS422 FROM SWS PS162 L80V RE fl0V 50 5-179A,8 WOT 142-A SIGIIALLED TO OPEN AF-16A SWS-3 ACP-TAC-LP-1AZA AFW-ACT-FA-ERCUT [ Q 1 0E-001 g 1.6E*t893 I RFW ICV 3-1364 AfW FCW 3-1368 FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN AfW-MOV-CC-3136A AFu-MOV-CC-3136s
. G 3.0E-003 G 3.0E-003
Tree AFW2 INSUFFICIENT Project: SES FLOW 10 STEAM ggq GENERA 10lt 2 cete test
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m M 27 12-38-66 19sy3. AF-20 Q irervsfers from Pegats) 1 12 4 I leSUFFICIENI RFW CW 3-922 nFW CV 3-662 FLOW FROM PS41T FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEW RND PS407 AF-21 AFW-Otf-CC-3722 AFU-CKY-CC-3862 Q 1.0E-006 Q 1.0E-004 I I IMSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIEWI FLOW FROM PS417 FLOW FROM PS407 AF-22 AF-23 [- d a Pope a I I I c: I topmou CAUSE INSUFFICIEmi Ato RFW IPAI4 8 RCTUAfl001 SIGNAL RFW ACV 3-173 FAILS TO OPEN RFW CV 3-872 FAILS TO OPE:t FAILINtE OF AFU FL0tf FROM PS415 FAILS htPft . AFW-ACT-FA-TRW8 ATW-A0W-CC-3173 AFM-CRV-CC-3872 AFU CCF-FT-Act AF-9 Q 1.6E-Gd3 Q 3.0E-003 g .1.0E-906 Q 3.4E-085 e PeTe 4 l#SUFFICIEmi FLOW FROM PS407 AF ~3 [g Iransfer from Pege 8 I I I I RFW IRAIN A RFW Aov 3 *% 'nFW CV 3-831 ttyman CAUSE t#5UFFICIE4I kCTUAil04 SIGNAL FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEW FAILURE OF AFU-.- FLOW FR98 PS405 FAILS . 40Vs ATW-ACT FA-TRWA AFW-20f-CC-31% AFW-Ctv-CC-3831 AFW-CCF-FT A0v AF-12 g 1.0E-006 g 3.4E-005 g Pope 2 Q 1.6E-003 G 1.0E-003
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INSUFFICIEst free: AW2 rtou 10 STEMt Project: SES r4NERATOR 3 rege 9 ef 12 Date Lost pedified: AF-24 feen Aug 29 12-38:46 T988 g g transi ers from PagMs) 1 12 I I INSUFFICIEN1 EfW CV 3-921 ReW CV 3-861 rLOW FROM PS416 FA!LS TO OPEW FAILS TO 0FEW RNO PS412 AF-25 AFW-CEV-CC-3721 AFU-CEV-CC-3861 Q 3.DE-006 G 1.0E-006 I I INSUFFICIENI l#SUFFICIEst FLOW FROM PS416 FLOW FROM F5412 AF-26 AF-27 [ g Page 9
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" _RFW A0W 3-172 RFW CV 3-571 ttPMON CAUSE leSUFFICIEmi RCTUnil04 SIG44L FAILS TO OPEg FAILS TO OPEN FAlltlRE OF AFU rLOW Fatst PS415 FAILS ROVs AFW-ACT-FA-TWWA AFU-A0V-CT-3172 AFU-CEV-CC-3871 AFW-CCF-FT-AOV AF-9
{}1.6E-003 G 1.0E-003 G 1.0E-03 G 3.6E-005 g Page & INSUFFICIEul rtou FROM PS412 AF-27 ggtrans!erfranPage9 I i l l RFW CV 3-830 RFU TRAls s - RFU ADV 3-148 E0 m04 CAUSE IWSUffICIEtt FAILS TO OPEN RCTUnf104 SIGNAL FAILS TO OPEN FAtttIRE OF AFU FLOW FROM PS&t9 FAILS ROWS AFW-CEV-CC-3830 AFU-ACT FA-TRNB ' AFV-A0V-CC-31&S AFV-CCF-FT-ADV AF-28 G 1.0E-006 Q l.6E-003 G 1.0E-003 G .3.6E-005 & Pege 10 .. . . . . ~ , , - . . . . . . - - . . - , . . .. . - . . ~ < . . . -.- . . . ,- ~ -- --- - - - - . . - -- .. .--- .
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. AILS TO OPEW FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUE FOR L48 AVAIL CUE TO 18-8 Fatt TO 24 mRS TEST AND MAINT START AFu-DOP-Fs-198 AFU-8eP-FR-19826 AFU-80P-TM-198 AFV-CCF-FS-1AA98 AFV-CEV-CC-3521 G 1.0E-004 Q 3.0E-003 Q I.2E-004 Q 2.0E-003 Q 3.7E-004 y INSUFFICIENI FLOW FR W PS409 es h 44D PS421 AF-27 transfer free Pegs 10 I I INSUFFICIE43 IN*ttF F ICIEWI FLOW FROM PS421 FLOW FROM PS409 AF-31 AF-30
[ d Pege 11
-l I ! I I FAULIS IN Et swt tmAv4BL FCys 3-126A AmD iwSUFFICIEnt FLOW sus mag Op vtv Falt TO PEST Sv5 3-1268 seof to sus Ps155 1718e PtuGGED me op vtv 1718e PS421 r.sov Rx Mov eD tm2-8 SIGNALLED TO OrEN Fret TEST /M4 AF-31A ACP-TAC-LP-182E AFV-ACT-FA-ERCus sus-4 sus-rvet-PG-tT1BB sus-rvat-RE-TTlss
[Q g Q l.6E-003 Q 1.0E-001 Q 6.6E-004 Q 8.0E-004 I nFW FCv 3-126A nFW FCv 3-126a FAILS TO OPEN FAILS To OrEN AFW-MOV-CC-3126A AFU-Mov-CC-31268 Q 3.0E-003 0 3.0E-003 ~ . ~ , _. _ __ , _ - .
INSUFFICIENg Tree: ATW2 FLOW FROM PS407 Project: SEO Page IT of 12 Date test 85fified: AF-30 9km Aug 27 12:38:46 1988 [gIronsferfromPage10 l I RFW CV 3-806 Rf W MAN OP WLW INSUFFICjtNI FAILS TO OrEN 3-804 PtuGGED FLOW FROM PS403 AFW-CEV-CC-3806 AFU-XVM-PG-3804 AF-13 Q l.0E-004 Q 3.1E-004 O Pega 3 iNSUFFiClENT FLOW TO STEAM GENERATOR 4 AF-32 Iransi ers from Popets) 1 12 Ce i I e INSUFFICIEuf INSUFFICIENI $ FLOW FROM PS411 FLOW FROM PS419 ' AF-33 AF-34 [Q d Page 11 I i - i I RFW IRAls R RFW CV 3-833- RFU A0V 3-171 COMm0N CAUSE INSUFFICIENI RCTUATION SIGNAL FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO CPEN FAILURE OF AFV FLOW FROM PS410 FAILS 40Vs AFW-ACT-FA-TRNG AFW-CEV-CC-3833 AFU-A0V-CC-3171 AFV-CCF-FT-ADV AF-28 1.6E-003 g Pope 10 G 1.0E-006 G 1.0E-003 Q 3.4E-005 INSUFFICIENI FLOW FROM PS419 AF-34 g transi er from Page 11 1 1 I I RFW IRAIN A RFW CV >874 RFW ADV 3-175 COP 9904 CAUSE INSUFFICIEMI RCTUATION SIGNAL FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO CPEN FAILURE.OF AFV FLO'J TROM PS415 FAILS 40Vs AFU-ACT-FA-TRNA AFW-CKY-CC-3874 AFU-A0v-CC-3175 AFU-CCF-FT-A0V AF-9 o i.6e + 3 o i.**4 o i.=*3 g 3.4E-w5 n ,, .
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T m - CNI INSuffICIENI Project SES FLOW FRGI PSO9 (SIT) Pope 2 ef 6 Dete Lost luodified: CM-5 feest Aug 22 16:32:46 1988: [gTrans<ersfromPege(s)16 I I SOIN AC POWER Bil UNAVAILABLE INSUfflCIEul TRAINS FLOW THROUG4 PSOT JNAVAILA8tE END PSOS CH-6 CMP-TIME-VF-Blf CN-T 6.5E-004 I I I I RC POWER t/NAVAll RC POWER LDAVAll INSUFFICIENI INSUff!CIENI 480V RX fe0V 80 L60V ta fun 8D rLOW Tsut0UGM PSOT FLOW TINKRJGet P308 1Al-1 p181-8 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A ACP-TAC-LP-1918 CM-8 CM-9 I I l l l e- LNG #CW 63-39 mc POWER UNavait LNG FCW 63-39 bc POWER UNAVAIL NO ACluntION INSUfflCIEmi LMAVAll DUE TO G80V RX MOV BD FAILS TO OPEN 125V V11AL SUS I EIG#AL FPaul SIS Flow Twm0UG4 P305 IEST AND MAINT 1A1-1 LOGIC TRAI4 1A h8ID PS06 CHP-M0W-TM-6337 AC -T AC-LP-1 A1 A CMP-MOV-CC-6337 DCP-TDC-LP-l' SIS-ACT-fA-19#4 CN-10 Q 2.0E-004 g Q_3.0E-003 g Q 1.6E-003 o Page 3 1
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Tree: CNg INSUFFICIENI Prelect: Ste FLOW TN#0UCN PSO2 Pepe & ef 6 kND PSO3 Date test Newfifled: port Aug 2712:40:44 1998 CN-16 Iransfers f rom Page(s) 3 5 I I INSUFFICIENT Insuff CIEmi FLOW TNRCUGN PSO2 FLOW TNROUGN PS03 CH-15 CH-16 [g g Paga & I I I FAULTS IN P502 >C POWER tMAVAIL rwSt UNAVAILABLE 20 ACTUAIION 125V VITAL SUS I SIGNAL FROM SIS LOGIC TRAIN 1A CN-15A DCP-TDC-LP-l LPI-TNC-VF-RWST1 $15-ACT-FA-TRWA [g g Q 2.10-006 Q l.6E-005 k i l I g CNG LCv 62-135 LMAVAIL DUE TO CMG LCV 62-133 FAILS TO CPEN LM LCvs 62-135 RND 62-136 FAIL nc POWER UNavAIL 480V RX 940V 3D TEST AND MAINT to OPEN 1A1-1 CMP-MOV-TM-62135 CNP-f407-CC-62135 CMP-CCT-CC-1356 ACP-TAC-LP-1ATA G 2.0E-00' O 3.0E-003 0 2 -' @ INSUFFICIENI FLOW THROUGN PS03 CH-16 irons' er fran Page & - [ 1 I I F AULIS IN PS03 PWST UNAVAILA9tE DC POWER UNAVA!L 20 ACTUATION 125V 12fAL SUS Il SIGNAL F904 SIS LOGIC TRAIN 19 CN-16A LPI-TNC-VF-#UST1 OCP-TDC-LP-II STS-ACT-FA-TWW8 [g Q 2.7E-006 g Q 3.6E-003 I I I CHG LCv 62-1M LNG LCV 62-1 M ENG LCys 62-135 AC F0WER tMAvalt
'LMAVAIL geK TO FAILS TO OPEN RND 62-1 M FAIL L80V 81t MOV OD TEST #4D 94RINI TO OPEN 181-8 CNP-MOV-TM-621% l CNP-Per-CC-621 % CNP-CCF-CC-1356 ACP-IAC-LP-1816 G 2.0E-004 g 3.0E-003 G 2.6E-006 g
F FAILURE 10 Tree: CNI ISOLATE VCT Project: SES Pege 5 ef 6
&#te Lost modif fah CM-99 More Aug 22 16:32:46 1998 irens'ers fress Pege(s) 3 5
[ i FAULTS 10 ECT Of FCVs CM-99 62-132 AND 62-133 CM-98 CMP-CCF-90W-VCT g 2.6E-006 i WCI ISOLAfl04 VCI ISOLAllON WALVE 62-132 VALVE 62-133 rAgLS TO CLOSE FAILS TO CLOSE CMP-MOV-FT-62132 CNP-Mov-FT-62133 G 3.0E-003 G 3.0E-003 t= d.s INSUfflCIENI G8 FLOW INROUGH PS06 CH-12 g g Transfer from Page 3 I I I I I CHARGING PUMP RC POWLR UidAVAll INSufflCIENI flow Las CV 62-504 INSUfflCIENI FAILLSE to 1A-A FAILS TO R'JN 5.9kV S/D BD 1A-A FRtM SWS PS162 FAILS TO OPEN FLOW THROUGH PSO2 ISOLATE VCT END PS03 CNP-MDP-FR-1AA ACP-TAC-LP-1AA Sv5-3 CMP-CEV-CC-62504 CN-14 CN-99 G 3.0E-005 g g g 1.0E-006 g Page 6 g Pege 5 INSUFi tCIEN T FLOW THROUGN PSO6 CN-9 Trans'er from Page 2 I I I I I I AC POWER UNAVAll LNG (CW 63-40 CNG FCW 63-40 K POWER UNAvAll e ACitmil0N INSUf f lCIENI 480V RX MOW SD lAfAVAIL DUE 10 FAILS TO OPEN 125v VITAL BUS II 51GNAL fn0R SIS FLOW TNR0Uer PSOS 181-8 TEST AND MAINT LOGIC TRAIN 18 RND PS06 ACP-TAC-LP-1918 CMP-MOV-ift-6340 CNP-mov-CC-6340 DCP-fDC-LP-il SIS-ACT-FA-TRW8 CN-10
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Tree: CWI IN$tN F ICIENT Flou THROUGN PS11 Pre}ect: SEO Pope 6 et 6 Dete Lost 8bedifled: say,Aug 22 16:32:46 1909 CW-4 4 g ironed er from Page 1 1 I I fat!LIS IN PS11 WD ACTU4110N K POWER UNAvell INSUFFICIENT SIGNAL FROM SIS 125V VITAL sus I rLau FROM PSO9 LOGIC TRAIN 1A (SIT) CM-45 515-ACT-FA-TRNA DCP-TDC-LP-1 CN-$ [g. / > 1.6E-003 g g Pope 2 I I l CMG FCV 63-26 tnG FCW 63-26 ENG FCVs 63-25 RC POWER UNAWAll FAILS TO OPEN MAWAIL DUE TO MID 63-26 TAIL TO L80V RX HOW 3D TEST AND MAINT PEN 1A1 1 CMP-MOV-CC-6326 CMP-HOV-TM-6326 CMP-CCF-CC-2526 ACP-TAC-LP-141A G 3.0E-003 G 2.0E-006 Q 2.6E-006 g tC
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t l INSUFFICIENI Flow inROUGu PS12 Tree: CNR (RECIRCULATION) Project: SEO Page 1 of 9 CH-21 Date LeSt Nodified: gg fue Sep 06 15:28:38 1988 l INSUFFICIENI FAULIS IN PS12 FLOW THROUGM PS10 AND PS11 CH-22 CMP-CKV-CC-63581 Q 1.0E-004 I I kNSUFflCIENI INSUFFICIENI FLOW THROUGH PS10 FLOW TINT 0UGN PS11
.g CR-23 o CM-24 u,
u [k d Page 9 I I I FAULIS IN PS10 kiO ACIUAllON DC POWER UNAVAll INSUFf'CIENT SIGNAL FROM SIS 125V VITAL BUS !! rLOW f8t0E PS07 LOGIC TRAIN 1B (Bli) CH-23A SIS-ACT-TA-TRNB DCP-TDC-LP-Il Cg-25 [Q Q 1.6E-003 p & Page 2 I I- I CHG FCV 63-25 CHG fCV 63-25 CHG ICVs 63-25 AC POWER tMAVAll JNAVAIL DUE TO FAILS TO OPEN AND 63-26 FAIL 10 r.80V RX HOV BD TESI AND MAINT EPEN 181-B CHP-MOV- TM-6325_ CMP-MOV-CC-6325 CHP-CCT-CC-2526 ACP-IAC-tP-1918 (j 2.0E-004 Q 3.0E-003 g 2.6E-004 g
freed CMR INSUFFICIENT Project: SEO FLOW FROM PSO9 Pm 2 of 9 ' (81T) Date Last Modified: sean tNw 14 11:59:24 1998 CM-25 Q Transfers from Page(s) 1 9 I INSufflCIENT BIT UNAVAILABLE FLOW THROUGH PS07 AND PSOS CH-26 CHP-TNK-VF-BIT Q 6.5E-004. I l INSUFFICIENT INSuff1CIENI FLOW THROUGH FLOW THROUGH PS07 PSOS CN-27 CH-28 Q d Page 8 I i i i I CMG FCV 63 bC POWER UNAVAIL NO ACTUATION INSW flCILNT CMG FCV 63-39 AC POWER UNAVAIL FAILS TO OPEN 125V VITAL BUS I SIGNAL FROM $1S FLOW TIAMN LfMAVAIL DUE To f.80V RX MOV BD LOGIC TRAIN 1A PSO5 AND PS06 TEST AND MAINT 1A1-1 CHP-MOV-CC-6339 DCP-TDC-LP-1 SIS-ACT-FA-TRNA CH-29 y CHP-MOV-TM-6339 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A g 1.6E-003 O Page 3 g Q 2.0E-004 g Q 3.0E-003
1 INSUFFICIENI free: CMR FLOW THROUGH PSOS Project: SEO RND PS06 page 3 ef 9 Date test Modified: CH-29 - Tue Sep 06 15:28:38 1988-
. Irons ers from Page(s) 2 9 I I INSUFFICIENI 7NSUF F ICIE N T rLOW THROUGH PSOS FLOW THROUGH P506 CH-30 CH-31 Q d Page 8 I I I I l ! I LNG CV 62-504. CCF OF FCVs LHARGING PUMP LHARGING PUMP AC POWER UNAVAll DC POL.ER UNAVAIL INSOfFICIEN17 6 [ W) ACIDAIlCN FAILS TO OPEN 52-132 AND 62-133 18-8 FAILS TO RUN 19-8 FAILS TO 5.9kV S/D BD 18-8 125V VITAL BUS 18 TO SUS PS175 stGNAL FRCat $r5 START LOGIC TRAIN 1B CHP-CKV-CC-62504 CHP-CCF-MOV-VCT CHP-MDP-FR-199 CHP-MDP-FS-1BB ACP-TAC-LP-188 DCP-TDC-LP-II SVS-2 SIS-ACT-FA-TRNg Q l.0E-004 . G 2.6E-00' O 35- 5 0 3 '- 3 @ @ @ O ' 65- 3 t: I . I l I b
*1 FAILURE 10 FAtJLIS IN PSO5 INSUFFICIEN! FAULIS IN PSO5 ISOLATE CHG PUMP (RECIRCULATION) FLOW THROUGW PS26 (INJECil04)
SUCTION LND PSIT CH-44 CH-30A1 CH-33 Cn-30C ~ O Page 4 [ d Page 4 6 Page 3 I I I I l CHG FAN 10-8 LNG FAN 18-8 PtGED OR SWS AcV 1176 PLGED OR - PLGED OR FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUN FOR 9tSPOSITIONED PLCED OR 4tSPOSlil0NED 9tSPOStif0NED 24 HR$ 4ISPOSill0NED CHP-FAN-FS-188 CHP-FAN-FR-18824 SUS-XVM-PR-16008 $US-AOV-PR-1170 SWS-XVM-PR-16018 sus-xVM-rR-16029 Q 3.0E-001 Q 7.2E-004 Q 7.0E-005 0 ' 5- 5 0 ' **- 5 O ' '-* 5 FAULTS IN PSOS (INJECTION) CH-30C fransfer from Page 3 [ I i 1 1. I I I CHG CV 62-532 CHARGING PUMP. PLCED OR . EAIL 10 RESI CMG PLGED OR PtCED OR PLGED OR PtGED OR FAILS TO OPEN '18-8 UNAVAll. DUE MISPOSITIONED 4AN OP VLV 62-510 9ISPOSIT10NED- 9tSPOSIfl0NED 9ISPOSITIONCD MISPOSITIONED TO TEST /MAINT FRM TEST /M _ CHP-CKV-CC-62532 CHP-MDP-TM-199 SUS-XVM-PR-17049 CHP-XVM-RE-62510 SvS-XVM-PR-17658 SUS-XVM-PR-17058 SUS-xVM-PR-17373 sus-xvM-PR-1761.8 Q l.0E-004 Q 2.0E-003 Q 7.0E-005 Q 3.2E-004 Q 7.0E-005 Q 7.0E-005 Q 7.0E-005 Q 7.0E-005 l
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ._._._m.m.-.._ , ----- - ~ ~b s--- ~ ~ ' - ' ' " - ~ ~ ~ ' ~ " " ~ ~ ~ '
Tree: CHR FAILURE TO Project: 72 0 ISOLATE CMG PUMP ' Page 4 of 9 SUCTION Date Last Modified: lean mov 14 11:59:24 1986 CH-44 Transfers from Page(s) 3 8 l l MOV F AULTS IN HPR CKY 62-504 PS02 OR P503 FAILS TO CLOSE CH-44A ' HPR-CCV-00-62504 [g Q 1.0E-003 I I I I I HPR LCV 62-135 AC POWER UNAVAIL AC POWER UNAVAIL HPR LCV 62-136 DP fA!LS to DP FAILS to RECONFIGJRE FAILS TO CLOSE 480V RX MOV BD G80V RX MOV B0 FAILS 10 CLOSE RECONf! CURE 1A1-1 181-8 62-136 FOR-62-135 FOR HPR-MOV-00-62135 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A ACP-TAC-LP-1819 HPR-MOV-00-62136 HPR-XHE-FO-62136 fMPR-XHE-FO-62135 Q 2.1E-003 (] 3.OE-003 g g Q 3.0E-003. G 2.1E-003 INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGH PS26 AND PS17 CH-33 $ fransfers from Page(s) 3 8 I I INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUCH FLOW THRGJGH PS26 PS17 CH-35 CH-34
.[g d Page 5 I I I I F AULi$ IN DPERAIOR FAILS INSUF FLOW FROM INTERLOCK LPI MINIFLOW PS26 TO OPEN HPR FCV RNR PUMP 1A-A' FAULTS FOR FCV VLV FCV T4-12 .
63-8 (THRU PS79) 53-8 DOES NOT PERMIT CH-354 HPR-XHE-FO-638 LPR-7 CH-42 CM-43 [Q Q 2.1E-003 g Q Q l i I i i 1 HPR FCVs 63-6, NPR FCV 63-8 HPR FCVs 63-8 RC POWER UNAVAIL LPR fCV 63-72 MINIFLOW- AC POWER UNAVAll FCV 74-12 DOES LPh FCV 74-12
-7,.AND -8 Tall FAILS TO OPEN. AND 63-11 FAIL 480V RX MOV B0 INTERLOCK FAULTS VALVE CLOSURE G80V RX MOV B0 WOT RECEIVE LOW FAILS TO OPEN TO OPEN TO OPEN 1A1-1 FAULTS 1A1 FLOW SIGNAL .
HPR-CCF-CC-V678 HPR-MOV-CC-638 HPR-CCF-CC-V811 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A LPR-!CC-NO-6372 CH-65 ACP-TAC-LP-141A LPI-AST-HI-6392 LPI-MOV-CC-7412 Q 1.6E-004 . Q 3.0E-06"3- Q 2.6E-004 g . Q 1.9E-004
/N Page 7 1.6E 004 3.0E-003
__ ._ _ ~ _ . , . _ . _ . , . . , . . - . . , _ . . , . .. . - , . _ _ . . _
INSufflCIEN? Tree: CNR FLOW THROUGH PS17 Project: SEO Page $ of 9 Date Last Modified: CH-34 Tue Sep 06 15:28:38 1988 [g Irons 1 er from Page 4 I INSUff!CIENI HPR MAN OP VLV FLOW FROM PS14 63-531 PLIMGED MID PS15 CH-36 RPR-XVM-PC-63531 Q 6.5E-004 I I INSUfflCIENT INSUfflCIENI FLOW THROUGH PS14 FLOW IRROUGH PS15 CH-37 CH-37 d Page 7 O
- I I FAULIS IN PS14 UPERAIOR FAILS 10 INSUfflCIENI.
DPEN HPR TCV 63-6 FLOW THROUGM PS23 CH 37A NPR-XHE-FO-636 CH-35 gg. Q 2.1E-003 A Page 6 l l I RPR FCVs 63-6, HPR FCVs 63-6 AND HPR FCV 63-6 AC POWER UNAVAll
-7, AND -8 FAIL 63-7 Fall'TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN - f.80V RX MOV BD .
TO OPEN 181-8 HPR-CCF-CC-V678 HPR-CCF-CC-6367 'HPR-MOV-CC-636 ACP-1AC LP-181B Q 1.6E-004 - Q 2.6E-004 Q 3.0E-003 g
Tree: CHR INSUFFICIEN! Project: SEG FLCW THROUGH PS23 Pege 6 of 9
. Date Lost modified:
fue Sep 06 15:28:38 1988 CM-38 ers from Page(s) 5 7 Q Trans: I I ! I FAULIS IN PS29 kPI FCV 63-48 INSUF FLOW FROM LPI MINIFLOW LINAVAILABLE RHR PUMP 16*8 VLV FCV 74-24 (IHRU PS74) X)ES NOT PERMIT re u CH-38A2 MPI-MOV-PG-6348 (PR-6 CH-40 [g Q 1.1E-004 g 6 Page 6 l l l l 1NIERLOCK @R FCVs 63-8 AND @R FCV 63-11 AC POWER tmAVAIL DPERATOR FAILS 10 FAutis FOR FCV $3-11 Fall 10 FAILS TO OPEN CBOV RX MOV BD DPEN HPR FCV 53-11 DPEN 181-8 53-11 CH-41 HPR-CCF-CC-v811 HPR-MOV-CC-6311 ACP-TAC-LP-1919 HPR-NME-FO-6311 [Q- G.2.6E-00' O .3. E-003 g Q 2.1E-003 l T.
.t LPR FCV 63-73 MIN! FLOW VALVE C INTERLOCK FAULTS CLOSURE FAULTS LPR-!CC-NO-6373 CH-45 Q 1.9E-004 O Page 7 l LPI MINIFLOW VLV FCY 74-24 DOES NOT PERMIT Ft U CH-40
-[gIransferfromPage6' l- I AC PouER UNAVAll 'FCV 74-24 DOES LPI FCV 74-24 f.80V RX MOV BD- 40T RECEIVE LOW FAILS TO OPEN 181 8 FLOW SIGNAL ACP-IAC-LP-1918 LPI-ASF-HI-6391 LPI-MOV-CC-7424 g Q 1.6E-004 (Q 3.0E-001
INSufflCIEN! Tree: CNR FLOW INROUGH PS15 Project: SES Page 7 of 9 Date test Modified: CH-39 lue Sep 06 15-20:38 1998 g g Irans1 er from Page 5 I I FAULIS IN PS15 DPERATOR FAILS 10 INSUfflCIEN! DPEN NPR FCY 63-7 FLOW TINT 0UGN PS23 CH-394 HPR-XNE-FO-637 CH-38 Q Q 2.1E-003 6 Page 6 I I I HPR FCVs 63-6, HPR FCys 63-6 AND HPR ICV 63-7 RC POWER UNAVAll
-7, AND -8 FAIL 63-7 FAIL TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN r.80V RX MOV BD r0 OPEN 1A1-1
. HPR-CCF-CC-V678 HPR-CCF-CC-6367 HPR-MOV-CC-637 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A r
G 1.6E-004 0 2 6'- ' O3 E- 3 b HisifLOW VALVE CLOSURE FAULTS CH-45 Iransfers front Page(s) 6 4 I I FCV 63-3 VALVE TGV 63-4 OR CLOSURE TAUtiS FCV 63-175 valve CLOSURE FAutis CH-46 CH-47 [g - d Page 8 I I AC POWER UfJAVAll LPR FCV 63-3 LPR FCV 63-3 r.80V RX MOV BD , INTERLOCK FAULIS FAILS TO CLOSE 1Al-1 ACP-1AC-tP-1A1A LPR-ICC-NO-633 LPR-MOV-00-633 g . Q 1.9E-004 - Q 3.0E-003
. . . ._ __ . _ . . . x. _ .__ __ . -
.- _ _ - ~ _ _ _ _
Tree: CNR FCV 63-4 OR- Project: SEO FCV 63-175 VALVE Page 8 of 9 CtOSURE FAULTS Date Lost modified:., Tue Sep 06 15:28:38 1988 CH-47 . ggIrans'erfromPage7 I FCV 63-4 VALVE FCV 63-175 CLOSURE FAutis valve CLOSURE FAULTS CH-48 CH-47 I I i l LPR ICV 63-4 LPR FCV 63-4 LPR FCV 63-175 RC POWER UNAVAll LPR FCV 63-175 RC POWER UNAVAll INTERLOCK FAULTS FAILS TO CLOSE INTECLOCK FAULTS G80V RM MOV SD FAILS TO CLOSE f.801 RX MOV BD 181-8 181-8 LPR-ICC-NO-634 LPR-MOV-00-634 LPR-ICC-NO-63175 ACP-TAC-LP-1815 LPR-MOV-00-63175 ACP-TAC-LP-1918 g Q 1.9E-004 Q 3.0E-003 Q 3.9E-004 g Q 3.0E-003 Y - N LPI MINifLOW VLV TCV 74-12 DOES NOT PERMIT Flu CH-43 hk i I RC PUuER UNAVAIL I C G 2 DOES LPI FCV 74-12 C80V R1 MOV BD WOT RECEIVE LOW FAILS TO OPEN 1A1-1 . FLOW SIGNAL ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A LPI-ASF-MI-6372 LPI-MOV-CC-7412 gj Q 1.6E-004 , G 3.0E-003 lNSUFFICIENT FLOW iHROUGH PS06 CH-31 fransfer fress Page 3
-[
I I I I I I I RC POWER UNAVAIL CHG FAN 1A-A INSUFilCIENI ILOW CHARGlkG PUP 9 CHG CV 62-504 CCf 0F FCVs . FAILURE 10 INSuffICIEN1 5.9tY S/D BD 1A-A FAILS TO RUN FOR' FROM SWS PS162 . IA-A TAILS TO RUN FAILS TO OPEN b2-132 AND 62-133 ISOLATE CMG PUMP FLOW TRROUGM PS26 24 HRS 9.Cil0N RND PS17 ACP-TAC-LP-1AA CNP-f AN-f F-1 AA24 SWS-3 CHP-MDP-TR-1AA- CHP-CEV CC-62506 CHP-CCF-MOV-VCi CH-44 CH g Q T
.2E-004 Q 1.0E-001 -0 3 *~ 5 O ' *- ' .O.2.6E-004- O Page 4 - O Page 4
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r - < s P l INSUFFICIENT . Tree: CMR FLOW THROUGH PS08 Projects SEQ
- Page 9 of 9
. Cate i n t Modified:
CN-25 .. Tue Sep 06 15:28:38 1988,. frans'er from Page 2 [ i i 1 -1 I INSUFFICIENI CHG FCV 63-40 AC POWER UN4 VAIL r.HG (CV 63-40 5C POWER tmAVAll WO ACTUAIION FLOW THROUGH PSOS FAILS TO OPEN G80V RX MOV BD' LMIAVAIL DUE 70- 125V VITAL BUS II SIGNAL FR0pl SIS. RND PS06 151 8 TEST AND MAINT LOGIC TRAIN 18 CH-29 CHP-MOV-CC-6340 ACP-TAC-LP-1918 CHP-MOV-TM-6340 DCP-iDC-LP-II- SIS-ACT-FA-TPNB d Page 3 3.0E-003 g Q 2.0E-004' g Q 1.6E-003 INSUFFICIEN! FLOW THROUGH PS11 CH*24 '. y [ .fransfer from Page 1
.s>
1 I l-FAUL15 IN PS11 bC POWER (MAVAIL W ACTUAI104-125V VliAL" BUS I [ INSUFilCIENT SIGNAL FROM SIS FLOW FROM PSO9 LOGIC TRAIN 1A : (811) ' CH-24A DCP-IDC-LP SIS-ACT-FA-TRNA CH-25 [Q g Q l.6E-003 . O Page 2 CHG FCV 637N CHG FCV 63 LNG FCVs 63-25 . AC P0uER AVAll lmAVAIL 00E TO- FAILS TO OPEN AND 63-26 FAIL TO G80V RX MOV BD IEST AND MAINT 3 PEN 1Al-1 CHP-MOV-TM-6326 CHP-MOV-CC-6326 CHP-CCF-CC-2526 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A Q 2.0E-004 G 3.0E-003 . G.2.6E-004. g r--.j~~
.ggw_- h-tMWe ' mesf-ae(+w=-- p*g. 'g
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Tree: CSSCpt' INSUF C00 LING Project: SE O FLOW 10 80TN C$$ Peg 1 of 3 SPRAY HEADERS Date test nodified: fue Sep 20 12:43:44 1998 F 7 E5UI [j[Ni - INSUFFICIENT COOLING FLOW FROM COOLING FLOW FR m PS55 PS56 CSS-CHR-2 CSS-CHR-3 I i l i I ' I INSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENI INSUFFIClENI INSUFFl[j[N! ' INSUFFICIEN{ 7 NSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENI NEAT REMOVAL FROM FLOW FROM PS51 FLOW FROM PS53 FLOW inROUGN PSS6 FLOW FROM PS$4 FLOW FROM PSS2 PEAT REMOVAL FROM FLOW THROUGN PS55 CSS HX 1A CSS era 18 CSS-6 CSS-CNR-4 CSS-5 CSS-4 CSS-9 CSS-T CSS-8 CSS-CPR-5 g Page 2 g Page 4 g Page 3 g Page 7 g Page 5 g Page 6 g Page 8 i l i I i I . I CSS MDP FAT IA-A ESS 640P 1 A- A F AN FAILURE OF CS 3 INSUFFICIENT FLOW DC POWER UNAVAll INSUFFICIENT. FLOW NO PMASE 8 SIGNAL] NO RWSI LO-LO 125V VliAL SUS 1 h FAILS TO START l>NAVAIL DUE 10 ROOM FAN 1A TO THROUGM CCW PS355 FROM CCW PS337 FROM CSAS LOGIC TRAIN 1A LEVEL ALARM g T/M Of FOR 24 MOURS CSS FAN-FS-MDP1A CSS- F AN-T M-MDP1 A CSS-FAN FR-PIA 24 CCW-XVM-RE-1725A OCP-TDC-LP-l CCW-20 ESF-ACT-FA-CSA1A ESF- A$t.-FC-RVST 1 Q 3.0E-003 - Q 2.0E-003 0 r.2E- ' O 3.0E-005 g g Q 1.6E-003 Q 2.0E-005 I I I I I I L liiSUTiitiENI FLOW RC POWER UNAVAi css MDP 1A-A CSS MDP 1A-A ESS MDPs 14-A AND ts$ MDP 1A-A FAULTS IN PS35' TO SWS PS163 6.9kV S/0 80 1A-A FAILS TO START FAILS 10 PUN FOR 18-8 Fall TO LJNAVAIL DUE TO 24 HRS START TEST AND MAINT sus-1 ACP-TAC-LP-1AA CSS-MDP-FS 1AA CSS-MDP-FR-1AA24 CSS-CCF-FS-1AABB CSS-MDP-TM-1AA CSS-6A1 g g Q 3.TJEM Q 7.2E-004 Q 33E-00' O 2.0E-003 gg i i I- 1 I I I Fall 10 RESI CCW PtCED OR SVS A0V 1184 COMMON CAUSE CSS FCV 72-39 CSS FCV 72-39 ] CSS FCVs 72-39 CSS CV 72-547 4AN OP VLV 569A MISPOSITIONED FAILS TO OPEN FAILURE OF SWS FAILS TO OPEN %UGGED RND T2-2 Fall TO FAILS TO OPEN FRM TEST /MAI LOVs JPEN CCW-XVM-RE-569A SVS-XVM-PR-1613A sus-A0V-CC-1184 SUS-CCF-FT-A0V CSS-MOV-CC-7239 CSS-MOV-PG-7239 CSS-CCF-CC-392 CSS-CEV-CC-72347 0 3 " 65 - O ' E' 5 0 1. E-003
- Q 1.0E-004 g 3.0E-553 g 1.1E-003 0 ' 6" '
O'*~' I i RC F'0WER UNAVAll CSS CV 72-32 F 480V RX MOV BD FAILS TO OPEN 1Al-1 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A -CSS-CKV-CC-72528 g Q 1.0E-004
INSUFFICIENI- Iree CSSCM REAT REMOVAL FROM Project: SES CSS NX 1A Pege 2 of 8 Date Lost Modiffed: CSS-CHR-4 fue Sep 20 12:43:44 1988 Q Irans'er from Page 1 i FAULIS IN SkS INSUFFICIENT FLOW PS160 FROM SWS PS162 CSS-CHR-4A SWS-3 I I I I I SWS FCV 6M2I AC POWER UNAVAll WS FCV 67~125 SWS FCV 6 M 26 ~ DP TAILS 10 OPEN SWS CSS M/X thtEl FAILS TO OPEN 480V RX MOV BD WAVAIL DUE 10 FAILS TO OPEN SWS CSS N/X VLYS FAIL TO OPEN 1A2-A- TEST AND MAINT VALVES-EWS-MOV-CC-67125 ACP-TAC-LP-1A2A SWS-MOV-TM-67125 SWS-MOV-CC-67126 CSS-XHE-SWSHXVLV SUS-CCF-CC-2523 Q 3.0E-003 g Q 2.0E-004 0 3 '- 3 0 4.lE-004 G 2.6E-004 ku C75
l l [ Tree: C$SclNt
-lNSUFFjCIENI Project: SEO FLOW FROM PS53 Page 3 of 8 Date test Modified:
fue Sep 20 12:43:44 1 M CSS-4 g Irans'er from Page 1 1 1 I I I INSUfflCIENI FLOW RC POWER UNAVAIL 20 RWSI LO-LO DFERATOR FAILS 10 FAULIS IN h 53 Fall 10 ISOL CSS MDP 1A-A THRU PS85 5.9kV S/D SD 1A-A LEVEL ALARM REAllGN CSS FOR SUCTl0N FROM RUST RECIRC LPR-12 ACP-TAC-LP-1AA ESF-ASL-TC-RWST1 CSS-XNE-FO-CSR CSS-12 CSS-13 g g g Q 2.0E-005 Q 7.7E-002 gg i I I FAIL 10 ISOL CSS TCV 72-22 RC POWER UNAVAll FCV 72-23 FAILS INTERLOCK FAILS TO CLOSE G80V RX MOV BD TO OPEN FAULTS FOR FCV FLW PAIN FRM RWST-MDP 1A-A 1A1-1 72-23 etrTM CSS-MOV-00-7222 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A CSS-12A CSS-20 CSS-14 h hk I I I I i 7 Alt to ISOL FCV 63-1 DOES hof AC POWER UNAVAll CSS FCV 72-23 LSS FCV J2-23 FCV 74 fvc 72-22 G80V RX MOV 80 FALLS TO OPEN PLUGGED INTERLOCK StGNAL INTERt0CK SIGNAL C. FLW PATH FRM CLOSE 40f TENT #0f SENT 1 cn RWST-MDP 1A-A artu 1 A1 CSS-14A LPR-14 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A CSS-MOV-CC-7223 CSS-McV-PG-7223 CSS-22 CSS-23 g4 g g Q 3.0E-003 .Q.1.1E-003 [g & Page 3 I I- I' I LPR fCV 74-3 AC POWER tMAVAlI LPl FCV 74-3 'PR FCV 63-72 L LFR FCV 74-3 RC POWER UNAVAll FAILS 10 CLOSE 680V RX MOV 90 FAILS TO CLOSE INTERLOCK FAULTS- INTERLOCK FAULTS 480V RX MOV 80-1A1-1 1A1-1 LPR-M04-00-743 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A LPI-MOV-00-743 LPR-ICC-NO-63?2 LPR-ICC-NO-743 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A 3M .g Q ,3.0E-003 Q 1.9E-004 Q 1.9E-004 g FVC 72-22 INTERLOCK SIGNAL WOT SENT CSS-23 gg irons er from Pcse 3 I I I CSS FCV J2-22 N RATOR FAILS 10 CSS FCV 72-22 AC POWER UNAVAll FAILS TO CLOSE- REALICM CSS FOR ' INTERLOCK FAULis (80V RX MOV BD REClRC 1Al-1 CSS-MOV-00-7222 CSS-RME-FO CSR CSS-1CC-NO-7222 ACP-IAC-LP-141A
- Q 3.R1 Q 7.7E-002 Q 2.5E-06E g ..____! _ , , 4., 4._- . _ , , _ -, .- _ - _ . - , - ~ . - , l. __..m . ..;._ - __
l INSUFFICIENT Tree: CssCm FLOW FROM PSS1 Project: SEO ' Page 4 of 8 Date test modified: CSS-5 iue Sep 2012:43:44 1988 fg irensfer from Poge 1 I RWSi LMIAVAILABLE CSS CW 72-506 FAILS TO OPEN LPI-INK-VF-RWST1 CSS-CKV-CC-72506 Q 2.7E-006 Q 1.0E-004 9 4
free: CSSCMt-INSUFfIC!ENI Project: SEO rLOW FROM PS$4 Pege 5 ef 8 - Date test Iso dified: fue Sep 20 12:43:44 1988 CSS-7 er from Pege 1 g g Irans' 1 INSUFFICIENI INSUfflCIENT FLOW FLOW TROM PS54 THfiU PS84 ' CSS-11 LPR-11 I I I I Fall 10 ISOL LC POWER (JNAVAIL M RWSI LO-LO DPERAIOR FAILS TO FAULIS IN PS54 CSS MDP 18-B 6.9kV S/D ED TB-8 LEVEL ALARM REALIGN CSS FOR SUCTION FROM RWSi REC 12C CSS-17 'ACP-TAC-LP-198 ESF-ASL-FC-RWST1 CSS-RNE-f0-CSR CSS-16 gg g Q 2.0E-005 Q 7.7E-002 gg i i I Fall 10 ISOL ESS FCV 72-23 4C PUWER UNAVAIL FCV 72-20 FAILS thlEttoCK FAULTS FOR FCV f FLW PAIN TPM FAILS TO CLOSE 480V RX HOV BD TO OPEN g RUST-MDP 18-8 arts 181-5 72-20 CSS-18 CSS-MOV-00-7221 ACP-TAC-LP-1815 CSS-164 CSS-21 Q 3.0E-003 g [4 6 Pege 6 I I I I Fall 10 ISOL FCV 63-1 DOES 1101 RC POWER UNAVAIL [.SS fCV 72 CSS FCV 72 FLW PATM FRM CLOSE G80V RX $10V SD FAILS TO OPEK PLUGGEO RWST-MDP 18-5 181-3 artu CSS-18A LPR-14 ACP-IAC-LP-1918 CSS-MOV-CC-7220 CSS-MOV-PG-7220 [k' _@- Q Q 3.0E-003 Q 1.1E-003 i LPR FCV 74-21. RC POWER tpsAWAll FAILS TO CLOSE 480V RX MOV BC 151-B - LPR-MOV-00-7421 ACP-TAC-LP-1818 G 3.0E-003 p
INTERLOCK Tree: CSSCpt FAULTS FOR FCV Project: SEO 72-20 Ps9a 6 of 8 Date test modified: CSS-21 , fue Sep 2012:43:44 1985 1 ensfer from Pege $ [ I FCV 74-21 FCV 72-21 INTERLOCK SIGNAL INTERLOCK SIGNAL NOT SENT WOT SENT CSS-24 CSS-25 I I I I I I l iPIFCV dQ1 EPR FCV 63-73 LPA FCV 74-21 P.C POWER UNAVAIL ESS FCV 72-21 DPERATOR FAILS 10 CSS FCV 72-21 PC POWER UNAVAIL FAILS 70 CLOSE INTERLOCK FAutis INTERLOCK FAULTS r.80V RX MOV BD FAILS TO CLOSE PTALICW CSS FOR INTERLOCK FAULTS r80V RX Mcv 80 151-8 RECIRC 181-8 LPI-MOV-00-7421 LPR-ICC-NO-6373 IPR-ICC-NO-7421 ACP-TAO LT-88 CSS-MOV-00-7221 CSS-MME-FO-CSR CSS-tCC-NO-7221 ACP-TAC-LP-1BfB Q 3 F DU3 1.9E-004 1.9E-004
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A CSS-8 [gIransferfromPage1 1 RWSI UNAVAILABLE ESS CV 72-507 FAILS TO OPEN LPI-TNK-VF-RWSTI CSS-CKY-CC-72507 Q 2.7E-006 Q 1.0E-004
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INSUfflCIENI free- CSR FLOW FROM PSS3 Project: SES Page 3 of 7 Date Lost Modified: CSR-4 Mori Aug 29 13:05:02 1986 ggtrans:erfromPage1 I I I I l 7 All 10 ISOL INSUFFICIENT FLOW RC POWER UNAVAIL MO RWSI LO-LO DPERK10R FAILS 10 FAULIS IN PS53 CSS MDP 1A-A THRU PS85 6.9kV S/D BD 1A-A LEVEL ALARM REALIGN CSS FOR SUCTION FROM RWST RECIRC CSR-13 'LPR-12 ACP-TAC-LP-1AA ESF-ASL-FC-RWST1 CSS-XHE-FO-CSR CSR-12 Q g g Q 2.0E-005 Q 7.7E-002 Q l I I Fall 10 ISOL CSS FCV 72-22 AC POWER UNAVAT I FCV 72-23 INTERLOCK FLU PATH FRM FAILS TO CLOSE G80V RX MOV BD FAULTS FAULTS FOR FCV RWST-MDP 1A-A 1A1-1 72-23 nriN CSR-14 CSS-MOV-00-7222 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A ~ CSR-12A CSR-20 Q 3.0E-D03 g [g .[g I I I I I Fall 10 ISOL FCV 63-1 DOES NOT RC POWER UNAVAIL CSS FCV 72-23 CSS FCV 72-23 FCV 74-3 TVC 72-22 FLW PATH TRM CLOSE 480V RX MOV BD y RW$i-MDP 1A-A 1A1-1 FAILS TO OPEN PLUGGED . INTERLOCK SIGNAL 40i SENT
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4C POWER UNAVAIL FAILS TO CLOSE 480V Rx MOV 80 FAILS TO CLOSE INTERLOCK FAULTS INTERLOCK FAULis (80V Rx MOV 90 1A1-1 1Al-1. LPR-MOV-00-743 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A LPI-MOV-00-743 LPR-ICC-NO-6372 LPR-ICC-NO-743 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A Q 3.0E-001 @ O 35- ' O ' '*-" ' O ' '"- ' @ fVC 72-22 INTERLOCK SIGNAL-h0T SENT CSR-23 Iransfer from Page 3 I I . I CSS FCV 72-22 DPERAIOR FAILS TO CSS TCv 72-22 4C POWER UNAVAIL FAILS TO CLOSE REALIGN CSS FOR INTERLOCK FAULTS 480V Ex MOV so RECIRC 1A1-1 CSS-MOV-00-7222 CSS-xNE-FO-CSR CSS-ICC-NO-7222 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A Q 3.0E-003 Q 7.7E-002 Q 2.5EW g
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IF: USE INSUFFICIENI Project: SEO FL(M THROUGN PSS6 Page 6 of 7 Date Lost Modified:
. Man AuS 2913:05:02 1988 CSR.9 g Irans'er from Page 1 I I l l l I I CSS MDP 18-8 CSS MDP 18-8 ESS 80P 18-8 CSS MDP FAN 18-8 tsS MDP 18-8 FAT FAILURE OF CS nC Paute uMAvAir CSS M:)Ps 1A-A AND FAILS TO START LMAVAIL DUE TO 200M FAN 18 TO 6.9tV S/D 8D 18 8 18-8 FAIL TO FAILS 10 START LMAVAIL DUE 10 FAILS TO RUN FDL TEST AND 9 TAINT 26 NRS T/M RUN FOR 24 NOURS START CSS-MDP-FS-188 CSS-MDP-TM-188 CSS-MDP-FR-18826 CSS-FAN-FS-MDP18 CSS-FAN-TM-POP 18 CSS-FAN-FR-P182&_
ACP-TAC-LP-188 lg CSS-CCF-FS-1AA88 O 3 35-O3 E- 5 0 z '- O ' z'- ' O 3 "E- 3 0 z *~ 5 O ' 25- o' I l - INSUFFICIENI FLOW __FAULIS IN PS56-- THROUGH CCW PS362 CCW-XVM-RE-17258 CSR-9A1 Q 3.0E-00T gg i i i I I I i CSS CV 72-568 FAIL 10 RESI CCW PtCED OR SWS A0V 1186 COMMON CAUSE CSS FCV 72-2 CSS FCV 72-2 ESS CV 72-529 4AN OP VLV $698 4!$POSti!ONED FAILS TO OPEN FAILURE OF SUS FAILS TO OPEN PLUGGED FAILS TO OPEN FAIL 510 OPEN ROVs y FRM TEST /MAI CCV-XVM-RE-5698 SUS-RVM-PR-16138 il SWS-ADV-CC-1186 SWS-CCF-FT-A0V CSS-MOV-CC-722 CSS-Mov-PG-722 CSS-Ctv-Cc-72529 CSS-CEV-CC-72568 Q 3.0E-005 Q 7.0E-005 Q 1.0E-003 Q 1.0E-004 Q 3.0E-003 Q 1.1E-003 Q 1.0E-00' O 1. E-004 I I ESS FCVs T M I RC POWER UNAVAIL P.ND 72-2 FAIL TO G80V RX MOV BD DPEN 181-8 CSS-CCF-CC-392 ACP-TAC-LP-1818 02m 4;p
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- LPR-6 (PI-ADV-PG-T&28 LPR-7 LPI-80V-PG-T&16 Q 3.1E-004 n Page 7 Q 3.1E-004 7 55 ILIENI LPI N/X 19-8 N ATOR FAILS 10 FAULIS IN CCW FLOW TNROUGM PST3 PtGED OURl4G DrEN CDI TCY TO M/X PS361 JPERAil04 1-153 (PR-8 (PI-RfM-PG-RMX15 LPR-TNE-CCv1153 tPR-68 Q 4.1E-004 o Pega 6 Q 1.4E-006 i i s a 1 1 1 LFI CW 74-51I li5LITTTEllNI FLOW II5DTTIEIENI f tUW swS 40v 1190 ttGED C81 rtGED OR rtGtD CR LTr~EIETeteW #Cv TNROUGN PST3 FAILS TO WEN FROM SUS PS176 PLUGGED 9ISFCSITIONED RISPOSIfl0NED utsPOSITIONED T&-24 DOES NOT REMIT FLOW LP-11Al-CE LPI-CKY-CC-T&515 SUS-$ SUS-A0V-PG-1190 SWS-IVM-PW-16068 SWS-WV4 PR-1613s SWS-rvM-PR-15549 CW-40 (g> Q 3.0E-006 Q Q 1.1E-006 Q 7.0E-003 Q 7.0E-003 Q 7.0E-003 <gy i I i s i i I
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TEST AND PA!WT 24 PRS START LPI-*0V-PG-T&21 iCP-TAC-LP-188 LPI-80P-TM-198 LPI-mDP-FS-188 LPI-MDP-FR-19824 LPI-CCF-FS-TAA99 LPR-10 LP1t-8C
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# FAILS 30 CLOSE J EC N3WER UusAvAlt Lpg 840W 63-1 FCV 63-1 FOR SDC 480y tr pgw 30 FAILS TO CLOSE 1A1-1 NPR-NNE-ro-631 ACP-tac-LP-1A1A LPI-Mov-00-631 Q 2.1 N Q Q 3.UE-UU3 Y
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Iree* LPC## INSUffICI[5 I Project: SEO FLOW THROUG4 7S84 Pege 5 of 9 Onte test stodified: fue Sep 2010:12:361998 LPC M-11 g trans<er frtum Pege 1 . . EM FCW 63-T3 LFR FCys 63-T2 IKit 10 **W Elftiilli;siTion es EUiililimENI SUMP KCICWR UNAVAIC~ FCV 63-T3 DOES LPR (CW 63-73 FAlts to CPEN FtGED RW 63-73 FAIL 10 PEttAmG Cut Dew Pv5T LEvit f.80V RX MOV 8D WJT RECElvE OPEN Rt0CKED stonAt trEu rtos art Rx stu stuscas 1st-s (PR-Mov-PG-6373 (PR-CCF-CC-7273 RfC-MME-CR4PtG RVT-EME-MSCAL LPR-stR-PG-SUMP ACP-TAC-LP-191s LPR-ACT-FA-TRN8 LPR-MOV-CC-6373 Q 5.0E-005 <g> Q 1.6E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 1.1E-003 Q 2.6E-004 Q 9.N Q 5.DE-004 Y a ec , . __. _ _ ~ _ . , _ , __. . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . -.__
fault $~IN CCW TrM: LPC8Mt TO M/X PS361 Freject: SES Page 6 ef 9 Dete test 8%dified: LPR-6e fue Sep 20 10:12:36 1988 g trensfer fress Page 1 IKIL IQ RSIOR I CCW FCV 1-153 PC POWER UNAM C cCW nan wx to-o rafts to Opts t. soy ex May so VLys FRM T/M 182-8 CCV-X981-#E-##xto CCW-MOV-CC-1153 ACP-TAC-LP-te2e () 6.0E-005 Q 3.0E-003 Q T 61 _ ,, . . - - - , . , __ -_- , ., ,-m. - . - . .. .- , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _
Tree: LPCM INSuf F IClfiii~ Project
- SES FLOW iMROUGN PS79 Fe9* 7 ef 9 Date test set *.fified:
fue Sep 20 10:12:36 1996 LPR-7 Trans'er fress Pege 1 1 ! I 1 7 iilWFititur LFT 1/X iA-A orERAIOR FITLs To #Autis IN CCW FLOW ffMKRF,M PSTS FtGED DURING TEN CCW FCV TO M/X PS354 TERAil04 1-156 LPR-9 LPI-MTX-PG-RMX1A. LPR-XME-CCV1156 LM-79 o Page 9 Q 1.4E-004 Q 4.1E-004 I I I T I I t i FtGED 04 [Fl FCV 74-3 7mSUfilCIENT FLW 5WS A0V 1185 PtGED OR FtGED OR INSUfflCIENI (LOW LPt CV 74-514 RISPOSIffJNED FLUGGED TO SUS PS163 FtUGGED 4ISPOSITIONED WISPOSITIONED THROUGW PST8 FAILS TO OPEN SUS-ADV-PG-1188 SUS-XVM-PR-16064 SWS-NVM-PR-16134 SWS-XV4-M-1$544 (PI-p0V-PG-743 LP-13Al-DE LPI-CKV-CC-74514 SWS-1 Q 7.0E- M Q 7.M-M Q 7.0E- M Q 3.lE-M4
<&> 0 1.0E-M 4 Q Q 1.1E-M4 LFIrep[A-A LFI A-A LFI Mcps imF Rws: ls0LITT W 7 EiET b liFETI LFT Wi5i/tDETTCT EC power UNIVIII !FITcF-fA-A 19-9 FAlt TO FAUtiS - A TRAIN (RECIRCULATION) 74-12 DOES NOT 5.9kV S/D 90 1 A- A LM8 AVAIL DUE TO F AILS TO START FAILS TO RUN FOR TEST AND MAINT 26 MRS START PERMIT FLOW CN-63 ACP-TAC-LP-1AA LP1-MDP-TM-1AA LPT-MOP-FS-1AA LPI-MDP-FR-1AA2% LPI-CCT-fS-14A59 LM-1T LPR-9C e Q 4.5E-004 g n Page 7 4 9 9 Q z.0E-003 Q 3.UE-003 Q 7.zE-004 I I I
INSurFICIENT LPI ICV 74-3 FCV 63-1 DOES DOES NOT CLOSE noi CLOSE FLOW IMROUGH PS85 LPR-16 LPR-14 LPR-12 o Page 8 o Page 4 [IiiiTATisdfTtiF RC PowtR UNWKIF FCV 63-7z' 00ES LFa#CV23-7z LPR FCv 63-7z Lrt FCVs 63-7z IIIL to b RIECKEINKTitsi of RLOCKED f 80V RX MOV 90 WOT RECEIVE OrtN FAILS TO OPEN PtGED n#D 63-73 FAlt. TO PEFULNG C#L De4 PVST LEVEL 1A1-1 SIGNAL TEN FLCS STR WX S/U SENSORS ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A LPR-ACT-FA-TRNA ,1M-MOV-CC-6372 LPR-MOV-PG-6372 LPR-CCT-CC-7273 RFC-RME-CRMPtG RWT-FME-MSCAL LPR-STR-PG-SUMP Q 5.UE-005 Q Q 1.6E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 3.1E-003 Q 2.6E-004 Q 9.00-DG6 Q 5.0E-004
~ #AutS lii Fi7F (RECIRCULAtl04)
LPR-9C Irons'er frem Pege T i . , , AC PUWER UNAVAll LPR IAN 1A-A LPR FAN 1A-A LPR FAN 1A-A 480V CAS VENT 90 falls TO STARf FAILS 30 RUN FOR JNAVAIL DUE TO 1Al-A 24 NRS TEST AND MAINT ACP-T AC-LP-C1 A1 A LPR-FAN-FS-1AA LPR-FAN-FR-1AA24 LPR-FAN-TM-1AA
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.Dete Lost simHfled:
'LPR Tue Sep 2016:12:361M
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[F M Cv 76-3 PC P0ldER UN4WelI [PR FCW 63-72 FAILS TO CLOBE (90W RX HDW go ' infERLOCK FAULTS' 1A1-1 LPI-MOV-00-763 ACP-TAC-LP*1A1A LPR-ICC-mo-6372 Q 3.UE-UU3 < gly- Q 3.9E-506 j i 1 5
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.. Tree: LMWR FAULi$ f4 CCat to N/N PS354 :- -Prefect: SEe ~
Pese 9 of 9 Date Lost stedlffed: Tue Sep 2619:12:361998 LPR-73'
.Iransfer. free rage 7 s 1 i FAIL TO RSTGIE . CCU FCV 1-1 % - RC POWEst tptAVATE~ -.
CCW WsNt WK 1A-A FAILS TO OPEN- L80V RK flDW 3D WLVs Fan T/pt IA2-A T CCW-Nv4-RE-901N u CCW-MOW-CC-1tS6 ACP-TAC-LP-1A2A (J 6.UE-UE5 ..(J 3.UE-dDJ Q . s C2 i
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Mot LEG Tree: LPWOT PECIRCUL ATION. . Froject: SES JNAVAILABLE Pege 1 of 1 Dete test medified: (PM-1 TSu Ju( 07 08:2T:341988 h'I i iNSUF FLOW ii3GF fLOIMU TMtf PS91 (MOT r$T6 & FS81 (COLD LEG RECIRC) LEG PFCIRC) LPM-2 LPR-1 1 1 I LPR f CW 63 UT LFERATOR FAILS 10 INSUfffCIFNI MARDWARE FAULTS DPEN LPR TCV rLOW TMPOUGH PS89 63-172 481D PS90 LPN-3 LPR-NME-FO-63172 LPN-4 g o 4.0e-Ou5 g i f i I I RC POWER LMAVAIL IFR FCV 63-172 LPR FCV 63-172 INSUFFICIENT l#$UfflCIENT
.Y 480V RX MOV 90 LMIAVAIL DUE TO FAILS TO OPEN rLOW THROUGIl PS89 FLOW TilROUGN PS90 181-8 TEST AND 94AINT ACP-TAC-LP-1818 LPR-MOV-TM-63172 LPR-fe0W-CC-63172 LPft-5 LPu-6 Q.
i Q 2.UE-004 i Q 3.UE-003 g e i i i i LPR FCV 74-35 LPI fCV 63-94 RC POWER UNav41L INSUFFICIERI FLOW LPR FCV I4-33 INSUtflCIENT FLOW hC POWER tpIAWAtt IPS fCV 63-73 i rastS to CPEN rails to ttoSE up0v Rx MOV SD - rNeu PSTS RAILS TO OPEN TNRU PS89 680V RK n0V SD FAILS TO CLOSE 181-8. 141-1 LPR-MOV-CC-7435 LPI-MOV-00-6396 ACP-TAC-LP-1918 LPR-4 LPR-MOV-CC-7633 LPR-3 ACP-TAC-LP-1ATA LP!-MOV-00-6393 0 3.0E-M3 Q 3.0E- M Q Q Q 3.0E-M 3 Q <gy Q 3.0E-M3
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-wm-4 -y,- +y.,- y y - re w v- w , e , w ^
w v - wr-t v - - - -e * ' qr e-t vw- v. .e e- +1 gev- ,s y =e e..-e .-.2._s- -.__ .----.m..._..--m._ _.-
Tree: SilNJ INSUFFICIENT PLOW Projects SES fnPOUGH PS25 rege 1 ef 3 (INJECTION) Date Lost motfif ted: Mert AuS 29 13:26:20 1988
$1-1 hh l
INSUFFICIENT el FCV 63-22 FLOW THROUGN PS22 JNAVAILABLE AND PS24 SI-2 >Pi-McV-Ps-6322 Q 6.6E-004 I I INSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGH PS22 FLOW THROUGH PS24 SI-3 SI-s [h O **** Z l l l l g i e l FtGED Ot INSUTFICIENI FLOW $ RPi MDP 18-8 FAILS TO STARY TPI MDP 18-8 FAILS TO RUN l'
@ l MDPs 1A-A AND 18-8 FAIL TO RC POWER tmAVAll 5.9kV S/D SD 18-8 DC POWER tmAVAIL 125Y VITAL OUS Il WO ACTUAf10N SIGNAL FR0ml SIS INROUGN CCW PS362 9tSPOSITIONED START LOGIC TRAIN 18 MP3-CCF-FS-1AABS ACP-TAC-LP-188 DCP-IDC-LP-II SIS-ACT-FA-TRN8 CCW-XVM-RE-17258 sus-rvM-PR-16138 NPI-PDP-FS-1BB WPI MDP-FR-1BB o 3.**3 0 3 * *' O 63'*'
@ @ Q 1.6E @ 3 Q 3.M45 Q T.0E- M i I I i i PLSED OR INSUFFICIENT FLOW INSUFFICIENT FLOW INSUFFICIENT FAULTS IN PS22 9fSPOSlfl0NED FROM SWS PS176 FROM CCU PS356 FLOlt TROM PS21 (13JECil0N)
SUS-XVM-PR-15548 SWS-5 CCV-23 51-5 51-3s Q I.0E-005 g g g g Page 2 1 I I HPI FCV 63-48 HPI CV 65-510 RWSi UNAVAILABLE '@l FCV 63-5 LMtAVAILABLE FAILS TO OPEN JNAVAILABLE HPI-MOV-PG-6348 nPI-CtV-CC-63510 LPI-TNK-VF-RWSTT nPI-MOV-PG-635 O ' "* O ' * *' o z ~ ~ O ' *-**'
FAULIS IN PS22 i m - SilNJ (INJECTION) Pf8}'Ct: SIO Pege 2 of 3 Date test Modified:
$1-38 Mon Aug 29 13:26:20 1988 Q rrans1er frew Page 1 1 I I I I I HPI FCV 63-153 SwS A0V 1152 HPI CV 63-526 COMMON CAUSE FtGED OR ' AIL 10 RSICRE F MPI #OP 18 JNAVAILABLE FAILS 10 OPEN FAILS TO OPEN FAILURE OF SUS MISPOSITIONED CCW St TRW 18-8 JNAVAIL DUE TO ADVs FRM T/M TEST AND MAINT MPI-MOV-PG-63153 sus-A0V-CC-1152 MP3-CKV-CC-63526 SVS-CCF-FT-ADV SWS-XVM-P8-SI188 CCW-XVM-RE-SI188 , WPI-MDP-TM-188 G 6.6E-Ou4 g 1.0E-003 Q I.0E-004 Q 1.0E-004 Q 2.3E-004 Q 3.5E-004 Q 2.0E-003
-IdSUFFICIEN!
FLOW THROUGH PS24 SI-4 Q Irans:er from Page 1
- I I I I I I l INSUfflCIENT flou INSUfflCIENI ILOW INSUfflCIENI FLOW FLGED OR FtGED OR MPI IOP 1A-A IE l 80P 14-A THROUGN CCW PS355 NPI MDPs 1A-A AND rROM CCW PS337 TO SWS PS163 9ISPOSITIONED MISPOSITIONED FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUlf 10 8 Fall TO START CCU-XVM-RE-1725A CCU-20 SUS-1 SWS-Xv4-PR-16134 Sv5-Xvn-PR-15544 MPI-MDP-FS-1AA MPI-MDP-FR-1AA Q 3.0E-003 g g Q T.0E-005 Q T,0E-005 0 35- 2 0 3. E-005 WPI-CCF-FS-1AA88)
Q 6.3E-004 I I I I I AC PcWER UNAVAll IJC POWER UNAVAll WO ACTUAll04 INSUfflCIENI " fAULIS IN PS24 5.9kV S/D 80 1A-A 125V VITAL 805 I SIGNAL FROM SIS FLOW FRGE PS23 (INJECTION) LOGIC 1 RAIN 14 ACP-IAC-LP-1AA DCP-IDC-LP-l SIS-ACT-FA-TRNA SI-6 St-48 g g Q 3.6E-003 [g g Page 3 I I .. I MPI CV 63-510 MPI FCV 63-5 Rwst UNAVAltastE M'I FCV 63-47 FAILS TO OPEN JNAVAILA8tE JNAVAILABLE MPI-CKV-CC-63510 HPI-MOV-PG-635 LPI-TNC-VF-RUST 1 NPI-MOV-PC-6347 Q 1.0E-00' O 5 'S
- 5 O 2 - 6 O ' 25-'o'
free: SilsJ F Aut.TS IN PS}f Project: SES (INJECT 10N) Foga 3 e8 3 Cote test modified: h Atg 29 13:26:20 1988 St-48 Trans'er from Page 2 g l l l l l l _ HPI MDP 1A-A HPI CV 63-526 5WS A0V 1176 SWS S! 1A-A MAN Fall 10 RSIORE l LUMPON cat.f3E RPI F0V 63-152 rf VtVs CCW St TR4 1A-A r FAlttRE OF SUS JNAVAIL DUE TO FAILS TO CPEN FAILS TO OPEN L9sAVAILABLE LMAVAILABLE FRM 7,M MWs TEST AND MAluf SVS-XVM-FR-SITAA CCW-Nv9t-RE-SITAA SWS-CCF-H- A0V HPI-CKV-CC-6352% SVS-ACV-CC-1176 MPI-Mov-PG-63152 MP1-MDP-TM-1AA
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INSUFFICIENT free: $1PEC FLOW THROUGN PS25 Preject: SEO (REC 1RCULAfl0N) Pe9* i of T Dete test Medified: St-10 fue Aug 30 13 00 30 1988 t l INSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIEN! FLOW THROUGN PS22 FLOW TPROUGN PS24 St-12 SI-13 Q . O Page 6 I I J l I i .- I lWSUFFICIENI FLOW FAULIS IN PS22 INSUFFICIEN! FLOW INSUFFICli%? FLOW N.GED OR FtGED OR PPI FOP 15-8 MPI MDP 18-8 THROUGN CCW PS362 (INJECTION) FROM SUS PS176 FROM CCW PS356 9tSPOSITIONED 4fSPOSITIONED FAILSTOSTART FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 MRS CCW-XVM-PE-17255 SI-38 SWS-5 CCW-23 SWS-rv4-PR-16135 SUS-xv4-PR-1554s lNPI-MDP-FS-1ss NPI-NDP-FR-1ss24 g 3.0E-005 g g g G T.0E-005 g T.0E-005 g 3.0E-003 0 ' '*- ' l I I I I I uC rower UNavAi r nC P0wER UNAvAIL =0 ActUA1 ION l INSUFFICIENT SI~F't.MP FAUliS IN PS22 y 125V VITAL BUS II 5.9kV S/D BD 18-8 SIGNAL FROM SIS FLOW THROUGN PS21 SUCTION FAILS 10 (RECIRCULAfl0N) on LOGIC TRAIN 19 RND PS27 ISOLATE DCP-iDC-LP-Il ACP-TAC-LP-198 SIS-ACT-TA-TRN9 SI-14 SI-18 S!-12C
/ Q 1.6E-003 d Page 5 gg i l i I INSUFF: ens INSUFFI;IEN RPI FAN 1s-s MPI PAN 1s-s 'nC P0utt uNavAtt FLOW TMROUGN PS21 rLOW inROUGN PS29 FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUll FOR L80V CAS VENT 8D TO TRAIN 8 24 HR$ 181-3 SI-16 SI-TT HPI-FAN-FS-198 MPI-FAN-FR-19924 ACP-TAC-LP-C1878
[g n Page 5 3.0E-003 g T.2E-004 g I INSUFFICIENI HPI fCV 63-48 FLOW TNROUGN PS23 JNAVAILA8tE TO TRAIN 8 L l SI-19 NPT-MOV-PG-6348 p g i.iE-004 I l INSUFFICIENI MPI FCV 63-47 FLOW THROUGN PS14 !MAVAILA8LE RND PS15 51-30 MPI-MOV-PG-6347 g Page 2 0 ' -* '
Teee: SteEC INSUFFICIENT PtejeCti SEO FLOW THROUGH PS14 Pege 2 of 7 RND PS15 Date Lost Mndified: Tue Aug 30 13:00:30 1988 SI-30 Irans4 er frcna Page 1 1 I INSUFFICIENT INSUfflCIENI FLOW THROUGR PSIS FLOW THROUGH PS14 51-24 S1-25 g Pege 2 g Page 4 INSUIIlCIENT FLOW THROUGH PS15
-$1-24 ers fran Page(s) 2 6 g g irons' m I I e FAULIS IN PS15 TERATOR FAILS 10 INSUfflCIEN!
$ TEII NPR FCV 63-7 FLOW THROUGN PS26 51-24A NPR-MME-FO-63T $1-27 gg Q 2.1E-003 g Page 3 I I I ett f Cvs 63-6, RC FouER UNAVAIL WR fCV 63-T W1t ICvs 63-6 AND
-7, AND -8 Fall F.80V RX FIOV 80 FAILS TO OPEN 53-7 FAIL 10 OPEN TO OPEN 1A1-1 HPR-CCF-CC-V678 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A NPR-MOV-CC-637 NPR-CCF-CC-6367 Q 1.6E-004 g Q 3.0E-003 Q 2.6E-004
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INSUF F ICIE N T Tree: SfdEC FLOW THROUGH Project: SEO PS26 Page 3 of 7 Date test podified:
$1-27 Wed Moe 01 10:30:12 1997 Q 1ransfers frtwo Page(s) 2 4 I I .
I I I FAULIS IN INSUF FLOW FRfJM DPERATOR FAILS LPR FCV 63-72 MINIFLOW LPI MINIFLOW PS26' RNR PLMP 14- A TO OPEN NPR FCV INTERLOCK FAULTS VALVE CLOSURE VLV 74-12 00ES (TMRU PS79) 63-8 FAULTS le0T PERMIT FLOJ SI-27A LPR-7 MPR-XNE-FO-638 LPR-ICC-NO-6372 SI-31 SI-23 [g g Q 2.1E-003 3 1.9E-004 O Page 3 [ l I I I I HPR FCVS 63-8 MPR FCVs 63-6, MPR FCV 63-8 AC POWER LMeAVAIL LPI FCV 74-12 RC POWER URIAVAIL FCV 74-12 DOES AND 63-11 FAIL -T, AND -8 FAIL FAILS TO OPEN r.80V R:* MOV SD FAILS TO OPEN 080V RN MOV BD BOT RECEIVE LOW TO OPEN TO OPEN 1A1-1 141-1 FLOW SIGIIAL MPR-CCF-CC-V811 NPR-CCF-CC-V678 MPR-MOV-CC-638 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A lLPI-MOV-CC-7412 ACP-TAC-LP-1A14 LP!-ASF-NI-6392 Q 2.6E-004 Q 1.6E-004 Q 3.0E-003 g Q 3.0E-003 g Q 1.6E-006 MINIFLOW VALVE CLOSURE FAULTS g SI-31 g Transfers fran Page(s) 3 $ ta i I FCW'63-3 FCV 63-4 OR VALVE CLOSURE FCV S3-175 VALVE FAULTS CLOSURE FAULTS St-32 51-33 Q g Page 4 I I I RC POWER UNAVAIL LPR FCV 63-3 LPR FCV 63-3 DP FAILS TO r.80V RX MOV BD INTERLOCK FAULTS FAILS TO CLOSE CLOSE St MINIFLO 1A1-1 TO RWST ACP-TAC-LP-141A LPR-ICC-NO-633 LPR-MOV-00-633 MPR-XHE-FO-633 g Q 1.9E-0G' O 5 "*- 5 0 2 '5-oo5
7 4 free: 51 REC FCV 63-4 om Project: SEO FCV 63-175 VALVE page 4 of T. CLOSURE FAULTS Date Last imodified: INd stor 01 10:30:12 1999 51-33 Q 1ransfer fress Pager 3 I FCV 63-4 FCV 63-175 WALVE CLOSLSE VALVE CLOSURE FAULTS FAULTS
' S1- 34 SI-35 Ik i i I I i 1 LPR FCV 63-4 DP FAILS TO ~ E PouER UmAVAll LPR FCV 63-175 LPR FCV 63-175 IF FAILS TO AC POWER tJetAVA E LPR FCV 63-4 FAILS TO CLGEE CLO5E St M!sIFLO INTENT 0CIC FAULTS FAILS TO CLOSE CLOSE St felulFLO 680V RK MOV 50 INTERLOCK FAULTS 480V RX IIOW SD FO ausi 181-8 TO RUST 181-8 LPR-mov-00-63175 upt-sue-FO-63175 ACP-TAC-LP-1818 LPR-ICC-IIO-634 LPR-sq0V-00-634 , MPR-WME-FO-634 ACP-TAC-LP-1818 L LPR-ICC-90-63175 g ' Q 1.9E-004 Q 3.0E-003 Q 2.9E-003 g Q 1.9E-00' O5 "1 0 2 '*-**5 INSUFFICIEMI
, FLou iNROUGH e PS14 Cn SI-25
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FAULTS IN DPtRATOR FAILS INSUFFICIEnf PS14 TO OPEN MPR FCV FLOW THROUGN 53-6 PS26 SI-258 ' HPR-xnE-FO-636 SI-27
- [g - G 2.1E-003 d Page 3 I I- I
= MPR FCVs 63-6, AC POWER UmAVAIL HPR FCV 63-6 hPR FCVs 63-6
-7,' AsIO -8 F AIL ' 480V RX MOV 80 FAILS TO OPE 4 MID 63-7 FAIL 10 10 OPEN 181-8 DPEN PPR-CCF-CC-V678 ACP-TAC-LP-1818 HPR-940V-CC-636 tePR-CCF-CC-6367
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INSUFBICIENI it M: SIPEC FLOW THROUGH PS29 Project
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- FAULIS IN PS29 INSUF FLOW JROM WERAIOR FAILS 10 LPR FCV 63-73 MINIFLou %ALVE LPI MINIFLOW RRR PUMP 18-8 DPEN NPR FCV INTERLOCIC FAULTS CLOSURE FAUtis WLV FCV 74-24 (INPU PS74) ' 63-11 KES NOT PERMIT rio St-17A l LPR-6 NPR-X8tE-FO-6311 . LPR-ICC-No-6373 SI-31 SI-21 Q g G 2.lE WJI
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Q 1.9E-004 O Page 3 I I I i WR FCWs 63- D ND~ EC POWER UNAVAll WR FCW 63-11 %C POWER UstAVAIL FCV 74-24 DOES LPI FCV J4-24 53-11 FAIL To . 480V RX MOV 90 FAILS TO OPEN G80V RX MOV 80 NOT RECElWE LOW FAILS TO OPEN ~ UPEN 181-9 181-8 FLOW SIGNAL MPR-CCF-CC-V811 ACP-TAC-LP-1818 IIPR-MOV-CC-6311 ACP-TAC-LP-1918 LPI-ASF-Nf-6391 LPI-MOV-CC-7424 G 2.6E-004 g Q 3.0E-003 g Q l.6E-004 G 3.0E-003 s.n St PUMP SUCTION FAILS TO ISOLATE SI-18 Iransfers freen Pege(s) 16' I I FCV 63-5 MPR CKV 61-310 FAULTS OR FAILS 10 CLOSE DPERATOR FAILS TO ItuiATF
'SI-184 NPR-CRV-00-63510_
[g - Q 1.0E-003 I I RC POWER UNAVAll DPERAIOR. FAILS 10 MPI FCV 63-5 480V RX MOV 50 CLOSE HPR FCV . FAILS 10 CLOSE 151-8 53-5 ACP-1AC-LP-1815 NPR-MME-FO-635 NPI-Mov-00-635 g Q 2.1E-60I G 3.0E-003 r wr*Ws-e WhF YP V' '
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3-t treer SIPEC INSUFFICIENI Project: SES FLOW inROUGM PS24 Pege 6 of T Date Lost 8%dified: Tur Aug 30 13:00:30 1986 51-13
- Q 1rens<er froo Page 1 I I I I I I I .
'EFI MDP 14 A
'INSufflCIEMI FLOW PtGED OR 'leSufflCIERI FLOW NPI #CP 1A*A INSUFFICIENT FLOW PLGED M FAULIS IN PS24 FAILS TO Cutt FOR to SWS PS163 41SPOStil0NED FROM CCW PS337 FAILS TO STARY inROUGs CCW PS355 MISPOSlil04ED (twJECT104) 24 IWt3 CCV-20 NPI-MDP-ts.1 ppi-MDP-TR-1AA24 CCW-Wyel-RE-1725A SWS-NvM-PR-16134 SI-48 Sv$-1 SWS-xvM-PR-1554A (J 3.0E-005 - Q 7.0E-005 g g Q T.0E-005 g g 3.cE-003 s ] 7.2E-004 I I I I l 1 '
INSUfflCIEmi FAULTS 14 PS24 bC POWER UNAVAll 'kC POWER UNAVAll 'WO ACTUAll0N St PUMP SIGWAL F#OM SIS SUCil04 FAILS TO FLOW ipRtl PS23, (RECIRCULATION) 125V VIIAL SUS I 5.9kV S/D 50 1A-A LOGIC TRAIN 1A ISOLATE PS14. AND Psi 5 07 SI-22 51-130 DCP-TDC-LP-I ACP-TAC-LP-14A SIS-ACT-FA-TRWA Si-18
-$ g Pope 5 O Page 7 C2 g g Q 1.6E-005 I I I INSUffICIEnl INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT FLOW ilut0UGE PS15 FLOW Tup 0UGN PS14 FLOW 104t0004 PS23 to TRAlW A SI-23 St-24 St.25
[k. O Pope 2 g Page & I INSUffICIEWI NPI FCV 63-47 FLOW THROUGE PS21 SIAVAILABLE TO TRAlW A - SI-26 HPI-Mov-PG-6347 [Q g 1.1E-004 1-MPI 80V 63-48 IwSUFilCIEmi lNIAVAILA9tE - Flad flut00Get PS2p MPI-M0W PG-6348 SI-12
-. g 1.1E-004. 6 Page 5 w q- yW w -fq=w,ea- g p. Ai-w.- -v-r-- --g-g retw =4 g-'+-%g "*-'er "'-%w-+- *-t' y,1v- gi- e+- '-491-'tNg rWw' 7 M' + 'rtt-ap- v 'me_v-rawe-i ao mnmm .w. Lw2 _ m.. t-
FAULTS IN PSM 2 (RECIRCULATION). Tree: SittC Project: SES Pese 7 of T : SI-13D Dete test feedified: fue Aug 39 13:00:30 1988 g g transier fraur Page 6 I I NPI FAN 14-A IIPI FAft IA-A RC POWER INIRWRIL 3 FAILS TO START FAILS TO IRsf FOR W CAO W WT OD M futs lAl-A
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MPI-FAII-FS-1AA NPI-F All-FR-1AAM ACP-TAC-LP-C1A14 Q 3.OE-003 Q T.2E-806 g , 4 5. f.
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free: SICM (AIL 10 Project: SEO PROVIDE FLU TO Pega 1 of 8 RCS FPM 2/4 Dete test modifled: recett ptsap fue Aug 30 12:56:32 1998 pt [k I (AILUWE Of $1
! FAILURE Of CMG 5YS AND AT LEAST SYS AND AT LEAST DNE SI PUW DNE CMG PURP D2-2 02-3 Q Page I I
I fAILUDE Of Al INSufflCIENI LEAST ONE St Ft;P FLOW Tet#0VGN PS12 TO DELIVER FLO (INJECTION) 02-4 CH-1 c [k [k 1 l I
- HP1 FCV 63-22 INSUfflCIENI ILOW INSUFFICIENT JLOW INSUf f lCIENT FAULIS IN PSIZ JNAVAILABLE THRU PS22 THEU PS24 FLOW THROUGH PS10 RND PS11 MPI-MOV-PG-6322_. 51-3 SI-4 CN-2 CMP-CEV-CC-63581_
Q 6.6E-004 g g Q 1.0E-004 I. I U INSUFfICIENI INSUFfICIEMi FLOW THROUGN PS10 rLOW TINT 0 UGH PS11 CH-3 CH-4 [g & Page 6 1 I I FAULIS IN PS10 NO ACTUAll04 Bli UNAVAILABLE INSUFFICIENT SIGNAL FROM SIS FLOW THROUGH PSOT LOGIC TRAIN 18 RND PSOS CH-39 SIS-ACT-FA-TRW8 CMP-T R-VF-Bli CM-7 6.5E-J04 g Page 2 [ Q 1.6E-003 l I l LHG FCV 63-25 LNG FCV 63-25 CHG ICVs 63-25 RC POWER UNAWAll FAILS TO OPEN JNAVAll DUE TO kND 63-26 FAIL TO G80V RX MOV 80 TEST AND MAINT JPEN 181-8 CHP-MOV-CC-6325 CNP-MOV TM-6325 : CNP-CCF-CC-2526 ACP-TAC-LP-1918 Q 3.0E-003 Q 2.0E-00' O 3 65-" ' @
INSUFFICIENT frae: SICM FLOW THROUGN PSOT Project: tE2 AND PSOS Pege 2 of 8 Cate Lost pHxfified: CM-7 fue Aug 30 12:56:32 1998 Iransi ers frtzw Page(s) 16 1 I INSUF F ICIE NI INSUFFICIENI j FLOW TNROUGN PSOT FLOW TNROUGN PSOE CN-8 CN-9 [k O ## 1 1 I I LMG FCW 63-39 RC POWER UNAVAll CNG FCV 63-37 NO ACIUA110N INSUFFICIENT JNAVAIL DUE 10 f.80V RX MOV SD FAILS 10 OPEN SIGNAL TROPI SIS FLOW TNRQKJB PSOS TEST AND I4AINT 1A1-1 LOGIC TRAIN 1A RND PS06 CHP-MOV-TN-6337 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A CHP-MOV-CC-6337 Sis-ACT-FA-TRNA CN-10 I Q 2.0E-004 g g 3.0E-003 Q 1.6E-003 g Page 2 Y ce C INSUFFICIENT FLOW TNROUGH PSOS AND PS06 CN-10 Transfers from Pege(s) 2 5 I I INSUFFICIENT INSuf F f CIENI FLOW TINtardi PSOS FLOW THRajGil P506 CN-11 CN-12 d Page 3 g Page 5
im- SICM 7Nsuf f lCIEn g Project: SES FLOW THRCRJGM PSOS Pege 3 ef 3 Dete test sno dified: fue Aug 30 12:56:32 1988 CN-11 rans' era fress Pega(s) 2 7 g ;i t I I I I I I I 3 RGING FUaP AC POWER tmAvAll DC N)WER tmAvall M ACTUAIFOst EMARGING n*4P CMG CV 6i-504 PtGED OR INSUf f1CIENI FLOW 5.9kV S/D SD 18-8 ;257 v11AL auS II sisNAL FR0st $15 1s-s FAILS TO 15-s FAILS TO Run FAILS TO CPEN 9tSPOSITIONED TO SWS PS175 LOGIC TRAIN 18 START SWS-2 ACP-TAC-LP-199 DCP-IDC-LP-Il SIS-ACT-*A-TPNS CMP-MDP-FS-199 CNP- W -ft-139 CMP-isnf-CC-62504 SWS-XVM-PR-15548 i g 1.0E-004 Q 7.0E-005 g g g Q 1.6E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 3.0E-005 1 I I INSUf f lCIENI FAILURE IO FAUL15 IN PS05 FLOW THROUGH PSO4 ISOLATE WCT CN-13 CM-97 CN-11C g Page 4 g Page 5 8 _ _ . EAG CV 62-532 I I EMARGING PUMP I SUS CCP 15-8 MAN Fall IO RESI CMG FAILS TO OPEN 18-9 tmAVAIL DUE 3P vtys en & VLv 62-510 TO TEST /NAINT LMAVAILABLE FRM TEST /M CMP-CKV-CC-62532 CMP-MDP-TM-195 SWS-XVM-PR-CCF95 CNP-NVM-RE-62510 Q l.0E-006 G 2.0E-003 0 ' **- ' O '25-"' . , , , . - , , .~ ~ ., - . . . . _ - . . _ . _ - --. -
INSuffICIENI . FLOW THROUGH PSO4 Project: SES Page & ef 8 Dete test modified: ggIrans1ersfromPagets)35 I INSufflClENI . CHG CV 62-504 FLOW THROUGK PS02 FAILS TO OPEN AND PS03 CH-14 CMP-CKV-CC-62504 G 1.0E-004 I I INSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGH PS02 FLOW inROUGH PS03 CH-15 Cn-16 [k [k 1 I I I e fAULis IN PS02 40 ACIUATION NSI UNAVAILABLE FAULIS IN 9503 NSI tmAVAILA8tE - a SIGNAL FROM SIS Pro ACIUATION 3 LOGIC TRAIN 1A EIG1eAL FROM SIS LOGIC TRAIN 18 CH-15A $1S-ACT-FA-TRNA LPI-TNK-VF-RWST) CH-16A LPI-TNK-VF-RUST 1 SIS-ACT-FA-Ib8 [Q Q 1.6E-003 Q 2.7E-006 d Page 4 2.7E-006 {31.6E-003 I I I CHG LCV 62-135 AC POWER UNAVAll CMG LCV 62-135 CHG LCVs 62-135 LINAVAIL DUE TO G80V RX MOV BD FAILS TO OPEE RND 62-136 FAIL TEST AND MAINT 1Al-1 TO OPEN CHP-MOV-TM-62135 AcP-TAC-LP-1A1A l CHP-MOV-CC-62135 CNP-CCF-CC-1356 G 2.0E-004 g ~ G 3 DE~66T G 2.6E-004 FAULIS IN PSY CH-16A. [gtransferfromPage4
- I I I CHG LCV 62-136 4C POWER UNAVAIL CMG LCV 62-136 CHG LCVs 62-135 LfMAVAIL DUE TO G80V RX MOV 80 FAILS TO OPEN RND 62-136 FAIL TEST AND MAINT 181-8 TO OPEN CHP-MOV-TM-62136 ACP-TAC-LP-1818 CHP-MOV-CC-62136 CNP-CCF-CC-1356 G 2.0E-004 g G 3.0E-003 G 2.6E-004
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T m : SICM FAltijRE 10 Project: SEO ISOLATE VCT Page 5 of 8 Date test modified: fue Aug 30 12:56-32 1988 CR-99 ers from Page(s) 3 5 gg Irare . I VCf FAULIS FOR CCF CF FCys CH-99 (FA! LURE TO 62-132 AND 62-133 CLOSE) CH-98 CHP-CCF-MOV-VCf G 2.6E-004 l l VCI ISOUtil04 WCI iSOLAIlON VALVE 62-132 valve 62-133 FAILS TO CLDSE FAILS TO CLOSE CMP-MOV-FT-62132 CHP-MOV-FT-62133 _ G 3.0E-061 g 3.0E-003 y e INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGH PS06 CH-12 Q Transfers from Page(s) 2 7 l -l i l l CHARGING nJMP AC POWEP UNAVAll iNSUFFICIENI FLOW CMG CV 62-504 INSUFFICIENT FAILUPE 10 1A-A FAILS TO RUN 6.9kV S/D BD 1A-A FRm SVS PS162. FAILS TO OPE 18 FLOW THROUGM PSO4 ISOLATE VCT CHP-MDP-FR-1AA- ACP-TAC-LP-1AA SWS-3 CRP-CEV-CC-62504 CM-13 Cn-99 G.3.0E-005 @ @ O ' '-* ' a "*** ' n ,' 5 INSUFFICIENT-FLOW THROUGH PSOS CM-9 ggIranserfromPage2 I I I I f,C POWER UNAVAIL- CHG FCV 63-40 CHG FCV 63-40. m AciUAIlON INSufflCIENI G80V RX MOV BD JNAVAll DUE TO FAILS TO OPEN SIGNAL FRm Sl$ FLOW ifMt0UG4 PSOS 191-8 TEST AND MAINT LOGIC TRAIN 18. LND PS06 ACP-TAC-LP-1618 CHP MOV-TM 6340 CHP-MOV-CC-6340 Sis-ACT-FA-TRws CH-10 g_ Q 2.0E-004 G.3.0E-003 Q 1.6E-003 g Page 2
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INSUFFICIENI - free: SICM FLOW Tf81t0UCN PS11 Project: SEO Pm 6 of 8 J Dete Lost 8%dified: . - CH-4 fue Aug
' 30.12:56:32 1988 :
Q Irans1er from Page 1 l I I FAULIS IN PSil 40 ACf0All04 Bil UNAVAILABLE . INSUFFICIENT. '- SIGNAL FR0rt $15 FLG1 flut0VGN PSOT LOGIC TRAIN 1A LND PSOS } CH-48 S!S-ACT-FA-TRNA ~.CHP-TNE-VF-8IT CM-T' ~~ _[g Q 1.6E-003 Q 6.5E-004 A Page 2
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CHG FCV 63-26 CMG TCV 63-26 CMG FCWs 63-25 RC POWER UNAVAIL FAILS TO OPEN LINAVAIL DUE TO . RND 63-26 Fall. TO G80V RX MOV SD TEST AND MAINT DPEN 1A1-1 CffP-MOV-CC-6326 CMP-MOV-14-6326 CHP-CCF-CC-2526 ACP-TAC-LP-141A G 3.0E-903. Q 2.0E-006 G 2.6E-006- g w ~ v h V
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FAILURE Of St Tree: SICM sis AND AT LEAST Project: SEO
~mE CHG PUMP p,7gg Date Lost Podified:
D2-3 fue Aug 30 12:56:32 1988 tra w er from Page 1 I I FAILURE of AI INSUff!CLENI FLOW LEAST ONE CHG PMP THRU PS25 TO DELIVER TLO (INJECTION) D2-5 SI-1 b h 1 1 1 FAltuRE OF FAULIS IN PS12 FAILURE OF FAILURE Of E11HER CHG PtMP -l ROTH BIT INLET ROIN BIT CUTLET VALVES VALVES CH-10A CHP-CKY-CC-63581 CN-7A CH-2A [g Q 1.0E-004 h Page 8 b l l l 6 INSUFFICIEmi INSUfflCIEN! !NSUfflCIEkl INSUfflCIENT FLOW THROUGH PSOS FLW THROUGH PS06 FLOW THROUGN PSOT FL W TH5iOUGM PSO8 C11 CH-12 CW-BA CM-9A d Page 3 6 Page 5 Q l i I I I I CHG FCV 63-39 ENG FCV 63-39 f,C POWER UNAVAIL N0 ACTUAL!ON ENG FCV 63-40 . ENG FCV 63-40 RC POWLR UNAVAIL 40 ACluATION FAILS TO OPEN JNAVAIL DUE TO GBOY RX MOV BD SIGNAL fROM !!S FAILS TO OPEN LMAVAIL DUE TO GBOV RX Mov BD SIGNAL fROM SIS TEST A C MAINT 1A1-1 LOGIC TRAIN 1A TEST AND MAINT 191-8 LOGIC TRAIN 15 CHP-MOV-CC-6337 CHP-MOV-TM-6337 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A SIS-ACT-fA-TRNA CHP-MOV-CC-6340 CHP-MOV-TM-6340 ACP-TAC-LP 1519 STS-ACT-FA-TRN8 Q 3.0E-003 Q 2.OE-004 g Q 1.6E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 2.0E-004 g Q 3.6E-003
i FAliURE Of Tree: SICN RoiH Bli 00iLET Project: SEQ VALVES Pege 8 of 8 Date test Modified: CH-2A fue Aug 30 12:56:32 1986 Irans'er from Page 7 l I INSOFFICIENI - INSUFilCIEN! FLOW FLOW THROUGH PS10 THROUGH PS11 CH-3A CH-4A [Q d Page 8 I I I I CHG TCVS 63-25 CHG ICV 63-25 CHG FCV 63-25 RC POWER UN4VAll NO ACTUAI10N AND 63-26 Fall 10 FAILS TO OPER LfMAVAIL DUE 10 G80V RX MOV BD SIGNAL TROM SIS DPEN TEST AND MAINT 191-8 LOGIC 1 RAIN 18 CMP-CCF-CC-2526 CMP-MOV-CC-6325 CHP-MOV-TM-6325 ACP-TAC-LP-1915 SIS-ACT-FA-TRN9 y e G 2.6E-004 0 3 *~ 3 0 2. E-004 g Q 1.6E-561 c,n INSUffICIEN! iLOW THROUG11 PS11 CH-4A ggIransferfromPage8 I I l l CHG FCVs 63-25 CHG ICV 63-26 CHG (CV 63-26 AC POWER UNAVAIL NO ACTUAll0N . AND 63-26 FAIL TO FAILS TO OPEN Lf4 AVAIL DUE TO 480V RX MOV BD SIGNAL FROM SIS JPEN TEST AND MAINI 1A1-1 LOGIC TRAIN 1A CHP-CCF-CC-2526 CMP-MOV-CC-6326 titP-MOV-TM-6326 ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A SIS-ACT-FA-IRNA Q 2.6E-00' O 3 *~ 3 0 3 '-
@ o 1.6E-003
B.2.2 Support System Fault Trees
-- Component Cooling Water System-(CCW-20). B-97
[CCW-23) B-98 e
-- Electrical Power Systtm (EPS-1AA) B-99 ,
[EPSSIA1A) B-100- < [EPSSIA2A] _B-101 (EPS-1A1A) B-102 [EPS-1A2A) B-103 ,
-[EPSC1A1A) B-104 (EPS-DCI)_ B-105 (EPS-1BB) B-106
[EPSSIB1B) B-107 [EPSSIB2B) B-108 (EPS-1B1B]- B-109 [EPS-182B] B-110-(EPSC1 BIB) B-111 (EPS-DCII) B-112
-- Service Water System (SWS-1) B-113
[SWS-2) B-114 [SWS-3) B-115 (SWS-4) B-118 q B-121' (SWS-5) [SWS-8] B-122 (SWS-9) B-123 F k s 4 i B-96 1
l free: CCW-20 INSUFFICIENI COOLING FLOW FROM Project: SEO CCW PS337 Page 1 of 1
' Cate Last Modified:
CCW-20 Thu Jul 07 09:08:04 1988 l I i INSOF FLOW INSUFFICIENI FLOW FROM CCW PS309 OR THRU PS116 PS314 CCW-16 SWS-9 0 t -- . I INSUFFICIEN! INSUFFICIENI FLOW FROM PS309 ft0W FROM PS314 CCu-17 CCW-18 6 1 e i CCW MDP 1A-A AC POWER UNiillI INSUFFif}FN I fill 10 RESI CCW FAILS TO RUN FOR f.80V S/D BD 1A1 A FLOW FROM PS310 1AN OP vtv 1-507 y 24 HRS FRM TEST /MA e CCW-MDP-FR-1AA24 ACP-TAC-LP-51A1A CCW-19 CCW-xvM-RE-1507 Q 7.2E-004 <g> g Q 3.0E-005 I e i i i i I I RC POWER UNAVAll CCW MDP 18-8 CCW MDP 18-8 CCW TP 13 DC POWER UNAgAll Fall.IO REST CCW CCW CV 15048 F All 10 REST CCW G80V S/D 80 181-8 JNAVAIL DUE TO FAILS TO STARI FAILS TO RUN FOR 125V VliAL SUS II MAN OP VLV 1-5038 FAILS TO OPEN 4AN OP VLV 1-058 TEST AND MAINT 24 HRS FRM T/M FRM TEST /MA ACP-TAC-LP-S1818 CCW-MDP-TM-188 CCW-MDP-FS-188 CCW-MDP TR-1BB24 DCP-fDC-LP-II CCV-XVM-RE-15038 CCV-CKV-CC-150/.8 CCV-XVM-RE-15058 Q Q 2.0E-003 O 3.0E-003 Q 7.2E-004 <:g> Q 3.0E-005 Q 1.0E-004 Q 3hN I NO CCW MDP 18-8 ACTUAfl0N SIGNAL CCW-39' h I I 40 ACTUAI!ON CCW PMP ACIDAll0N SIGNAL FROM SIS JN LO DSCHRG LOGIC TRAIN 18 PRESSURE FAILS SIS-ACT-FA-TRN8 CCU-ACT-FA-LODP1 Q 1.6E-003 Q 1.6E-003
l Tree: CCV-23 INSUFFICIENT Project: SEO COOLING FLOW FROM Page 1 of 1 CCW PS356 Date Last Modified: Thu Jul 07 09:11:36 1938 CCW-23 h i I INSUF FLOW INSUFilCIENT FLOW FROM CCW PS311 OR THRU PS115 PS315 CCW-29 SWS-8 [.) W 3 INSUFFICIENI INSUfF1CIEN! FLOW FROM PS311 FLOW FRCH PS315 - CCW-25 CCW-26 h i , I i I i i i INSUfflilENT CCW MDP 1A-A LCW ICV 70-26 DPERATOR FAILS 10 CCW FCV 70-27 AC POWER UNAVAll CCW MDP C-S FAILS AC POWER tMAVAll FLOW FROM FS310 FAILS TO RUN FOR FAILS TO OPEN START CCW S/8 FA!LS TO OPEN 480V RX MOV OD to RUN FOR 24 MRS L80V S/D 80 282-8 24 HRS PUMP 182 CD CCW-27 CCW-m P-FR-1AA2C CCW-MOV-CC-7026 CCV-NHE-FO-CCWCS CCV-MOV-CC-7027 ACP-TAC-LP-1828 CCW-MDP-FR-CS24 ACP-TAC-LP-32828 Q 7.2E-004 Q 3.0E-003 Q 3.2E-002 Q 3.0E-003 Q Q.7.2E-004 Q 3.UE-004 i s s i i i i i AC POWER UNAYAll CCW teP 18-8 CCW MDP 18-8 CCW 2P 18-8 BC POWER tmAVAll FAIL 10 RES! CCW Fall 30 REST CCW CCW CV 15048 480V S/D OD 181-8 FAILS TO RUN FOR L74 AVAIL DUE TO FAILS To START 125V VITAL BUS It um CP VLY 1-5038 MN OP VLV 1-058 FAILS TO OPEN 24 HRS TEST AND MAINT- FRM T/M FRM TEST /M4 ACP-TAC-LP-$1818 CCW-MDP-FR-18824 CCW-PDP-TM-188 CCW-MDP-FS-188 DCP-TDC-LP-It CCW-XVM-RE-15038 CCW-XVM-RE-15058 CCW-CKV-CC-150t.8 Q Q 7.2E-004 Q 2.0E-003 Q .3.0E-003 Q Q 3.0E-005 Q 3.0E-005 Q 1.0E-006
AC POWER Tree: EPS-1AA JNAVAIL 6.9kV . Project: SEO SHUTDOWN BOARD Page 1 of 1 18-8 Date Last Modified: ACP-TAC-LP-1AA Thu Jul GT 08:27:12 1988-hh i No POWER 6.9kV SMJIDOWN SUPPLIED TO 6.9kV BOARD 1A-A S/D BD 1A-A BUSWORK FAILURE EPS-2 ACP-BAC-ST-1AA E- 5 O ' I I ALIERNAIE NORML POJER POWER SOURCE SOURCE UNAVAILA8tE JNAVAILABLE EPS-4 EPS-3 y Q O **** ' UD
- 1 1 1 I UNSilE EPS DGs DNSi1E EPS DG DNSITE EPS DG DNSilE EPS DG DNSITE EPS DG 1A-A AND 18-8 1A-A FAILS TO 1A-A FAILS TO RUN 1A-A IAeAVAIL DUE CKiBRK 1912 FAILS FAIL 10 START START FOR 6 NRS TO MAINTENANCE TO XFR CLS DEP-CCF-FS-1AA88 M P-DGE-FS-1AA OEP-DGN-FR-1AA6 OEP-DGN-MA-1AA OEP-CR8-FT-1912 0 1.1E-003 Q 3.0E-002 Q 1.2E-002 Q 6.0E-003 Q 3.0E-003 NORMAL POWER SOURCE LfNAVAILABLE EPS-3 frarm er from Page 1 I I l' LOSS OF OFFSIIE SPURICUS XFR OF I SPURIOUS XFR OF 6.9kV UNIT 80ARD POWER W/IN 24 4RML FDR BRKR 10 WRML FDR BRKR TO 18 BUSWORK WR$ 6.9kV S/D BD 6.9kV S/D 80 FAILURE LOSP ACP-CR8-CO-1718 OEP-CP8-CO-1714 OEP-BAC-ST-18 Q 2.0E-00' O - 5 0 z "- 5 0 ' '- 5
__ _____- .- . ~ . - - - - ~ - - -. .--~-L---- =------'-----~~----l~ - - - - - -- - - ~ ' - - - ~ ~ - - - -
- Tree: EPS$141A AC POWER Project: SEO LINAVAIL 480V page 1 of 1 Sm31DOWN BOARD 1A1-A Date Lest Modified:
ACP-TAC-LP-51A1A This Jul 07 06:27:24 1788 h i i NO POWER 450V SHUIDOWN SUPPLIED TO 480V BOARD 141-A SHUIDOWN BOARD BUSWORK FAILURE tai-a EPS-1 ACP-BAC-ST-SIA1A () 9.0E-005 i i i i AC POWER UNAVAll SPURIOUS XFR Of 1RANSFORMER 1Al-A SPURIOUS XFR Of 6.9kV S/D BD 1A-A XFMR INLET CETBRK FAILURE KFMR OUTLET CKiBRK ACP-TAC-LP-1AA ACP-CRB-CO-1A1A1 ACP-ffM-NO-1A1A ACP-CRB-CD-1A1A0 m (g;> () 2.9E-005 () 4.0E-005 () 2.9E-005 b C C
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i + e e AC PouER Tree: EPS$1A2A JNAVAIL 480V Project: SEO . SHUiDOWN 80ARD . Page 1 of 1 1A2-A ~
' Date Lost Modifled: .
ACP-TAC-LP-51A2A Thu Jul 07 06:27:24 1988 [- k i NO Po6ER 450V SHUIDOWN SUPPLIED TO 480V BOARD 1A2-A 5HUIDOWN BOARD BUSWORK FAILURE ' ' 1A7-A EPS-50 ACP-BAC-ST-S142A g_ Q _ Q .9.0E-005-I I I
'AC POWER JNAVAll SPURIOUS XFR Of TRANSf0RMER 1AZ-A SPURIOUS XFR OF 6.9kV S/D 80 1A-A KFMR INLET CETSRC FAILURE KFMR OUTLET' CKiBRC -
ACP-TAC-LP-1AA ACP-CR8-CO-1A2Af ACP-TFM-NO-1A2A ACP-CR8-CD-1A2A0 _ <@> Q 2.9E-005 Q 4.OE-005 Q ,2.9E-005 Y w O w e C. %. g,4- g, .c. r 9m g <w 4 *,'ey' d e -Werge* ( Ms 4g / M'ey-e-g 53 "13 4WT' '*'
"'S '-rey,dg, i,,ry, g. .,,,9l,,m w'.r. p ,pp y4 e y p h- ey y wi <Wyw cy pw, -b+#.y% g em 7'y.- ghf g -%yN p., uvg._a 2 g .l.._pciapj_y' ,tgj.2mmw.ww,,,.e'mindm_w,mm.i.an.n- n a.ii
l l l-l I i Tree: EPS-141A AC POWER Project: SEO MAVAIL 480V Page 1 of'i REACIOR MOV BOARD 1A1-A Date L8St Modified: Thu Jul 07 08:27:10 1788 ACP-TAC-EP 1A1A h, i NO POWER r.80V REACIOR MOV SUPPLIED TO 480V BOARO 1Al-A RX MOV BOARD BUSWRK FAlltJRE 1A1-A EPS-30 ACP-8AC-ST-1A1A g Q 9.0E-005 i i i SPURIOUS IRANSfER SPURIOUS IRANSTER AC PouER UNAVAIL 3F FEEDER BREAKER OF FEEDER BREAKER 480V S/D 80 1A1-A ACP-CRB-CO-30 ACP-CRB-CO-31 l ACP-?AC-LP-51 A1A Q 2.9E-005 Q 2.9E-005 Q
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AC POWER WAVAIL 480V Tree: EPS-1A2A REACTOR MOV BOARD Project: SEO 1A2-A Page 1 of 1 ACP-TAC-LP-1A2A Date Lost Modified: Thu Jul 07 08:27:10 1988 h, , k0 POWER E80V aEACTOR MOV SUPPLIED TO 480V BOARD 1A2-A RX MOV BOARD- BtJSWORK FAILURE 1A?-A EPS-32 ACP-8AC-ST-1A2A Q 9.0E-005 I . 1 I SPURIOUS IRANSFER SPURIOUS IRANSFER mc POWER UNAVAll DF FEEDER BREAKER 3F TEEDER BREAKER 480V S/D BD 1A2-A ACP-CRB-CO-32 ACP-CR8-CO-33 ACP-TAC-LP-$1A2A Q 2.9E-005 U 2.9E-005 Q 8 l- _
1
-Tree: EPECIA1A AC POWER - Project: SEO :
LMAVAIL 480V CAS Pege 1 of 1.. WENT 90ARD 1A1-A Date Lost Modified: Thu Jul OT 08:2T:201988 ACP-TAC-LP-C1A1A
-[h 1
NO PobER . 480V CA8 WENT SUPPLIED TO 480V' M)ARD 1A1- A CA8 VENT BOARD . BUSWORK FAILURE tai-a EPS-34 ACP-BAC-ST-C1A1A - g . Q 9.0E-005 I I i SPURIOUS IRANSFER SPURIOUS IRANSFER AC POWER UNAVAll SF FEEDER BREAKER OF: FEEDER BREAKER 480V S/D 8D 1Al-A ACP-CRS-CO-38' ACP-CR8-CO-37 ACP-TAC-LP-51A1A
- Q 2.9E-005- Q 2.9E-005 -Q-K C
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DC POWER Tree: EPS-DCI JNAVAIL 125V Projects SEO VITAL BUS ! ' Page 1 of 1 Date test Modified: DCP-fDC-LP-1 flon AuS 22 16:20:34 1988 l No POWER '125V VIIAL BUS ! SUPPLIED TO 125V BUSWORK FAILURE VITAL SUS I EPS-1I DCP-90C-ST-f G 9.0E-005 i i FAILURE Of FAILURE Of BATT CHRGR I 10 BAffERY I TO SUPPLY POWER TO SUPPLY POWER 10 RtM BlM f EPS-21 EPS-3I [k i l I' l l 5 AC POWER UNAVAll WO CUIPUI TROM . SPURIOUS O R OF BATIERY CMARGER I SPURIOUS Xf R Of FAILURE Of FAILURE Of. SFtfRIOUS XfR of c.n 480V S/D BD 1AT-A BATIERT CHARGER I BATTERf CMARCER I BATTERY l- BATTERIES I AND RATIERY I CKiBRE INLET BRKR DUTLET BRKR- II ACP-TAC-LP-51A1A DCP-BCH-NO-I DCP CRB-CD-BCilN DCP-CRB-CD-BC10U DCP-BAT-LP-! DCP-CCF-LP-III DCP-CRB-CD-BAT 1 g Q 4.0E-00I Q 2.9E-005 G 2.9E-005 Q 7.2E-004 Q 5.8E-006 Q 2.9E-005
~ - - - - - -
1 i l' Treer EPS-198 AC POWER Project: SEO JNAVAIL 6.9tv Page 1 of 1 SHUTDOWN BOARD M-R Date Lost Modified: Thts Jul 07 08.27:16 1988 ACP-TAC-LP-188 [k l NO POWER 6.9kV SHUIDOWN SUPPLIED TO 6.9kV BOARD 18-B S/D BD 19-B RUSWORK FAILURE EPS-200 ACP-BAC-ST-188 Q 9.0E-C05 I I ALi[RNAIE NORMAL POWER POWER SOURCE SOURCE JNAVAILABLE JNAVAILABLE EPS-202 EPS-201 [g O Page 1 I I l l ASi1E EPS DG -
$ IsillE EPS DGs 1A-A AND 1B-8 DNSIIE EPS DG IB-B FAILS TO DNSIIE EPS DG 19-8 FAILS TO RUN DNSilE EPS DG 18-6 UNAVAll OtX CKTSRK 1914 FAILS Fall TO START START FOR 6 HRS ?O MAINTENANCE TO XFR cts DEP-CCF-FS-1AABB CEP-DCN-FS-189 OEP-DCN-FR-1986 OEP-DGN-MA-18B OEP-CRB-FT-1914 Q 1.1E-003 Q 3.0E-002 Q l.2E-002 Q 6.0E-003 Q 3.0E-003 NORMAL POWER SOURCE JNAVAILABLE EPS-201 ggIrans'erfromPage1 I .
I I LOSS of Of f SilE SPURICUS XfR OF SPURIOUS MR OF 6.9kV UNIT BOARD POWER U/lN 24 WRML FDR BRKR 10 WRML FDR BRKR 10 1C BUSWORK H10URS 6.9kV S/D BD 6.9kV S/D BD ' FAILURE LOSP' ACD-CRB-CO-1726 lOEP-CRB-CO-1722 OEP-BAC-St .6 0 2 E-"' O 235-*5 O 2d*-"5 0 9. E-M5
AC POWER Tree: EPS$1818 JNAVAIL 480V Project: SEO 5ffUIDOW 80ARD Page 1 of 1 191-B Date test Modified: ACP-TAC-LP-51818 Thu Jul 07 08:27:26 1988 I I NO POWER f.80V SHUIDOW SUPFLIED (0 480V ROARD 181-8 SHUTDOWN BOARD BUSWORK FAILURE Int-R EPS-100 ACP-BAC-Si-51818 g . Q 9.0E-005
+ i . _
i RC POWER UNAVAIL SPURIOUS KFR OF 1RANSFORMER 181-8 SPUR 10tfS XFR OF 6.9kV S/D SD 15-8 KFMR INLET CRTBRK FAILURE KFMR OtfiLET CETBRK ACP-TAC-LP-188 ACP-CRB CO-18181 ACP-TFM-NO-1918 ACP-CR8-CO-18180
<@> Q 2.9E-005 Q 4.0E-005 Q 2.9E-005 Y
'* W Tree: EPSS1829 7 C P0utR Project: SEO LMIAVAIL 480V SHUIDOWN BOARD Pege 1 of 1 ' ..
1R2-R -Date LeSt 990dIIIed: A
-Thu Jul 07 08:27:28 1988
__C_P-TAC-LP-51829 i
, i leo POWER r.50V SMUIDOWN --
SUPPLIED TO 480V BOARD 182-5 SHUTDOWN 90ARD BUSWORK FAILURE 1R2-R EPS-1000 ACP-BAC-$T-$1828 g Q 9.0E-005 i i i i AC POWER UNAVAIL- Sour 10US XfR OF TRAstSFORMER 182-8 SPURIOUS XFR OF 6.9kV S/D 80 18-8 KTMR INLET CKISRC FAILt*E KFfut CUTLET EKTORK ACP-TAC-LP-188 ACP-CRB-CD-18291 ACP-TFM-NO-1928 ACP-CRB-CO-18250 Q Q 2.9E-005 - Q 4.0E-005 Q . 2.9E-005 k C 00 l
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AC POWER : Tree: EPS-1819 JNAVAIL 480V Project: SEs i REACTOR MOV BOARD -
- Page 1 of 1 MI*" Date Lost Modified:
ACP-TAC-LP-1818 - Tliu Jul 07 08:27:1419M - h, No POWER.. f.80V REACIOR MOV SUPPLIED TO 480V- BOARD 181-8' ~ RX MOV 8OARD BUSWORK FAILURE int-a EPS-31 AC*-BAC-ST-18M g Q .9.0E-005 i i :- SPURIOUS IRANSFER SPURIOUS IRANSFER RC POWER (MAVAll DF TEEDER SkEAKER 3F FEEDER BREAKER f.80V S/D 80 181-8 ACP-CR9-CO-34 -ACP-CRB CO-35 ACP-TAC-LP-51918 O 2.9E-005 - Q 2.9E-005: ..Q. 9 T-C CO w<%,. . - h- = s i v' e- -+ r W+ - '?'- .' We' / % 4- ..mv --1+.5%,.- 'td G p* g y 'o v" 7T +W s 43 s.", e g%+ '% -3 e.* g y pw c g. , g, ,g.y 7 , ,_
AC POWER Treet EPS-1828 Project SEO lMAVAIL 480V REACTOR MOV BOARD Page 1 of 1' in?-R Date Last Modified: ACP-TAC-LP-1828 Thu Jul 07 08:27:14 1988 hI f NO POWER 480V REACIOR MOV SUPPLIED TO 480V' BOARD 182-8 RX MOV BOARD BUSWORK FAlltRE 1R2-R EPS-33 ACP-BAC-ST-1828 Q 9.0E-005 i i i SPURIOUS TRANSFER SPtsR100S IRANSFER AC POLTR UNAVAIL 3F FEEDER BREAKER 3F FEEDER BREAKER 480V S/D 80 182-8 ACP-CRS-CO-36 ACP-CR8-CO-37 ACP-TAC-LP-51828 Q 2.9E-005 O 2.9E-005 Q ? o
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;..n AC FOWER Tree: EPSC1918 "
JNAVAIL 480V CAB ' Project: SEO VENT BOARD 181-8 - Page 1 of 1. . . . . .. , Date Lost Modified: . ACP-TAC-LP-C1818 - Thu Jul 07 08:27:22 1988 . h.I i NO POWER r.50V CA8 VENI StFPLIED TO 480V ' BOARD 181-8 CAS VENT (* .RD BUSWORK FAILURE. 1R1-R EPS-35 ACP-8AC-ST-C1818 g . Q . 9.0E-005 i e i SFURIOUS 1RANSIER SPURIOUS IRANSTER AC POWER tmAVAll -- DF FEEDER BREAKER DF FEEDER BREAKER f.80W S/D 80 181-9 ACP-CR8 CO-40 ACP-CR8-tO-41~ ACP-TAC-LP-51818
. Q . 2.9E-005 . Q . 2.9E-003. <ig>
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l i Tree: E*S-DCII DC POWER Project: SEO lMAVAIL 12SV Page i of f WITAL BUS Il Date Last Modified: DCP-fDC-LP-Il Men Aug 22 16:16:58 1988 j l [k l l NO POWER 125v V11AL pus 11 SUPPLIED TO 125V BUSWORK FAILURE VITAL BUS II EPS-til DCP-BDC-ST-Il Q 9.0E-005 I I FAILURE OF FAILURE of RATT CHRGR 11 TO BAllERY 11 TO
';UPPLT PWR TO BUS SUPPLY POWER TO RIM EPS-2tl EPS-3tl
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- l 1. l i I g nC P0uER UNAVAll 40 OUIPui FR0Pt SPURIOUS XfR OF SPURIOUS XfR OF FAILURE OF RaffERY ll FAILURE Of RATTERIES I AND SPURIOUS NFR Of RA11ERT 11 CET8RK f.80V S/D BD 182-8 BATTERY CHARGER RAliERY CHARGER - RATTERY CHARGER-11 11 INLET BRKR- II OUTLET BRK fl ACP-TAC-LP-S1829 DCP-8CN-NO-il DCP-CR8-CO-8C2IN DCP-CRB-CD-8C200 DCP-BAT-LP-Il DCP-CCF-LP-Ill
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bh . I I , INSUFFICIENT FLOW PltEGED Olt PEGED Clt . FROM SUS PS162 4tSPOSIT10ND 4ISPOSITIONED - n1
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e. Tm: SWS-3 INSUFFICIENT Project: SEO rLOW frRajcH Page 2.of 3 PS106 Date test Modified: fue Aug 23 14:10:06 1988-SWS-11 ggIransersfrornPage(s)13 I I I i I l I SWS MDPS K-A AND SWS MDPs K- A, RC POWER UNAVAIL DC POWER UNAVAll WO ACTUAll0N SWS MDP K-A FAILS SWS MDP K-A FAILS SWS MDP K-A 3-A Fall TO START N-8, N-8, AND 0-A 5.9kV S/D SD 2A-A 125 Y VliAL SUS SIGNAL TROM SIS TO START TO RUN FOR 24 HRS tmAVAIL DUE TO TEST AND MAINT FAIL TO START !!! LCCIC TRAIN 1A . SWS-MDP-FR-K-A;6 SWS-MDP-TM-K-A SWS-CCF-FS-to SWS-CCF-FS-KMNQ ACP-TAC-LP-2AA' DCP-TDC-LP-Ill SIS-ACT-FA-TRNA SWS-MDP-TS-K-A Q 3.0E-001 Q 7.2E-d M Q 2.0E-003 Q 7.8E-005 Q 2.9E-005 Q l.0E-004 Q 9.0E-005 Q 1.6E-003 7 NSUFFICIENI FLOW THROUGM PS111 SWS-12 p transfers frorn Page(s) 1 3 I i I i l I i SWS MDP 0-A SWS MDPs K-A AND SWS MDPs K-A, LC POWER UNAVAll bC POWER UNAWAIL NO ACIUATION C SWS MDb 0-A FAILS SWS MDP Q-A FAILS 1 TO START IO RUN FOR 24 HRS tmAVAIL DUE TO 3-A Fall TO START N-8, N-8, AND Q-A 5.9kV S/D SD 1A-A 125V VITAL BUS I SIGNAL FRCat $15 TEST AND MAINT FAIL TO START LOGIC TRAIN 1A c . SWS-MDP-FS-0-A SWS-MDP-FR-c-A24 SVS-MDP-1M-0-A SWS-CCF-FS-KO' SUS-CCF-FS-EMNQ ACP-TAC-LP-1AA DCP-TDC-LP-1 l ST S- ACT-F A-TRN A Q 3.0E-003 . Q T.2E-004 Q 2.0E-003 Q T.BE-005 Q 2.9E-005 g g Q l.6E-003 I INSUFFICIEN! FLOW THROUGH PS112 SWS-13 ers frors Page(s) 13 Q Irans SWS MDP R-A FAILS AC POWER UNAVAlt. TO RtM FOR 24 HR$ 5.9kV S/D 80 2A-A SWS-MDP-FR-P fC. 1 ACP-TAC-LP-2AA G 7.26DR Q l.0E-004
7 NSUfflCIENr Treer sWs-3 FLOW FROM PS105, Project: SEO .
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PS111. AND Ps112 page 3 of 3 Oste test modified: Sus-81 Tue Aug 23 14:10:06 1988. Irans1er frere Page 1 1 I l INSUFFICIENI INSUFFICliNI.._ INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM Ps105 FLOW THROUGH FLOW THROUGH rs112 Ps111 SWS-10 SVs-13_ SWS-12 A Page 1 d Page 2 d Page 2 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM PS106, Ps111, AND PS112 SWS-E2 Irans1 er from Page 1 I I I - INSUFFICIENT . INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIEN! T FLOW THROUGH FLOW THROUGH. FLOW iMROUGH C ps106 rs112 Ps111 a sus-11 sus-13 SWS-12 d Page 2 d Page 2 d Page 2
Tree: SUS-4 INSUFFICIENT Projects SEO FLOW TO SWS PS155 Pege 1 ef 3 Date Last modified: Thu Jul 07 16:44:40 1988 SvS-4 h-\ l INSUFFICIENI SWS SIRAINER FLOW FROM PS207 B18-8 PLUGGED RND PS208 SWS-T SWS-STR-PG-818-8 gg Q 3.0E-005 I I I INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENI INSUFFICIEN! INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM PS107, FLOW FROM PS107, FLOW FROP! PS108, FLOW FROM PS107 PS108, AND PS109 PS109, AND PS110 PS109, AND PS110 PS108, AND PS110 Sus-83 SWS-85 Sus-86 SWS-84 6 Page 3 : A Page 3 I I I I C3 I I INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT lNSUFFICIENT h INSUFFICIENT ' INSUFFICIEN! iMSUFFICIENI FLOW THROUGN FLOW TINT 0UGN FLOW TNR(RfGM FLOW THROUGil H rLOW THROUGM FLOW THROUGN
- PS109 PS107 PS110 PS108 PS107 PS108 SWS-21 SUS-22 SWS-20 SWS-23 SVS-21 595-20 6 Page 1 6 Pege 2 6 Page 2 O Page 1 d Page 2 ~ d Page 2
. INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGN PS107 SUS-20 ggTransersfromPage(s)13 1
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FAULIS $N PS415 !NSUFFICitWI INSUFFICIENI IN93F SIEAM TO RFV ftP ROOM FLCW FPOM PS414, T179tWE CRIVE4 C00 ting FS422 AND PS&23 rvMP VIA PS426 AF-7A AF-41 AF-10 AF-35
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imSUFFICIEmi Tree: L-SGfit FLOW FROM PS412 Project: SEO Page 6 of 11 Cate test Modified: AF-2T Tue AuS 30 16:52:46 1998 [gironsierfromPege1 i l I l RFW CW 3-830 AFW IRAIN 9 RFU A0W 3-145 L0pm04 CAUSE _INSUFFIC3ENI FAILS TO OPEN RCTUATION SIGNAL FAILS TO OPEN FAILtRE OF AFU FLOW fROM PS410 FAILS ROWS AFU-CEV-CC-3830 ATV-ACT-FA-TRnB AFv-A0V-CC-3148_ AFV-CCF-FT-A0W AF+28 G 1.0E-004 Q l.6E-003 G 1.0E-003 G 3.4E-005 g Page 6 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM PS410 ' AF-28 ggIrans'ersfrom#sge(s)611 I c FAULIS IN PS410 INSUFFICIEul 1 FLOW F#0N PS409 R40 PS421 co. AF-2841 AF-29 [k O #9 I I I I i ._. I I I RFW CW 3-821 RFW DOP 18-8 RFW MDP 18-8 RFW MDP 18-8 RFW MDPs IA-A AND LC POWER UWAVAll DC POWER UNAVAll RFW 14 Alm 8 FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUN FOR JW4 WAIL DUE TO 18-8 FA?L TO 5.9kV S/9 OD 18-8 125V VITAL SUS II RCTUATION SIGNAL 24 Mt3 TEST Amp MAINT START FAILS AFW-CKV-CC-3821~ AFW-MDP-FS-188 AFW-MDP-FR-19824 AFU-MDP-TM-188 AFW-CCF-FS-1AA88 DCP-TDC-LP-II AFU-ACT-FA-ftes
~ACP-TAC-LP-188 G 1.0E-00T G 3.0E-003 G T.2E-004 G 2.0E-003 Q 1.7E-004 g g 1.6E-003
Tree; t-SGit INSUFFICIEng Pfwject: SES FLOW FROM PS409 Pege 7 of 11 nND PS421 Dete Lost en e dified: fue Aug 3016:52:46 19W AF-29 Irans' er frtzu Pege 6 I I < INSUFilCIEN! INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM PS421 FLOW FROM PS409 ~ AF-31 AF-30 h & Page 7 I I I I I FAULIS IN PS421 4C POWER (MAVA6L FCVs 3-126A AND INSUf FICIENT FLOW BUS MAN OP VLV )FAIL 10 #ESI SWS 680V RX MDt 90 - 3-1268 NOT TO SUS PS155 17185 PLUGEED nan CP VtV 1718s 182-3 SIGNALLED TO OPE 4 FRM TEST /MA AF-31A ACP-TAC-LP-1825 AFW-ACI-FA ERCWB SWS-4 1 SWS-XVM-PG-17185 SWS-FWRE-17188 [g g Q 1.6E-003 g G 6.6E-004 Q 8.0E*004 - ca t
" AfW ICV 3-1264 ILFW FCW 3-1268 FAILS TO CPEN. FAILS TO OPEN AFW-MOV-CC-3126A AFW-MOV-CC-31268 G 3.0E-003 Q 3.Ge-003 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM PS409.
AF-30 1rans<er frem Page 7 ' [ I I nFW CV 3-806 AfW MAN CP Vtv INSUfflCIENT FAILS TO UPEN 3-804 PLUGGED FLOW FROM PS403
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7 SUFFICItnt - Treet L-SC1R FLOW TO STEAM Project: SES GENERATOR 2 Page 8 of 11 '
. Date test Modified:
AF-20 fue Aus 30 16:52:46 1988 ggtransfersfromPage(s)1 I I INSUFilCIENT nFW CV 3-922 nFW CW 3-862 TLOW fp0M PS41T FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN - RND PS407 AF-21 AFV-CEV-CC-3722 AFW-CAY-CC-3862' G.1.0E-004 g 1.0E-004 l l' INSUFFICIEN! INSUFFICIENT rLOW FROM PS417 FLOW FROM PS407 AF-22 AF-23 [k~ 6 Page 9
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- FAILS TO OPEN FAILS TO OPEN AFW-MCV-CC-3116A AFW MOV-CC-31168 G-3.0E-003 G 3.0E-003
- INSUF F'lC IENI FLOW FROM PS406 AF-18 g 4 Irons < er from Pope 10 I I RFW CV 3-805 RTW Mall GP VLV 1#9JFFICIENT FAILS TO OPEN 3-803 PLUGGED FLOW FROM PS&O3 AFW-CKV-CC-3805 AFW-Nvet-PG-3803 AF-13 T
Q 3.0E-004 . G l.1E OR d Page 5 - - . - .- .. - .= . .- - , . -- .- - . - . . . - ..=- .- .- - . . . - -
free: L-SGTR InsuffsCIENI Project: SES FLCf TO STEMI Page 11 ef 11 GEW5iRATOR 4 Date Lost Me*34 fled: fue Aug 30 16:52:46 19 5 AF-32 Trans' ers fran Page(s) 1 1 I INSUFFICIENI twSUFitCIENI FLOW FROM PS411 FLOW FRCM PS419 A7-33 AF-34 O **Y , hh 1 I i 1 afW CV 3-833 . ntu A0W 3-171- tev el CAUSE INSUFFICIEst "nFW IRAlu a FAILS To CPEN FAILS TO OPEN rAILURE OF AFU FLOli Fatm PS410 ncfDAft04 SIGNAL ROWS FAILS AFW-CKV-CC-3853 AFU-A0V-CC-3171 AFW-CCF-FT-A0W AF-28 AFW-ACI-F A-T RW8 Q 3.6E-005
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Tree: CD F Af ttJRE OF Project: SES N L SPRAf FROM Page 2 ef 4 RCPs Date Last Modified: Tue Aug 30 12:53:06 1998 004 Irans'er from Pege 1 1 I FAILtRE OF FAltt9E OF WORMAL SPRAT FRUM NORMAL 17947 FROM LOOP #1 (S/5 PMP) L0tP #2 (& P9P) CD9 0D10 l I I i i I EUMMON CAUSE PCS LOOP #2 Sta9 FZR SPRAY VLV FMequit CAUSE lECS LOOP #1 PUMP RCS LOOP #1 ftMP PIR SFRAY Vtti FAILS TO RUN FAILS TO START FA-340D FAILS TO FAILtJRE OF PZR FAILS 10 RUlf 'N5-3405 FAILS TO FAILUDE OF PZR JPEN SPRAT VLVS DPEN EPRAY EVS RCS-MDP-FR-RCP1 RCS-MDP-FS-RCP1 RCS-A0v-CC-340D WCS-CCF-CC-34060 RCS-seP-FR-RCP2 Res-A0V-CC-340s Res-CCT-Cc-340s0
- G 5.0E 005 G 3.0E-003 G 1.0E-003 G 1.0E-004 G 5.0E-005 G 1.0E-003 G 1.0E-004 N
CD F AILL,9E 10 COOLDOWN vIA STEAM CENERATOR E7 MS-1 Iransfers from.Pege(s) 1 4 I I AIMOSPHERIC LOMMON CAUSE MJMP VALVE FAILtJRE OF JNAVAILABLE TUR9INE BYPASS IfALVF1 MS-18 ' MSS-CCF-TT-A0V g G 3.4E-005 I MSS ADV 1-12 MSS Aov 1-12 IS FAILS TO OPEN BLOCKED PRIOR TO INITIATOR MSS-AOV-FT-ADV12 MSS-A0V-FC-ADV12 G 3.0E-003 G 1.5E-001
FAILURE TO Tree: CD COOLDOWN VIA Project:'SEO ETEAft GENERATOR page 3 of 4 Date Lost feedified: i MS-2 Twe Aug 30 12:53:06 1998 Irans< ers from Pege(s) 14 l . l AIMOSPMERIC ECMON CAUSE DUMP VALVE FAILURE OF LusAVAILASLE TtMt9fuE BYPASS' WALVF1 MS-25 MSS-CCF-FT-A0W [g Q 3.4E-005 _. I
%s ADv 1-23 vss mov 1-23 is FAILS TO OPElf BLOCKED PRIOR TO 148TIATOR MSS-A0V-Ft-ADV23 MSS-A0W-FC-ADV23 Q 3.0E-003 Q 1.5E-001 b3 fA! LORE TO C00LDOW4 VIA STEAM CE18ERATOR f'
MS-4 frensfers from Page(s) 14 I I AIMOSPM(RIC C0 m 04 CAUSE MJMP VALVE FAILURE OF MAVAILABLE tup 9INE SYPASS WALVFt MS-48 MSS-CCT-TT-A0V [Q Q ,3.4E-005 l nss mov 1-5 FAILS 9Ss ADV 1-5 is TO OPEN BLOCKED PRIOR TO IsttTIATOR PGS- A0W-FT- ADV5 mss-A0v-FC-ADV5 G.1.0E-003 G 1.5E-001
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Tree: 00-SCit FAllt*E OF Project: SEC - DEPRESSURIZATION N RE Pe9* 2 of 3 Dete Lost 89 edified: fue Aug 30 12:51:22 198R 002 trans:er fr a Page 1 I I I IAlLURE Of F AILtSE of FAILURE of 1 0F 2 40RMAL SPRAY FROM RUNILIARY P2R VLV FORY TRAINS TO RCPs SPRAY DFEN . 004 CMP-40V-CC-6284 P1-SGTR G 1.0E-003 g i I (AILURE OF FAILUeE OF MORMAL SPRAY fROM WORMAL SPRAY FROM LOOP #1 (S/B PMP) LOOP 82 (OP *w) CD9 0010 y k k i i F2R SPRAT Viv i LOMMON CAUSE RCS LOOP #2 PUFF i r2R SPRAT VLV i COMMC4, CAUSE kCS LOUP #1 PUMP RCS LOUP #1 PUMP FAILS TO Rtm RAILS TO START 58-3400 TAILS TO FAILUeE OF PZR FAILS TO RUE 68-3405 FAILS TO FAlltME OF PZR DPEN SPRAY VLVS 3 PEN -# RAY vtv5 RCS-MDP-TR-RCP1 RCS-MDP-FS-RCPI RCS-A0V-CC-3400 RCS-CCT-CC-340sD RCS-ecP-FR-RtP2 RCS-A0V-CC-340s RCS-CCF-CC-340s0 Q 5.0E-005 Q 3.0E-003 Q 1.0E-003 G 1.0E-004 Q 5.0E-005 Q 1.0E-003 G 1.0E-006 FAILURE 10 COOLDOWN YTA STEAM GENERATOR V MS-1 Ironsfers fra Pege(s) 1 i i AIMUSPHERIC CUeFJN CAUSE XMP VALVE FAILURE OF LfMAVAltABLE TURBINE 8VPASS WatVFt MS-19 MSS-CCF-FT-A0V Q 3.4E-005 5 i MSS ADV l-12 %S AoV l 12 IS FAILS TO OPEN ItLOCEE0 PRIOR TO INITIATOR MSS-A0V-FT-ADV12 MSS- A0V-FC- ADV12 G 1.0E-003 Q 1.5E-001
FAILURE TO Tre*: 00-SGTR COOLDOWIf vl4 Project: SES STEtJI GENERATOR Pepe 3 ef 3 81 Dete test see dified: MS-2 fue AuS 30 12:51:22 1988 Ironsiers frons Page(s) 1 1 I ATMOSPHERIC LL"eU8 CAUSE DUMP VALVE FAlltRE OF LfetAVAILABLE ftRBINE SYPASS MLWE MS-28 MSS-CET-TT-A0v [ Q 3.4E-005 I
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h FAILURE 10 C00LDOWit VIA STEAM GENERtTOR t4 MT-3 Iransfers frene Pege(s3 1 1 I AIMOSPHERIC LOMMUN CAUSE DUMP VALVE fat;URE OF LINAVAILA8tE TL* SINE STPASS WAt. WE MS-38 MSS-CET-fT-A0v [g Q 3.6E-005 I 935 Aov 1-30 955 Aov 1-30 IS FAILS TO OPEN PLOCKED PR10ft 10
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INSuf Flo free: W1 THRU PS76 AND Project: SEO PS81--S/D Page 1 of 5 Date Last modified: LPR-1 man Nov 14 12:03:04 1988 I I INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGH FLOW THROUGN PST6 PS81 LPR-2 LPR-3 [k [k I I IWSUfflCIENT LPl FCV 63-94 INSUFFICIENT LPl FCV 63-93 FLCW THROUGN LMcAVAILABLE FLOW THROUGN uMAVAILA8tE PSTS PS80 LPR-4 LPI-MOV-PG-6394 LPR-5 LPI-MOV-PG-6393 4A O 6 5'- ' [A O 6.5E-004 I I INSUFFICIENT LPI AOV 74-28 INSUFFICIENT LPI AOV 74-16 NEAT REMOVAL PLGED MEAT REMOVAL PLGED THROUGH PS74 THROJGM PS79 _7 LPR-6 LPI-40V-PG-7428 LPR-7 LPI-40V-PG-7416_ g Q G 1.1E-006 O Page 4 Q 1.1E-004 on i I I I I INSufflCIENT LPI N/X 18-8 DPERATOR FAILS [INSUFFICIEN! CCW FCV 1-153 FAULTS IN CCW FLOW THROUGH PLGED DURING TO OPEN CCW FCV FLOW FRtyt CCW FAILS TO OPEN TO N/M PS361 PS73 DPERAfl04 1-153 PS356 LPR-8 LPI-MTX-PG-RMX18 LPR-NNE-CCW1153 32-23 CCW-m0V-CC-1153 tPR-68 d Page 2 Q 1.4E-004 Q 4.1E-00' @ O3 "E- 5 [A
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Tree: W1 Project: SEO INSUFFICIENI HEAT REMOVAL Page 4 of 5 THROUGH PS79 Date Last Moclified: Mon mov 14 12:03:04 1988 LPR-7 ggtransferfromPage1 I I I I I INSUFFICIENT ECW FCV 1-156 F AULIS IN CCW LPI N/A 1A-A DPERATOR FAILS INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM CCW FAILS TO OPEN TO M/X PS354 PLGED DURING TO OPEN CCW FCV FLOW THROUGH PS337 PS78 DPERAil0N 1-156 CCW-20 CCW-MOV-CC-1156 (PR-?B LPR-XHE-CCW1156 LPR-9 LPI-HTX-PG-RHX1A g Q 3.0E-003 g Page 5 Q Q 1.4E-004 Q 4.1E-004 I l i l l I I ! LPI pep 1A-A LPI peps 1A-A INSUFFICIENT PLGED OR AC POWER tutAVAT LPI MDP 1A-A LPI MDP 1A-A FLOW TO SWS 4tSPOSITIONED LPI CV 74-514 LPI FCV 74-3 FAILS TO START FAILS TO RUN FOR AND 18-5 FAIL TO 6.9kV S/D 80 LNtAVAIL DUE TO START PS163 FAILS TO OPEN PLUGGED 24 HRS 1A-A TEST AND MAINT LPI pep-FR-1AA24 LPI-CCF-FS-14 ABS SWS-1 SWS-NvM-PR-1606A LPI-NDP-FS-1AA 1 LPI-CKV-CC-74514 LPI-MOV PG-743 ACP-TAC-LP-1AA g LPI-MDP-TM-1AA Q 2.0E-003 Q 3.0E-003 Q 7.2E-004 Q 4.5E-004 g { } 7.0E-005 Q 1.0E-004 Q 1.1E-004 )~~~~ ~~7 I l l l I l . 1 MO ACTUATION DC POWER tAAAVAIL !NSUFFICIENT- INSUFFIC ENT FAIL 70 ri! N i [ ' ~Pi'i-14)LAt t0N Pt.GED OR SWS A0V 1188 FLOW ina0 UGH CCW FLOW FROM CCW CCW RMR S - 1 VM ;74-1, PtGED OR SIGNAL FROM SIS 125v VITAL BUS I KISPOSITIONED PLUGGED PS337 wtTER MK % ~ ,
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/\ Page 5 O Page 3 I i AC POWER UNAVAIL FCV 74-12 DOES LPI fCV 74-12 MOT RECEIVE led FAILS TO OPEN 480V RX MOV BD 1A1-1 FLOW SIGNAL ACP-TAC-LP-1A1A LPI-ASF-MI-6392 LPI-MOV-CC-7412 g Q 1.6E-004 Q 3.0E-003
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I i 1 APPENDIX C HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - DETAILED RESULTS f
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. C.! Pre-Initiator Error Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3=
C.2' Post-Initia tor Error Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3' .- l t List of' Tables ' , f C-1 l' l C Valve R e storation Er rors . . . .' . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2. ECCS Reconfigura tion to Recirculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-13' f
~ C-3 Feed and Bleed Cooling Sequences .:. . . . . . . . .:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-25 C-4 SGTR with a Faul ted SG Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . .' . . . . . . . . .' . . - C-37 j C-5 AT W S Seq ue nc e s . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~. . . . . . _ C-49 j
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C. HUMAN RELIAIMLITY ANALYSIS- DETAILED RESULTS This appendix contains the analysis performed to calculate the probabilities for human actions used in the revised Sequoyah probabilitic risk assessment (PRA). This section presents the detailed results of the Human Rellability Analysis (HRA) described in Section 4.8 of the main report. Two types of human errors, pre-Initiator and post initiator, were studied for the PRA. Pre-initiator error analysis was entirely concerned with miscalibration errors and equipment restoration errors. Human actions which lead to these errors were done under normal plant operating conditions with stress levels appropriate for everyday work environments. The calculation of error probabilities for these actions was concerned l with the adequacy of the maintenance and inspection procedures, the dependence of related tasks, and the administrative redundancy of restoration procedures. The pre-- inltitdor analysis is detailed in Section C.I. The other category of human errors was post-initiator errors. Post-Initiator error analysis was concerned with human errors made in response to the mitigation of an initiating event. The human actions from which these errors derive were procedure directed. Calculation of error probabilities for these actions was primarily concerned with the amount of time available to complete the task, the stress level under which the task was performed, and the amount of redundant verification that was possible within the allowable time period. The post-initiator error analysis is detailed in Section C.2. , C.! Pre-Initiator Error Analysis i Restoration errors were postulated for each valve in each standby system. Restoration I errors were not postulated for valves in operating systems. Restoration errors were not i postulated for pumps or other components. Actions resulting in improper restoration of a pump or other component were considered primarily to be manifested in the failure to restore valves af ter isolation of the component for maintenance. In fact, the Impetus to postulate a valve being in the wrong position is predominantly from failure to restore af ter isolation of a component. ; The restoration errors for each valve were taken from the applicable case in Table 5-3, Reference 26. For some component cooling water valves, an exception was made to the valves in Table 5-3. Some cooling water valves are never expected-to be closed, except for pump or motor removal. Pump removal can not occur during plant operation, and ' motor removal during reactor operation is so rare it is not possible to establish an accurate f requency. The most likely cause of these valves being closed. Is due to operator errors of commission (i.e., inadvertant closure), it was not possible to postulate a frequency of this event either. For these valves, therefore, the median value of Case , 1 IX in Table 5-3, Reference 24, was used as the mean value for restoration error. i Restoration errors for all valves are shown in Table C-1. l C.2 P(ast-Initiator Error Analysis i' Post-Initiator human actions are those operator actions performed after the accident has started. The methodology used to evaluate post-accident human actions is described in ; detail in Reference C-1. In summary, the evaluation was performed in eight major steps: ! (1) Identification of the sequence and subsequent accident conditions. C-3
i (2) Based on the cut set (and sequence), the timing of the' events (i.e., occurrences, failures, alarms, Indications, etc.) was established. (3) Based on the cut set (and sequence), the symptoms and therefore the possible recovery actions (and required activities) were identified. (4) The time available to the operator to diennose and perform the action (and activities) was established. (5) The probability of the operator . falling to. properly diagnose the , accident was determined. This considered operator training, simulator exercises, and other factors. (6) The type of recovery action (whether ' dynamic' or ' step-by . step') was determined by the plant using symptom-oriented procedures or not, and operator training, etc. (7) The stress level of the operator was determined, considering the time available, dif ficulty of the action, and training. - (8) The probability of the operator falling to perform the recovery action was evaluated. in evaluating the accident sequences for potential recovery credit, the HP A process was documented in a series of eleven tables, as follows: (1) The first table identifies the accident sequence with. a detailed description of the accident scenarlo. (2) The second table establishes the timing of the accidentt . timing of . , the events, annunciators, and alarms. (3) Based on Table 1, this third table identifies the symptoms, potential recovery actions, and those activities associated with-them. (4) The time available for the operator to perform the recovery action. 1 is determined and shown in Table 4. - (5) The time it takes the operator to perform the action is calculated in Table 5. (6) The amount of time the operator has to diagnose problems is displayed in Table 6. (7) Diagnosis error probabilities are evaluated and documented in-two tables (Table 7, more than one abnormal event, and Table 8, one abnormal event). > (8) Table 9 Identifies the ' type' of action the operator performed. (9) The ' stress' level of operators, considering the accident sequence, is documented in Table 10. C-4 L
(10) Using the information from the previous tables, the probability of - the- operator falling to recover from the faults of the accident ; sequence is evaluated in Table 11. The notes that describe each column in the tables are presented below. , Table 1 Notes (1) This should include a detailed description of the accident sequence under consideration -- what functions and systems are falling and succeeding, what phenomena are occurring because of the failures and successes and their resulting , etfects, what is the final outcome of the sequence, etc. (2) The basic accident type is described here. (3) Because of the accident type and the " symptoms" of the accident, certa!n immediate conditions, (i.e., entry conditions) are generated (e.g., reactor trip, low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, etc.). These immediate conditions are listed here. (4) From the accident conditions or symptoms, the operator is immediately directed into certain EOPs. These are listed here. Additionally, other relevant procedures are also listed here. Table 2 Notes: See Step #1, page 6-9 and Step #3, page 8-3 of ASEP HRA procedures. (1) Identify the major events which are expected to comprise the accident sequence. (2) Identify the time at which each event is expected to occur, beginning with the-Initiating event at T=0. Subsequent' events are expressed in minutes following the initiating event. (3) Identify any annunciators or other indicators notifying the operators that each event has occurred. (4) Provide any additional comments which serve to clarify information on this table, as required. Table 3 Notes: See Step #2, page 6-10 and Step #4, page 8-3 of ASEP HW A procedures, t ' (1) Identify the principal component fu. ctional failures which comprise the cut sets for the accident sequence. (2) Identify the specific symptoms which will-indicate to the operators that the component functional failure has occurred. C-5
(3) Identify ali actions which may be taken by the operator in response to each component functional failure. (4) Identify the Individual activities (tasks) which comprise each potential operator action. List only significant operator actions as opposed to decisions, diagnoses, , etc. (5) Any additional comments required to clarify the information on this table.
,T_able 4 Notes:
(1) The actions listed in Column 3, Table 3, are listed here. (2) The last possible time at which, if the operator establishes the required function, (3) In many ases he ope ator is not alerted to the failure at the time of the initiator. Lisst the time at which the operator recognizes that the failure has occurred. (4) The dif ference between the time in which the operator must successfully perform the action following the initiating event -and the time at which the operator recognizes that the action must be taken. Ted - To = Tm ; Table 5 Notes:
- See Step #3, page 610 and Steps #5, 6, and 7, pages 8-3 and 8-4 of ASEP HRA -
procedures. (1) The major activities (tasks) which comprise the operator actions are listed. (2) Identify the location in which each activity must be performed. 1 (3) Identlfy the travel time required for an operator to transit from his likely location at the time the requirement for the action is recognized to the loction at which l the activity must be performed. Assume that the operator knows the proper l ' location. (4) Identify the time which is required to perform the activity, given that the I operator has reached the location at which the activity must be performed. Assume that the operator knows how to perform the required activity. Any. anticipated dif ficulties or complexitles should be reflected in this estimate. i Table 6 Notes:
- See Step #4, page 6-10 and Step #7, page 8-4 of the ASEP HRA procedures.
(1) Tm is determined in Table 4. (2) Ta is determined in Table 5 i C-6
(3) Time available to disgnoses is equal ?o Tm less Ta. (4) Any additional comments required to clarify the Information in this table. Table 7 Notes: See Step 9, pages 8-4 to 8-7 of the ASEP HRA procedures. (1) In order to accomplish the action, if the operator must diagnose for each activity, the probability of mis-diagnosis for each activity needs to be determined. CD If the analyst can determine that the probability of the operator falling to-diagnose the event is negligible, then remainder table is not applicable. Reasons for determining that the diagnosis error is negligible should be discussed in the comment column. ' (3) See Table 3 for definition of abnormal event. (4) If there is more than one abnormal event, there is the probability that the operator will fall to recognize an additional occurrence of another event. Therefore, the probability that the signal of subsequent abnormal events are not noticed needs to be estimated. These HEPs are added to the final HEP. At the time of the second, third, etc. abnormal event, you need to determine the total number of annunciators being alarmed. Read down the column marked " Number of ANNs" to the total number of annunciators you have determined, then read straight across to the column marked Pr(F;), this is the HEP that the operator will fall to respond to the signal of the second, etc. abnormal event in the midst of the other annunciators, k (5) Based on Td (from Table 6) an initial HEP for failure to diagnose is selected from ! Table 8-2. Use mean value. (6) Indicate whether or not the action is " skill-based" as defined in Table 2-1, Page 2-6 of the ASEP HRA procedures. (7) It is assumed that mis-diagnosis of scram is " epsilon"(<lE-4). The HEP for each action (or activity) should be adjusted accordingly Cup or down) depending on , whether the es ent is covered in training, the event is practiced by the operators, ! the event is well recognized and interviews indice.te that a_ll operators are familiar j with the accident, the event is practicled by the . operators in simulator j. requalification exercises and the complexity of sequence (e.g., confilcting i readings). To adjust the HEP upward and downward, use the associated error factor to adjust. l 2 (8) Any additional comments required to clarify the information in this table. Table 8 Notes. See Step 9, pages 8 4 to 8-7 of the ASEP HRA procedures. (1) List the actions identified in Table 3, Column 3 which are part of one abnormal event. C-7
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(2) If the analyst determines that the probability of the operator falling to diagnose the event is negligible, then the remainder of the table is not applicable. Reasons for determining that the diagnosis error is negligible should _be discussed in comment column. (3) Based on Td (from Table 6), an initial HEP for failure to diagnoses is selected from Figure 8-1. Use mean value. Indicate whether or not.the action is " skill-based" as defined in Table 2-1, page 2-(4) ' 6 of the ASEP HR A procedures. (5) It is assumed that mis-diagnosis of scram is " epsilon" ( < lE-4). The initial HEP is adjusted downward (use lower bound) or upward (use upper bound) depending on whether the plant uses symptom-orlented EOPs, event is covered in the EOPs, operators are trained on the EOPs and the EOPs are well designed. Additionally, the HEP for each ~ action (or activity) should be adjusted to reflect any special complexity of the sequence (e.g., conflicting readings). (6) Any additional comments required to clarify the information in this table. Table 9 Notes: I
- See Step #10, pages 8-7 and 8-8 in the ASEP HRA procedures.
(1) List the actions identified in Table 3, Column 3. (2) List any safety systems that were functioning and then failed. (3) Indicate whether or not EOPs are well designed, operators use EOPs, and . operators are well trained on procedures. (4) Indicate whether or not an individual operator performs more than one safety function using a system without good Indication (cues) that he must shif t from one activity to another. (5) If any safety systems fall after initially operating (#2), EOP design or training is not adequate (#3), or if operator performs more than one. function (#4) without adequate indication, then the action (or activity) should be classified as " dynamic" and not " ster-by-step". Generally, step-by-step is- defined as a routine, q procedurally-gulded set of steps when performed one-at-a-time. (6) Any additional comments required to clarify the information in this table. Table 10 Notes:
- See Step #10, pages 8-7 and 8-8 in the ASEP HRA procedures.
(1) List the actions identified in Table 3, Column 3. (2) Indicate whether or not the time available to diagnose and perform the action (activities) is less than two hours. C-8
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l t 1 (3) Indicate whether or not more than two safety systems fall in the course of the sequence. (4)' Indicate whether ot not operator is very experlenced in the sequence, regardless of items 2 and 3 above. (5) Extremely high stress is assessed if the response to items #2 or #2 is yes and the , response to item $3 is no. However. If item #4 is yes, moderately high stress can be assessed. Additionally, the stress should be adjusted accordingly, taking into . account such things as " degree of burden", complexity of action (activity), action ; (activity) needs to be performed "quickly", action location not easily accessible, - etc. Any PWR large LOCA is presumed to involve extremely high stress until recirculation is established. (6) Any additional comments required to clarify the information in this table. Table 11 Note,si See Table 8-5, pages 8-13 and 8-14 in the ASEP HRA procedures. (1) List the actions identified in Table 3, Column 3 (2) List the activities (tasks) which comprise each action as identified in Table 3, Column 4. (3) The failure probability of the original operator performing the activity. . The HEP is based on whether the activity is step-by-step, dynamic, moderately high stress, extremely high stress (refer to Tables 9 and 10).' The HEP is taken from either item #3, #4, or #5 of Table 8-5 of the ASEP HRA procedures. ' (4) If recovery of the activity (action) made by the original operator is possible, ! identify the probability that a second person (generally the shift supervisor) falls to correct the original operator. This HEP is based on whether the activity is step-by-step, dynamic, moderately high stress, extremely high stress (refer to Tables 9 and 10). The HEP is taken from either item #6, #7, or #8 of Table 8-5 of the ASEP HRA procedures. (5) If the accident sequence is such that a third independent check (e.g., accident management team, second shif t, etc.) is performed, the probability for falling to do so is assessed. This HEP is based on whether the activity is step-by-step, . dynamic, moderately high stress, extrememly high stress (refer to Tables 9 and , 10). The HEP is taken from item #6, #7 or #8 of Table 8-5 of the ASEP HRA procedures. (6) The probability of falling to perform an action is the multiplication of the HEPs of ' s items #3, #4, and #5. (7) Any comments required to clarify the information in this table. C-9
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Table C-1 Valve Restoration Errors Reason Applicable Restoration Yalve is Case from Valve Error Closed Table 5-3,Ref. 24 Mean HEP g Coment CCW-XVM-RE-1503B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 (1) Median value for HEP used, CCW-XVM-RE-1505B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 because there is no reason for CCW-XVM-RE-1507 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 this valve to ever be closed. error IX 1.24E-4 16 Not possible to establish fre-- CCW-XVM-RE-1725A 3.0E-5 CCW-XVM-RE-17258 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 quency of closure. CCW-XVM-RE-569A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 CCW-XVM-RE-569B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 IV CCW-XVM-RE-673B 8.2E-3 test IV 8.2E-3 10 CCW-XVM-RE-677B 8.2E-3 test .IV 8.2E-3 10 CCW-XVM-RE-CCPBB 1.5E-4 error IX 1.24E-4/ valve- 16% See coment (1). CCW-XVM-RE-RHRIB 9.0E-5 error IX -1.24E-4/ valve 16 (2) These events represent groups CCW-XVM-RE-RHRIA 9.0E-5 error .IX 1.24E-4/ valve 16 pof 2, 3, and 5 valves. CCW-XVM-RE-RHX1A 6.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4/ valve. 16 o 6.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4/ valve 16 .L CCW-XVM-RE-RHX1B ~ CCW-XVM-RE-SI1AA 1.5E-4 error IX 1.24E-4/ valve. 16 CCW-XVM-RE-SI1BB 1.5E-4 error IX 1.24E-4/ valve 1$ CHP-XVM-RE-62510 1.24E-4 test IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-A0V-RE-1170 3.0E-5 error. IX 1.24E-4 16) SWS-XVM-RE-1718A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-X'!M-RE-1718B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1554A 3.0E-5 error- IX 1.24E-4 -16
.SWS-XVM-RE-1554B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-16008 3.0E-5. error IX 1.24E-4 '16 See coment (2). 'SWS-XVM-RE-1601B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 3.0E-5 error IX .1.24E-4 16, 'SWS-XVM-RE-1602B SWS-XVM-RE-1603A 3.0E error IX 1.24E-4 SWS-XVM-RE-1603B 3.0E-5 .- error 'IX 1.24E-4 16l 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1604A. 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1604B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1605A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1605B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1606A 3.0E-5 error- IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1606B 3.0E-5 error .IX 1.24E-4 1
Table C-1 (Continued) Valve Restoration Errors Reason Applicable Restoration Valve is . Case from Valve Error Closed Table 5-3,Ref.24 Mean HEP E Cornent SWS-XVM-RE-1613A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16) SWS-XVM-RE-1613B - 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 ! SWS-XVM-RE-1704A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 { SWS-XVM-RE-1704B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1707 A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1707B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1708A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 k SWS-XVM-RE-1708B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 5WS-XVM-RE-1709A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16feecomment(2). 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1709B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1737B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1764A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1765B 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16 j 9 SWS-XVM-RE-537A 3.0E-5 error IX 1.24E-4 16/ Z; SWS-XVM-RE-726A '8.0E-4 test VIII 8.0E-4 lu SWS-XVM-RE-726B 8.0E-4 test VIII 8.0E-4 10 SWS-XVM-RE-745A. 8.0E-4 -test VIII 8.0E-4 10 SWS-XVM-RE-CCPBB 1.24E-4 maint IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-SIIAA 1.24E-4 maint IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-SI1BB 1.24E-4 maint IX 1.24E-4 16 SWS-XVM-RE-1718A 8.0E-4 . test - VIII 8.0E-4 10 SWS-XVM-RE-1718B 8.0E-4 test VIII 8.0E-4 .10
7 Table C-2 ECCS Reconfiguration to Recirculation These tables explain the derivation of the following human' actions. HPR-XHE-FO-631 Isolate RWST from RHR suction HPR-XHE-FO-635 Isolate RWST from SI suction HPR-XHE-FO-CHISL Isolate RWST from Charging Pump suction
-HPR-XHE-FO-SIMIN Close minifIow valves on SI pumps.(S1 , S2)-
HPR-XHE-FO-SIMN1 Close miniflow valves on SI pumps '(long, slow'53) HPR-XHE-FO-SIMN2 Close miniflow valves on SI pumps (53 )' . y HPR-XHE-F0-V6V7 . 0 pen RHR-SI; pump cross over valves , HPR-XHE-FO-V8V11 Open RHR-SI pump cross over valves CSR-XHE-FO-CSR- Reconfigure CSS forl recirculation m--w*mee-m.wm, a--*'- em u-- --em.. d- mn-+-.'t.h--*s----- iw-:,uma.-h--.e-a ---.wa 'a m_-um=t u h=a-s 4-.m
TABLE 1 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION
- EVENT TREE: S,S'S3 i 2
-SEQUENCE NUMBER:
SEQUENCE DESIGNATOR: Sg2 H '~S22H ' S3C2 OH 0 H ' S3CDg SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION-LOCA of- varying size is the initiating event. 'Except for S 03C02 0 H , containment sprays 'come on and are;not _ terminated. RWST water' 1evel reaches 28% at approximately 20 minutes' from the initiating ' event. Swapoveriof. the RHR suction occurs automatically. The sump valves open and the RWST~ valves ~ close automatically. Thist operation takes.about 4 minutes. The operator then must perform.the reconfiguration of the SI and Charging
. System, switching the suction from the RWST'to the RHR-pump discharge.. This requires closure. of the miniflow valves on the' SI~ pumps, because they are interlocked with the RHR discharge valves. After the disch6rge valves are open, the operator reconfigures the containment spray, system. Finally, he closes -isolation valves on the suctions of the RHR,'SI, and.Chps. This 'last action is not critical unless'a check? valve or MOV failure has' occurred in the pump.
9 APPLICABLE PROCEDURES: E-0 Reactor Trip or SI
-E-1 Loss of Reactor or. Secondary Coolant
.E-1.2 Transfer to Containment-Sump- _
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- 1. LOCA- t=0 SI signal,-Phase Afor B
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POTENTIAL OPERATOR. ACTIVITIES (TASKS)' COMMENTS /-' DESCRIPTION SYMPTOMS ACTIONS REQUIRED-TO PERFORM.- - SOURCE.-0F INFORMATION-0F EVENT L(2) (3) ~ ACTION'AND- l(5) (1). ' n PROCEDURAL 1 ZED (4) Not applicable to these operator actions. ~ These actions are ' required to occur for mitigation of small breaks. These actions are'not in response to system failure.
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.w(,.wm,,
_ mAm. g-aw_A w.gm - .i.ya pus , c. i. cs m .
TABLE 4 SEQUENCE AND CUT SET AVAILABLE TIME CUT SETS: ACTION TIME BY WHICH OPERATOR MUST ACT TIME AT WHICH OPERATOR IS MAXIMUM TIME AVAILABLE TO COMMENTS / (1) TO PREVENT SUBSEQUENT CORE ALERTED THAT SYMPTOM HAS PERFORM THE IDENTIFIED SOURCE OF DAMAGE (Tcd) (2) OCCURRED (To) (3) OPERATOR ACTIVITIES (Tm) (4) INFORMATION.(5). Table not applicable. These actions are not in response to a system failure, but are a required part of LOCA mitigation. Time is available to perform action. System is designed to ensure time is available. Technique is practiced in simulator to verify that time is available. O d.
~
.. .c . . . , . - -
, , , . . , . . , , - - . . . -n , ~ ,,..-. , ,- , , . , , ,
- o s ..
e TABLE .' S' .
~
0PERATOR ACTION PERFORMANCE TIME *-
~ CUT SETS:
t LOCATION. . TRAVEL PERFORMANCE :TOTALr - C099ENTS/ i '- - ACTION ACTIVITIES'
-TIME cTIME (Ta): - SOURCE OF INFORMATION?
(1) .(2) TIME. (3) ~ (4)'. =(5): .(6)
-Table not.l applicable.: See comment on Table 4. _
- 1 O- 1
' ,L -
l w 4
+
4 I - f
+ N ~- 4 -- -Nn. , ,j;;, ' ,
y_ - _ _
,# ,e S.
v
- TABLE 6 DIAGNOSIS TIME OF SE0VENCE CUT SET
- SEQUENCE / CUT SET MAXIMUM TIME TOTAL ACTION TIME AVAILABLE~ COMMENTS /
AVAILABLE (Tm). ' TIME (Ta) - TO DIAGNOSIS-(Td) ' ~ ' SOURCE OF INFORMATION
.. (1)- (2) (3) <
(4): A diagnosis error is included for these events, even though-they are procedure directed and an expected partJof LOCA : mitigation. The diagnosis error was based on the time from the initiator.to the time when.the RWST sun valves.
~
open. The operator must recognize a LOCA' is in progress and realize there are manual . actions to perform.'- -
- 1. S,S.
i 2 '20 min.
- 2. .
503C 30 min.
- 3. 500 3C0 10 hr.
o~ 4. S0O_ 3CD: reci[culation not e required :
'i m
$ %, .g.' q-M g%W".Pt'P' g 'W' h N i
- eN #P' '
Mt e '""'(N +r *- (' 3 T' M N *
#iT -
F"'D #
""+7N Y C l't '-
Y Y Y W'bM8 CT WPY T% E 'f' % %*PWiF"W'fW l#M-d W4**Yk'd ePB 9"'WDPMhT Wwr w --* T
~.. < ~
m.
-=
TABLE 7 ,. ; DIAGNOSIS ANALYSIS - MORE' THAN ONE ABNORMAL EVENT
- CUT SETS:
ACTION . DIAGNOSIS : NUMBER ANNUNCIATOR- FAILURE TO SKILL-BASED . ADJUSTMENT'. COMMENTS /. (Symptom) NEGLIGIBLE OF ABN HEP DIAGNOSE . .IN FINAL . SOURCE OF- . (1): '(2). EVENT (Table 8-4)~ (Table 8-2) (6) HEP (7):- ' INFORMATION-
--(3) (4) - (5). .
(8)- NOT' APPLICABLE
-O 4
a ,_a-I
+
.r-
-n..,
he'%.9,. g..NW%ie q Se wJr.e Jues e; 9 .--gai.w a'am,' mp M , ae ---w ,, + -* . y--e y war -- u s'smai4+ p-'r3~'wi,- 3'W '- -" fd-- 'd A' **w k H'
- FfWt*P"-"*V'"' c' g'.#vv +*%--9
'*f-WV'y*-M%"'d'**.a --1.--edra.r'.dCm aa s E*-ia..Mri=.=<%.- *-shtha----'- '
- ' = - - ' - " = - - * -
.,=
TABLE 8 DIAGNOSIS ANALYSIS - ONE' ABNORMAL EVENT
- CUT SETS:
ACTION DIAGNOSIS FAILURE'TO' SKILL-RASEn ADJUSTMENT COMPTNTS/' (Symptom) : NEGLIGIBLE. DIAGNOSE' - (4) IN FINAL' SOURCE OFLINFORMATION
'(1) (2) (Figure 8-1). HEP (5) '(6)
(3)
- 1. 'Si , S2 'No 8E-4' - --
- Lower Boured '
2. S03C. ' No . - ~2E-4 -- Lower Bound See: discussion below
'3. 50O3CD Yes .: - - ~-- --
g The lower bound diagnosis' curve was;used for these events because'they.are frequently practiced in training.
- Note: Event Oc is. comprised of three elements. One element ~ represents a split fraction for-larger break sizes, .where:
continued spray.operationi.is inevitable... The other elements. represent an operator.-die. gnosis error'and an operators
~
action error.i The. error. probability for. the failure to ' switch to > recirculation was talculated ~ differently: for-
~
that portion of Ocrepresenting diagnosis _ error. .For this portion, theidiagnosis er W for. failure to' switch to recirculation was calculated'as'the~second event at 40. minutes. 'Thus, from Tc51e 8-2.'+n Reference 24, the: -
= diagnosis error is 2.7E-3. .- m-
+
i
.~
W s 9 Y i-9
,.-.._...,;,_~ _. - ..,a,_ - _ _ . - _ , . . , , - _ , - a+ . . . _ . _ . . ~ . . - ..,..._w.--,.. , ,_ .~, , ...c.. ,_a..~ 2; _2 ; .
. v.a ;.. . .
,qq
__. m ,
-y. -
. _ - ze-- -<
';3 3 :.
- . ~ -
- = . a ' i
" ' [.
'* ~ * ?" .
R.+ ,_ ' _ ' , u ,. 4 y y_ 'I TABLE 9 -
' POST-DIAGNOSIS ACTION-TYPE IDENTIFICATION
- CUT SETS:
~
J
-ACTION.. SAFETY; SYSTEMS FAILED' E0Ps, TRAINING, USE E0Ps, -OPERATOR-PERFORMS DYNAMIC:0Rr .. COMMENTS /-
- ONE ACTIVITY .. STEP-BY-STEPf = SOURCE: 0F ' INFORMATION; "
(Activities) (2). WELL-DESIGNED E0Ps
- (5)' .(6)>
'(1) (3): .;(4) < -
lL
;15tep by Step .
All ' No Yes ' .Y$s ' . K s T t
, B
., . g. .,.
' 20 .
n
.s.. ..
I .n _n.
,n ,
k' a 'w- 4
/ ..'
n e. eM } mL, l',) I
, r
~
yi-
+.
4'
-w. . .
~ e n N , :a.
.. 4 g b
~ 3 6 s _
p I ' 4 - 3
,Y '
l y 4 t 4x ., a s ~ . - p %%- u- 9 g e. ,ry .,.E.'.. w.9.g. .', .. 79,9 2, ,,, _m.g.),. t
..y ;y p [ _ , ,W ~;,,,,,, ,, ,
_ _g,. .p,, ; .,-
.h-
..h t
~
l: ,. TABLE 101 [ POST-DIAGNOSIS STRESS-LEVEL INDICATION *J CUT SETS: \-
' ACTION- - Tm 2h MORE THEN TWO OPERATOR. STRESS LEVEL; . COMMENTS /_
(Activities) AFTER.IE- - SAFETY SYSTEMS FAMILIAR (5). - SOURCE 0F'.INFORMATION
,(2)- -(6)
~ (1) -FAIL .W/SE00ENCE (3)' -- (4 ) -
All except ' No l No ' .Yes Moderate CSS-XHE-FO-CSR . CSS-XHE-FO-CSR,_ No. No- . Yes :- Moderate when~no'other-failures occur. CSS-XHE-FO-CSR- No: :No No Moderate,-Time Stress- _, .i 1after-failures'of -~1 LPR or HPR
, .b-
.f ..
.m.
v m *' e s J
-w it._ad,=_ __i_-rN'h-e+-4'--,,.--Eln
- - _ *- a-, ~ka[ 5 . .--, ( ig .
y'h 4 [p . ,,.w. ,.$y- #wg, s . ..,.p4u,. _,m ,. .._] .,,yy., J'.
, , 'h 4
- n. .
- ' leri. ', g [ "
p i
.a . p'f'.p~ , '
,- '$ "r TABLE-11' -
_g..
- ,(
POST-DIAGNOSIS ANALYSIS * , CUT SETS:
, ' a-
' ACTION - ACTIVITIES ' ORIGINAL. :
SUPERVISOR FAILS- -THIRD INDEPENDENT: --; TOTAL. HEP ' COMMENTS /. l .
~(1)- :(2)- OPERATOR 1 TO CORRECT ' CHECK / CORRECTION- '(6); tSOURCE;0F'INFORMATION'
' HEP - OPERATOR-HEP . HEP ~ ~ (7)L (3) (4) .- -. (5)l
- 1. Open'or Close. . .02 ~.32 - .32 32.05E-3, '
- any pair of -
valves, oriany'
. single' valve.
(3) The BHEP of .032 in Reference-24 was' reduced-to .02, the median;value, due.to the controlLboard: graphics available for-these actions. _ (5)~ : third 'independenti-check was allowed for these actions, becauseithe ; operator is: requirsd' to ' verify. valve position with ^a. check list and then to verify flow;at various points in: the qsystem. o 2
- E' -2. CSS-XHE-FO-CSRE a) turn off . .02:*12' >1.32
- 2: -- '
1.0256l 1;FactorJof2fis~for'. .
' after previous . ! pump-- .
. time.: stress 1 , :
-fallurel . b)fopen sump; :.02.' * ; 2 . 32..*;2 ~. -- , ...0256E 2. Third f werification valves .
not available'as c)"close RWST' - .02
- 2 .321*.2. '--- :.0256 attent ion .is?
' diverted'to'
~
- valves- .076 - *
. previous" failure :
L - " l'
- e n' w ,
5- = a {
;/,
,,#-l.
j - i . . y;
)
<- , , , - . M-.- p .mhcw g-M Ne i -
- 5.r-whNm - '_-
w + r i.ycy. ~ . iN % .- -p - e' ,.
.=- 9 -, G -y =o-- y-- -l-Ny . A i h-' ., d, - -[} -
__mm3-s -as.2. - s .m a s. v .w w w.... as .w .b w e,it-
---~aa
, ~
y* j ll p l' [' "' ; ., '
, , . .;r y f .
in 4-g - - ag l' l #' Table C-3 . EFeed and Bleed. Cooling Sequences 2 , The following sheets calculate human error probabilities for: HPI-XHE-FO-FDBLD ? Failure to initiate HPI for feed and-bleed
'M -'RestorationLof' main feedwater or' condensate for S3, T ,p T ,.and 3 T sequences-with 3
two DGs-operable. O w
.,o E4 LM -
- ;:' .j 4.r
% 4 m
v
.'s /
e f j W' ,. 6 % "W-e'
.m l
r
+
}
g l /, r - 4 "
, f*
m.- -i'.t-tJ. 's <.. -- f,0.y
._, r - r , ~ t s
, jg l ~v .
T
'l3 s -
cp- L'- _. OJ l' #
':h I /'.4 -
. . . 51 , _ .,
r~.. r+1%._. - < s< m . , *
-+ ._,
3,;.
._a,. , , . _ __ _ . .
TABLE 1 ACCIDENT SEOUEMCE DESCRIPTIOM EVENT TREE: 7 9 T 2' T 3 SEQUENCE NUMBER: SEQUENCE DESIGNATORr y T LP2 /T t /T 3 WP
/ S,LWF SEQUENCE DESCRIPit04:
(1) Torb3ne trip with or without mein feedwater is the In3tletIng event. Mein *sedwater w!It be Isoleted when T AVE
.reeches $43'F - which Is shortly after turbine tr3p. After ImmedIete post trip recovery, operate- wita ettempt to restore mfd wie. opening ef the c4fn feed regulating bypass we8ves, or witi go to AFW. If th}s !$ weevelt-eble, he wl88 depresserire the SG and ettempt to restore flow from e condensete peop. $f condensate is unevellebte, he efit go te feed fad bleed, using et toest one charging psop or $5 pump and 2 PORVs. In the event that feed and bleed falls, the operefor is instructed to depresserite one SG and 17 Ject f i r e4et er fato it.. This option was not included because we consider that by the time-ett ettempts et FW resterstion new, felled, there efts not be any t'me teft to inject fireweter. Feed and bleed Is generetty coes tse,ree e test nation. Attempts to restore SG feed w ou l d be priority.. Feed end bleed would not be Initteted.estt% B e f e ' '3 4 g the sequence.
b. e APPLICABLE PROCEDURES: E ~Reector Tr1p or $1
~
E-G.1 - Reactor Trip Recovery
.FR H.1 - Loss of Secondary Meet Sint
.O ;.,--..,. . . , . . _ . . _; , r _, , . . _ . . - .. . . ..-,_._._;,.,_ _ .-, . . , . , _
,_ 2.._.,_ _ . . . .
.., ~
. - j -- -
s .:m TABLE 2. SE00ENCE AND CUT SET TIMIE* EVENT / OCCURRENCE (1) TIME (2) AMNtfMCIATOR/INDsCATION (3) COMMENTS / SOURCE Or 1NFORM ATION ' (41
- 1. . Re ac tor. trip / turbine. tr ip
. t=0 Tes.
- 2. Main feedseter i solate t = 3m
- 3. Operator attempts to restore Mrw t=5
--thre bypass-valve 4 Lo. level ~ in SG- t= 10m. Yes
.: t - .
-Ql 5..- AFW - fails to st ar t '.. 't
- 10m Yes-e-
.g.
'W 6.- Operator attempts depresserfre SG end- _t =)t5n condensate pumps
- 7. Operator f a li s.' to Initlate; feed' t = 35m and.bIeed s.
7 .. 6 a i,- V f s = u 2. ; m .. _..-..._.__._:._m..m... _ _ . _.._ ..._ m _ . _ . __ _ - - - = - -
;I .
l I ! I]. . a y - l n O I T - A M .
/ R .
S O 4 T F M N) EI 5 . ( m s F oO C E C R , U O s m S p e e . p i S d p n . - e e s e s -
- p s e
) M ) pd c S RO 4 es en ean e
K F ( t e .
- S - a v.- p .
S A R DD G sl sf N T E N E S n a. gV I O ( P A Z ew nR I O NL I ed iO s T S T s r n s gP e v C E OA p i os r . A I I R m rca ah l T D T U o e p h t a R O l E R CD p sey cov b v A E srb - T A l I U C t eo t r nc k . T O r rt n R E C EQ R a p s e e e p. aeo t pl i A R P t + P s d ro sob , O . r. l ) 3 ) l 3 -. L I 1 2 3 i 2 . A . 3 I . T . E N 0 - L E - B T R . A O O T P T - A e D R s N E S p , A P N e d . O O) e e , E I 3 P e R L l
~
U A T( C e b' L t
~
I I T A a d A N s n F E n a . T e . T O d d E P W n e S F o e . A C F . T . U C , l l . e e v v - e e . wl wl o o [ S l G l G M f S f S O T ) oo nt oo nt P 2 M ( Y l ) l ) S ab ab . p ,. m - u . . P . W W N F F f e O T 9 A ot a I N f f es T P E ) o o" r n ae '
- V S
I E(I s s l d , T R s s l n E C o o eo S S FC L L F C E .
~
T D . U . . . C I 2 3 (go,ao
)
i 2,
, e+ i.. i .t 4
- m TABLE 4 SEQUENCE Am CUT SET AVAILABLE TIE.
-CUT SETS: {
ACTION TIME BY WHICH OPERATOR MOST ACT TIME.AT WHICH OPERATOR'IS - MAXIMtPt TIME AVAILABLE TO COMMENTV
. (8) -TO PREVENT-SUBSEQUENT CORE - ALERTED THAT SYMPTO8t NA S ' PERFOR99 TME sDENTIFIED 50UetCE OF.
- DAMAGE (Ted) (2) OCCURRED (Tol (3) OPERATOR ACTIVITIES (Tm) (4) I NFORMAT I005 (3)
M 35m 10m - 25m . I 1 i HP f -X HE-F O-F DB LD 35m ' 15m 20e i
-e te -
.=(C 5
4 ..
., a . b
, " I f. {. 1 y b b 1. 9 Wn- a e v' ww 'ew e ^'aw t v u er* >t^ '-t'et "W=+-se9w *w =e
- n 'w s 'D'Y'" V -"T'v"'+4'*W *'**PN*'" "-*"w*v**'f"*w1**'VPWM*'*"Nf'*ND'9*rV"**ws****"PN'-***'W"WW9"'N*-w e' + 9 vt t e'v
- 1"erwWN'***'"*++"+'1v'****'wa**-M*'*ehCwm * -"'m-'
,~ '
- e. i k ,J 'i -- '": - ,
y 1- -;p'?
.;y
~ - ^ ' -
J s
;E; w1- .
r
' a.
5gl
-g l.
e m . . ' ,, ';. t r
- .A',
. 's
': . a
..,_r-TABLE E -
- - . .s-e -a 4 . \7 - -' _
OPERATOR ACTI0lt PERFORMMICE . TIME * - -
' CUO 5ETS:- _ % 2.; i .
-l P 1. i 75 ACTIY87IES LOCATION TRATEL PERFORMANCE TOTAL '
COeW8ENTS/ AOTION-
- (1 ) - (2 ) - TIME -Time TIME (Ta).' S0tfutCE F _ ImFORMATION
( 31. . -(4)- ~ (58 (6) v
~
'y'
.HPB-XHE-FO-FDBLD to 1m' -2m. ~\
stort charging CR pumps, open PORVs s.
=
',t .
^ ~
4 _-l
'1
'.i_.
, m a
a
- i. a.
~
.t_
, i-r- ,
~ - m me, w w ,
m-
,] .,I,
.-=.'m*2~.m....E_.m.._d__~.,,...,_,.,__
, f.
I i 7 )
'l:.
f
.ig t-u i h
1
~
fk ', n
,4" 2
- . + E k '
, 'm ,
=
>= . g,
.R a
.R. ,
-w, ..
+ u
<W '
/ O '{
't
. . ?
i + e N - I .' , l 5 y D > g w k- i . 's
.l}
- . @ s
. .a YA "
S,,, h. '("i
.>- M- W -l g w- .
y L' ' ; W g. i
' _ a: :
g .-
->np i t
t
-l?
.r [
H :
) .l -
. , :- f
_e d . o g *k 1 a N g .c
.,J ')
'g w- N ? 'p w
gg o"
. , y .
y k j b -? [
,1 m~ ;6 w- ~l m .
yg. :'i ' , l E k
== w
' h O W a 3 gg. .. o-6 t i
n.-
= .a
~
- k i
M * . t s( 1 K> 'l C .7 ll
.r.
.s :
'P; dj 3
. . 1s
.h
'1 di p i '*
W D
, :W ' s
,j
.> .. h, it'- ;h
-n< g- ..
l u- -o N 4s .-
.. W. r 3
.- - O
- g w g. t
_ 4 - D W 11 o x 1 W -M $}
.o 1 i -;
- m r ;
1 L g ~
-.n:
;j e
. J .-- , _ -
- ', l t . .
-" C-31: 15
. - 1, .
.+ , ;
~
., s , -;; s -
+
c i:-- x kt
- a. . .- % .
_,---. i
_. c
-l z y ,
. , - ~ , .- , # _
g t
. a i
- r. .,
j ' .. , _ j'
4
/ r0 S Ol T T M E4 )
ECM8 8 9 R R( MU O COF CS M I T N E A L) 7 MN ( TI SF P U E J N H DI A T N E V E D E L S A A M B ) R - 6 ( O L N L B I A K S E N O E L N B A ) A 7 HT O 2 C I E T E S
- L L E 8 P B R EO )
P A O RUG N e5 ( A T N LA b l f I a T A D T O
- C ( N S
I S Y L ) A 9 N O 4 A T - A 8 S I P ) I CE e4 ( S *4 Ml O U b N N a G N T A A ( I D RM T E B N ) BA E 3 M V ( UF E N O S E I L S B I O M G )2 I GA G L( . I D E N
)
m S N ot ) T IO p1 E T S C m( y A s T ( U C
TABLE 8 DIAGNOSIS ANALYSIS - ONE ABNORMAL EVENT *-
- CUT SETS:
>~ ACTION - DIAGNOSIS FAILURE'TO SKILL-BASED . ADJUSTMENT COpmENTS/ (Symptoo) MEGLIGIBLE DlAGNOSE (4) 8N FINAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION (1) (2) (Figure 8-1) HEP (5) (6) (3) Feed and Bleed - Yes Thls is procedure directed by-FRP H.1; which wIll be entered directly on low feed flow. St AFW ls unevellable becesse of mechanical fofferes, the operator would rec.egnfze this tamedletely and go to,the next
'h steps In-the procedure which
$$ tell him to feed end-hieed.- The -
STA eilt be mon itoring . t he core
-status trees and =111 have.the opportunity to recognTze there? -
Is no AFW.
+ '
f e -
..s-w,,_.., e,_r,-,. 2 - . - ,,~,e,wwer----.,-, ..e*.--* me,, - <- -,-~-,w ---4, + . .=ir 4, --*- ,,--*ve...ev---,= *~ . - - - ' - - = ~ . . . - - - - , ~ -- - = - - -
>;g '
s.
,- .s. -
x __'
~
.y
~
+
) ~
.: v.
.,. g.9 ,
- a '
. ;c .;
m _ J. 7' A 4 r
~
~ ~
g[; , : .t.y -
-;,.p [4 -
' 1 TARLE 9-POST-DIAGNOSIS ACTION-TYPE IDENTIFICATION *'
1 CUT SETS: ..w
- ~
OPERAT OR PERFORMS ~ DYN48 tlc. OR: COensE4TS/ J ACTIOM' --SAFETY SYSTEMS FAILED EOPs, TRAINING, USE E0Ps,
^ (2 ) WELL-DESIG4ED EOPs C18E - ACT I V I T Y - STEP-9Y-STEP' SOURCE OF-INFORMATION
-(Activities) (S) - (6)' *- _
(3) - (4) (11 Yes Yes' Step by: Step'- 'If AFW has Feedend bleed i ipreviewsly L felled
- d oe to operator error, the time _ to-do feed end. bleed
. I s .. shoc te9ed and ~
. time stress iS-present. -e
. g-
.~
' ns '
" 1; .y f:) _
< 'i h
u
+ ! .
~
~ e 4w-
~
',M. '
C,
- T Ur 4NT" g $ -F1'r M g W eg 'W pg 5 myg , ,, _ .' .-
s TARLE 10 , POST-DIAGNOSIS STRESS-LEVEL IM11CATIOM* . 4 CUT SETS- ; 4
. ACTION- To 2h te0RE TM'EM Two OPERATOR STRESS LEVEL- ICONNENTS/- I (Activltles) AFTER tE SAFETY SYSTEMS FANILIAR (5) SOURCE OF INF3RNATION-
.(f) (2) FAIL W/ SEQUENCE' (6).
(3) (4) .t e ; t- r 6
. v
- Food and blood . #A No Y*s- Moderate- i G
. . o, M . J 4 4 t a L M w b4 9 "M Iff W ge7 6 t-4'99 dV 'E W34 'T '7&4% W ' W S fu ur *W W1N*' FW'"T-'W-' #El?W9Y t f'WP'W'WW PS'*- M' MS T FW'4 TWW &&'T '9 F 'MW M e '* 4% W'T3 +'9 9 9 ' T
- a*W $ WM --W WW48W W F ^CW *4f4 G+'V' FMM
- 4 Et*NN***- NWMi . Nw m enee8 h re e e m
g n m 1~ TABLE 11 POST-DIAGNOSIS AMALYSIS* j; jCUT SETS: ACT I'ON . ACTIVITIES ORIGINAL SUPERVISOR FAILS THIRD I NDE PENDE NT ' TOTAL HEP. COMMENTS /- (1)' (2 ) ~ OPERATOR- TO CORRECT- CMECK/ CORRECTION - (6 ) SOURCE OF INFORMAT304 HEP' OPERATOR HEP - HEP (7) (3) (4 ) (5) .,
.> -{
4 i
' H P I -X HE-F O-F DB LD star t HPI . pvap ' 3.2E-2 3 2E-l 1.04E open PORY 3.2E-2 3.2E-1 .1. 0 4E-2 s-2.2E-2
+
4 e . G1 m: e T Y 4
=
. ,m--,~...~T.,.~ . . . , , , , . . . . .
Tc a h Table C-4 SGTR with a Faulted SG Settuence These tables explain the derivation of human error probabilities for the f'ollowing events:
~
MSS-XHE-FO-BLOCK- .- Manually isolate block valve on-SG ADY RA 13 (M$5-XHE-FO-ISBLDN) - P'.anually close isolation valve on SG hlowdown line RCS-XHE-FO-DPRZ-TSG - Depressurize RCS in tire to prevent pressure relief demand in SG
~ RA 14 -
Cooldown and depressurize the RCS to limit flow from stuck open SG.sa'fety valve. RA 11 . - Cooldown and depressurize the RCS to ' limit flow from stuck open 'SG' ADV. RA 3 - Override SI signal: and restore main feedwater
- , D a.
They all appear at various times in-T 3g0O D S or T3gt. \ e-4 . i - q.- -g.r,g,,, , . t. ye.w w- % -n - r- % 9 q '- -4 r-se w g eFm P b r. ee ese-w arv w w *r' M ew W w 'es' A w3 =e w ' gm vw- u- , + ,r ew -w -We V vs v gy- wt/4 wy y e 'v vy-p, -e ** - % %'Wtvre *mr'e 4 9Ne iEMt4 9'-=r't='- T ** Tw me' v' em avm'm * * . ee r-=uw-i
TABLE 1 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION-EVENT TREE: T SG - S es Generator Tebe Reptere SEQUENCE. NUMBER: SEQUENCE DESIGNATOR: T 3g0 0 S '" SG SEQUEgCE DESCRIPit04: (1) Steam generator tube rupture of 600 gym. Sefety injection comes on due to low pressurizer pressere. Raptured steen generefor (SGI starts to be presserized due to break flow. Operator is expected to ctose WSIV on.high redletion Indicetion, in order to altigate the accident, the operator east depressurize the reactor to e pressere'1ess then the SG-SW end ADY. set point; and Isolete all.other lines which represent blowdown paths. free the SG. In one sequence the operator falls to.depresserire the RCS and the reptered SG loses its integrity J(becomes~ feutted) thus 1eedteg.to uncontrolled blowdown from the RCS. The first operat or depressurization error represents the,fetture to.depressweize before e SG-RV (SW or ADV) demead.' Should th is ' event ' occer end shoofd.there be~en encontro11ed blowdown, there 11s-s+111 en:edditionet B-10 hours to recover. Recovery can be accomplished aby isolation of the feelted SG fit possible1 er, aCS - depressurization to a potnt where the break flow is of little consequence." RA11 end RA 14 are the failure to perfore g g- the subsequent'depressurization. In..the other t u be ' rep t e re sequence, AFW is onevellable, and the operefor east override - en $1 signet and re-estabitsh MFW to the SGs, In order to provide cooldown. AP'LICABLE PROCEDURES: E-0 - Reactor Trip E-3 - Stese Generator Tube Rupture E-4 - Famited Steem Generster Isolation-ECA 3.1 --SGTR'wlfh Loss.of Reactor Coolant,'Subcooled Recovery
" V
#wDNw wr-- h- AN-e ahv-mw
, _ . . _.. - - . ~ . . ..--
. - , ; v ne. r s
2 :. += TABLE 2
'SE00ENCE AND CUT SET TIMING *
~
~
. SG00
.r -
0 51 COMMENTS /;
. TIME (2) ANNUNCI ATOR/INblCATION (3)
. EVENT / OCCURRENCE (1) SOURCE 0F;lNFORMATION't4)
- 8. St e am ... gener e f or tube' rupture .t = .' O high'. condenser rbdlation~
low pressuri zer- pressure
- 2. Safety i nj ect ion f=0+ many 3.- SG blowdown line fall'to close on S1 indicated in CR 4.- Fall AFw t = 10m yes 45m after oper.
noise ,0perator assumed to close-
- 5. 'SG. pressure reflef demand
' closes MSIV'- open ir.g _ Indicated :In CR MSIV soon o
..c (8 ? 6. 'SG ADV-opens'and sticks- 45m ~positlon -Indtcated in CR 7.: SG SV opens andLsticks- - 45m W
9 v w' k ow r
e E O s=
<. g I 3 i 15 > k -
l X 2 a h W -e .
- e 4 '
e >. e e _ f e g 4 .L I O 'e o O D i g e f E D e cev > e e e s t O .e . . g-
'M M& @ L c O'4 n. .c = . ** f t2 C O e' E A
$ +- .-l
.c. 4 .. ..- .=
-nD L L 3 9 l eoo s .
N
..h -4 @
y ag "N t vc a . .N . e-b $O C C -
-- L9 'L a .L. e 0 == - D l
- e e e .,
m E m e m & D ~@*
- j mh nt 6
.g 9 9 e e OD D N $ ** L L e
U $ e T O ** N e Ch CL :
.M < EW OO .* L *= >@ # 5 g w> A <R -N,-
W O .e O
= eT #
= m L
3 9 9 T M M j
." U 3 0 e e- et T N m O r .J 6 0 9 e O cr
- # g- e 5
e E I W OE 4- < U L @ 9' S -6
== = g a Ch L U }
> g =k D. 3 D: 9 9 Ch c c == == v g -
W E <W oo 3 $4 y e U T -
>e 0
3 0 0 V 0 U I e
>" p e c w - t' 4 > O D o L e L e=4 .c o O .9. . ==. e e e
85 o w em+ cn e L oo o e .s 8
< W" o. ac. eo n o o- o V' -@-
OW< aE e .J V - t 9 k e e e e e s s- @
- g. Nn w- .= N ~ e. e *:
M M ! H WE r M WH Oe e e M e. c -e e t 4 O E e
- H D. o m .o. .o. . O %
O
; o. t v 0 >- O >
E E g .O- 4 .+ b e-4 Wm b > e ! A r ,e *- ,e M. m ,o - W QQa g oe -o e e 3-e .j 2: o"O eg-@ g $ -eg ,=3- ') o WU .p L. e. > e c,
' .o v
.N m u' R I
==8 L . t.c. =
# WH eb d N en ; .N.
. * ' U.0.Lo' D O -l 4
- 9 -G O -A e 9 $
D k o W n.m L@ D ee 0 ' .* ae e L. .@ . L. .e - e e
.=
e . . a eL e = b L o-
- 4 e- ,
4
'[ E D C +- e C e-p
. ec .0 a- ee M. == # @ $* 9 == , 9 >@ t 4- E = eLR L 3- KU$ 0 L i eL 0 0 nL nL -
a g a e - - e@ p: .a's a ,a m -(
* + .m ov+ +- : eao em ;
.- n n .
m e o a eo -
.C- ,1
' .e L V
oe
- e eL e
== D D
-- m.
0' t 6
$- a
== . . = , .m-- M =
}:
m N O@ c .c .e - = O 9=' @
*- =
o- - E L L 0' 0 'L L 0: C a
==
+= D == vc c e += @ < ,*c e D c' .
U-2- 4 O e'2 T, A N & O e=+tT- a < : [, x - e oee esL :oe n e ,
> > c L 0 U e- c L 0 e c.- 0-e a a CL == .O. > p CL == > a. C ,
@ V f e a'O a c= c a oa e a g .-
m e e a == V = e o A == eo e , f. o > .'O 9
< m mc-2- g g: g o-
** r a
n ac- 3r . s. yw_ > 0 -o oa u ,0 w ec > m m W-- g s u.
.c U u .
W m N4 w o o 3
+-- +-
D-
. +-D .0
*=
e :; T
, o e e a em . ..
w , 3
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e
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n
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o C-40 .<
.I
':r
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5 (
/F SO4 T 0 NE1 ECT mR A MUM oOR CSO
~
F . 1e . 1
)
O T D 4 ( E El I e . L B FT I ( . A . L T I NS - A EE = m V DI m A I TI m 0 m 0 O* - 0 1 0 5 I E EV H I 4 h 2 h h M TT I 9 9 9 . T C - MA MR U OR _ M F RT O . I X EA ' - E A PR E M I M P _ . T O a
~-
E L - B S' S - A I A
~
L I R H A O M) .- V A T A TO( 3 4 R - T E P) E E PM Y o - L S O $ (T . B m m m m A T H m 0 o 0 0 _ C T 5 - T U C I A D E 5 s 1 5 - H H RT D W R t _ N . A T Di C A E T C E C E E R O - N M L E I A - U T ~ Q - E . S T , C . HA C . t T HS wU
.M m h r s h r
h r f 5 0 4 0 3 0 0 _ B..OR 1 1 1 . ET . MA I R T E P e r k _ . u O c n T . s o w S s e l b .d o ow t R
~
ord w / ~ t p n V o eS eG o e A D w F l
.b rC i R rS e M r y .
u d G G eer - st S e S s v o . s nt r s rt . N . eee e o e een O) r vl s t .s r s e I p et o s o. p n v . T t ere l e l eon - C( , D p r C R .C D cI ., A 1 2 3 4. 5 O;-
. .f,. - , { e
TABLE 5 OPERATOR ACTION PERFORMANCE TIFT
- CUT SETS:
ACTION ACTfylTIES LOCATION TRAVEL PERFORMANCE TOTAL CO*MENTS/ (1) (2) TIME TIME TIME (Tel SOURCE OF I NF ORM A T I OM (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Depresserire e) Open ste CR -- im 25m A l t hough the ections are to prevent SG dee p or SG-PORY very quick and simple, the SV/RV d em and b) Depressurize CR -- to 25m reector takes time to depressertze RCS vie sprey end cooldown. It Is estieeted or PORV that cooldown end depressurization will take 25m. At North Anne It was accomplished in 12=, et Glane It wasn't done by 2Tm.
g 24 Close SG ADY el meneelty local 10m 10m 20m , I block close volve eo
- 3. Restore MFW al override $1 CR 2m 3m 7m b) restore MFW --
Se 12m
- 4. Close 59 el close volve local 10n 10m 20m blowdown
- 5. Depressurize el open ste en CR 1m -- 3hr To depresserire enough to to conserve dumps terminate RCS Icekege, If there RCS/RwST b) depr es sor i ze CR is --
3hr is e feelted SG, requires thet Inventory RCS oper. Cooldown to 300*F or so. At 100'/hr, this will take opprow. 3 hr .
-- n ;e ,. - - ..
, , , - m
' TABLE 6- -
DIAGNOSIS TIE OF SEQUENCE. CUT SET
- ACTION- M AX g aguet TIME TOTAL ACTIO4 TIME AVAILABLE COMME N T S/. .
AVAILABLE (Ts) TIME (Ta)~ TO DIAG 40$1S'(Td) _ SotfRCE OF IMFORMAf f 04 (1)'- (2) (3) (4) f.- Depressor 8ze RCS to prevent'SG 43s - 25m 15e SY/RV deoend
- 2. 'Close-SG'ADV block 9h - 10m .20s B hr- - 50s . ,
- 3. . Restore NFW' 20e. 12s 8e 4.Close.SG blowdoen.IIne.
7n . vb - 50m ~20e 9h - 30m
,.1 u,
; 5. -Depressurize to conserve 9h - 10e 3hr 6 h - 10m _
'Insenfory.
v'
.4 w-3
..+
=
~ %
%- aay%v-- w%? e- q 9
. - . _ ~ . -
. = . . . ._
r - TABLE 7
. DIAGNOSIS A% LYSIS - MORE THAN ONE ABNOReal EVENT
- CUT-SETS:
ACTION DIAGNOSIS NUMBER : ANNUNCIATOR FAILtFRE TO. $st a tt.B ASED AeJUSTMENT- CO*MENTS/
-(Symptom) NEGLIGIBLE OF ABN HEP DIAGNOSE ..
1M FIN 4L SOURCE OF
-(1) (2) EVENT (Table B-4) (Table 8-21 (6) HEP (7) . 8 9 FORMA T 4 04 '
(3) (4) .' ( 5 ) (3) NOT APPLICABLE
. O'
~ k:
=
J _
~~
TABLE'8 DIAGIGOSIS ANALYSIS - O!4E ABNORMAL EVENT
- ACTION DIAGNOSIS FAILURE TO SK I LL-B ASED ADJUSTMENT ' C OMME N TS/
(1 ) NEGL I GI BLE DIAGNOSE (4) IN FINAL SOURCE OF, INFORMATION , (2) (Figure 7-1 ) REP (5) (6) (3)
- 1. . Depressarire to No' 6.8E-3 Lo er sound A diagnosis error is.essigned prevent SG SV/RV here, even though action is d em and procedure directed becease -
operefor must diagnose SGTR and-
- J eep ' In to E-3 In order to start i
depress. In time. g 2. Close SG ADV block Yes Procedere directed. Time'
- c.i ev el i ab l e to work through -
procedures.
- 3. -Restore MFW Yes The STA will reed AFW flow ,
reading as the. third parameter on CSF trees. Provides direct-Indication that AFW unevelfeble.-
'4.. Close SG blowdown Yes See ebove
- 5. Depressurize.to Yes _ Operator.hes 2 hours to inlitete conserve Inventory. cooldown.~ tt is procedere d ir ec ted . Time evell ebte to work through procedeces.'
4 _J .-..C,,,..~,4...m.%.,.... , , , - , . . . . . - , , . . ~ , - . . . , . . , . - . . . . .,--,.,,...~.,,,.m., , . . . . . . . ~ , , , . ~ , - , , , . , , - ,
,_A._,,-...m .,..-_; .
F,
-m--~~ _
- m. - -- -- y g- -.: ,m:-;m.m '
u,_c' ' '
., ~ . . , . .
~
_ .3 ,
.g;
"~--
.a:
I,i .9 _ ~ . TABLE 9 - -
- [ _
POST-DIAGMOSIS ACTION-TYPE IDENTIFICATI0M* - y
; ACTlON - SAFETY SYSTEMS FAILED- EOPs, TRAINING, tfSE EOPs, OPERATOR.PERFORMSL DYNAMIC'~OR I ^ COMMENTS / _
~
(Activities) (2 ) wELL-DESIGe:ED EOPs ONE ACTIVITY STEP-BY-STEP ~ SOURCE OF INFORMATIO86 - --
- (1 ) (3) (4) - (5 ) (6) ,'r'-
J ..
- - 1.': Depress. RCS No Yes ~ Yes- Step by S tep -- 1 2.' -Close SG ADV b l ock '- 16 o Yes- .
Yes- Step by Step . : --
- 3. ' Restore MFW No Yes . Yes Dynamic l(ewst. override: p
.. S I la en SGT8t ' even t1 '" _
- 4. -Close SG blowdown No Yes Yes Step by Step-tine - ;
.o' -
5.:.~ Depress. In long Mo Yes - Yes_ Step;by Step ;. 71-!l ters-es . g. T r* J d
.p
? ..
y',-
n
-2'.
4 wf'-
~<-l,
'"' ~
d S
'W w-9e@m"# g WW WW ' gag - .w - ,.g..g , ,,p. , * ,, _ .,
. s 4 ' 7 ,,
,-+;,.
TABLE 10 . _ - POST-DIAGleOSIS STRESS-LEVEL IIIDICATION*" ACTION Tm 2 tv MORE THEtt Two OPERAT04 STRESS t.EVEt. - COsarENTS/ (Activitles). AFTER IE SAFETY SYSTEMS FAMILfAR . (5) SOURCE OF INFORM AT ION (1) (2) Fall w/SECtfENCE ' (6 3 - (3 ) tt)-
- 1. : Depressurize .NA No Yes Mode ste'hi
.RCS to prevent SG SV-RV demand
'2. Close SG ADV -
No Yes- Moderate hl-block
- 3. . Restore MFW --
fio No ' Moderate' 5 Close SG ~ No -Yes Moderete hl 4 g - blowdown line
.. =4
.5..'Depressorize RCS- --
No Yes: U Moderate'ht: to conserve.
' f riven tory s
e t T f A -. '% 4 4" An
~R * '
y _ _ _ , , _ _ , f _
- y. .
__ ,,4.,--,.~---,~m~.,-.-,,,,,-.,.-,.~,----. - s- -- . - - - - , , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TABLE 11 POST-DIAGNOSIS ANALYSIS
- Ctff SETS:
ACT10N ACTIWITfES OR1GIMAL SITERtlSOR FAILS THI50 tNDEPE*CFE TOTAL HEP CDeEMTS/ (1) (2) OPERATOR TO CORRECT 04ECK/ CORRECTION (6) SOURCE OF IW3RPMTPO4 HEP OPERATOR HEP HED (T) (3) (4) (5) 1 DapressurIre a) Dump steem 3.2E-2 3.2E-1 - 1.04E-2 RCS to prevent b) Sprey pzr 3.2E-2 3.2E-* - 3.04E-2 SG SW/RV demand or coen FORY 2.08E-2
- 2. Close SG ADV - 1.0E-1 - -
3.0E-1 NEP estimeted, besed evt 41f fIcelty of block velve task In potentleilt harsh environments. 3 Restore ww ei overrfde SI 8.0E-2 - - 1.!2E-7 fee t1se for verlfleettoe b) restore ww 3.2E-2 - - O 4 Close SG - 3.2E-2 3.2E-1 - 1.0tE-2 blowdown 11ae h
- 5. Depresserire to -
conserve RCS Inventory e) Dump steem 3.2E-2 3.2E-1 b) Sprey per 3.2E-2 3.2E-t
* ~ * * ' * "' '* co 1 N U e D I T M *M M to or open PORY coot h wes geentlffed.
- 2. The ve1we et 2.fE-4 wes not us e in the quentlfication. This action is found in est sets along with action number 1 The % - s homen error probebility woeld then be 4E-6.
The HRA gulde1Ines for minimum hwurm erfor probebfiltles and the go!delines for mewimum ettempts et one action were consulted to modify the probebility of ection #5, in order thet the ewere11 cet set HED met these goldelines. The resulting HEP for eetion #5 wes calculated to be f.4E-2
' ew c 5
$Jl b
4 $s i i Y h I L t
. e m O 6
V 3 W w h 4 D i e in W *E w ._ sEC k e 6 b
\
C 2 s
'L
[ i l-r I t i I C C e L C t C C-49 e o p, fy w^ w - n W4-4
- # - m - m ** * "" _ ,mw* -W _ar- .,&" #W'W 3Jy"k-W
TABLE 1 ACCIDEhT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION EVENT TREE: ATwS SEQUENCE nun 8ER: 1 SEQUENCE DESIGNATOR: TKRD,, URT , ML 2 SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION: , (1) ATwS event for which manual scram has failed. Manual serem has been ineffective either due to operator.orror .j (2.7E-3) or failures which are not recoverable by senoet screw (.331. The. event has'orogressed.for 2.to 5 l minutes. Primary pressure has risen to the point that the pressurizer safety' valves are open. The operator. i 1 must Initiate emergency borat1on in order to reduce the primary prsssure .thus closing the relief valves end conserving coolant Inventory. During some ATwS events, the operator may need to trip the turb1ne and start AFw, If these actions do not occur automatically. Ot J I sn o ACCIDENT TYPE:
-(2) l ACCIDENT CONDITIONS:
(3) APPLICABLE PROCEDURES: E-0 1 FR S.1 l l
.i
._ j
- . _._.._;. . _ . _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ .. .. . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ y
TABLE 2 SEQUENCE AND CUT SET TIMING
- CUT SETS:
.} - E VE NT/0CCURRE NCE (13 TIME (23 ANN UNC I ATOR/inD ICAT l088 (33 COMMENTS / i- sotmCE OF INFORMATION ' (41
- 1. Initiator t=0
- 2. Fallure of RPS t=O* Yes I
- 3. Fell ere of Menwel. Scram t= to
- g. 4. Failure of' Turbine Trip t= to
-a w
w
- 5. Fallere'of AFW Actuation f=Tw c.
i 1 + A i , e
..,~,-.,n,,,o.,,n.w--...s.w a + u. ,c e.-m , v . .yse ns-- .,,w.e.,m,~,,r~e v ,e em=>-- - + ' r '~+~~c~n,w,s v ,~
- w a v - m we s w,w ww m ~~ ve v ve e- we w m w-w- v em w ew-w w ve=vw ww m -a n ~* ww.,v . vm. - e m w e -.
/ '
,W
- TABLE 3 CUT SET FAILURE'AND POTENTIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS
- CUT SETS:
DESCRIPTION SYMPTOMS- POTEMTIAL OPERATOR AOTIVITIES (TASKS)- COMMENTS /
~
OF EVENT ACT80NS- REQUIRED TO PERFORM SOURCE OF INFORMATION-(1) (2) (3) ACTION AMD (5) PROCEDURALIZED 14) J
- 1. Failure of RPS 1. Manuel scree 1. Push menvaf scree
- 2. Emergency boratIon '1. Open BtT 1 solation velves 0e 2.'Open Chp section to RWST m.
Go
- 3. I sol a te VCT
- 4. Turn BAT pump to
, fast speed-
- 5. Open PORV
- 3. Trip..torbine If necessary.
- 4. S tart AF W If necessory M
9Pb M*Fyy [ *" W mWu ->g EP"gT qw1 --T ' ai.9F wm #8humi'tT-WMrg'*---W54 -
'a gh $N-w F -g- 9 43*'i+gEu4 P Vf'ygP-M9 g = dWWMwW%O*7"447'W'49"'W911 'FP*'9p'fT M'YN-PiF?-'+4P'MW"P'We#"?TebTTY 4 WS % =W 4'D-9'-a'm.,,y r .96Wg- g y9y-[,-,ge. r=r MAamm=wgrw-t inWe m 'im- .asw-me-- sume m a- msh 1 s- .a -
J-
' TABLE 4 SEQUENCE AND CUT SET AVAILABLE TIteE CUT SETS:
i ACTION TIME BY WHICH OPERATOR MUST ACT TIME AT WHICH OPERATOR IS MAXIMUM TIME AVAILABLE TC~ COMMENTS / (1 ) TO PREVENT SUBSEQUENT CORE ALERTED THAT SYMPTOM HAS PERFORM THE.80ENTIFIED SOURCE Or DAMAGE (Ted) (2) OCCURRED (To)Jt3) OPERATOR ACT!YlTIES (Tm) (4) INroRMAT804-(5)- 5-
- 1. Mon tf el ser em NA
- 2. Emergency boration 10m 2e 8e -
l 3. Trip. turbine 2e- 1m' to O
-e
$ 4. . Star t AFw 2m in in- ,
1 i 4 w N [ 1PT' -,-y W' y ge W14-84eri$ g 'up4'@' 'g'-TTp'O"@ +- N W4PM $W@48 6 gp'$4WPp'w'9' Y' 9Q'9'#-$:- r N'tTFI*$$ W -$ > 7 "YN$W g" % 4'W"T"W#'M n-(9hN d'g W g bey.wggsg'm4-p g%,y g 'hg n ggat-pr= yi* 3 y <L*Dgg9 "TWq' y'>sp*84T g- g- wq w-agam p -we gw- yq w, g v v v
r...
+
. .s
- v -
a.. ; - ~ <
~ c - - . .= n f g *r ,' " . k .
.g , '
.i-.,
3,3_
~.
- : .uy ,
;a .y ;
TABLE 51
' ~
. OPERATOR ACTION PERFORMANCE TIME
- CUT SET'S:
ACTION. . ACTIVITIES - LOCATION .T R A V E*. PERF ORM/.MCE' TOTAt. -
. t* MMENTS/ J:
(1 ) (2) : TIME ' TIME' :- T I ME L- (T a) :" -' SOURCE.sf INFORMATION
, (3) '(41- (5 3 - {(6).
4' 3. Manual scram CR '-- 10 see 10)sec l 2.' Turbine' trip 'R1 --. 10 seef 10 see -
' 3. - -Start _AFW- .CR' :-- 10 sec:
'to sec Emergency.la)2 open' 4.- BIT CR --
3- .. .
~
';ma boration : valves
. bliopen suction..CR --
to RWST- . c) switch' BAT.' -
.CR ' -- .
pump-to fast' di open'PORY .CR . - - - - .le 1 m -- r
,e F
i P .# !^ 4
.1
,,ar "T'
y- ..-
*TYF '
$ g g w'M- yy 's^br - eprn- p %@ A - .-4.--si g r,' ppb
#1- p- 9 g_ <- yyy yg.gq -.,w. 33 y ,Ja _;,.9, 5 ., , , , . g ., , , . ,q. , .
- g . , l .c. ' k
- s % }'
p l'M 1 Q i, . n s p - - . 9
.q
, W f%}
er )p-
}
,'jxl 4,
> s g
1
.r b
.y - m
.N e D -
.O , -
< ]4
. I S' (p
,., TA 4
.+
x. M
/ R SO~
T F M N ) EI t 4 ( mF 3 oO C ,, E C R U' O' , S d , s
. w 3
. ) ai
'E d s
L B (T 7 A ; L IS I A S) y V O3 A N ( G E . IA , M D I T- O r,.
.T
.T
.E ; ,
S lg T 7, U '- ,
- C N -
y E O) g d k' , C I T s E N E C A (T ) L B U 2 A k
~6 Q L E( C ,
E A M I E S T I a L L B F O T P '. , T P A O 'A T A. ' '" ., E I
'0 T Y T N ,
S I S . ) O E m 2 * #' N MT G I I ,, 9,., A T , I D ML 1 E) ,
' m, N' ,
U B . MA( ',,y,
' g I
L m -+g XI [. ,. A A '_g MV . A *
',g
^
j.i, , g; . 4
'~
y ,
'i,
, 'd_ r .
1-i T c. E S ,,., T l'7% U , C w
/ .
E ', . C ,w N . s., , E - - U
- Q ;
a E ., S
. ,r .
3 [y
'. IGM
.y .
y L n u .
,:I' j, . w 44 f ,
x - ,_
^ '~
a *a ' ~
- s.
-.;_M,
TABLE 7 DIAGNCSIS' ANALYSIS -- MORE THAN'ONE' ABNORMAL-EVENT * - 1 CUT SETS:
' ACTION DIAGNOSIS' NUMBER _ ANNUNCIATOR FAtt.URE TO' SKILL-BASED. AD J UST99E NT COM89E NTS/ .-
(Symptom) NEGLIGIBLE OF-ABN HEP' DIAGNOSE IN FINAL . SOMCE OF , (1 ) (2)- ' EVENT- (Table 8-4) (Table 8-2) (6) : HEP .'(7 ) -- I NF ORM A T I OM :- (3) (4) (5 ) ..- ( B ) '- Y NOT APPLICABLE s ,
-..nh, i..;
g i C#u -
' @ u
,l', ^'
{,.i
?,- ,
r
1,,
.g f
.( -
~
d _ W
'N 4,.
T w [
*'M-'. f 3 '8'FO'f] a s'-+Mw'V-6M+,- ' yh a 4g"4 np 99g h ..a 8 7f q g- whype, , cad 13 w ey, n pr ' Jig +,,',- i'<ap',g,, e f' Mid 'k 4 #77".M '*% 6' @WW*M N'PM 1.my % A + p M, W g 9 9- y'ggg g g4-_ .. p , g,gg ,,.g gj gg, gg , , , , j
.m v--
- s. ._
q.9
"+ a .
~ ~
TABLE 8
' ~
DI AGNOSIS ANAi.YSIS - ONE ABNORMAL EVENT * ' CUT' SETS: 4 ACTION 'DIAGNOSI5 F A 1 L URE.- TO - SKILL-BASED AJJUSTMENT. C 088ME N T S/ ..
'(Symptom) NEGl.tGIBLE DIAGNOSE (4 ) 'IN F I N Al. ' . SOURCE OF. INFORMATION ,
(1) . (2) . (Figure 8-1)l ' HEP-(5).
^(6)' .E-(3). .
1.-Manual scram' IYes- Yes
.2. Turbine trip .Yes - ~ Yes 3.-Start AFW- Yes Yes
- b I.
m
- 4. Emergency 'Yes _ No .,
#i
~
boration jr w 1 T
.L.
4 = F e
.ii h
s
'[
Jr T c q.. 4 7.4c;d-a6 =. L 4 ., M ~ l~C,i.. -M e6 i MN,I 043M,. ok, , , . J -- k,& S ,w m.. <, g,v '. c.y., L-,v .s M., , _.y ,r.. Ee.L.. ..,,yd CZ _.L ;.L .; .u ,. i . ,;.44j l. .. ,, :; .J, W , ., /; .._'_. .. ._.c,;,_m.a.___
w .
~
n.
-y-c _
.+;, e. s . ' ?.20:{
E' !' 9 l . b p j, 1 TABLE 9- - '
~
POST-DIAGNOSIS ACTION-TYPE IDENTIFICATI0M* _ CUT, SETS: ACTION SAFETY SYSTEMS. FAILED EOPs, TRAINING, USE EOPs, . OPERATOR PERFORMS) DYNAMIC lOR ( COMME NT S/I' (Activities)- (2 )' WELL-DESIGNED EOPs -ONE ACTIVITY 1 S TE P-B Y-S TEP,1:- ! $ 00RC E : Or-.' I NF 08tM AT 104 '
. (11 - (3)- : (6)~
1(4) -(5)
- f. Emergency --
Yes one; S tep '. by ; S tep' :
,l
- Boration
'~
1 q I U' OD M
,r
[ m A. 5
'.eq-r.
- c. . ,
- 4. -
um ' ,' 4 4 .i 4. 4 NJ'i= cta - ',- '
%. ghf.'.-p-',h W., py ah, wyg ,q- . e p.s.py. --.g- d*ar '-r'q 'g ye q 4 +f (M=< r' rig * *W-V' h'W 'hy a Tq . 4 tF,pv @'y*y a d' ,wgpg w4-Fw Pt WT Mi' W 611 4 4M -Gr e T %'h 199 '" Y* hm V et DC "mh'- > * ' &** "^ m1 h'h"h"* * " " " " * ' ' - " ' - " "
+- .v:,
- m- -
1 -
, , ,c w - w
+ - ..,j;.14
,- ir : :-
w
+
,..E._
~
' ~
, m..? .
~ .
r.' ? TABLE.10t-
~
se A POST-DIAGNOSIS' STRESS-LEVELLINDICATIOM*: .
- CUT SETS: .
+
,,-' ' Y
.ACT10N
' Tm' 2 h' 'MORE THEN TWO 'OPERNTOR. STRESS : 1.E VEL : -CO*MENTS/-
4, ; ' (Activities!' AFTER .IE SAFETY SYSTEMS FAMILIAR: ' (5 ) : SOURCE-OFTiMFORMATION "I (1)- .(2) _ F A l '. :. W/ SEQUENCE' ' (6): r.
' (3.) ~. (41
- 1. ' Emergency ., N o . No Yes . Moderate ~
+ BoratIon . t- .f A ! 'O . tJe
- CD
+ .n -
~
.w ._,_
. ....a
~m
.w =
g%..
.. p
._ *:-w,.1
~
3 +
.,s: .
Y . 9
* g.-'
~ ,
s
..h ,* , ~, . 1..~$ p ., [.rb y.:s A+, .+Eew 1.E.s. g k~ r y's,~ ,-<,a, , w.y v d. ~v. '[*dM. , m, . - -'s,w - , we I c veO w.. 0, rur -e v A h
r v e EE [4 e w v v%. r- -, Y. v A,-, A e erN OwN M+ -'we. I w-Ameu v .NM. N-- [ db.E w.-ow-=.m,U .- "'
- v
- r & y
~
3 -
- 1 4 ]%
- . F f; -
p. TABLE-11' ; s POST-DIAGNOSIS ANALYSIS
- CUT-SETS:
ACT10N ACTIVITlES ORIGINAL SUPERVISOR FAILS THIRD'lNDEFENDENT-~ .-TOTAL IHEP' _: COMME N TS/, -
- (1 ) (2) OPERATOR ~TO CORRECT CHECK / CORRECTION (63- 50tJRCE . 0F ':L I NF ORM AT l 0N '
HEP OPERATOR HEP: ? HEP ', (7) (3) - (4 ) (5 ) c
' t.- Manual scram 2.7E -- --
12.7E-3I e-' '
- 2. Tr'lp turbine 2.7E-3 -- ' - - -
2.7E-3
- 3. Stert AFW 2.7E-3 -. ---
I- 2. 7E s a b Q '4. Emergency borate ;
- g al,open' BIT,
. 032 .032 .32- 3.3E-4 ,
. valves'
, lb).open RWST.
.032 '.032 .32- .3.3E-4
- valves:
c) Isolate VCT '032 . . - .032 ' .32 : ' 3 3E-4 :-
~
- 1. 0E -3 '
r-m o j_ q L
.,y.
W %-+% f s' v.- 4
,. 'T .
u ,
^ #
-"i -
- s. ,., [
r.,p cJr , 4. 4. , (f ,4.Il -. m _,. W,' ,,.j , r f .r.L55,k . J /J . , . . ., "' , ,,, . Ady"..u,,,,.,, .. L, ;.,- ,, % 2lA4 ,,,,,,,, g m ,,_ , .; g ,g, .[ _g ,, g.y,_4';;,;,,';/,, L.,, ' ( _;.,,, , ,; ;_ S ' .-
APPENDIX D PLANT SPECIFIC ANALYSES i 1 1 i l ' D-1 l \ d
1 Table of Contents Section - Page D.! Failure Mode and Elfeet Analysis on Support Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-3 D.2- Assessment of Frequency of Small Breaks, Based on His t or ical Exp er ienc e . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-67. D.3 Development of the T1 Initiating Event Frequency and Non-Recovery Probabilities for Of f site AC Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-71 D.4 Core Uncovery Time Versus Break Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-75 D.5 Integration of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal LOCA Modelinto Station Blackout Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-75 D.6 Failure Data Development .................................... D-86 D.7 Discussion of Diesel Generator Mission Time for-LOSP Ini t i a to r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-89 D.8 Quantification of Individual Event Tree Headings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - D-92 D.9 Discussion of Loss of SW and CCW as initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-98 List of Figures D 3-1 Distribution of Initiating Frequency for Sequoyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - D-72 D.3-2 Recovery Curve f or Sequeyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . D-74 D.4 1 Time to Core Uncovery and Core Melt Variation with LOC A B r e ak Siz e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . D-77 D.4-2 Time to Core Uncovery Variation with LOCA Break Size and Secondary Depressurization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . - D-78 List of Tables D.1 Station Control Air FME A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . D-4 Component Cooling Water FMEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-Il Auxillary Control Air F MEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-20 120 VAC Power FM EA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-25 ERCWFMEA............................................ D-42 HVACFMEA............................................ D-54 D.2-1 Summary of _ Small Break Experience . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-68 D.3 Distribution of Initiating Event Frequency f or Sequo yah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-73 D.4-1 Times from Start of Accident to Core Uncovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-76 D.5-1 Aggregated RCP Seal LOCA Probabilities-Four Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-79 D.5-2 Sequoyah RCP Seal LOCA Model Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-81 D.5-3 Sequoyah RCP Seal LOC A Modet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-84 D.7-1 Typical Core Uncovery Frequency Due to Battery Depletion During Station Blackout and the Elfect of Modeling Considera tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-93 D.8-1 Quantification of Event Tree Headings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . D-94
- l. <
l l l D-2
q J D. - PLANT SPECIFIC ANALYSES 1 Appendix D contains the details oi several plant' specific analyses performed in support of the revised Sequoyah probabilistic risk assessment for NUREG-il50. The analyses cover a wide range of areas: from initiating events to the reactor coolant pump (RCP),
~
seal LOCA model to failure data and . mission times. :This appendix is organized into-subappendices as follows:
' D.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis on Support Systems D2 Small Break initiating Event Frequency Assessment . .
D.3 -T g Initiating Event Frequency and Non-Recovery of AC Power - Probabilities . D.4 Core Uncovery Time.Versus Break Size D.5 Integration of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal LOCA Model ~-into < Station Blackout Sequences D.6 - Failure Data Development D.7 Discussion of Mission Time for Diesel Generators for LOSP Initiators. D.8 Quantification of Individual Event Tree Headings D.9 Discussion of Loss of SW and CCW as initiators D.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis on Support SystemsL The effects of the loss of support systems were examined on an individual basis to deter-mine if they should be included as initiating events. This section describes the analysis - performed on the support systems as part of the initiating event identification and group . Ing task, described in Section 4.3 of the main report. A list of systems at Sequoyah which provide supporting services to components in front - line safety systems and' normally operating systems was' developed. Each of these systems was viewed as a potential initiator. A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)- was done on the support systems in order to support this investigation. The FMEA identifies the failure causes' for the support systems. Then, the FMEA qualitatively assesses the impact of each of these failure causes on the unit's front line ; systems. FMEA's were performed on the following systems: ; e Station Control Air e Component Cooling Water e Auxillary Control Air e 120 VAC Power e ' Emergency Raw Cooling Water e- HVAC The FMEAs follow. ' D-3 e
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM Station Control Air UNIT Sequoyah-I DRAWING 47W848-1 SHEET 1 of 7 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Loss of All Station air com- Air compres- Loss MFW .FW regulating and bypass Station Control pressors A, B,-C, sor A,B,C,D MSIV-closure valves fail closed - loss Air (Headers and D fail alarms Reactor Trip of FW A and B) -or-Station air com- Auxiliary Main condenser air renoval pressor aftercoolers control air pumps suction valves fati rupture train A,B closed - loss of condenser
-or ' low pressure vacuum Station control air alarms receivers 1 and 2 tp rupture Service air a- -or- isolation valve MSIVs fail closed - loss of One control air closed alarm ~s team to mainLturbine receiver rupture and failure to Auxiliary isolate control air
-or ' isolated from Service station ser ' . station con-vice air failure'and trol air isolation valve 0-PCV-33-4 fails Auxiliary to close control . ai r
-or _ compressors 2 of 3 air dryers start' (A,B,C) fail, or.
associated filters Air-operated plug valves fail to
-or- -fail-safe posi-Header A-and B tions rupture or blocked
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE 10 DES Alm EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM Station Control Air UNIT Sequoyah 1 DRAWING 47W848-2,3 SPEET 2 of 7 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD FAILURE EFFECT OM UNIT REMARKS Feedwater Regu- Local air leak One or more Loss of MFW - reactor FW reg. valves fail closed on lating Valves -or FW reg. trip loss of air (FCV-3-35,48, Local individual valves close 90,103) isolation valve plug Loss of FW
-or- flow to one Isolation valve or more SGs 1751 plug Feedwater Bypass Local air leak Unable to No effect FW bypass valves fall closed on Valves (FCV -or- .open'one or loss of air ? 35A,48A,90A,103A) Local individual more bypass v'
isolation valve valves FW bypass valves normally plug closed and SGs fed via FW
-or- reg. valves Isolation valve 1752 plug Feedwater Pump Local air leak No effect FW min. flow valves closed Min. Flow Valves -or during normal power operation (FCV-3-70,84) Local individual isolation valve plug
-or-Isolation valve 1651 plug
-_ - _ _ _ . - ~ _
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AIS EFFECTS ANALYSIS
. UNIT Sequoyah 1 SYSTEM Station Control Air SHEET 3 of I OPAWING 47W848-6,11 FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION LOAD / FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS LOAD CAUSES METHOD _
COMPONENT Valve (s) full Unable to control charg- FCV-62-93 falls open on loss
. Charging Flow Local air leak ing flow of air
-or- open Valves (FCV-62-89,93) local individual air isolation valve plug
-or-Air isolation valve 746 plug No effect Valve fails open on loss Normal Charging Local air leak Increased of air
-or- charging Valve _
flow (FCV-62-85) local individual Need to isolate nornal charging q, m air isolation by closing FCV-62-90 to prevent valve plug thermal ~ shock to regen HX,
-or- prevent filling pressurizer Aux. isolation and to create back-pressure valve 1263 plug for adequate RCP seal flow No effect Valve fails open on loss Local air leak Increased L Alternate Char- charging- of flow ging Valve -or-local individual flow (FCV-62-86) Need to isolate alternate air isolation charging by closing FCV-62-91 valve plug to prevent thermal shock to
-or- regen HX, prevent filling pres-Air isolation valve surzer, and to create back-1262 plug. pressure for adequate RCP~ seal flow
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE M1 DES AIO EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM Station Control Air UNIT Sequoyah 1 DRAWING 47W848-7,8 SHEET 4 of 7 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT. LOAD CAUSES METHOD FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Letdown Valves Local air leak Letdown flow No effect Valves fail closed on loss (FCV-62-69,70) -or- indications of air Local individual air isolation valves plug
-or- >
Air isolation valve 800 plug Letdown Orifice Local air leak Letdown ori- No effect (loss of Valves FCV -or- fice flow single. load) 72,73,74) local individual indications air isolation y valves plug-
-a .or.-
Air isolation valve-1419 plug Letdown Heat Local air leak HX flow or No'effect Valves' fail closed on loss Exchanger Valves -or- dP indication of air (FCV-62-77,81) Local individual air isolation valves plug Excess Letdown - Local air leak Excess let- No effect Valves (FCV -or- . down flow 54,55,56) Local individual indication air isolation valves plug
-or-Air isolation valve 800 plug
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES afb EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM Station Control Air UNIT Sequoyah 1 DRAWING 47W848-11 SHEET 5 of 7 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD FTILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Auxiliary Pres- Local air leak Unable to No effect Valve fails closed on loss surizer Spray -or- open valve Normal spray available, of air-Valve Local individual provide RCP for #1 or (FCV-62-84) air isolation #2 loop operating Normal pressurizer spray valves plug valves supplied by auxiliary; control air RCP Seal Local air leak One or more No effect Seal injection valves fail Leak-Off -or- seal leak- open on loss of air Valves Local individual off valves (FCV-62-9,22, air isolation full open- Manual valve outside contain-35,48) valves plug ment may be used for isolation,
-or- and seal leak-off will be 22,35:-air isolation directed to pressurizer relief q,
oo valve 800 plug pressurizer relief tack 9,48: valve 808 plug Pressurizer. Local air leak One or more No effect Valves inoperable on loss Relief Tank .or- valves in- of air-Spray, Vent, & . Local individual operable , Drain Valves- air isolation (FCV-68-303,301, valves plug 310) -or-Air isolation valve.1333 plug.
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE PWDES Ale EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM Station Conrol Air UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING 46W848-8,11 SHEEl 6 of 7 LOAD / FA! LURE / LOSS OF DETECTION-COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD FAIL}fE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Main Steam Local air leak One or more MSIV closure MSIVs fail closed on loss of Isolation -or- MSIVs close Reactor Trip air Valves (1-FCV- Local individual MFW unavailable 1-4,11,22,29) air isolation valves plug
-or-4,29: Air isolation valve 780 plug 11,22: Air isolation valve 812 plug g, Main Steam Line Local air leak Inability to No effect MS line drain valves fail e Drain Valves -or- open one or closed on loss of air (1-FCV-1-147, Local individual more MS line 148,149,150) air isolation drain valves valves plug
-or-147,150: Air iso-lation valve 780 plug 148,149: Air iso-lation valve 1395 plug
q SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM Station Control Air UNIT Sequoyah 1 DRAWING 47W848-5,8 SHEET 7 of 7 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT' REMARKS Seal Injection Local air leak One or more No effect Seal injection valves fail Valves: -or- seal injec- open Local individual tion valves
--FW Pumps air isolation full open (FCV-54-1,2,5,6) valves plug
-or-
--Cond. Booster Air isolation Pumps valve 2038 plug (PCV-54-12,13, 14,15,17,18)
--Heater Drain Tank Pumps 7 (PCV-54,20,21,23, E$ 24,26,27,30,32)
SG Blowdown Valves: Local air leak Closure of No effect (loss of Valves fail closed on-loss of
-or- one or more single load)' air, and must be reopened upon
--Containment Local individual valves recovery Isolation air isolation (FCV-1-181,182, valve plu.9 183,184) -or-
--BD Isolation BD: Air isolation (FCV-1-7,14, valve 1598 plug
.25,32) CI: Air isolation valve 1352 or 805 plug
._. - - . - . . __ _ _ ~__ _ __
- s. n- -
.. c. : -
1 . v SYSTEM LEVEL FAILINtE' FCDES NW EFFECTS MIALYSIS . SYSTEM CCW ,llNIT Sequoyah 11-ORAWING-NO. 47W859-1,2,4-- SHEET 2 of LOAD / LFAILURE/ LOSS OF. - DETECTION COMPONENT - LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILtIRE EFFECT-ON UNIT - REMARKS CCW Unit 1 . Failure of train Pump alarn Loss of: cooling to RCP . : ChargingLpenp 1R-R, SI purp.
' Train A A CCW pumps (IA-A oil coolirig necessitates . 1R-B, PH2 purp:1R-B, contain-i FTR - and IB-B F TS) - Low discharge- ircediatejshutdown of' ment spray ptmp 1B-9,. and : PH0;
- -or-
~
flow-indica-2 RCPs, which requires; HXi1R-8:are operable; Surge tank section - tion -' reactor trip .. 1A; rupture .
; SealJwater HX-1A, letdown.
- -or- .
Cooling' load Both charging pumps re--- -HX-1A, excess 71etdown HX-1A,< . 1 CCW HX-A~ tube rup- temperaturef main operable. l sample'HXsf1A,lR;and: 1C'are'
. inoperable
~
ture or plug l indications: - Train A ECCS is in --
-or- . .
Loss of-ERCW to- RHR,-SI,.CHG,- operable. ,
. Spent fue1L pit.'HXs. A'andfP, ,
CCW HX-A' or.- CS ' mech. . : may ' be aligned for cooling".
- -or- seal outlet -
~
~
e ^
- from'linit' 2 CCW .
~
-1
' ~
- Train A valve' -flow low closure-(FCV-70-25,
' 8,. 'or . 2_ and '.4) 1-or _
strain'A: discharge-m y -0.r _ return header
. rupture
~
x T ,
., ~
9 - > + a
,Jmap w yif y Aa.Npq p P W a4reag ' -qga$4 w b,t-g 4 ew.p W 3 r---pg*-wp gf+yg gww f-' y f*g-4 -r v"'gWN ~ y' g " M.py' 'p-gr 7 3- *rV'-p Myfi.V [' g$ ww 'W %g-y g@% g + F r 'S y9 '
'*gf=*g,'.-.U--g @-%=$( rg gg-g ti- Wd g g m %'q --a5 mg -i.w y un<e e e u.e e z.
q SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W859-1 thru 5 SHEET 1 of 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILUPE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Entire CCW Failure of CCW CCW pumps Loss of oil cooling loss of RCP thermal barrier Systen (all pumps (IA-A,C-S ~ alarm to RCPs. necessitates cooling loads - Unit 1) FTR, and IB-R FTS) pump shutdown, which and Discharge leads to reactor trip. Seal cooling to CCPs is lost. Failure to align pressure But, RCP seal injection finw Unit 2 pumps indication Charging pumps are ifrom charging pumps available.
-or- operabl e. All other As charging pumps can operate CCP heat exchs Cooling load ECCS punps are inoper- without CCW.
A and C tube temperature able rupture or plug indications Loss of $1.punps seal e and cooling i Failure to align CCW HX inlet "' HX-B to Unit 1 pressure loss of PHR cooling and PPR
-or- .
indications pumps seal cooling Loss of ERCW to CCW HXs A and C Loss of containnent spray
-or- . pumps seal cooling One train A valve (FCV-70-25,8,or loss of level in surge tank
- 2) and one train IA, start shutting dcwn Unit 1 8 valve.(FCV reactor 27, 12 or 3) fail closed and Failure to align Unit 2 equipment-
~ - _
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE N) DES AlW EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W859-1,4 SHEET 3 of 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS CCW - Unit 1 Failure of train Pump alarm No effect. Charging pump 1 A-A, SI pump Train.B B CCW pump (C-S Train B ECCS inoperable, IA-A, RHR pump 1A-A, CS pump FTR) Low discharge if needed 1A-A, and RHR HX IA-A are
-or- flow indication Charging pump B operable. operable
. Surge tank section IB rupture Cooling load .No disruption in charging
-or- temperature pump flow, even if pump B is CCW HX-C tube ' indications operating rupture or plug
-or- RHR, SI, CHG, Loss'of ERCW to or CS mech. seal CCW HX-C outlet flow low 9
e -or-Train B valve closure (FCV 22,12, or 3)
-or-Train B discharge or return header rupture
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE 50 DES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWIhG NO. 47W859-2 SHEET 4 of 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS RCP Thermal ' Loss of CCW train A RCP CCW flow No effect Alternate seal cooling Barriers -or- . temperature provided by injection (1,2,3,4) Valve FCV-70,4, indication from charging pumps
'133,134,87 or 90 closes
-or-Thermal barrier Booster pumps booster pumps flow indication fail RCP Oil Coolers Loss of CCW RCP CCW flow Reactor trip necessi- RCPs must be shut down if.
7 (upper, lower) train A temperature tated by required either tenperature increases
% (1,2,3,4) -or- indication shutdown of RCPs to 2000F Valve FCV 4,139,140,89 RCP oil tem-or 92 closes perature indication
- 3 I
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. 47W859-4 SHEET _ L;_gf 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT RLMARKS Charging Pump (s) Loss of'CCW train A Charging pump (s) No effect. Charging pump 1A-A Mechanical Seal - or - seal temperature Charging pumps du seal cooler supplied Cooler (s) (IA-A, Loss of CCW train B indication not require seal- by CCW train A, and pump 1B-B) - or - cooling for continued IB-B cooler by train B Cooler plug or operation rupture SI Pump (s) Loss of CCW train A SI pump (s) seal No effect. Pumps IA-A, IB-B not normally Mechanical - or - temperature SI. pumps are in service Seal Cooler (s) Loss of CCW train B indication unavailable if needed _ gr (IA-A,IB-B) - or - Purp 1A-A cooler supplied by Cooler plug or CCW-A rupture Pump 1B-B cooler supplied by CCW-BB Containment Spray Loss of CCW train A CS pump (s) seal No effect.. Pumps IA-A, IB-B not normally Pump (s) Oil and CSS pumps are
- or - temperature in service Mechanical Seal Loss of CCW train B indication unavailable if needed.
Cooler (s) - or - Pump 1A-A cooler supplied by (IA-A,18-B) Cooler plug or CCW-A rupture Pump IB-B cooler supplied by CCW-B
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE M)CES afb EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. 47W859-2, 4 SHEET 6 of 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS RHR Pump (s) Seal Loss of CCW train A RHR pump (s) seal No effect.- Pumps IA-A, IB-B not normally Water Heat Exch(s) - or - water temperature RHR pumps unavailable in service (IA-A,IB-B) Loss of CCW train B indication if needed
- or - Pump 1A-A cooler supplied Cooler plug or rupture by CCW-A Pump IB-B cooler supplied by CCW-B
)[ RHR Heat Exch(s) Loss of CCW train A No effect when unit HXs IA-A, IB-B not.in service
* (1A-A,IB-B) - or - at power at power operation
. Loss of CCW train B
- or - .
HX. lA-A supplied by CCW-A HX plug or rupture HX IB-B supplied by CCW-B Seal Water Heat loss of CCW train A Seal water No effect One seal water HX for Unit 1 Exchanger (IA) - or - temperature Necessary to monitor Valve FCV-70-4 closes' indiction VCT temperature for
- or - increase in seal-
- HX - plug or rupture ~ water supply temp.
. . _ . ., _.2. . - _
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MDDES Ale EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. 47W859-1,2 SHEET 7 of 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (5) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT -%EMARKS Non-Regen Loss of CCW train A Letdown flow No effect- Requires removal of HX from Letdown Heat - or - temperature service.- Excess letdown flow Exchanger (IA) Valve FCV-70-4 or indication will not be available. TCV-70-192 closes
- or -
HX plug or rupture a Excess Letdown Loss of CCW train A Excess letdown No effect (Non-regen) letdown flow Heat Exchanger (1A) .
- or - flow temperature maintained Valv~e FCV-70-4, 143, indication or 85 closes
- or -
HX plug-or rupture Spent Fuel Pit Loss of CCW train A SFP HX' outlet No effect HX-B can provide cooling. Heat Exchanger (s) - or - flow alarm to SFP if HX-A lost l (A,B) Valve FCV-197. 198, ! 40 or 11 closes SFP water temp Both SFP HXs can be supplied
- or - indication by Unit 2 HX plug or rupture -
Maximum SFP cooling requires 2 CCW pumps - but 1 pump is sufficient for'norpel loads -
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE 10 DES AND EFFECTS Af1ALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. 47WB59-1,2 SHEET 8 of 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Sample Heat Exch(s) Loss of CCW train A Sample flow. No effect Sample system not required (IA,1B,IC) - or - temperatures for operation Valve FCV-70-4 or 183 closes
- or -
HX plug or rupture Gas Stripper and Loss of CCW train A . Boric acid evap No effect- Secure boric acid evaporator, 7 bottoms, and continue to operate if s Boric Acid Evap' - or - Package' Valve FCV-70-4 168, distillate and . Tech Spec requirements met or FCV-62-188 closes vent temperatures
- or -
Condenser / cooler plug or rupture Cond Demin Waste Loss of CCW train A Cond demin evap . No effect Secure evaporator and' continue Evap Package - or - . flow temp to operate if Tech Spec Condenser plug or requirements met rupture. Waste Gas Loss of CCW train A Waste gas temp No effect Secure compressor and continue - Compressor. Heat . - or - . indication (s) to operate if Tech Spec
~ Exchanger (A) Valve ~FCV-70-4 closes requirements net
- or -
. HX rupture or plug-g a'e% #- + ,+Jr.,. y- A w y -
g m a
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE PODES AfG EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM CCW UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. 47W859-2 . SHEET 9 of 9 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF. DETECTION COMPONENT ' LOAD ~CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS loss of CCW train A
~
Waste Evap Package Waste evap No effect Secure evaporator and continue
- or - . flow temp to cperate if Tech: Spec-Valve FCV-70-4, or requirements met FCV-77-80 closes
- or - Aux waste.evap cooling Cond/ cooler plug or still.available rupture Y Aux Waste loss of CCW train A Aux waste evap No effect Secure aux evaporator and U$ Evap Package .
- or - flow temp continue'to operate if
-Valve FCV-70-4, Ill, Tech Spec requirements met or FCV-77-170 closes
- or - Main waste evaporator Cond/ cooler plug or cooling still available rupture
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS' Auxiliary Control Air UNIT -Sequoyah SYSTEM DRAWING NO. 47W848-1,12 SHEET 1 of 5 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES_ METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT- REMARKS All Loads Loss of station con- Station air No effect Both normal pressurizer spray trol air headers A compressors valves inoperable (Both Aux. Control Air and B A,B,C,0 System Trains) -or- alarms ' Aux. pressurizer spray valve is Aux. control air . operable (served . by station isolation valves Train A aux. control air). FCV-32-82 and control air low 85 fail closed pressure alarm All main SG atmospheric relief
-AND- valve" inoperable.
9' Aux. air compres- Train B aux. y sors A-A and B-B control air low All M0AFW pump to SG LCVs fail fail- pressure alarm open, all TDAFW purp to SG~LCVs
-or- fail closed.
Aux. air compres- Aux, control air sor accumulators isolated from Both aux. building.-gas treat-- rupture station control nent system trains dampers fail
-or- air closed Aux. control air dryers A-A and B-B Aux." air com- Containment vacuum relief iso-fail pressor A alarms-lation valves fail'open.
-or-Aux. control air . Aux. air com- Both emergency gas treatnent-dryers afterfilters pressor B alarms systems trains dampers fail -
plug closed
-or-Aux.' control air- Control building HAV dampers Tr-A and Tr-B (except for MCR ARU inlets) leaders rupture closed
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES Als EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM Auxiliary Control Air UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W848-12 SHEET 2 of 5 LOAD / . FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Main Steam 1-PCV-1-5,23: Loss Valve No effect Yalves not used for normal 1-PCV-1-5 of. train A inoperable operation PCV-1-23 1-PCV-1-12,30: Loss 1-PCV-1-30 of train B. PCV-1-12 -or-(Steam Genera- Local air leaks tor Atmospheric -or-Relief Valves) Local manual iso-lation valve plug RCS 3400: Loss of train A Valve No effect Pressurizer. spray valves are 1-PCV-68-3400 .-or- inoperable redundant. Auxiliary .PZR spray y 1-PCV-68-340B Valve 1-FCV-32-84 supplied by station control n (Pressurizer. fails closed- air Spray Valves) 340B: Loss of train B
-or-Valve 1-FCV-32-102 fails closed
-or-
. Local air leaks
-or-Local manual iso-lation valve plug 3 ., ., -.3 p3 ,_--y ..:.~, .,,y _ . -
y _~ , ,w .
SYSTEM LEVEL FAlltRE M) DES MS EFFECTS ANALYSIS Auxiliary Control Air UNIT Sequoyah - 1 SYSTEM SHEET 3 of 5 DRAWING NO. 41W848-12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS COMPONENT AFW 156,164,172,175: No effect TDAFWP SG LCVs fail closed on loss of air (172,173,174, 1-LCV-3-156 Loss of train A 1-LCV-3-164 148,171,173,174: 175) 1-LCV-3-172,175 Loss of train B MDAFWP SG LCVs fail epen on 1-LCV-3-148 -or-loss of air (148,156,164,171) 1-LCV-3-171 Local air leaks 1-LCV-3-173,174 -or-Local manual iso- AFW pumps not in service during (Steam Generator normal operation AFW LCVs) lation valve plug
? Containment loss of train A Valve (s) No effect (loss of Vacuum relief valves fail open Rj Vacuum Relief -and- open single load or train) on loss of air, but can be FCV-30-46,47,48 Loss of train B closed by redundant air supply (Vacuum Relief -or-Isolation Valves) local air leaks in both supply trains
-or-Local manual isolation valve plugs in both supply trains
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE FWDES AIW EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM AuxtJiaty Conrol Air UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W848-12 SHEET 4 of 5 LOAD / FAILUME/ LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAU!ES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Control Bldg. 14,20,105A,B; 108, Damper (s) No effect (loss of MCR ARI inlet danpers AC & Vent 109: Lo9s of train A close single load) fail open on loss of air FCO-31A-14,15 FCO-31A-105A,B 15,25,106A,B; 110 All other equipment dampers FCO-31A-106A,B 111: Loss of train B fail closed on loss of air FCD-31A-20,25 -or-FCO-31A-103,109 Local air leaks Remaining pressurizing fan FCO-31A-110,111 -or- will supply electrical board (H&V Equipment local manual room AHUs rather than MCR ARUS FCR Dampers) isolatioe valve plug 1 of 2 emergency pressurizing T y fans A energency cleanup fans w lost Aux. Ridg. Gas Loss of train A Danper(s) No effect Both ARGTS danpers fail closed Treatment -or- close Must comply with Tech. on loss of air Systen _ _ Local air leaks Specs. for ABGTS 1-FCO-30-146A,B -or- damper inoperability System not normally operating - Local manual designed to reduce radioactive isolation valve releases fron AB during acci-plug dents Consists of two redundant trains
SYSTEN LEVEL FAILUltE NIDES NW EFFECTS MIEYSIS LSYSTEM Auxiliary Control Air UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING N0. 47W848-12 SHEET 5 of 5 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES ETH00(s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT. REMARKS Emergency Gas 10,24,26,47A,B:51,52, Damper (s) No effect EGTS dampers fail closed on Treatment 80,81,86,88: Loss of close Must cosply with Tech. loss of air
' System . .
train A Specs. for EGTS damper 0-FCO-65-24,43 8,27,28A,B;30,43,53, operability EGTS not normally in service - 0-FCV-65-47A,8 82,83,87,89: Loss of' designed to preserve safety 0-FCV-65-28A,B train B in accidents as severe as de-1-FCO-65-26,27 -or- sign basis LOCA 1-FCV-65-51 Local air leak 1-FCO-65-10,30 -or-I-FCO-65-52,53 Local manual' iso-4
~V 1-FCV-65-8 lation valve plug
.% PCO-65-80,82
~PCO-65-88,89 PCV-65-81,86 PCV-65-83,87 1
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SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES AIS EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM '120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 1 of 17 LOAD / , FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE-EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Loss of all (4) All (4) vital 120V AC vital Reactor trip on low-low - Loss of SG level control Vital Boards inverters fail power board (s) SG level results'due to loss of program
- or - 1-I, II, III, IV inputs for SGs 1, 2, 3, and 4 480V AC-shutdown UV or breaker boards IAl-A, alarms Loss or decrease of FW ficw to IBI-B, 1A2-A, all'SGs 182-A, 2Al-A, 120V AC vital 2B1-B,'2A2-A, and inverters (s) 1-I, Loss of steam and FW flow 2B2-B fail AND II, III, IV signals to FW control systen 125V DC vital; abnormal alarm (s) batteries or Main feed pumps go to minimum battery boards I, Trip status lights speed II, III and IV and safeguards fail' systems Loss of all 4 SG PORVs ..
' tg - or - annunciators (PIC-1-6A,13A,.24A,31A):-
g inverter output malfunction breakers trip loss of AFW auto level control
- or - for all 4 SGs Feeder breakers on all 120V AC vital loss of power to all SSPS '
boards trip input and output relays Pressurizer low level automatic actions occur Pressurizer sprays closed and
' backup heaters energized-Loss of condenser steam dump capability loss of auto-makeup to volume control tank ..- _,:.,.__._--c_ ._--_,_--.~a._..-, _...,,,,..._.-.,c.-. . _ _ _ , -. _ . _ , _ . . . . . . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - = - - - - - _
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES AM) EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEtt 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 2 of 17 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REPARKS Loss Vital Board Vital board 1-I 120V AC vital Possible reactor trip on Loss of level control on 5G 1 due 1-1 (All Loads) feeder breaker power board 1-1 UV low-low SG level to loss of input signal. trips or breaker trip
- or - alarn loss of steam flow signal to FW Vital inverter 1-1 control systen - failure to fails 120V AC vital control SG level if Ch.1
- or - inverter 1-I selected Vital inverter 1-I rsmormal alarm output breaker Main feed purps go to ninirun trips irip status lights speed - loss of input to speed
- or - and safeguards controller Both inverter 1-I systems feeder breakers annunciators Loss of auto control of SGs 1 and fail (1 F0 and 1 malfunction 2 level for FDAFWP 1 A-A, and SGs gr FTC) 3 and 4 level for TDAFWP 1A-5 u - or -
- loss of power to SSPS input and 480V AC shutdown boards IAl-A, and output relays and Ch.1 input 131-B fail AND relays 12SV DC battery or battery board I Loss of auto-nakeup to volume fails control tank Loss of condenser steam dump capability-Pressurizer low level automatic actions occur if on Ch. LT-68-339 Pressurizer sprays closed and backup heaters energized if on Ch. PT-68-340 Letdown denineralizers bypassed -
divert to holdup tank
r-SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MDDES Ne EFFECTS NIALYSIS SYSTEM- 120V AC Power- UNIT Sequoyah-I DRAWING M). SHEET 3 of 11 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METH00(S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REPARKS
- Loss of Vital Vital board 1-II 120V AC vital Possible reactor trip on Loss of level control on % 2 Board 1-II-(A11 feeder breaker . power board I-II low-low SG 1evel due to loss.of' input signal.
Loads) trips UV or breaker trip
- or - alarn loss of steam flow signal to Vital inverter FW control system - failure to 1-II fails 120V AC vital control SG 1evel if Ch. 2
- or - inverter 1-II selected Vital inverter abnormal alarm 1-II output If centrifuga1'Chg pump in breaker trips Trip status lights ' operation, charging flow and
- or - and safeguards seal injection flow will Both inverter 1-II systems increase (FT-62-93 opens feeder breakers annunciators FCV-62-93)
-fails (1 F0 and 1 malfunction FTC) -
Loss of auto control of SGs 3 e- - or - and 4' level for MDAFWP IB-8, a 480V_AC shutdown and SGs 1 and 2 level for:
-+ boards 1A2+A and- TDAFWP IA-S
- 1B2-8 fall, AND'
-125V DC battery -or loss of power to SSPS output
< battery board II relays and Ch. II input relays fails Loss of auto-erateup to volume-control tank l Pressurizer low level automatic actions occur if on Ch. LT-68-335 Pressurizer sprays closed and backup heaters energized if on
, PT-68-334-9
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE PODES AIE) EFFECTS AftALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 4 of 17 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT _ REMARKS Loss of Vital Vital board 1-III 120V AC vital Possible reactor trip Loss or decrease of FW flow to Board 1-III feeder breaker power board 1-111 and turbine trip all SGs (All Loads) trips UV or breaker trip
- or - alam Possible reactor trip on loss of Fil flow signal to FW Vital inverter low-low SG 1evel control system - failure to 1-III fails 120V AC vital control SG 1evel if Ch. 3
- or - inverter 1-III selected Vital inverter abnomal alarm 1-III output Reduction of FW flow due to breaker trips Trip status lights SG 3 demand signal failed low
- or - safeguards systems Both inverter -annunciators loss of SG PORVs (PIC-1-13A, 1-III feeder malfunction 24A) if in nomal mode breakers fail (1 tgr F0 and 1 FTC) Loss of power to SSPS input u - or - relays for Ch. III 480 VAC shutdown boards 2Al-A and Pressurizer low level 2B1-B fail, AND automatic actions occur if on 125V DC battery or Ch. LT-68-320 battery board III fails Pressurizer sprays closed and backup heaters energized if on PT-68-323
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE FWBES Af5 EFFECTS NWE.YSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 5 of 11 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES PETHOD(5) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT PEPARKS Loss-of Vital Vital board 1-IV 120V AC vital Possible reactor trip Loss or decrease of FW flow to - Board 1-IV feeder breaker power board 1-IV and turbine trip ~ all SGs (All Loads)' trips UV or breaker trip
- or - alam Possible reactor trip on loss of FW flow signal to FW -
- Vital inverter low-low SG level control systen - failure to 1-IV fails 120V AC vital control SG 1evel if Ch. 4-selected-
- or - - inverter 1-IV Vital inverter abnormal alarm 1-IV output Reduction of FW flow due to SG breaker trips Trip status lights 4 demand signal failed low
- or - and safeguards Both inverter 1-IV - systems Loss of SG PORVs (PIC-1-6A, feeder breakers annunciators 31A) if in normal mode
~
fail (1 F0 and 1 malfunction FTC) - Loss of power to SSPS input
'- or - relays for Ch. IV 480V AC shutdown boards 2A2-A and 282-B fail, AND 125 VDC' battery or.-
battery board IV fails - e
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SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE 80 DES AIS EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 6 of Il LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS SSPS (Solid State Individual load Loss of power to No effect (loss of One SPSS input relay Protection System breaker trip assoc. SPSS single load) channel per vital board Input Relays channel (Channels I-IV) SSPS Output Relays Individual load Loss of power to No effect (loss of One SPSS output relay (Trains A & B) breaker trip assoc. SPSS output single load) train per VB 1-1 and train 1-II t!IS Instrument Individual load Loss of instr. No effect (loss of One NIS instrument power Power breaker trip power to assoc. single load) channel per vital board (Channels I - IV) NIS channel V a NIS Control Power Individual load Loss of control No effect (loss of One NIS control power (Channels I - IV) breaker trip power to assoc. single load) per vital board NIS channel
SYSTER LEVEL FAILINtE NIDES afb EFFECTS AINILYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1
' DRAWING N0.-
SHEET I of 17 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS' Process Protection Individual load Loss of power to No effect loss of single One process protection set per (Sets-I -<IV) breaker trip assoc. process load) vital board protection set UHI Accumulator Individual valve No effect (loss of
'Ch I - IV breaker trip single load)
Isolation Valves-(FCV-87-21',22,
.23,24),
V w. ERCk and Individual monitor Out-of-scale No effect (loss of One monitor per VB 1-1 and Containment Rad. breaker trip ' radiation single load) 1-II Monitors . indication-(1-RE-90-106,112)- -Monitors fall on-loss of 120V AC-
-RCPs 2, 3 and 4 UV' Individual load Erroneous UV/UF No effect One RCP relay set per VB 1-II, and UF Relays breaker trip: indications for. -III and IV assoc. RCP-Relays provide protection in ever.t of other failures.
_ _ . . _ . , . . a. c. . __a-.c.,.-. , . - - . . . _ . _ . . . . . ~ . ._,. -_.-a ._ ,_ , _ . _ , .._ ..--_ _ _ ~._. .
i- - SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE 80 DES NW EFFECTS MIALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-I DRAWING NO. SHEET 3 of 11 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Instrument Buses A Individual load Loss of power to No effect (loss of One instrument bus per VB.1-1 and B breaker trip assoc. bus single load). - and 1-II Instrument buses are redundant AFW Turbine Flow Normal-power No effect One power supply each provided
- Controller supply breaker from VB 1-III and 1-IV (FIC-46-57) Normal trip and Alt. Power .and - - AFW not normally in service-Alternate power supply breaker trip
?- TDAFWP-SGs.1, 2, 3 Individual . ' No effect Two level . controllers per VB
.1-III (SG 3,'4) and 1-IV (54
~
M and 4 Level , controller. breaker
. Controllers trip. 1, 2)
(LIC-3-172,173,
.: 174,175) AFW not normally in service -
TDAFWP SGs 1, 2, 3 Individual No effect Two instrument loops per VR' and 4. Instrument . instrument loop 1-III (SG 3, 4) and 1-IV (SG Loops breaker ' trip 1,2)~ AFW not normally in service N 4 *' 49yryyw?- ) +T *iw-riy ^ q ,#y* c y ey "gFy f 4 t v- l' err *'#48*'#d e +*"gPe94' -- D' +fW'-*FF- w'e' mW-9 sy ,7see--9-*-'v-'+ 'W-wW --1w sub 1ri. F --+w't. sis't- M<-*ew
*w ar'-** *:'9' -re---'--
- i-
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE PODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-I DRAWING NO. SHEET 9 of 17 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT - REMARKS Aux. Relay Rack Individual rack Loss of power to No effect (loss of One aux. rack per VB 1-1 SPSS Aux. Relays breaker trip assoc. rack single load) and 1-II (1-R-73,78) RB Control Air Individual valve Valvc(s) closure No effect (loss of Valves 80A, B; 110A, 8 Isolation Valves breakers trip (2 single load) powered from VB 1-1 and (FSV-32-80A,B; SOVs per FCV) 102A, B fron VB 1-II 110A, B; 102A, B) Valves fail closed on loss of 120V AC Refer to Station and Aux. Control Air FMEA U Aux. Compressors Individual breaker Valve (s) closure No effect itess of One valve per VB 1-1 and (A, B) AB trip single load) 1-II Isolation Valves (FCV-32-82,85) Valves fail closed on loss of 120V AC Refer to Aux. Control Air FMEA Incore Temperature Individual load Temperatura No effect (loss of One monitoring system Monitoring Systems breaker trip indication (s) single load) per VD 1-III and 1-IV out-of-scale
SYSTER LEVEL FAILURE NIDES NW EFFECTS MIM.YSIS SYSTEM -120V AC Power UNIT' Sequoyah DRAWING NO. SHEET 10 of 17 LOAD /. FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES. METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Radiation Rate Individual load Itidication(s) No effect One rate meter and one monitor- ._ Meters and: breaker trip out-of-scale .per VB 1-1 and 1-II Monitors (1-RI-90-106,112; 0-RE-90-125,126) 125V DC Vital Individual load Loss of power to No effect (loss of~ One battery board instrument Battery Board breaker trip assoc. battery bd single-load) load per VB 1-I and 1-II Instruments instruments 4 (Boards I and II) J T Instrument Buses .3 Individual load Loss of power to -No effect (loss of One instrument bus and one and 4'and breaker trip assoc. instr. bus single load)- transformer per VB 1-III and Transformer Power .and transformer- 1-IV. Aux. Control Both' supply - Loss of: instrument' No effect (loss of . Panel A ' instr.' and relay buses Panels'A,'B'and.C. breakers for each or relay power to single load) . powered by VB 1-1 or 1-III Instrument and individual control assoc. control
. Relay Buses pawl ' instr. or panel Panel B instr. and relay buses
' relay buses trip powered by VB 1-II and 1-IV-Panel.C relay. buses powered by VB 1-III
- b. .; -
- _ . . _ 2. . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ .. u _. _ , . _ . . . . . _ _ a. c _. _ . , _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
w SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE NIDES MS EFFECTS NMLYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power- ' UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 11 of 11 LOA 9/ FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UMIT REMARKS Letdown Flow ~ Switch breaker letdown No effect Switch powered by VB l-I Temperature Switch trip deminerlizers by-(TIS-62-79) passed and LCV-62-11B diverts to hold-up tank Chlorine Detectors Individual Chlorine No effect One detector per VR 1-1 and (CLAN-43-205A,B) detector breaker indication (s) 1-II trfp. out-of-scale Detectors fail on loss of 120V AC 7
- M
. Post-Accident PASS breaker (s) -No effect PASS.SOVs powered by VB 1 Sampling System trip; and 1-II SOVs PASS not normally in service Spreading and Individual damper .No effect (loss of' .One spreading room and one
- Control Room breaker trip - single load) control room. isol. damper per Isolation Dampers ' VB 1-I and 1-III (FCO-31A-105A. B;
.106 ~ A,B) '
u . -- - . .u . u. : - , ,-a,- z, . . . : - . . - . - . . . . - - - ~ . . ., - . - - . . - - . . . . - - . .
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 SYSTEM DRAWING NO. SHEET 12 of 11 LOAD / -Fall.URE/ LOSS OF DETECTION LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS COMPONENT BOP Process ITdividual rack Loss of power to No effect (loss of One BOP instrument rack per
' Instrument Control breaker trip assoc. B0P instr. single load) vital board Racks (1-R-126, rack 128,130,131)
T w
- Containment Purge Individual monitor Radiation No effect One monitor per VB 1-1 and
' Air Exhaust Rad. breaker trip indication (s) 1-II Monitors out-of-scale (1-RE-90-130,131)
_ ~. . - _, _ - . _ _ - ~ . .
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES AIS EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO.- SHEET 13 of 17 LOAD / . FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS NSSS Aux. Relay Both bus A or both Loss of power to Bus A powered by VB 1-1 Rock (Buses A, B bus B feeder assoc. NSSS aux. (1-R-54) or VB 1-III (1-R-58) and C) (1-R-54, breakers trip relay rack (s) 55, 58) '
- or - . Bus B powered by VB 1-II All 3'l-R-58 (1-R-55) or VB 1-IV (1-R-58)
' feeder breakers ~
trip Bus C powered by'VB 1-IV (1-R-58) Aux. Relay Racks Individual rack Loss of power to No effect (loss of Racks 1-R-73 and 74 sep. and Sep. and Aux. breaker trip assoc. rack single load) aux.. relays powered by VR 1-1 Relays (1-R-73, 74,77,78) Racks 1-R-77 and 78 sep. and
~? aux.-relays powered by VB 1-II ti~
Aux Relay Racks Both Bus C feeder loss of power to No'effect'(loss of Bus A powered by VB i-III (Buses A, B and C) -breakers trip assoc. aux' relay single load) (1-R-72, 75, or 76) (1-R-72,75,76) .or'- rack or bus All 3 feeder Bus B powered by VB 1-IV breakers _for (1-R-72, 75, or- 76) 1-R-72, 75, or 76 trip Bux C powered by VB 1-III (1-R-76) or 1-IV (1-R-72 or 75) Process Control Individual group Loss of power to' No effect (loss of One process control group per Groups 1-4 breaker trip assoc. process single load)- vital board
~
t(1-R-14,17,20, control' group 22)
- .- - . - - . . . - . = . . . - . - -, -- . - - - . - - . - a. - . .-.-.-.-..-.- =.
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 120V AC pcwer UNIT Sequoyah-1 SYSTEM DRAWING NO. SHEET 14 of 17 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS COMP 0NENT Reactor Vessel Both feeder loss of power to No effect (loss of Systen on 1-R-148 powered by Level breakers for one assoc. instr. single load) VB 1-I or 1-II Instrumentation instrumentation system Systems (1-R-148, system trip Systen en JB-4031 powered by JB-4031) ~ VB 1-III or 1-IV BAT A and C Heater Individual Control No effect (loss of BAT A htr A-A and BAT C htr Controllers A-A, controller breaker temperature single load) A-A .. trollers on VB l-I and B-B trip out-of-scale (TIT-62-239,243, (Comply with any BAT 4 htr B-B and BAT C htr 245,246) applicable Tech Specs) B-B controllers on VB 1-II E ABGTS Fan Pressure Indi v', dual No effect One pressure controller per VB Controllers (A-A controller breaker I-I and 1-II and B-B) trip ABGTS not normally in operation Refer to HVAC FMEA Auxiliary Dryer Individual dryer loss of power to No effect (loss of One dryer per VB 1-I cod I-II Trains A and B breaker trip assoc. dryer single load) Aux. control air supply systen not noramily in service Dryers operate on re".indant trains Refer to Aux. Control Air FPEA
, r y , . . , . _r . .
SYSTEM LEVEL. FAILURE IWDES AIS EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 15 of 11 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS Of DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Control Air Individual breaker loss of alarm No effect One alarm per VB l-III and Headers A and B trip alarm capability 1-IV Moisture Alarms Radiation Monitors individual monitor Radiation No effect (however, must One monitor per VB1-1 and (0-RE-90-205,206) breaker trip indication (s) comply with any applic- 1-II. Out-of-scale able Tech Specs.) 7 Instrument Buses 1 Individual bus loss of power to No effect (loss of One bus per VB 1-I and 1-II and 2 (0-M-27B) breaker trip assoc. instr. bus single load) AB General Exhaust Individual Assoc. fan stops No effect (loss of One controller per VB 1-I and Fans IA and IB controller breaker single load) 1-II Flow Controllers trip Refer to HVAC FMEA
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE NDES NW EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 16 of 17 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES PETHOD(S) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS UHI Instrument Individual bus No effect (loss of One UHI instrument bus per Buses'1-4 breaker trip single load) vital board (comply with any applicable Tech Specs.) Fire pumps 2A-A Individual load No effect (comply with One fire pump sep. relay set and 2B-B Sep. breaker trip any applicable Tech. per VB 1-I and 1-II Relays Specs.) Fire pumps not nornally in service 7 8 C02 Fire Individual load No effect (comply with CB; DG-1A, 2A CO2 pewered by Protection breaker trip any applicable Tech. VB 1-III (Ctl. Bldg; DG-1A, Specs.) 2A, Lube Oil Rm; TB; SB;.DG-1B, 2B CO2 P0"*"'d DG-1B, 28: Lube by VB 1-IV Oil Rm; Turb Bldg; Svc Bldg) CO2 fire protection is standby system Post Accident Individual No effect (comply with One monitoring system per VB Monitoring 1 and 2 monitoring system any applicable Tech. 1-III and 1-IV breaker trip Specs.) Post acc. monitoring is standby system
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE fEDES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 120V AC Power UNIT Sequoyah-1 DRAWING NO. SHEET 11 of 11 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (S) FA! LURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS LOCA H2 Individual monitor No effect (comply with One monitor per VB 1-111 and Containment Flow breaker trip any applicable Tech 1-IV Monitors Specs) (XI-43-200,210) Monitors used only in event of LOCA Acoustic Flow Individual load Indication (s) No effect Acoustic flow nonitoring Monitoring and breaker trip out-of-scale powered by VB 1-II Fluid Dynamic Flow 7 Sensors Fluid dynamic flow sensors O powered by YB 1-III SG PORY Pressure Individual con- SG PORVs No effect Controllers troller breaker' inoperable if in (PIC-1-6A,13A, trip normal mode 24A,31A)
STSl; ' u. vel. FAILURE IWDES AfE EFFECTS MulLYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UMIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-1 through 5 SHEET 1 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Entire ERCW System All 4 traveling Low supply header Reactor shutdown due Operation of 2 pumps on 1 (All Unit 1 Loads) screens blocked / flow indications to loss of all RCP plant train is sufficient to all 4 screen wash and alarms cooling supply all cooling require-systems fail nents for 2-unit plant
- or - Low pump discharge All ECCS and CSS All 8 ERCW pumps pressure indications unavailable loss of ERCW to all CCW HXs fail and alarms will eventually lead to insuf-ficient cooling for RCP thermal barriers, charging punp seals, SI pump seals, CS pump seals, and RHR 7
*; Will also cause failure of air compressors, CRD and contain-ment ventilation cooling, and control building AC
.. _- ,. ~ . . . _ , _ _
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES Als EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W349-1 through 5 SHEET 2 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS ERCW Train IA Traveling screens low supply header Reactor shutdown due Refer to FFEA entries for A and D blocked / flow indication to loss of water individual loads screen wash systems cooling to two RCPs A-A and D-A fail Low pump discharge
- or - pressure indication Train A ECCS and CSS ERCW pump pairs and alarm are inoperable J-A,'K-A and 0-A, R-A fail
- or -
Supply headers 1A-A and 2A-A cross-
)(
'3 connect header rupture
- or -
Supply header 1A-A strainer A1A-A plug
- or - -
Supply header IA-A N.O. isolation valve 1-FCV-67-492 closes
- or -
Supply header IA-A blocked or ruptured
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE fGDES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-1 through 5 SHEET 3 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS ERCW Train IB Tcaveling screens low supply header Reactor shutdown due 8 and C blocked / flow indication to loss of notor cooling screen wash systems to two RCPs B-B and C-B fail Low pump discharge
- or - pressure indication Train B of ECCS un-ERCW pump pairs L-8, available M-B and N-B, P-B fail Train B of CSS un-
- or - available Supply headers 18-B 7 and 2B-B cross-2 connect header rupture
- Or -
Supply header IB-B strainer BIB-B plug
- or -
Supply header IB-B N.O. isolation valve 1-FCV-67-489 closes
- or -
Supply header IB-B blocked or ruptured
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES NW EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-2, 3 SHEET 4 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS CCW HX(s) HX-A: Valve 0-FCV-67-478 CCW temperature No effect (single load CCW HX-A may be cooled by. (A,C) or 146 fails closed indication foss) Unit 1 CCW trains ERCW-1B or 2A
- or - utilizing HX-A and HX-C Valve 2-FCV-67-81, 223 are redundant. Unit 2 CCW HX-C may be cooled by or 1-FCV-67-223 fails CCW HX-B also provides ERCW-1A or 2B closed; and 1-FCV-67-424 backup fails to open CCW HX-B may be aligned to
- or - support Unit 1 CCW HX-C: Valves FCV-67-151 and 152 fail closed
- or -
[ . Valve 2-FCV-67-82 or 147 v' fail closed; and 1-FCV-67-147 fails to open
- or -
Either cooler rupture RCP Motor Cooler (s) Cooler 1: Valve 1-FCV- RCP motor temp Unit will shut down if Motor coolers 1 and 3 cooled by (1,2,3,4) 67-83, 87, 88; or 1-FCV- indications one or more RCP coolers ERCW-IA 67-86 closes fail Cooler.2: Valve 1-FCV- Motor coolers 2 and 4 cooled 67-99,103,104; or 1-TCV- by ERCW-1B 67-102 closes Cooler 3:~ Valve 1-FCV-67-91,95,96; or 1-TCV-67-94 closes Cooler 4: Valve 1-FCV-67-107,111,112; or 1-TCV-67-110 closes
-or-Cooler empture or tube P l ug
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-2,3 SHEET 5 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD LAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS CRD Vent!1ation Cooler IA: Valve 1-FCV- CRD No effect if any one Ventilation coolers 1A and 1C Coolers 67-83,87,88; or 1-TCV- ventilation cooler lost cooled by ERCW-1A (IA,IB,IC,ID) 67-85 closes temperature Cooler IB: Valve 1-FCV- indications If all coolers fail, Coolers 18 and 10 cooled by 67-91,103,104: or 1-TCV- shutdown would be ERCW-1B 67-101 closes required within hours Cooler IC: Valve 1-FCV-67-91,95,96: or 1-TCV-67-93 closes Cooler ID: Valve 1-FCV-67-107,111,122; or 1-TCV-67-109 closes
-or-Cocler rupture
)(
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-3, 4, 5 SHEET 6 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Containment Upper IA: Valve 1-FCV- Containment air No effect Upper cont. vent. coolers Ventilation 67-130,131,295; or temperature 1A and IC cooled by System Cooler (s) 1-TCV-67-129 closes indications ERCW-1A (upper: 1A,18, Upper IB: Valve 1-FCV-1C,1D) 67-138,139,297; or Upper coolers 18 and (lower: 1 A ,1B 1-TCV-67-137 closes ID cooled by ERCW-1B IC,10) Upper IC: Valve 1-FCV-67-133,134,296; or Lower coolers IA and IC 1-TCV-67-132-closes cooled by ERCW-1A Upper ID: Valve 1-FCV-67-141,142,298; or Lower coolers 18 and 10 1-TCV-67-140 closes cooled by ERCW-1B 7 Lower IA: Valve 1-FCV-4 67-83,87,88; or 1-TCV-67-84 c'oses Lower IB: Valve 1-FCV-67-99,103,104; or 1-TCV-67-100 closes Lower IC: Valve 1-FCV-67-91,95,96; or 1-TCV-. 67-92 closes Lower ID: Valve 1-FCV-67-107,111,112; or 1-TCV-67-108 closes
-or-Cooler rupture
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE ICDES TJID EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-3,4,5 SHEET 7 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Air Compressor (s) Station Air: Valves Air compressor No effect if any one Station air compresscr(s) (Station Air: 0-FCV-67-205 an 208 temperatures cooler lost coolers A,B,C and D A,B,C,D,E) fail closed cooled by ERCW-1A or IB (Aux. Control Air) -or-Valves 0-FSV-32-32, Aux. control air cempres-37,42 and 137 fail sor A cooled by ERCW-1 A closed
-Or-Local line or cooler rupture Control Air: Local line or cooler 9 rupture g; -or-Valve 1-FCV-67-127 fails closed
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES MS EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W844-4 SHEET 8 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMP 0NENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Aux Bldg No effect For each pair, one Space Cooler (s): cooler (A or B) is sufficient
--SFP pumps & Valves 1-FCV-67-213 SFP/TB booster SFP pump A TB booster TB booste- and 215 closed (1 FC pump overheat pump space cooler IA (IA,IB) and 1 FTO) indications cooled by ERCW-1A,
-or cooler IB by ERCW-1B Both coolers rupture
--CCW & AFW Valves 1-FCW-67-162 CCW/AFW pump CCW & AFW pumps space pumps (1A,10) and 164 closed (1 FC overheat cooler IA cooled by ERCW-1A, and 1 FTO) indications cooler IB by ERCW-18 f, -or-e Both coolers rupture
--Charging Valves 1-FCV-67-168 Charging pump Centr. chg. pump 1A-A oil pumps (IA-A, and 172 closed (2 FC overheat & room coolers cooled by 1A; IB-B, 181 and.1 FTO - indications ERCW-1A, pumps 18 and IC IC) -or cooled by ERCW-1B All coolers rupture
--SI pumps Valves 1-FCV-67-176 51 punp area SI pump room cooler IA and 182 fail to open temperature cooled by ERCW-1A, cooler
-or- (standby system) IB by ERCW-1B Both coolers rupture
--CS pumps Valves 1-FCV-67-184 CS pump area CS pump room cooler IA and 186 fail to open temperature cooled by ERCW-1A, cooler
-or- .(standby system) IB by ERCW-18 Both coolers rupture
1 SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MDDES AIO EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT -Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-4 SHEET- 9 of 12
. LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT- LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS-Aux. Bldg.
Space Cooler (s): cont'd
--RHR pumps Valves 1-FCV-67-188 RHR pnmp area RHR nump room cooler IA and 190 fail closed temperature cooled by ERCW-1A, cooler
-or- IB by ERCW-1B Both coolers rupture
--Penetrations Valves 1-FCV-67-346, Penetrations Penetration room coolers 350,354,348,352,356 area temperature ' 1 A1,1 A2,. and 1 A3 cooled by closed- - ERCW-1A, coolers IB1,1B2,
-or- and 1B3 by ERCW-1B g Multiple coolers g rupture
--Pipe chase Valves 1-FCV-67-3a2 Pipe chase . Pipe chase cooler IA cooled and 344 closed (1 FC. area tempera- by ERCW-1A, cooler IB by and 1 FTO) ture ERCW-1B
-or-Both coalers rupture
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE M) DES AM) EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-2,4 SHEET 10 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Control Building No effect (single load AC: loss) All room A/C systers consist of re-
, dundant equipment and ERCW supplies
--Shutdown Valves 1-TCV-67-158 S/D board Shutdown board room A/C board room and 2-TCV-67-158 fail room tempera- chiller A cooled by (A) to open ture indication ERCW-1A, chiller B cooled
-or- (standby) by ERCW-2B Both chillers rupture One A/C ~ chiller is sufficient -
7 --Instrument Valves 1-TCV-67-115 Instr. room -Instrument room cooler IA 93 room (1A, 1B) and 118 fail closed temperature cooled by ERCW-1A; cooler-18
-or- indication cooled by ERCW-1B Both coolers rupture One room cooler sufficient'
--Main control Valves 0-TCV-67-197 Main control Main Control room A/C condenser-room (A, B) and 201 fail closed room temperature A cooled by ERCW-1A, condenser
-or- B cooled by.ERCW-1B .
Both condensers rupture One A/C condenser sufficient
--Electrical Valves 0-TCV-67-195 Electrical Electrical board room A/C board room and 199 fail closed board room condenser A cooled by ERCW-1A, (A,B) .-or- temperature condenser B cooled by ERCW-1B Both condensers indication rupture One A/C condenser sufficient
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS-
- SYSTEM ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-1, 2 SHEET 11 of 12 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES , METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Containment Spray Valve 1-FCV-67-125 CS temperature No effect CS HX-1A cooled by ERCW-1A-HXs or 126 and 1-FCV- (standby system)
(IA,IB) 67-123 or 124 fail CS HX-1B cooled by ERCW-1B to open
--. or - Dne CS HX sufficient Both HXs rupture Emergency Diesel OA1, 2: valves DG temperatures No effect DG units 1A-A and 2A-A cooled Generator Coolers 1-FCV-67-72 and (standby components) .
by ERCW-1A or 2B (0A1,.2; 1A1, 2; 2-FCV-67-73 fail DGs unavailable if f, IB1, 2; 2A1, 2; to open demanded DG units IB-B and 2B-B' cooled' w 2B1, 2) 1A1 2: 'stives by ERCW-1B or 2A 1-fSV-61-66'and 68 fail'to open- DG units OA1 and 0A2 cooled 2A1, Zi. valves by ERCW-1B or 2A 2-FCV-67-66 and 68 fail to open IB1, 2: valves 1-FCV-67-65 and 67 fail to open 281, 2: valves 2-FCV-67-65 and 67 fail to open we- .g ,,,b F -u'
.g 3 e- , , %dwe % . M - --
W_e. y ,'. %-- __ .,__ ..___=.mm
.,#. .N. rum-km,._ ns A
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MDDES Alm EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM . ERCW UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W849-1, 2 SHEET 12 of 12-LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS SG Emergency Makeup Motor-driven AFW No flow to AFW No effect Motor-driven and turbine-driven (via AFW) pumps: valves suction (standby Required for. pumps may be fed by ERCW-1A, 1-FCV-3-116A, 126A; function) emergencies only, 18, 2A or 2B 2-FCV-3-116A and 126A fail to open Turbine-driven AFW pump: valves
? 1-FCV-3-136A and EJ 179A fail to open CCW Emergency Valves 1-FCV-67-81 No makeup flow No effect Emergency makeup to CCW surge and 82 fail closed Makeup Required for tank A may be provided by
- or - emergencies only ERCW-1A or 18 Failure to align ERCW to CW surge tank
--- - - ~ ^ -
l. SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM' HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-2,3 SHEET 1 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS' Auxiliary Building:
--Building Air Supply Supply fans 1A-A Area No effect '(single failure) One supply fan and one
& Exhaust (General and IB-B fail temperature exhaust fan normally on Ventilation) (1 FTR and 1 FTS) indications standby
-or-Exhaust fans 1A-A TDAFW pump room also has and 18-B fail has redundant emergency (1 FTR and 1 FTS) exhaust. fans
-or-7 Supply or exhaust Fuel handling areas has own g damper pairs fail redundant exhaust fans closed, or isolation dampers fail closed-
--Building Cooling CRD Eqpt. room A/C~ Area No effect-(single failure) Chilled water system for AHUs units IA and IB fail-temperature consists of redundant pumps
-or- indications and chillers Instrument shop A/C unit fails
-or-Misc. AHU fails
-or-Loss of ERCW to
- cooling coils
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MDDES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-2,3,8 SHEET 2 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD _CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Auxiliary Building (cont.)
--Auxiliary Board AHU 1A-A or A/CU Room Operation of equipment _After.25 hours of no cooling, Room A/C System. IA-A (480V Board temperature should be monitored 50% of rooms experience ten-Rm.' 1A, and Bat- indications when room temperatures - peratures higher than designed tery Rm I) fails exceed design (1040F)
-or-AHU 1A-A or A/CU 1B-B (480V Board Rm.-18, and Bat-
- tery Rm II) fails
--Safety Feature Area No effect Each area is served by redun-Equipment Coolers temperature dant coolers, or redundant
[ indications equipment is placed in separate vi e RHR pumps Coolers IA-A and areas served by different IB-B fail coolers
-or-Loss of ERCW to coolers For full-flow ventilation in pump rooms, pump rom 4 e SI pumps Coolers IA-A and IB-B doors must be open to sup-fail plement general aux. bldg.
-or- exhaust Loss of ERCW to coolers e CS pumps Coolers IA-A and IB-B fail
-or-Loss of ERCW to coolers-l
-- . _ = . - _ - - _ _ _
= - _ . -- - __ --__ .
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES AIO EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-8 SHEET 3 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Auxiliary Building (cont.): o Charging pumps Coolers 1A-A, IB-B (Centrifugal & _ and IC-B fail Reciprocating) -or-Loss of ERCW to coolers e AFW & CCW pumps Coolers A-A and B-B fail 7 g; -or-Loss of ERCW to coolers e CCW TB booster'& Coolers A-A and B-B SFD pumps fail
-or-Loss lof ERCW to coolers w-e a p , ,= m .
meir.--_ .m* w, p+p<rqv. _,.. _m ,..%.,,,,, _. ,,%.
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE M) DES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - I DRAWING NO. 47W866-8 SHEET- 4 of 13 LGAD/ FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Auxiliary Building (cont.): o Penetration El. 669 Coolers 1A-A, rooms 1B-B fail
-or-El. 690 coolers 1A-A, IB-B fail
-or-El. 714 coolers IA-A, 7 IB-B fail
$ -or'-
Loss of ERCW to coolers e Pipe Chases Coolers IA-A and IB-B fail-
-or-Loss of ERCW to coolers l
. - - , - - . .n , ,
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE M) DES AIO EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-3 SHEET 5 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS-Auxiliary Building (cont.):
--Shutdown Board AHU/ACU 1A-A, 18-B, Rooms Must monitor equipment loss of A/C chillers will re-Room A/C 2A-A, and IB-B fail temperature operation at tempera- sult 'in 7 of 9 rooms '2xceeding System -or- indications tures above 104 F . design temp. (1040 F) within Loss of ERCW to A/CU 15 hours cooling coils If one AHU is used for air circulation upon loss of cooling, area would reach
-1040 F in 27 to 44 hts.
AHU/ ACUS 1A-A and-1B-B serve [ 480V shutdown board rooms 1A1,- m 1A2, IB1, 1B2; 6.oKV shutdown board ' room A; battery board rooms l'and II; aux. control room; and aux. Instrument rooms: 1A and 1B. Refer to ERCW FMEA
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 bRAWING NO. 47W866-3 SHEET 6 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Auxiliary Building (Cont'd):
--Shutdown Transfer Both 480V Xfmr Rm 1A Room No effect (single failure) No AHUs or A/CUs associated Room Ventilation f resh air intakes temperature tLese rooms close indications
-or- Redundant air intakes and All 4 480V Xfmr exhaust fans for each room Rm 1A exhaust fans IA-A fail
-or-Both 480V Xfmr Rm IB 9 fresh' air intakes -
g close
-or-All 3 480V Xfmr Room IB exhaust fans IB-B fail --Miscellaneous Both TDAFW pump room No effect (single failure) TDAFW pump 'roca also served by Ventilation area emergency ' general exhaust and A/C exhaust fans fail CRD equip. room served by local A/CUs and general ventilation air supply Instrument shop served by local A/CU and general aux. building ventilation
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IWDES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS HVAC UNIT- Sequoyah - 1 SYSTEM SHEET / of 13 DRAWING NO. 47W866-3 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS-COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES Control Building:
--Main Control Both MCR A/Cus fail Roora No effect (single failure) 'Two .100% capacity redundant Room A/C System - or- temperature A/C systens Both MCR AHUs fail indications 1 of 2 electric steam gene-
-or-Both MCR filter banks rators provides humidity plug . control
- t. will. operate normally at EggF<T<104F 50 0
Both MCR cleanup No effect' Standby system actuated manual-
--Main Control ly; or automatically on SIAS, Room Emergency fans fail (FTS) high radiation, high 9 Air Cleanup . -or- temperature, high : chlorine -
$ System Both MCR cleanup filter banks plug concentration or high smoke or pass contami- concentration nants:
-or-
. Automatic.and manual actuation fail Both supply. fans Room No effect Standby systen actuated manual-
--Main Control ly or automatica11y 'on SI AS,
. Room Emergency fail pressure /
Pressurizing . -or- L in-leakage .high radiation, high-tempera - indications ture, or'high smoke Air Supply Both air intakes - Systen blocked concentrations
-or-Automatic and Control building' pressurizing manual actuation air supply systen normally supplies air to MCR
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MDDES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC !! NIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-4 SHEET 8 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Control Building (cont.):
--Electrical Board Both electrical board Room No effect Two 100% capacity redundant Room A/C System ' room A/CUs fail temperature A/C systems
-or- indications 1 of 2 electric steam gene-Both electrical board rators provides humidity-room AHUs fail control
-or-Both electrical board room filter banks plug
--Control Building Both supply fans fail Room No effect Isolation dampers close on 7 Pressurizing -or pressure / Increased possibility actuation signal that.
S3 Air Supply Isolation damper (s) in-leakage of contamination in- operates MCR emergency; pres-System fail closed indications leakage surizing system
--Battery Room All 3 exhaust' fans. Room No'effect (single failure) . Air intake from electrical Ventilation fail (1 FTR and . temperature board room A/C return System 2 FTS) indications H2 concentra-tion indications
--Miscellaneous Spreading room sup- Area No effect Additional air supply from Ventilation ply fans fail temperature pressurizing air system Systems -or Spreading room Other areas (kitchen, locker exhaust fans fail rooms,'etc.) ventilation not vital ~ for operation l
- . - - ~ . . - - _
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE IODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-9,14 SHEET 9 of 13 LOAD / -FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPDNENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Diesel Generator Building:
--DG Unit 1A-A Room exhaust fans 1 DG room No effect' Redundant room exhaust fans Room and 2 fail, or fan temperature exhaust dampers iadication Standby systen - required to close (when DG operate when DG starts
-or-. required to Electrical board operate) room exhaust fan fails
-or-Battery area vent fan fails 7
--DG Unit IB-B ' Room exhaust fans 1 DG rocm No effect Redundant room exhaust fans Room and 2 fail, or fan . temperature exhaust dampers ' indication Standby system - required to close (when DG operate when DG starts
-or- required to Electrical board operate) room exhaust fan fails-
-or--
Battery area vent. fan fails,
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE N) DES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-7 ' SHEET 10 of 13 , LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LDAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Auxiliary DG Room exhaust fans 1 DG room No effect Redundant room exhaust fans Building and 2 fail, or fan temperature exhaust dampers indication Standby system - required to-close (when DG operate when DG starts
-or- required to 480V Aux. board room operate) exhaust fan fails
-or-Fuel oil transfer room exhaust fan fails
-or-
? Xfmr and 6.9KV
$ board room exhaust fan fails Turbine Building:
--Elev. 732.0 Both air supply Turbine room No effect" Designed to maintain Turbine Room fans fail temperature temperature between 500F Ventilation -or- indications and 1100 F for Elev. 732.0 System Several roof ven- turbine room tilation fans fail
--Elevs. 706.0 Both. air supply fans Space No effect. Designed to maintain and 685.0 in 1 of 2 air supply temperature temperature between 500F Spaces Venti- ' systems fail indications and 1100 F for Elev. 706.0
.lation System -or- 'and 685.0 spaces Several roof venti-lator fans fail l
. _ _ _ , _ _ . ~ , . , .. __ _
SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AIO EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-7 SHEET 11 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Turbine Building (cont.):
--Building Heating Both hot water circ. Temperature No effect Required for.only part of year - dependent on' environ-
~
System pumps fail indications
-or- mental conditions Both steam to water HXs fail Designed to maintain building
-or- temperature above 500F Loss of steam to both HXs
--Pump Coolers and All coolers for Local No effect For each set of. pumps ther'e.
9 Fans each pump area . increased are redundant coolers g e Hotwell pumps fail temperatures .
-or- Used to supplement turbine e Condenser All fans for each Pump overheat building. ventilation'sys-Vacuum Pumps pump area fail to indicat - tem during peak cooling-start when pump if opei .y requirements e Heater Drain starts Tank Pumps -or-
' Loss of ERCW to e Condensate coolers Booster pumps
--Space Coolers e Elev. 706.0 Both coolers or local No effect Used to supplement-turbine (1A-1D; 2A-20) fans in each pair' increased building ventilation system fail ' temperatures during peak cooling . require-e Elev. 685.0 -or- ments (IA-1C; 2A, 28) ERCW supply SOV fails to open
-or-e Elev. 662.5 . Loss of ERCW to (1A, 1B; 2A, 28) cooler
. - . . .. ~. . -- -
= . . - -. ___ .
r SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE N) DES AM) EFFECTS. ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. - 47W866-7 SHEET 12 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT . LOAD'CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Reactor Building Both supply fans ' Containment No effect - Used to provide acceptable Purge Ventilation fail atmosphere - Unable to purge con- environnent in prinary and System -or- quality tainment secondary containment for Both exhaust fans indications eqpt. Operation and person - fail l nel access for periods' when
-or- containment will be occupied.
Both cleanup filter trains plug or pass contaminants
-or-Air flow control valves close Containment Air - Both CRDM fan-coil ' Containment No effect (single Designed to maintain accepta-Cooling System subsystems fail temperature failures) able temperatures in the RB'
-or- indication upper and lower compartments,-
2 of 4 lower com- reactor well, CRDM shroud,'and partment fan-coil instrument room during normal assemblies-fail operation and shutdown.
-or-
- 3 of 4 upper com--
- partnent fan-coil assemblies fail.
-or-Both instrument room A/C systems fail
-or-Loss of ERCW to coils-
.o *e-
_ - - - 4 y g =g re-- , _- - p .*
, 4
SYSTEM LEVEL _ FAILURE 100ES AM) EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM HVAC UNIT Sequoyah - 1 DRAWING NO. 47W866-7 SHEET 13 of 13 LOAD / FAILURE / LOSS OF DETECTION COMPONENT LOAD CAUSES METHOD (s) FAILURE EFFECT ON UNIT REMARKS Condensate Both main roof-ex- Loss of No effect All cooling needs accomplished Demineralizer haust fans fail ventilation with ventilation air flow ' Building (CDB) -or-Environmental Main and auxiliary Local incre& sed ' Heat supplied by duct and Control System air intakes blocked temperatures space heaters when required No nuclear safety-related sys-tems or equipment located in CDB Condensate Supply fan fails Loss of No effect Designed to provide continuous' Demineralizer -or- ventilation ventilation air flow Waste Evaporator Exhaust fan fails Environmental Local-increased Separate A/C systems provide. 7 Building (CDWEB) temperatures heat removal as'needed $ Control System Space heaters provide heat when required No nuclear safety-related sys tems or equipment in CDWER
D.2 Assessment of Frequency of Small Breaks, Based on Historical Experience The original NUREG/CR-4550 analysis used a frequency of 2E-2 for very small breaks. One of the industry comments received during the review cycle indicated that if the ' value of 2E-2 was accurate, there should have been approximately 20 small breaks in the history of nuclear power. This is based on an accumulated U.S. LWR expertence of approximately 350 reactor years for BWRs and 600 reactor years for PWRs. This number of failures would be visible and thus provide an accurate historical basis for calculation of small break frequency.- As a results of these comments, a survey of historical experlence was done to assess the frequency of small breaks. This survey resulted in the assessment of a frequency of 1.3E-2 per year for this event. D.2.1 Scope of Search Very small LOCA is defined as a loss of coolant inventory which is large enough to cause a safety in}ection signal but not large enough to be put in the 52 event category. Very small LOCAs could result from the following e Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Fallures e Pipe Breaks e Component Failures A search of operating experience was made for each of these type of events. The results are summarlzed in Table D.2-1 and discussed individually in the following sections. D.2.2 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failures This event category involves LOCAs due to internal failures of the seal. ' Seal failures due to loss of cooling are not included in this category. NUREG/CR-4400 (Reference D.2-1) provides a survey of seal failure events from 1974 to January 1984. Five of these events were considered applicable to this effort. Plant Date Leakrate Total Leakage Oconee 2 1/74 90 gpm 50.009 gallons H.B. Robinson 5/75 500 gpm 200,000 gallons Indian Polnt 2 7/77 75 gpm 90,000 gallons Salem 1 10/78 - 15,000 gallons ANO1 3/80 400 gpm 60,000 gallons These five events were applicable due to leak size and total leakage as compared with the other events. A' sixth event, at Connecticut Yankee in August 1977, resulted in total: leakage of 4020 gallons at an unspecified leak rate. This event was not included as an applicable seal failure because of the limited total leakage. compared with the other events. The survey in NUREG/CR-4400 covers operational experience up to January 1984. An LER search was performed for all PWR. seal LOCA events from January 1984 to January 1988. No events were found. PWR operating experience through January 10R4 was calculated to be 418 reactor years. Total PWR experience through January 1988 was calculated to be 610 reactor years. At first glance, it would seem appropriate to divide 5 failures by 610 years, for a point estimate of 8.2E-3 per year. However, looking at the dates when the five large seal failures occurred and looking at the dates of all the non-serious seal failures listed in , D-67
. . ~ - . - - . .- ,, . -
.x . .
~
.~
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- f- . .
e Table 0.2-1 ' "'
SUMMARY
.OF SMALL BREAK. EXPERIENCE P Number of .. Point' Break LER Survey- ~ Number of- : Applicable Number of. - Estimate , Type. or Reference ' Occurrences Occurrences Reactor-Years . Frequency, Coments - RCP Seal LOCA Ref. D.2-l' fany 5 418 Frequency . representsy the'mean'of.1a Bayesian 1 LER Survey. 0 .0 192' . . 0039 4 update of pre .'R1' data
'with. post.'81.datar
~
1/84'- 1/88' .
- Pipe Break- Ref. D.2-2 19 :-- '" 8 - - 741: Cornbined PWR and BWR '
- experience. : ~ Assumed 20% .
. LER Survey- ;2 -0 216 . 0017 of PWR piping was"LOCA' 1/85 "1/88 ' sensitive. c ~
'a , _
Component Leakage Ref. D.2-3 '20 14' 3701 ' -
. 0076' ~
1 PWR' experience-only.
- (PWR Cet, 5).
' Assumed 120f LOCA sensitivel-piping l
- .0132: ,
4
* ,w
. .f
,,-- + N
.w
% re'
. . . . 3,.
m
-,.% , , 4. ; 3:4 , ,~. ' [ ,
, .,,' g 1,.:J. . ,.,L 4. _J , , %.y. . wJ c . - ;.,ZJ. , , w, . Cs.; 4 0. . J f, '. ._ b; aa ',- 4.. .J < L Ali <-C L .. J, ,, m . . _ s. ._ .1 .J. . _; . d . .. . J J. 4 , .
NUREG/CR-4400, it is clear- that seal problems have significantly decreased over the: years. The experience- was therefore correlated, based on the hypothesis that seal quality has improved over the years, and that seal failures were predominately an early-industry problem. The data was split into two time periods, a ed . the performance of the first time period was combined with the performance of the second time period through-Bayeslan update, as summarized below: Time Period Seel Failures Reactor Years 1/74 - 1/81 5 281 1/81 - 1/88 0 329 The prior used 5 failures Iri 281 years with a range factor of 3. The resultant mean frequency, af ter updating the data was 3.9E-3, error factor 2.7 D.2.3 Pipe Breaks - NUREG/CR-4407 was reviewed for occurrences of pipe break events. Pipe breaks are different from component failures as-described in the next section. . Th!s category represents failures in pipes.themselves rather than pumps, heat exchangers, valves or thermocouples. NUREG/CR-4407 reports = on pipe failures in nuclear grade systems, including steam generator systems, steam, and feedwater systems. The survey shows 3 that through 1985, 19 pipe failures had occurred. An LER search was done to survey l experience through 1988. This yielded two additional failures; a Surry MFW pipe failure , and a Farley charging system pipe crack. . Of these 21 failures, none have occurred in LOCA sensitive piping connected to the reactor coolant system. The failures have oc-curred in steam generator, feedwater, steam systems, and non-LOCA sensitive portions of the primary systems, it was therefore necessary to correlate the total number of = , failures and apportion the frequency to LOCA sensitive piping, i This apportioning was based on the following estimates of pipe lengths in a typical Westinghouse PWR. The values below are based on Table 6 in NUREG/CR-4407. . A. Reactor Coolant System Pipe Length (it) ' I B. 960 High Pressure injection System 2280 C. Residual Heat Removal System 1 D. 2380 l Chemical Volume and Control System 6110 E. Main Steam System 4300 F. Main Feedwater System 1000 For purposes of determinini; the percentage of LOCA sensitive piping, it was estimated { that 100% of A, 33% of B and C, and 10% of D were LOCA sensitive. This yields an over . l all ratio of 18% (or approximately 20%) for LOC A sensitive piping. .j Of the 19 pipe failures in Reference D.2-2, eight were classified as large (greater than 15 gpm), and occurring during startup or power operation. None were assumed to be large enough to be a larger size LOCA. Of the two additional failures uncovered by the LER search, only the Surry MFW break was categorized as large. However, it 'is clearly too ; large to be counted as a very small break. Therefore, there were eight applicable ! failures in 957 reactor years. Multiplying by the 20% LOCA sensitive ratio, results in an estimate of 1.7E-3 for pipe break frequency in LOCA sensitive piping. j
'D-69 1 1
I k
- D.2.4 Component Boundary Failures I.
- NUREG/CR-3862 was surveyed for component boundary failures. The referenced docu-ment lists 41 categories for PWR transient initiators. PWR category 5 was considered
. applicable to this evaluation. .. Category 5 is " leakage in primary system." Category 4,
" leakage from control rods" was initially examined, but it was concluded that it was not physically possible to get control rod leakage of sufficient magnitude to require safety injection flow (i.e., definition of a LOCA). NUREG/CR-3862 turveys experience through January 1984, accounting for 418 PWR years. Twenty events are. reported in category
- 5. Of these, 6 were elimirr ted. Two events were seal LOCAs at ANO-1 and Salem,
" which have been previously counted in Section D 2.2. Four other events occurred in the
- first year of reactor operation and were eliminated on that basis. . Fourteen events in 370 '
reactor years (i.e., eliminate first year), times 20% LOCA sensitive piping = 7.6E-3 per year. D.2.5 Estimation of O C - Percentage of Breaks for Which Containment Sprays Come on The value for O is determined by.the percentage of small breaks for which continued - c spray operation is inevitable, due to the size of the break, and an operator error - .!' probability for failure to secure sprays for the smaller size breaks for which containment pressure can be controlled without continued spray' operation. The split ~ fraction: for larger and small breaks was estimated as foGows: Frequency- % Large Large Freq
' Type Break-
.0039 40% 00156 Seal Failures 00017 Pipe Breaks .0017 10 %
.0076 10 % .00076 Component Failures
.0132 00250 Larger .00250
* =.192 Total .0132 The operator error was estimated as a diagnosis error at thirty minutes (the joint upper r
bound from Figure 7-1, reference 24 of the Main Report) of 2.66E-2 and an action error of 2.2E-2. OC = .192 + .0266 + .022 = .241 D.2.6 References
~l D.2-1 Azarm, M. A., Boccio, J.L., Mitra, S., The Impact of Mechanical and Maintenance Induced Failures of Main Reactor Coolant Pump Seals -on Plant Safety.
NUREG/CR-4400, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York, December 1985. D.2-2 ' Wright, R.E., Steverson, 3.A., Suroff, W.F., Pipe Break Frequency Estimation for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-4407, EG&G Idaho, Inc., May 1987. D42-3 Mackowiak, D.P., et al, Development of Initiating Event Frequencies for Use in Probabilistic Risk Assessments, NUREG/CR-3862, EG&G Idaho Inc., May 1985. D-70 4.
i j l D.3 Development of the Ti Initiating Event Frequency and Non-Recovery Probabilities-for Offsite AC Power A Bayeslan statistical analysis was performed in support of NUREG-ll50, in order to derive a plant specific frequency for loss of offsite AC power and the probabilities for non-recovery of offsite power by various times. The methodology and supporting data , for this analysis is described in detall in Reference D.3-1. This section provides a sum- ' mary of the methodology, the plant specific data used in the calculation, and the results. - Reference D.3-1 provides a statistical analysis of 63 loss of offsite power events at nuclear p! ants in 721 calendar years. The 721 calendar years represent 503 operating years of experience. For each of the 63 events, the actual time for recovery of offsite power is known. The 63 events are divided into three categories, based on the cause of power loss. The categories and events are e 43 plant centered events: caused by faults in the switchyard o 7 weather related events: grid failure due to severe weather e- 13 grid related events: grid failures or instabilities. The plant centered events were further divided into three : categories, based on 1 switchyard configuration. These groups are 11,12 and 13 as described in NUREG-1032.' The number of events in each category are: e 14 events for group 11 i e 13 events for group 12 e 16 events for group 13 A generic distribution for frequency of loss of offsite power was generated, based on a two component model. The plant centered component included 43 events in 503 operat-Ing years. The grid / weather component included 20 events in 721 calendar years. Each , part of the two component model was analyzed using Bayeslan methods to generate a-plant specific distribution. The two components were combloed to form the cumulative distribution for frequency of loss of offsite power at Sequoyah. : The Sequoyah specific experience is zero plant centered failures in 4.3 operating years and zero grid / weather failures in 6.5 calendar years. - The resultant distribution for loss of offsite power frequency is shown in Figure D.3-1. The statistical characteristics are shown.In Table D.3-1. A three component model for probability of non-recovery of AC power was similarly de-veloped. However, it was not possible to include plant ' specific experience in this model. Rather, a model was developed for each switchyard type. - All plants with a par-ticular switchyard type can be represented by the same- non-recovery curve. The non-recovery model included grid and weather components applicable to all plants, and a plant centered component representative of the switchyard. ~ Sequoyah has an II switchyard configuration. The resultant recovery curve is shown in Figure D.3-2. D.3.1 ' Reference Iman, R.L., Hora, S.D., Modeling Time to Recovery and initiating Event Frequency for , Loss of Off-Site Power incidents at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-5032, January' 1988. D-71
. DISTRIBUTION OF llNITIATING FREQUENCY FOR SEQU. OYAH 1-0.8 -
~'
o ,
.Z e w a-a '
8 m 0.6 - u. _i w 0.4 - x f r. .n a o 0.2 - . 1
-O i .i .
i . i i i :- 0.00- 0.05 :0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 l FREQUENCY OF fINITIATING. EVENT Figure D.3-1. ' Distribution of Initiating Frequency for Sequoyah ' l
. , . - _ ~ . .. __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . ..________ _ ________._.______ . . . . __ .___ _ ._ _ _ __._ _
d,- i, Table D.3-1 l Distribution of Initiating Event Frequency for Sequoyah UNIVARIATE VARIABLEoFREO WOWENTS N 1000 SUW WCTS 1000 WEAN 0.0904689 ,5UW 90.4689 ' 513 DEV 0.0516674. VARIANCE 0.00266952 SKEWNESS 1.78549 KURTOSIS 6.17064 ; USS 10.8515 -CSS 2.66685 1 CV 57.1107 STD WEAN 0.00163387 !
.1 WEAN =0 55.3711 PROB >lTl- 0.0001 SCN RANK 250250 PROB >lSl 0.0001
}-
NUM S 1000 _' OVANTILES(DEF=4) EXTREMES i 100% wax 0.413984 99% 0.299789 LowtST - _ HIGHEST 75% 03' C .10 7 9 77 '95% 0.178952 j
.000042496.. 0.340021' -
$0% WED 0.0831295 903- 0.149531 .'000397874 "0.345203-25% C1 0.0015148 10% 0.03t9369 .000736323 l0.348667 ;
On MIN .000042496 5% 0.0211783 0.0012522 0.35859: i 1% 0.00308701 0.00127814 0.418984-RANGE 0.'418941 03-01 0.0464621 MODE 0.340021 j i. 4 4 l 1 i D-73
^l q
RECOV E RY CU RV E FO R S EQUOYAH 1 1-0.8 - e 3 - i Al 0.6 - , w , 1 F- 0.4 - v , ct , 0.2 -
.i 0 i .i i i i-0 2; 4 6~ 8 10 -
TIME TO:: RECOVER LOSP Figure D.3-2. Recovery Curve for Sequoyah
~ ,- .- . . _ _ .~ . _ _ . ~ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _. _ _ . . . . - _ .. . - - - - . . - .. .
l l L D.4 Core Uncovery Time Versus Break Size l Core uncovery times versus break size for sequences with no high pressure makeup were developed based on a survey of existing analyses on Surry, Sequoyah and generic Westinghouse plants. Based on the results of the survey, it was decided that modeling assumptions and computer code differnces produced greater variations'in results than plant-to-plant variability could produce. All analysis on Westinghouse plants was,
~
therefore, considered applicable. to this generic evaluation. The small break analysis , results listed in Table D.4-1 plus results published in NUREG-1032, WCAP.9763, and the-Westinghouse seal LOCA analysis have formed the basis for the development of the core uncovery curve. The times 'to core uncovery and core damage of the individual analyses were plotted : versus break size. The distinction between core uncovery and core damage was retained t in the correlation of data, in addition, some analyses report break size and some report 2 flow rate. A mass flux constant of 11,000 lb/s-f t was used to put the data on a consistent basis. This value is taken from the Moody critical flow chart, saturated water at 2200 psl. This plot is shown in Figure 0 4-1. A curve was estimated -for core uncovery, and another curve was estimated for core melt. The uncovery curve, not the core damage curve, became the basis for determining recovery times in the recovery analysis. The next step was.to develop a curve which included the effect of operator induced depressurization of the primary system. The
. data points in Figure D.4-1 represent analysis with no operator depressurization.
The effect of operator induced depressurization on the extension of core uncovery times depends upon when depressurization begins, how fast it occurs, and how low the RCS pressure goes. These parameters are sequence and reactor specific. In order to provide a generic estimate, the depressurization curve was based on Westinghouse seal LOCA analysis-(ref. D.4-3), which developed uncovery times with and without 'depressuriza- 1 tion. The percent increase in uncovery time for specific break size from the= Westing-house analysis was used to develop the uncovery curves are shown in Figure D.4-2. D 4.1 References D.4-1 WCAP-9763 - Inadequate Core Coollng- Studies of Scenarios with Feedwater . Available, Using the NOTRUMP Computer Code, Westinghouse Elecric Corp., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Novembec 1980. . D.4-2 Baranowsky, P., Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-1032, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1985. D.4-3 Presentation to the NUREG-ll50 Expert Elicitation Meeting by.M. Hitchler, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, November 1987, i i D.5 Integration of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal LOCA Model into Station Blackout Sequences Prediction of reactor coolant pump seat behavior under loss of all seal cooling conditions is an integral part of station blackout model development. Due to unavailability.of data to this project, the issue of seal performance was resolved through expert elicitation. The process of this elicitation and the results are presented in NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 2, Revision 1. This section provides a discussion of how the elicitation results were used to develop a plant specific model and how this model was integrated into the event tree analysis and quantification process. D-7 5
Table D.4-1 Times from Start of Accident to Core Uncovery - Time to Plant -Sequence Uncovery (Min) Source Surry . TMLB' .95.5 BMI-2104 - Surry 52D - 27.8 - BMI-2104 Surry .V 20.6 BMI-2104 Surry AB (2 Vol.) 9.4 BMI-2104 Surry AB (4 Vol.) 7.1 BMI-2104 Surry AG- 3081. BMI-2139 Surry - TMLB' 97.2' BMI-2139 Surry - S2D 28.5 BMI-2139 Surry 53B 87.6 BMI-2160 Sequoyah S3HF -272.4 BMI-2139. Sequoyah 53HF : 273.7 BMI-2160 Sequoyah S3B 236.6 BMI-2139 Sequoyah S3B (delayed) - 362. BMI-2160 Sequoyah TMLU-SGTR 104.0 BMI-2139 Sequoyah TBA 517.8 BMI-2139 Seabrook TMLB' (fast) 120. W MAAP Seabrook TMLB' (slow) 420. af ter FW loss W MAAP Sequoyah S2D 48. Idcor MAAP Sequoyah S2H 78. Idcor MAAP Sequoyah S2HF 72. _ Idcor MAAP Sequoyah TMLB' 105. -idcor MAAP Sequoyah T23ML 90. .idcor MAAP Sequoyah TMLB' 97.8 BMI-2104 ' Sequoyah 52HF 163. B MI-2104 - Sequoyah TML 97.2 BMI-2104 D-76
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