ML20042G637

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Amend 140 to License DPR-77,revising Tech Specs to Account for Removal of Upper Head Injection Sys & Deactivation of Boron Injection Tank During Current Cycle 4
ML20042G637
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah 
Issue date: 05/11/1990
From: Black S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20042G638 List:
References
NUDOCS 9005150190
Download: ML20042G637 (29)
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{{#Wiki_filter:. c c 'o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATCRY COMMISSION [ ["' g wassiwovow. u. c. rosss T~. :... f I I 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY { DOCKET NO. 50-327 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 l AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE l Amendment No.140 License No. DPR-77 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) has found that: A. The two applications for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated January 12, 1990, complys with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), l and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in confonnity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and L i E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. I h I l' 9005150190 900511 {DR ADOCK 05000377 I FDC l

6 a ',, - e .g. i 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is tiereby amended to read as follows: i (2) Technical Specifications I The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.140, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with ] the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. 4 FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b $?w $^$ Suzanne Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical l Specifications Date of Issuance: May 11, 1990 l l l L I +*

L ,o l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 140 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77 ,00CKET NO. 50 327 l Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal L lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness. REMOVE INSERT Vll Vil 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 2-5 3/42-5 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-7 3/4 2-7 3/4 2-8 3/4 2-8 3/4 2-9 3/4 2-9 3/4 4-15a 3/4 4-15a 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-7 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-8 3/4 5-7 3/4 5-9 3/4 5-8 3/4 5-10 3/4 5-9 3/4 5-11 3/4 5-10 3/4 5-12 3/4 5-13 3/4 5-11 3/4 6-6a 3/4 6-6a 3/4 6-21 3/4 6-21 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3' B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3 8 3/4 5-3 i t l

p a, 4 b'** INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS Cold Leg Injection Accumulators........................... 3/4 5-1 Deleted................................................... 3/4 5-3' 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg greater than or equal to 350'F..... 3/4 5-4 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg less than 350'F.................... 3/4 5-8 3/4.5.4 DELETE0................................................... 3/4 5-10 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK.............................. 3/4 5-11 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Containment Integrity..................................... 3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage......................... 3/4 6-2 Containment Air Locks..................................... 3/4 6-7 Internal Pressure.......................... 3/4 6-9 Air Temperature................ 3/4 6-10 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity................... 3/4 6-11 i Shield Building Structural-Integrity...................... 3/4 6-12 -Emergency Gas Treatment System (Cleanup Subsystem)........ 3/4 6-13 Containment Ventilation System............................ 3/4 6-15 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Spray System.................................. 3/4 6-16 Lower Containment Vent Coolers............................ 3/4 6-16b' SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 VII Amendment No. 67, 69, 116, 140

m e c REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE: a. A boric acid storage system 'and associated heat tracing with: i. 1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 2175 gallons, r 2. Between 20,000 and 22,500 ppm of boron, and 3. A minimum solution temperature of 145'F. b. The refueling water storage tank with: 1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 35,443 pallons, 2. A minimum boron concentration of 2500 ppm, and 3. A minimum solution temperature of 60'F. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 ard 6. ACTION: With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The-above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 7 days by: 1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2. Verifying the contained borated water volume, and 3. Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when f it is the source of borated water. b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the I:WST temperature when it is the source of borated water, i l 4 { SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 140

"v REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES OPERATING i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2: a. A boric acid storage system and associated heat tracing with: 1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 7176 gallons, 2. Between 20,000 and 22,500 ppm of boron, and r 3. A minimum solution temperature of 145'F. ? b. The refueling water storage tank with: 1. A contained borated water volume of between 370,000 and 375,000

gallons, 2.

Between 2500 and 2700 ppm of boron, 3. A minimum solution temperature of 60'F, and i 4. A maximum solution temperature of 105'F. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: a. With the boric acid storage system inoperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least-1% delta k/k at 200'F; restore the boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours. b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperab's, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. P 1 Amendment No. 140 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 1 1

p t POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.2 HEATFLUXHOTCHANNELFACTOR-Fg LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.2 F (t) shall be limited by the following relationships: g F (Z) 5, [2.32) [K(Z)) for P > 0.5 0 P F (Z) _< ( g.32) [K(Z)) for P _< 0.5 2 g THERMAL POWER where P = RATED THERMAL POWER i l and K(Z) is the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for a given 1 -core height location. i APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 ACTION: With F (Z) exceeding its limit: 9 a. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 3 Fn(Z) exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the PowVr Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION 1 may proceed provided the Overpower Delta T Trip Setpoints (value of K ) have been reduced at least 1% (in AT span) for each 1% F (Z) O 3 eReeeds the limit. b. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided F (Z) is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.0 SURV_EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable. I l l-l' SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 2-5 Amendment No. 19, 95, 140

n,: POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.2.2.2 F (z) shall be evaluated to determine if F (Z) is within its 9 9 limit by: a. Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribu-tion map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Increasing the measured F (z) comp nent of the power distribution b. Q map by 3 percent to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties. c. Satisfying the following relationship: M 2 32 (z) Fg (3) 5 for P > 0.5 M 2 ) for P $ 0.5 Fq (7) i where F (z) is the measured F (z) increased by the allowances for n manuf ac uring tolerances and measurement uncertairety, F limit is the Fn limit,K(z)isgiveninFigure3.2-2,Pisther01ative THERMXL POWER,and W(z) is the cycle dependent function that accounts for power distribution transients encountered during normal operation. This function is given in the Peaking Factor Limit Report as per Specification 6.9.1.14. M d. Measuring Fq (z) according to the following schedule: 1. Upon achieving equilibrium conditions after exceeding by 10 percent or more of RATED THERMAL POWER, the YHERM5L POWER at which F (z) was last determined,* or 9 2. At least once per 31 effective full power days, whichever cccurs first.

  • During power escalation at the beginning of each cycle, power level may be increased until a power level for extended operation has been achieved and a power distribution map obtained.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 2-6 Amendment No. 19, 95, 140

4,. POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) e. With measurements indicating 7 F (z) maximum over z K(z) ~ M has increased since the previous determinatin of F0 (z) either of the following actions shall be taken: M 1. Fq (2) shall be increased by 2 percent over that specified in 4.2.2.2.c, or N 2. Fq (z) shall be measured at least once per 7 effective full power days until 2 successive maps indicate that F (z) maximum is not increasing. over Z K(z) f. With the re'ationships specified in 4.2.2.2.c above not being satisfied: 1. Calculate the percent F (z) exceeds its limit by the following 9 expression: r M Fg (z) x W(z) -1 jx 100 for P > 0.5 maximum over z 2.32 x K(z) ~ l $'k P 1 d 5\\ (( ~ ~ p Fg (z) x W(z) -1{,x100 for P < 0.5 maximum i over z 2.32 x K(z) l 0.5 s J 2. Either of the following actions shall be taken: a. Place the core in an equilibrium condition where the limit in 4.2.2.2.c is satisfied.- Power level may then be increased provided the AFD limits of Figure 3.2-1 are reduced 1% AFD for each percent F (z) exceeded its limit, 9 or b. Comply with the requirements of Specification 3.2.2 for F (z) exceeding its limit by the percent calculated above. 9 1; l l SEQUOYAH.- UNIT 1 3/4 2-7 Amendment No. 19, 95, 140 h

9 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) g. The limits specified in 4.2.2.2.c, 4.2.2.2.e, and 4.2.2.2.f above are not applicable in the following core plane regions: 1. Lower core region 0 to 15 percent inclusive. 2. Upper core region 85 to 100 percent inclusive. 4.2.2.3 When F (z) is measured for reasons other than meeting the requirements 9 of Specification 4.2.2.2 an overall measured F (z) shall be obtained from a 9 power distribution map and increased by 3 percent to account for manufacturing tolerances or further increased by 5 percent to account for measurement l uncertainty. 1 l i 'l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 2-8 Amendment No. 19, 140 L i

g 2 m S g o 1.20 E e S 5 1.10 - E w o 1.00 r-E 0.90 - ~ gw 3:i 3 0.80 - 0 o o. v, 0.70 - O Total Pealung Facter y m m LL s z o 0.60 - O 2.32 0 m. m ~ o d 0.50 - Core Height K(Z) z w e 8 o ro 4 0.000 1.000 4 0.40 - g. g gog 3,ogo o m i z 10800 O.9 e 0.30 - m 12.000 -0.925 ~ox l 0.20 - -i 0.10 - .E L g 0.00 i i i i i i i i i i i l 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10:0 12.0 E CORE HEIGHT (FEET) z

  • e Fioure 3.2-2 K(Z) - Normalized Fq(Z) as a Function of Core lleight E

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TABLE 3.4-1 L REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION 63-560 Accumulator Discharge 63-561 Accumulator Discharge 63-562 Accumulator Discharge 63-563 Accumulator Discharge 63-622 Accumulator Discharge r 63-623 Accumulator Discharge 63-624 Accumulator Discharge 63-625 Accumulator Discharge 63-551 Safety Injection (Cold Leg) 63-553 Safety Injection (Cold Leg) 63-557 Safety Injection (Cold Leg) 63-555 Safety Injection (Cold Leg) 63-632 Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg) 63-633 Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg) 63-634 Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg) 63-635 Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg) 63-641 Residual Heat Removal / Safety Injection (Hot Leg) 63-644 Residual Heat Removal / Safety Injection (Hot Leg) 63-558 Safety Injection (Hot Leg)' 63-559 Safety Injection (Hot Leg) 63-543 Safety Injection (Hot Leg) 63-545 Safety Injection (Hot Leg) 63-547 Safety Injection (Hot Leg) 63-549 Safety Injection (Hot Leg) i 63-640 Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg) 63-643 Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg) FCV-74-1* Residual Heat Removal FCV-74-2* Residual Heat Removal 1 l l

  • These valves do not have to be leak tested following manual or automatic actuation or flow through the valve.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 4-15a Amendment No. 39, 83, 140

q 3/4.S EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS COLD LEG INJECTION ACCUMULATORS 1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with: a. The isolation valve open, b. A contained borated water volume of between 7615 and 8094 gallons of borated water, .t c. Between 2400 and 2700 ppm of boron, and d. A nitrogen cover pressure of between 600 and 683 psig. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.* ACTION: a. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. b. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the isola-tion valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours. c.# With one pressure or water level channel inoperable per accumulator, return the inoperable channel to OPERABi.E status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in liOT SHUT 00WN within the following 6 hours, d.# With more than one channel (pressure or water level) inoperable per accumulator, immediately declare the affected accumulator (s) inoperable, t

  • Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.
  1. Actions e and d are in effect until the restart of Unit 2 from the Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 124, 140

V \\: i a hh . ;s, %/!fW EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) d i, DELETED l. J.IMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION + This Specification is deleted. -{ h 3-.e

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L ': k ,4 ), 1 l t 4 -jSEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 28, 86, 140 ,r

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+ j; %.; e j. ro p '*6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING ~ SYSTEMS (ECCS) ~3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg Greater Than or Equal to 350'F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ~g 3.5.2 Two-independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with'each subsystem 1 comprised of: a. One OPERABLE-centrifugal charging pump,- b. One OPERABLE safety injection pump, c. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger, d. One OPERABi.E residual-heat removal pump, and e. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling f water storage tank on a safety injection signal and automatically l l - transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation s phase of operation, j -APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. ACTION: I a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem i to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be'in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 . hours. i b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor N Coolant System, a REPORTABLE EVENT shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification.6.6.1. This report shall~ ~ include a description of the circumstances of the actuation and the i total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current'value of the usage factor _for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this report whenever its value exceeds 0.70. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed: SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 36, 140

7 i e. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) -SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position a. FCV-63-1 RHR Suction from RWST open b. FCV-63-22 SIS Discharge to Common Piping open b. At least once per 31 days by: 1. Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points, and 2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. c. By a visual inspection which-verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during-LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed: 1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2, Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT' INTEGRITY is established, d. At least once per 18 months by: 1. Verifying-automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR-system from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is above 700 psig. 2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion. e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by: 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal and automatic switchover to containment sump test signal. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 92, 140 Correction letter of 1-22-89

.g EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 1 SMRVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continued) 2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically -upon receipt of a safety injection. signal: a) Centrifugal chargin, pump b) Safety injection pump c) Residual heat removal pump f, By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated discharge pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5: 1. Centrifugal charging pump Greater than or equal to 2400 psig 2. Safety Injection pump Greater th'an or equal to 1407 psig 3. Residual heat removal pump Greater than or equal to 165 psig g. By verifying the correct position of each mechanical stop for the following Emergency Core Cooling System throttle valves: 1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or. maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. 2. At least once per 18 months. Charging Pump Injection Safety Injection Cold Safety Injcction Hot Throttle Valves leg Throttle Valves Leg Throttle Valves Valve Number Valve Number Valve Number-

1. 63 - 582
1. 63 - 550
1. 63-542'
2. 63 - 583
2. 63 - 552
2. 63-544
3. 63 - 584
3. 63 - 554
3. 63-546 4, 63 - 585
4. 63 - 556 4, 63-548 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. 140

a c t. l.~ :,{, \\ EMERGENCY" CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) m SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) I h. By performing a flow balance test during shutdown following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystem that alter the = subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow-rates: 1. For safety injection pump lines with a single pump running: a. The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate is greater than or equal to 443 gpm, and b. The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 675 gpm. 2. For centrifugal charging pump lines with a single pump running: a. The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate is greater than or equal to 309 gpm, and l. b. The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 555 gpm. .3. For all four cold leg injection lines with a single RHR pump running a flow rate greater than or equal to 3931 gpm. l [ 1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 50, 140

(g- ]l, 4 J 1 q EMERGENCY CORE' COOLING' SYSTEMS (ECCS)- '3/4.5.3 :ECCS' SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg Less Than 350'F 1 LIMITING' CONDITION FOR OPERATION ..3.5.3 As:a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be .0PERABLE: l .a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging' pump, b. One OPERABLE residual heat removal' heat' exchanger, c, .One OPERABLE' residual heat removal pump, and d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling-water storage tank upon being manually-realigned and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation. -APPLICABILITY: MODE 4. ACTION: a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of.the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the o refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to 0PERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours. b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the residual heat removal heat exchanger or -. residual heat removal pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T"V9 less than 350 F-by use of alternate heat ~ removal methods. (( c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water-into the Reactor Coolant System, a REPORTABLE EVENT shall be prepared and submitted j to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.6.1. This report shall include a description of the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of d the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be v.. provided in this report whenever its value exceeds 0.70. t ,g-3 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-8 Amendment No. 36, 140 l

Q , a; o+ EMERGENCY CORE ~ COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) I SURVEILLkNCE REQUIREMENTS 4 + ' 4.5.3-The.ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable:

c-Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.-

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! -l EMERGENCY' CORE COOLING-SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.4* DELETEDr 9 LIMITING C0_NDITION'FOR OPERATION This-Specification is ' deleted. q ..i e 'h L o ,11 I 4 I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-10 Amendment No.140

c..m EMERGENCY CORE COOLING-SYSTEMS (ECCS)- -3/4.5.5;, REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ~ i 3.5.5 - The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE w th: la.- A contained borated water volume of between 370,000 and 375,000

gallons, b.

A boron concentration of between 2500 and-2700 ppm of boron, c. A minimum solution temperature of 60 F, and ' d. A maximum solution temperature of 105 F. ' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: With the RWST inoperable, restora the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least' HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 7 days by: 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and 2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water. 'O b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature. 'I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-11 Amendment No. 12, 140 -~

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c TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued) t-.-

.m2 BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING-8 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS 35 x PENETRATION DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION E Z 'X-106 Postaccident Sampling,' Air Discharge . Auxiliary Area to Containment ~ e X-108 Maintenance Penetration Auxiliary Area' X-109 Maintenance Penetration Auxiliary Area X-114-Ice Condenser Auxiliary Area. g' -X-115 ~ Ice Condenser Auxiliary Area X-116A Postaccident Sampling,' Containment Auxiliary Area Air Sample R a ? 3 a Ee M t l ,U .o -8 + l 1 wa. --,:--:...~.-~=.,,_-_--..=..-....-- ~

R x.., .3 TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued) i- - u, J CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES k VALVE NUMBER.- FUNCTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) A. PHASE "A"_ ISOLATION (Cont.) 61. FCV-77-19 RCDT and PRT.to V H 10* c-i'i 62. FCV-77-20

N to'RCDT 10*-

2 63 FCV-77-127 Floor Sump Pump Disch 10*- 64. .FCV-77-128 Floor Sump Pump.Disch 10*; 65. FCV-81-12 Primary Water Makeup .10* B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION 1. FCV-32-80 Control Air Supply-10 2. FCV-32-102 Control Air Supply 10 3. FCV-32-110 Control Air Supply. 10 4. FCV-67-83 ERCW . LWR Cmpt C1rs. 60* 5. FCV-67-87 ERCW - LWR Capt Clrs 60* t' 6. FCV-67-88 .ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 60* 7. FCV-67-89** ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 70* T 8. FCV-67-90** ERCW --LWR Cmpt Cirs 70* N 9. FCV-67-91 ERCW - LWR Capt Clrs 60* 10. FCV-67-95 ERCW -: LWR.Cmpt Cirs' 60* 11. FCV-67-96 ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 60* 12. FCV-67-99 ERCW . LWR:Cmpt Clrs 60* 13. FCV-67-103 ERCW.- LWR Cmpt Clrs 60*~ 14. FCV-67-104 ERCW.- LWR Capt Clrs 60* 15. FCV-67-105** -ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 70*- p 16. FCV-67-106** ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 70* g 17. FCV-67-107 ERCW LWR Capt Clrs 60* g 18. FCV-67-111 ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 60* g 19. FCV-67-ll2 ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 60* 20. FCV-67-130 .ERCW - Up Capt Clrs 60* g 21. FCV-67-131 ERCW - Up Capt Clrs 60* 22. FCV-67-133 ERCW - Up Capt Clrs 60* g 23. FCV-67-134 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs 60* 24. FCV-67-138 ERCW - Up Capt Clrs 60* 5 O J,. 4. .L.;

3 1 .F 1 ..;m ,y 4 a 7., Al.' s REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES' l .6042 gallons cf f>,000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or. '82,082 gallons of 2500 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank. With.the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is acceptable' . without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection .{ system becomes inoperable. -The boron capability required below 200 F, is sufficient'to provide a [ SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140'F. This condition requires either 835 gallons of 20,000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 9,690 gallons of 2500 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank. The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics. i The limits on contained water volume and boron, concentration of the RWST also ensure'a.pH value of between 7.5 and 9.5 for_the solution; recirculated within containment after a LOCA. ' This pH band. minimizes the evolution of iodine-and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures-that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6. 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES-The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distri-bution limits are maintained,.(2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to ' determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. I Amendment No. 140 'SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Revised 08/18/87

n

, Mtr p ~ -4 3/4.2 P0'WER DISTRIBUTION-LIMITS-BASES .The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I-(Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) - events by: (a) maintaining the calculated DNBR in the core at or above design during normal operation and in short term transients, and (b) limiting the - fission' gas-release, fuel pellet temperature and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria. In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Condition I events.provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200'F is not exceeded. The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors as used in-these specifications are as follows: F (Z) _ Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the maximum local. O heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing tolerances'on fuel pellets and rods. ' F Nuclear Enthalpy' Rise Hot Channel Factor is defined as the ratio of the H integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power to the average rod power. 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE assure that the F (2) upper bound 9 envelope of 2.32 times the normalized axial peaking factor is not exceeded during either normal' operation or in the event of xenon redistribution follow-ing power changes. Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer deter-mines the one minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs 7 and provides an alarm message:immediately if the AFD for at least 2 of 4 or 2 3 1 of 3 OPERABLE excore channels are outside the allowed AI-Power operating space j 'and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 50 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER. ~ 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT AND NUCLEAR'ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTORS l The limits on the heat flux hot channel factor and the nuclear 1 t enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensure that 1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and 2) in the event l-of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200*F ECCS acceptance criteria limit. t l l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 2-1 Amendment No. 19, 138, 139, 140

A4 .. ; a,.. f -6 T3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l t , BASES t 3/4'.5.1' ACCUMULATORS .The'0PERABILITY of each cold leg injection accumulator ensures that a l -sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor . core in the event that the RCS pressure falls below the specified pressure of the accumulators. For the cold leg injection accumulators, this condition occurs'in the event of a large or small-rupture. The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. - The limits in the specification for accumulator volume and nitrogen cover pressure are analysis limits and do not include instrument uncertainty. The cover pressure limits were determined by Westinghouse to be 615 psia and 697.5 psia. Since the instrument read-outs in the control room are in psig, the TS valves _have been converted to psig and rounded to the nearest whole numbers. The actual nitrogen cover pressure safety limits in SQN's design documents are 600.3 psig and 682.8 psig. The minimum boron concentration ensures. that the reactor core will remain subcritical during the accumulator i injection period of a small break LOCA. u The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std.- 279-1971, which requires that-i bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation-valves J fail.to meet single failure criteria,- removal of power to the valves is required. [ The limit.s for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required. 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient-emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying suff.icient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break-of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recircu-lation mode during the accident recovery period. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 140

^ a w , " *; t _ g 's - L n EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES With the RCS temperature below 350'F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single' failure consideration on the basis'of the stable. reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements., The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of-each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point'is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding. runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration,. (2) provide-the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with' the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or abovelthat assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. 3/4.5.4' BORON INJECTION SYSTEM This specification was deleted. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 140

(.gy ie EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS t BASES 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of - a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that

1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to-the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and'the RCS-water volumes with all contro1~ rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These-assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses. Additionally, the OPERABILITY.of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures 4 that sufficient. negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract-J any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS cooldown. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of-tank discharge line location or other physical characteritties. The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 9.5 for the solution recirculated within containment afteria.LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of ' iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. l l ( SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 140 Revised 08/18/87 t .}}

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