ML20042C779
| ML20042C779 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1983 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037D496 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436, TASK-PINC, TASK-SE EA-83-088, SECY-83-465, NUDOCS 8312140314 | |
| Download: ML20042C779 (12) | |
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L POLICY ISSUE (NEGATIVE CONSENT)
November 14, 1983 SECY-83-465 For:
The Commissioners From:
William J. Dircks l
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY ACTION (EA 83-88) FOR CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
Purpose:
To advise the Commission of the Staff's intention to issue a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties to Carolina Power and Light Company for a violation involving a material false statement (MFS).
Discussion:
The Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement proposes to authorize the Regional Administrator, Region II, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $80,000 for two Severity Level III violations.
Since the first Severity Level III violation and associated proposed civil penalty involves a MFS, consultation with the Commission l
is required for this item.
The second violation involves violations of fire protection requirements and is not addressed in this paper.
The material false statement was made in response to a Notice of Violation issued as a result of an inspection conducted January 19-21, 1982 (IE Inspection Report 50-324/
82-10 dated April 2, 1982).
During the inspection, inade-quacies in the implementation of surveillance testing of safety-related instruments at the Brunswick f acility were l
identified.
Specifically, certain pressure switches were not tested at the required frequency.
These indequacies were classi#ied as a Severity Level V violation in the Notice of Violation issued April 2, 1982.
CP&L's resconse to the l
Notice of Violation, dated May 24, 1982 admitted the viola-tion and stated that the cause of the violation was a discrepancy between Tables I and IA in Volume XI of the Plant Operating Manual (POM).
Both Tables identify surveillance
Contact:
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requirements for safety-related equipment '(i.e., Q-list equipment).
The response stated that,.since Table IA did not describe pressure switches as Q-list items, they were not entered on the Periodic Maintenance Scheduling Program.
Therefore these instruments were not tested in accordance-with the required surveillance frequency.
The May 24, 1983 response further stated:
"The tables (1 and 1A) in Volume XI have been revised to assure that all Q-list equipment-is correctly identified on both tables.
In addition, instructions for retrieving a correct maintenance instruction for a partictlar instrument-have been provided at each maintenacce computer console.
All Q-listed instrument:cion has been entered into the Periodic Maintenance Scheduling Program to assure a proper calibration schedule.
This item is considered closed."
During an inspection conducted November 15 - December 15, 1982 (IE Inspection Report No. 50-324/82-45 dated February 7, 1983),
the NRC Resident Inspector again identified discrepancies between Tables I and IA.. These discrepancies revealed that-the licensee had failed to properly implement the corrective action discussed in the May 24, 1982 response to Inspection Report No. 50-324/82-10.
The failure to implement corrective action was-classified as a Severity Level IV violation of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,- Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and the QA Program described in Chapter 13 of the Brunswick FSAR and a Notice of Violation was issued on February 7,1983.
However, the staff subsequently determined that the licensee's response of May 24, 1982 should be considered a material false statement.
The statement was false when it was made in that.
the licensee had not revised Tables I and IA'to assure that all Q-list equipment was correctly identified on both tables.
The false statement was material in that, if the NRC had been aware that discrepancies continued to exist on the Tables in question, further regulatory action would have been taken, i
i Specifically, at a minimum, the licensee would have been required to correct the Tables.
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The Commissioners At an enforcement conference held to discuss this violation, the licensee explained how it occurred. The licensee stated that the instrument and control technicians, who were asked to verify that all the items were properly listed, used an existing list of items that had been generated as discrepancies were discovered during the normal course of business over several months.
They did not conduct a thorough review of-Tables 1 and 1A to ensure that all discrepancies were corrected.
The letter containing the MFS was signed by Benjamin J. Furr, then Vice President for Nuclear Operations. */ However, it had -
gone through the normal plant review chain without a thorough check on how the lists had been corrected.
There is no evidence that the reply to the NOV was formulated with the-intent to. deceive the NRC.
Rather, the licensee negligently failed to ensure that necessary corrective actions had been thoroughly completed.
Thus, the violation does not appear willful.
In response to NRC's concerns expressed subsequent to the November 1982 inspection, the licensee reexamined the lists, and identified all discrepancies.
Evaluation of these discrepancies indicated that some items were improperly listed and that these items had only minor safety significance.
This was confirmed by the NRC resident inspector.
Under these circumstancer the staff has concluded that the violation should be classified as a Severity Level III violation under Supplement VII to 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, General Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions.
In accordance with the policy, a $40,000 civil penalty _ is-being proposed for this violation. The staff considered proposing a larger civil penalty. However, the statement was made over a year and a half ago and the licensee has since initiated an extensive program to improve plant operations and has completely reorganized its Regulatory Compliance Group.
The staff believes that these corrective actions should ensure the accuracy of future submittals.
A small civil penalty is being proposed to emphasize the need for sustained attention in this area.
Recommendation:
The Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement intends to authorize the Regional Administrator, Region II, to issue this escalated enforcement action on November 30, 1983 unless the Commission directs otherwise.
The Regional Administrator, RII, has observed that as this issue does not encompass items of major policy or safety significance and the licensee has implemented extensive corrective actions
- / As a result of a reorganization, Mr. Furr is no longer
_involved in nuclear operations.
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The Commissioners-I which has been verified by RII, a Commission meeting to discuss the proposed action is not felt to be necessary.
Pending the Commission's action on the issuance of the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition.of Civil Penalties, this matter should not be disclosed to the public.
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William J.'Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties.
SECY NOTE:
In the absence of instructions to the contrary, SECY will notify the staff on Wednesday, November 30, 1983 that the Commission, by negative consent, assents to the action proposed in this paper.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners OGC OPE REGION II EDO ELD SECY i
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Docket Nos. 50-325 50-324 Carolina Pcwer and Light Company ATTN: Mr. E. E. Utley Executive Vice President 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT:
PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES:
EA 83-88 MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT AND VIOLATIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS:
REFERENCE:
REPORT NOS. 50-325/83-11 AND 50-324/83-11 A special inspection was conducted by this office during the period March 18 to April 15,1983 of activities authorized by NRC License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 for the Brunswick facility.
The inspection included a detailed review of the circumstances surrounding two areas of concern involving failure to comply with NRC regulatory requirements.
One area involved submittal to the NRC of _ an inaccurate statement having safety implications made in response to a Notice of Violation. The statement was discussed during an Enforcement Conference held at the Brunswick facility on April 26, 1983, by Mr. R. D. Martin, Deputy Regional Administrator, and members of the NRC staff with you and members of your staff.
The statement has been determined to be material and false. The second area involved violation of fire protection Limiting Conditions for Operation-(LCO's).
The Senior Resident Inspector discussed this issue with CP&L management on March 25 and April 15, 1983.
With regard to the first issue, during a January 1982 routine inspection, the NRC Resident Inspector at your Brunswick facility identified discrepancies in the 0-listing of safety-related pressure switches. The Q-list is contained in Tables I and IA of the Plant Operating Manual. The discrepancies involving the safety-related pressure switches were documented in Inspection Report No. 50-324/
82-10 and 50-325/82-10.
The discrepancies were categorized at that. time as Severity Level V violations and a formal Notice of Violation was issued by the NRC. This Notice was dated April 2, 1982. The CP&L response to the Notice of Violation dated May 24, 1982, stated that the discrepancies had been corrected.
An inspection conducted during the period November 15 - December 15, 1982 by the Resident Inspector revealed that Q-list discrepancies continued to exist.
This item was addressed in a Notice of Violation issued on February 7,1983 with Inspection Report No. 50-324/82-45 and 50-325/82-45.
Subsequent evaluation'by the NRC staff determined that the CP&L response of May 24, 1982 contained a-material. false statement.
This material false statement appears to have resulted from your failure to have an appropriate system in effect to ensure the accuracy of statements submitted to the NRC.
I recognize that the statements were made over a year ago and substantive improvements have been made in your program to ensure that statements made to the NRC are accurate and complete.
CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Carolina Power and Light Company 2
The second issue involves a determination by the licensee on March 13, 1982 that, while both trains of the Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment System deluge system were inoperable between February 11 and March 13, 1983, a continuous fire watch was not posted as required by Technical Specifications. The two deluge system trains were made inoperable by the closure of the common supply valve to facilitate planned maintenance on the Unit 1 Service Water System.
Failure to post the required firewatch is indicative of a weakness in implementation of the Brunswick fire protection program.
The significance of this event is increased in view of the fact that the surveillance performed by fire protection aides was incorrectly documented in that the isolation valve was recorded as locked open on February 12, 20, 26 and March 7, 1983 although it was actually shut.
This violation resulted from a programmatic breakdown of fire protection administrative and managerial centrols. This violation also indicates systematic weaknesses in the training of nonlicensed personnel in the conduct of safety-related activities.
To emphasize the need for you to ensure that statements made to the NRC are accurate and complete and the need for you to operate the Brunswick facility in accordance with facility Technical Specifications, and after consultation with the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, I have been authorized to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties. The material false statement has been classified as a Severity Level III violation, Supplement VII, civil penalty 540,000.
The fire protection LC0 violation has been classified as a Severity Level 11I violation, Supplement I,-
civil penalty 540,000.
The total amount of the civil penalties proposed for these violations is $80,000 in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C.
You are required to respond to the Notice and should follow instructions speci-fied therein when preparing your response.
In response to the enclosed Notice of Violation, please include the changes you have made, or plan to make, in the Brunswick Improvement Program which address programmatic problems in the fire protection program.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
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Caroli a Power and Light Company 3
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- The responses _ directed by this letter and the enclosures are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the
. Paperwork ~ Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
Sincerely, James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties cc w/ encl:
C. R. Dietz, Plant Manager t
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i NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND IMPOSITION OF-CTVIL PENALTIES Carolina Power and Light Company Docket Nos. 50-325 i
Brunswick, Units-1 and 2 50-324 EA 83-88 During an inspection conducted January 19-21, 1982 (IE Inspection Report 50-324/82-10 dated April 2, 1982), inadequacies in the implementation of surveillance testing of safety-related instruments at the Brunswick facility were identified.
Specifically, certain pressure switches were not tested at the required fnquency.
These inadequacies were classified as a Severity Level V violation in the Notice of Violation issued April 2,1982. CP&L's response dated May 24, 1982 to the Notice of Violation, admitted the violation and stated that the cause of the violation was a discrepancy between Tables I and IA in Volume XI of the Plant Operating Manual (P0M).
Both Tables identify surveillance requirements for safety-related equipment (i.e., Q-list equipment).
The response stated that, since Table IA did not describe pressure switches as Q-list equipment, they were not entered on the Periodic Maintenance Scheduling Program.
Therefore these instruments were not tested in accordance with the required surveillance frequency.
The May 24, 1983 response further stated:
"The tables (I and IA) in Volume XI have been revised to assure that all Q-list equipment is correctly identified on both tables.
In addition, instructions for retrieving a correct maintenance instruction for a particular instrument havt. been provided at each maintenance computer console.
All Q-listed instrumentation has been entered into the Periodic Maintenance Scheduling Program to assure a proper cali-bration schedule. This item is considered closed."
During an inspection conducted November 15 - December 15, 1982 (IE Inspection Report No. 50-324/82-45 dated February 7,1983), the NRC Resident Inspector again identified discrepancies between Tables I and IA.
The failure to implement corrective action was classified as e Severity Level IV violation of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and the QA Program described in Chapter 13 of the Brunswick FSAR.
These discrepancies
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revealed that the licensee had failed to properly implement the corrective action d,iscussed in the May 24, 1982 response to Inspection Report No. 50-324/
82-10.
The statement quoted above which was contained in the licensee's response of May 24, 1982 is considered to be false and material. The statement was false in that Tables I and IA did not correctly identify all Q-list equipment.
The statement is material for the NRC would have taken further regulatory action to correct the Tables had it known they were incorrect.
Further, during an inspection conducted March 18-25, 1983, additional violations of NRC requirements were identified. These violations resulted from decisions made on February 11, 1983 to shut the water supply valve (W-V207) during maintenance.
Shutting this valve isolated the water supply to the Standby Gas Treatment System deluge system resulting in the violation of Brunswick Technical Specifications. The position of valve W-V207 was required to be verified -
during several subsequent suveillance tests. Although the valve was required to be verified as being in the locked open position, the actual position of
e Notice of Violation the valve (shut) was not discovered until March 13, 1983.
During the period February 11 - March 13,1983 the required fire watch was not established.
When the valve was discovered in the shut position on March 13, 1983, this event was not promptly reported to the NRC in accordance with Technical Specifications.
To emphasize the need for the Carolina Power and Light Company. to ensure that statements made to the NRC are accurate and complete, and the need to operate the Brunswick facility in accordance with facility Technical Specifications, the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties in the amount of
$80,000.
In accordance with the General Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295, and 10 CFR 2.205, the particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
Violations Assessed Civil Penalties A.
In a response dated May 24, 1982 describing corrective action taken with respect to a Notice of Violation dated April 2,1982, the licensee stated that Tables I and IA of Volume XI of the licensee's Plant Operating Manual had been revised to assure that all Q-list equipment was correctly identified on both Tables. These Tables are used by licensee personnel as a-reference to determine if a plant instrument is a Q-item (i.e. safety-related)
Contrary to the above, on May 24, 1982 and as of November 1982, numerous discrepancies existed between Tables I and IA of Volume XI of the licensee's Plant Operating Manual and consequently the Tables did not correctly identify all Q-list equipment.
For example, Table IA did not-identify pressure switches E
as Q-list equipment while Table I did. Thus, the licensee's response' to the NRC of May 24, 1982 contained a material false statement within the meaning of Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
The licensee's statement was false in that Tables I and IA did not correctly identify all Q-list equipment. The statement is material for the NRC would have taken further regulatory action to correct the Tables had
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it known they were incorrect.
Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII)
Civil Penalty $40,000 B.
Technical Specification 3.7.7.2 for Brunswick, Unit I requires that the deluge system for the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) trains 1A and IB, be operable whenever the SBGTS system is required to be operable.
3 Action Statement "a" of TS 3.7.7.2 requires that, with the deluge' system l
inoperable, a continuous fire watch with backup suppression equipment be established within one hour.
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Notice of. Violation Contrary to the above, the Unit 1 deluge system for the SBGTS trains 1A and.
1B was rendered inoperable when valve 1-W-V207 was shut during the period of February 11 to March 13, 1983 and a continuous fire watch was not established.
During this time the plant was in a condition which required the SBGTS to be operable.
Severity Level III violation (Supplement I) l Civil Penalty $40,000 Violations Not Assessed a Civil Penalty C.
Technical Specification 3.7.8 for Brunswick, Units 1 and 2 requires that all-fire barrier penetrations, fire doors and fire dampers, in fire zone boundaries ;
protecting safety-related areas, shall be functional.
Technical' Specification.
3.7.8 Action Statement "a" requires that, with one or more of the fire barrier penetrations non-functional,-within one hour a continuous fire watch must be established on at least one side of the affected penetration or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
Contrary to the above, during the period of February 13, to April 5,1983,.
fire barrier penetrations protecting safety-related areas in Units 1 and 2 i
were non-functional and the associated fire detectors were inoperable without continuous fire watch.
Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I)
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Technical Specification 6.8.1.f for Units 1 and 2 requires 'that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering Fire j
Protection Program implementation.
j Contrary to the above, procedures covering _the Fire Protection Program for Units 1 and 2 were not adequately implemented as demonstrated by the following examples:
a.
Fire protection surveillance procedure PT-35.7 was inadequately implemented on February 12, 20, 26 and March 7,1983 in that.the position of valve W-V-207 was not properly identified.
The valve j
was shut.
The position was recorded as being locked open.
b.
Fire protection surveillance procedure PT-35.1 was inadequately implemented on February 14, 21, 28 and March 7,1983 in that valve W-V-207 was not properly verified as locked open.
c.
Fire protection procedures PT-35.16 and PT-35.18 were not being adequately implemented in that surveillance to ensure the functional i
status of fire barrier penetrations were not being performed in accordance with the acceptance criteria specified in these tests.
4j Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I)
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Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.6 for Uni, l' requires the reporting within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by telephone and confirmation b; telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the Director of the Regional Office or his designee no-later i
than tr a first working day following operation of the unit or affected-system when any parameter or operation subject to an LC0 is less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the LCO established in the Technical Specification.
Contrary to the above, the LC0 violation described in Item B above was a reportable event which was not reported to the NRC Region II within 24-hours.
Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
F.
Technical Specification 6.9.2 for Unit I requires a special report to be issued within 30 days after a fire barrier penetration has been inoperable -
for 7 days.
Contrary to the above, fire barrier penetrations. identified in Licensee Event Reports 1-83-87, I-83-88, I-83-32 and I-83-152 were inoperable for more than 7 days and the required special reports were not submitted.
Severity Level IV Violation (SJpplement I)
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power and Light Company is hereby required to submit to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II, within 30 days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation, including for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation; (2) the reasons for the violation, if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
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Consideration may be given to extending ~the response time for good cause shown.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power and Light Company may pay the civil penalties in the I
amount of $80,000 or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part by a written answer.
Should Carolina Power and Light Company fail to.
answer within the time specified, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment will issue an Order imposing the civil penalty proposed above.
Should Carolina Power and Light Company elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, such answer may:
(1) deny the violation presented in this Notice, in whole or in part; (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances; (3) show error in this Notice; or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed.
In addition to protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the five factors v
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contained in Section IV(B) of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C should be addressed.
Any l
written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 20,205 should be set forth separately j
from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may I
incorporate statements or explanation by specific reference (e.g., giving page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.
Carolina Power and Light Company's attention is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedures for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due, which has been subsequently determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, maybe collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator Dated in Atlanta, Georgia this day of November 1983 i
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VICTOR Gil.INSKY
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August.25, 1992 FREEDOM 0F INFORMATION Samuel Chilk ACT REQUEST Secretary Nuclear Regulatory Commission OM-N-[8 b Washington, DC 20555 M
(Zac b( f-2 7-97_.
Dear Sam:
I am writing to follow up, after long delay, on our discussions over my collection of NRC papers at the Hoover Library.
As you know the papers have been opened to the public with the exception of a set of about 700 or so whose public release gave concern to the General Counsel.
It seems to me that the best way to resolve thi question of public availability of these remaining papers, and to do it in an amicable and fair manner, is for the General Counsel to formally apply to them the-strict standards of the Freedom of Information Act.
The papers are a well-defined category and there should be no problem in identifying them.
No doubt the General Counsel has a list.
I expect the papers are all neatly stacked in a corner somewhere.
In order to trigger the formal review, I therefore request the papers in question be released under the Freedom of Information Act.
Sincerely, L
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