ML20042F569

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 90-011 on 900502 Re Selected Events That Occurred Since 900418 Briefing.No Significant Events Identified for Input Into NRC Performance Indicator Program

ML20042F569
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee, Palisades, Oyster Creek, FitzPatrick
Issue date:	05/03/1990
From:	Baranowsky P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-90-011, OREM-90-11, NUDOCS 9005090077
Download: ML20042F569 (22)

Text

-

o.

May 3,1990 i

h MEMORANDUM FOR:

Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:

Patrick W. Baranowksy, Acting-Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING May 2,1990 MEETING 9011 l

On Ma 2 sE s meet 90 11) to in orm,1990, we conductgd an Operating Rgto{oninyen}on stajng (nd senior managers rom NRR, AEOD, A ss f, a regional offices of selected events that occurred since our_last briefing on April 18, 1990. lists the attendees. pretents the significant elements of the discussed events.

I Enclosure.3 contains reactor scram statistics for the weeks ending 04/29/90 and 04/22/90. No significant events were identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.

Original Signed By 1

Patrick W. Baranowsky, Acting Chief L

Events Assessment Branch L

Division of Operational Events Assessment l

[

Enclosures:

L As stated f

cc w/ Encl.:

l See Next Page L

DISTRIBUTION

. Central File EAB. Reading File Circulating Copy, EAB Staff MLReardon, EAB LKilgore, SECY PDR hW 0FC :EAB/DOEA

AC:EAB/DDEA :

,NAME':MLReardon

PWBaranowsky:

DATE :05/0/2/90

. :05/6 /90.. :.

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY Q f0I 4{#

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hKy/M 9005090077 900503 yl@

PDR ORG NRRB

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T. Murley, NRR.

D. LaBarge, NRR F. Miraglia, NRR-R. Capra, NRR

-W. Russell, NRR L. Wiens, NRR D. Matthews, NRR J.~Partlow, NRR S..Varga,-NRR A. Dromerick, NRR

'B. Boger,_NRR J. Stolz, NRR G. Lainas NRR A~. DeAgazio. NRR F.' Congel. NRR J. Thoma, NRR A. Thadani, NRR.

J. Richardson, NRR R. Barrett, NRR.

J. Roe, NRR W. Russell, RI W.'Kane, RI S. Ebneter, R11 L.: Reyes, Ril

.B. Davis, Rill E.-Greenman, Rlli S. Collins, RIV R.D. Martin, RIV J.B. Martin, RV

.R. Zimmerman, RV P. Boehnert, ACRS E. Weiss, AE00

-S. Rubin, AE0D M. Harper, AE0D J. Taylor, EDO J. Dyer, ED0 R. Newlin, GPA J. Cowan, INP0 E.'.Beckjord,RES l

A. Bates, SECY.

ENCLDSURE 1 1.IST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING. REACTORS EVENTS. BRIEFING.(90-11)

May 2, 1990 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME-ORGAWlZATION P. Bochnert A0RS V. Benaroya GPA/IP W. Troskoski OE P. Baranowsky NRR/DOEA

'J. Dyer EDO J. Raleigh NRR/00EA H. Reardon NRR/DOEA S. Bilhorn OCM/KR M. Case NRR/DLPQ W. Butler NRR/PD1-2

~,

J. Thompson NRR/DOEA F. Burrows NRR/ DST-Y. Hsii NRR/ DST A. Mattson NRR/DOEA T. Greene NRR/DOEA N. Fields NRR/00EA H. Walker NRR/ DST J. Donohew NRR/ADSP A.-Dromerick HRR/PD1-4 A. Vietti-Cook OCM/KC R. Capra NRR/PD1-1 D. LaBarge NRR/PD1-1 S. Mazumdar AE00 M. Chirimal AE00 W. Koo NRR/DET R. Gramm NRR/DRIS A. Toalston NRR/ DST C. Thomas NRR/DLPQ M. Dapas NRR/DLPQ D. Tondi NRR/ DST L. Weins NRR/PD2-3 M. Case NRR/DLPQ l

l-1 l

l l

ENCLOSURE 2 4

t OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 90-11 EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH LOCATION: '12B-11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, MAY 2, 1990, 11:00 A.M.

0YSTER CREEK UNIT.1 LOSS 0F VITAL BUS RESULTS IN LONG-TERM BATTERY USE AND REhCTOR SHUT DOWN OCONEE UNITS-1, 2, 8 3 POSSIBLE EQUIPMENT DAMAGE /

i IN0PERABILITY DUE TO LOW VOLTAGES OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRICAL SUPPLY DURING LOCA AND DEGRADED GRID PALISADES GROSS DEFORMATION OF PIPE HANGER RESTRAINTS FOR THE SAFETY INJECTION TANKS l

L FITZPATRICK CRACK AND SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS IN THE WELD OF l

REACTOR VESSEL HEAD L

90-11 P

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DYSTER CREEK l! NIT 1 LQ_SS OF VITAL BUS RESULTS IN LQNG-TERM BATTERY USE

-AND REACTOR SHUTDOWN APRll 21, 1990 PROBLEM THE SINGLE FAILURE OF VITAL BUS "1B2" RESULTS IN THE, LOSS OF j

VARIOUS SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS, AN UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARATION DUE TO HIGH UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, THE INITI ATION OF A REACTOR SHUTDOWN, AND THE USE OF THE "B" STATION BATTERY BEYOND'IT'S RATED CAPACITY, CAUSE A GROUND FAULT ON THE "C" PHASE CABLE LEADING TO THE "1B2" TRANSFORMER CAUSED THE LOSS OF THE VITAL 480 VOLT SUBSTATION "1B2",

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE THE SINGLE FAILURE OF THE VITAL BUS REMOVED REDUNDANT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT.

FURTHER, THE DEPLETION OF THE 'B' BATTERY MAY HAVE PRECLUDED THE USE OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUlPMENT IF REQUIRED ON

DEMAND, DJSCUSSION o

AT 09:54 AM, ON APRIL 21, 1990, A "1B2" SUBSTATION TRANSFORMER GROUND FAULT CAUSED THE LOSS OF THE VITAL 460 VOLT UNIT SUBSTATION "1B2",

o THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECH SPECS 3.7 TO BE IN COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN 30 HRS DUE TO THE LOSS OF ESSENTIAL BUS "1B2".

o ALL BUS "1B2" SAFETY-RELATED DC LOADS WERE NOW ON DIRECT FEED-FROM THE "B" BATTERY, o

APPROX HALF 0F THE SAFETY SYSTEMS WERE DECLAF.ED INOPERABLE.

o AMONG THE EQUIPMENT LOST WAS ONE DRYWELL EQUIPMENT DRAIN TANK AND THE CONTROL POWER TO THE OTHER PUMP, 3

CONTACT:

J. RALEIGH SIGEVENT:

NO

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50.72#s 18299, 18301, 18305, AND PNO-1-90-31

0YSTERLCREEK-UNIT 1 90-11 y.:

o-BECAUSE THE PUMPS WERE NOT RUNNING THE LEAKAGE OVERFLOW WAS CALCULATED AS UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE AND RESULTED IN-THE DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT (> 5 GPM, FROM 3:27 PM 4/21 TO 2:20 PM 4/22),

o LICENSEE COULD HAVE MANUALLY CONTROLLED THE SECOND PUMP BUT LACKED MAN POWER AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, o

THE "B" BATTERY WAS LOADED AT 100 AMPS F0'R 10 HRS, THEN THE DECISION WAS MADE TO REDUCE THIS LOAD TO 40 AMPS WHICH WAS j

THEN USED FOR 9 HRS (1360 AMPERE-HRS).

o THE "B" BATTERY IS RATED FOR 1200 AMPERE-HRS AT AN 8 HR DISCHARGE RATE, o

THE LICENSEE CONSTANTLY MONITORED "B" BATTERY V0LTAGE TO ASSURE OPERABILITY, o

BASED ON BATTERY CONDITIONS THE DECISION WAS MADE TO PROCEED TO SHUTDOWN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

o LICENSEE MANUALLY SCRAMMED.THE REACTOR.

o THE LICENSEE CROSS-TIED THE "A" AND "B" SUBSTAY10NS A FEW HRS BEFORE REACHING COLD SHUTDOWN, o

ADMINISTRATIVELY THIS CROSS-TIE CAN NOT BE PERFORMED UNTil THE UNIT IS IN COLD SHUTDOWN.

o THE LICENSEE ISSUED A.ONE TIME TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE TO PERFORM THE CROSS-TIE, o

BOTH ISOLATION CONDENSERS WERE TEMPORARILY LOST DURING A PORTION OF THE SHUTDOWN BUT HAD N0 ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE

. SHUTDOWN OF THE UNIT, FOLLOWUP-o REGIONAL PERSONNEL AND LICENSEE STAFF ARE STILL PERFORMING EVENT FOLLOWUP AND ANALYSIS.

o THE RAB REVIEWED THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT AND EXPRESSED THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS:

THE SCPAM FROM 25% POWER INTRODUCED TRANSIENTS IN THE FW SYSTEM AND THE 4160 VAC POWER (AT TO ST' FAST TRANSFERS),

i BOTH OF WHICH THREATENED AVAILABILITY OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN FW PUMPS.

0YSTER CREEK UNIT 1 90-11 FOLLOWUP (CONTINUED)

IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE "B" BATTERY COULD HAVE SUPPORTED ITS PEAK LOAD REQUIREMENTS AFTER A 1000 AMP HR DRAWDOWN, (DESIGN BASIS'IS PEAK-LOAD FIRST.)

HOWEVER, THESE CONCERNS MAY BE MITIGATED TO SOME EXTENT BY THE AVAILABILITY OF THE NON-SAFETY-GRADE "A" 460 VAC BUS AND THE "A" 125 VDC BATTERY CROSS-TIES, (NOT BACKED BY EMERGENCY D/Gs.)

o NO FURTHER EAB FOLLOWUP IS PLANNED, 8

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c 90-11 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, 8 3 1

POSSIBLE EQUIPMENT DAMAGE /INOPERABillTY DUE TO LOW VOLTAGES APRIL 24, 1990

-PROBLEM INADEQUATE PROTECTION AGAINST DEGRADED GRID V0LTAGE.

CAUSE IMPROPER SETPOINTS FOR UNDER VOLTAGE PROTECTION RELAYS.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM VOLTAGES COULD FALL BELOW THE MINIMOM VALUES RECOMMENDED BY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS CAUSING EQUIPMENT'INOPERABILITY AND/0R DAMAGE, i

DISCUSS 10N' o

ON april 24 1990, THE-DUKE POWER C0 NOTIFIED THE NRC THAT A DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTATION REVIEW HAD FOUND THAT THE SETPOINTS FOR THE UNDERVOLTAGE (UV) PROTECTION RELAYS FOR THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE LOWER-THAN PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED VOLTAGES.

o THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER CIRCUIT BREAKERS WOULD REMAIN CLOSED WITH GRID VOLTAGE POSSIBLY BELOW EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS' MINIMUM RECOMMENDED REQUIREMENTS, FOLLOWUP o

NRR AND REGION 11 PERSONNEL ARE HOLDING ONG0ING-DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LICENSEE, o

LICENSEE IS MONITORING SWITCHYARD VOLTAGE EVERY TWO HOURS UNTil t

-NEW SWITCHYARD UV RELAYS WITH HIGHER SETPOINTS ARE INSTALLED TO INITIATE ALARMS IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND SYSTEM DISPATCHER'S 0FFICE.

THE RELAYS WILL ALSO SEND A START / CONNECT SIGNAL TO THE KE0 WEE PLANT IF AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION EXISTS COINCIDENT WITH THE TRIP 0F ANY EMERGENCY SAFCGUARD CHANNEL IN ANY UNIT.

CONTACT:

F. BURROWS SIGEVENT:

YES

REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50,72# 18344

90-11.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, 8 3 SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRICAL SUPPLY-j DURING LOCA AND DEGRADED GRID APRll 24, 1990 PROBLEM POTENTIAL SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY OF THE STANDBY POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM,.

CAUSE t

DESIGN DEFICIENCY, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE POTENTIAL-INABILITY-TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOCA COINCIDENT WITH A DEGRADED GRID CONDITION.

DISCUSSION o

A POTENTIAL SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY HAS ALSO BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE STANDBY ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, o

BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DESIGN-AT

'0CONEE, A DEGRADED GRID CONDITION (GREATER.THAN 160 KV BUT BELOWL 211 KV) WOULD PREVENT THE OVERHEAD KE0 WEE LINE FROM INTERCONNECTING-WITH THE SWITCHYARD.

WITH THE SINGLE FAILURE OF THE UNDERGROUND FEEDER FROM THE KE0 WEE HYDROELECTRIC STATION THE STANDBY ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WOULD BE RENDERED IN0PERABLE, o

FOR' GRID VOLTAGES LESS THAN 160 KV THE SWITCHYARD IS AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATED FROM THE GRID, ALLOWING THE OVERHEAD LINE FROM THE HYDR 0 PLANT TO BE TIED TO THE SWITCHYARD, THEREBY ELIMINATING THE SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY.

ILOLLOWUP NRR'AND REGION 11 PERSONNEL ARE HOLDING ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE

LICENSEE, CONTACT:

F. BURROWS SIGEVENT:

YES

REFERENCE:

LER 269/90-04

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-gCONEEUNITS1,2,&3 90-11

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-FOLLOWUP (CONTINUED) o LICENSEE IS MONITORING SWITCHYARD VOLTAGE EVERY TWO HOURS UNTIL NEW SWITCHYARD UV RELAYS WITH HIGHER SETPOINTS ARE INSTALLED T0 INITIATE ALARMS IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND SYSTEM DISPATCHER'S OFFICE.. THE RELAYS WILL ALSO SEND A START / CONNECT SIGNAL TO THE KE0 WEE PLANT IF AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION EXISTS COINCIDENT WITH THE TRIP 0F ANY EMERGENCY SAFEGUARD CHANNEL IN ANY-UNIT, L

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90-11 PALISADES GROSS DEFORMATION OF PIPE HANGER RESTRAINTS FOR THE SAFETY INJECTION TANKS APRIL 25, 1990 PROBLEM ON april 25, 1990, THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED GROSS DEFORMATION ON

-THE "A" AND "D" SAFETY INJECTION TANKS (SIT) PIPE HANGER SEISMIC RESTRAINTS.

THE "B" AND "C" SIT PIPE HANGER RESTRAINTS SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE,

'CAUSE LICENSEE SPECULATES THAT A 1987 WATER HAMMER-TYPE EVENT MAY-HAVE CAUSED THE DAMAGE TO THE "A" SlT PIPE HANGER SEISMIC RESTRAINTS, ROOT CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO THE OTHER SIT SEISMIC RESTRAINTS MAY

.BE RELATED TO SIMILAR-TYPE TESTING FOR THE "B", "C",

AND "D" TANKS, AT THIS TIME.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE FAILURE OF PIPING BETWEEN THE RCS LOOP COLD LEG AND THE SIT TANK COULD CAUSE AN UNISOLATABLE LEAK OR BREAK lN THE RCS, DISCUSSION o-ON APRIL 25,-1990, 2 0F 4 0UTLET LINES ("A" AND "D") FOR THE SIT TANKS WERE IDENTIFIED AS HAVING GROSS DEFORMATION TO THE VERTICAL PIPE SUPPORTS,

-o THE D INCH (HEIGHT) BEAMS WERE " CRUNCHED" TO ABOUT 2 INCHES L

(IN HEIGHT) ON THE "A" AND "D" SIT TANK LINES, o

LICENSEE BELIEVES THE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY A 1987 WATER HAMMER-TYPE EVENT WHEN THEY WERE PERFORMING MAINTENANCE ON THE "A" SIT

TANK, o

THE SCOPE OF REPAIR WILL BE TO REPLACE ALL DAMAGED l-BEAMS WITH L

TUBE STEEL SUPPORTS, l

CONTACT:

J. THOMPSON SIGEVENT:

NO L

REFERENCE:

MORNING REPORT 04/27/90 1

i PALISADES-'

-2'

'90-11 FOLLOWUP o

THE LICENSEE IS CllRRENTLY INVESTIGATING THIS EVENT FOR A MORE PROBABLE ROOT CAUSE, o

lHE REGION AND EAB WILL FOLLOW UNTIL A' ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION IS MADE, r h L

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90-11 FITZPATRICK CRACK AND SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS IN THE WELD OF REACTOR VESSEL HEAD APRIL-30, 1990 PROBLEM

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A CRACK AND SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS WERE FOUND ON THE INSIDE SURFACE i

OF THE REACTOR VESSEL (RV),

fAUSE IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THE CRACK AND SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS WERE' CAUSED.BY THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS AND/0R SERVICE-INDUCED DEGRADATION MECHANISMS.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE p

THE SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS HAD A MAXIMUM DEPTH OF 2 INCHES (50%

THROUGH WALL) AND COULD AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF RV.

L DISCUSSION L

o INITIALLY IDENTIFIED BY ROUTINE INSERVICE ULTRASONIC INSPECTION 0F THE RV HEAD.

o A ONE INCH CRACK, ON THE INSIDE SURFACE 0F THE HEAD, WAS OBSERVED

[

VISUALLY AND CONFIRMED BY SURFACE EXAMINtTION, i

o-FOUR SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS WERE FOUND IN THE GENERAL AREA 0F THE CRACK, o

THE CRACK AND SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS ARE CIRCUMFERENTIALLY l

ORIENTED AND LOCATED IN THE WELD THAT JOINS THE D0LLAR PLATE TO THE MERIDIAN PLATE, o

SUBSURFACE INDICATIONS ARE 12 INCHES LONG AND HAVE A MAXIMUM DEPTH OF 2 INCHES (50% THROUGH WALL),

o REACTOR VESSEL IS NOT CLADDED.

CONTACT:

T. GREENE SIGEVENT:

TBD

REFERENCE:

MORNING REPORT 05/01/90 AND 10 CFR 50.72# 18366

pm "F1TZPATRICK 90-11

?...

FOLLOWUP o-THE LICENSEE PLANS TO TAKE BOAT-SAMPLE.

o THE LICENSEE IS CONTINUING TO EVALUATE MODE AND MECHANISMS OF 1

THE DEFECTS, o

NRC WILL ISSUE AN INFORMATION NOTICE, o

MATERIALS AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH IS CONTINUING.T0 REVIEW lHE LICENSEE'S COURSE OF ACTIONS.

THEY WILL REVIEW t

THE RESULTS OF THE LICENSEE'S INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE GENERIC IMPLICATIONS, o

MEETING IS PLANNED WITH THE LICENSEE ON MAY 3, 1990 (THURSDAY).

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'II. 02FARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WI'Di INDUSTRY AVERAGES L

SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDI!G 04/29/90-

['SCRAMCAUSE.

POWER NUMBER 1990

'1989-1988 1987 1986 0F WEEKLY' WEEKLY ' WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS (5)

AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE' YTD (3)(4) 1

• • POWER >15%

'BQUIP. RELATED

>15%

1 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.9 4.3 PERS. RELATED(6) >15%

0 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8

01'HER(7).

>15%

0-0.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.4 1** Subtotal **

1 3.4 4.0 4.6 -

6.4 6.5 E**' POWER <15%

!BQUIP. RELATED-

<15%

0 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.4

'PERS. RELATED

<15%

1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 ODIER

<15%

0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2

.** Subtotal'**

1 0.6 1.4 0.9 2.1 2.4

• • • Total ***

2 4.0 5.4 5.5 8.5 8.9 i

MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NUMBER 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 0F WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD MANUAL SCRAMS 1

0.9-0.9 1.0 1.4 1.0

. AITIONATIC SCRAMS 1

2.9 3.8 4.5 7.0 7.9 T

a

II.' 00MPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES 4

SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING' 04/22/90 l:

SCRAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER 1990 1989 1988 1987 1988 i

b 0F WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY l

SCRAMS (5)

AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE i

YTD (3)(4)

• • POWER >15%

.i o

BQUIP. RELATED

>15%

3 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.9 4.3 PERSi RELATED(6) >15%

0 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8' CfrHER(7)

>15%

0 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.4

.i

• • Subtotal **

j 3

3.5 4.0 4.6 6.4 6.5 j

}

• • POWER <15%

LEQUIP, RELATED

<15%

1 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 PERS RELATED

<15%

0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 OTHER

<15%

0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2

• • ~ Subtotal **

1 0.5 1.4 0.9 2.1 2.4

• • • Total ***

4 4.0 5.4 5.5 8.5 8.9

-l l

MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NltfBER 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 OF WEEKLY-WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD-

. MANUAL SCRAMS 3

0.9 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.0 AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 1

3.1 3.8 4.5 7.0 7.9 4

i

1 t

4,

' NOTES 1

1.:

PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH

' MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE

'ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE.111 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.

t 2.

COMPLICATIONS: REC 0VERY COMPLICATED'BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.

7 i

1 3.

PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL

PROBLEMS, 4.

"0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS-ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES(LIGHTNING),SYSTEMDESIGN,ORUNKNOWNCAUSE.

0EAB SCRAM. DATA Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1986 ------------------ 461 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1987 ------------------ 439 Manual and Automatic Scrams for-1988 ------------------ 287 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1989 ------------------ 244 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1990 (YTD 04/29/90) --- 58 4

i e