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Mark III Containment Ventilation/Purge:Il Power Study of Containment Continuous Vent/Purge Issue as Applicable to Clinton Power Station.
	ML20041G160
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Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	03/31/1982
From:	Riley T; ILLINOIS POWER CO.
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{{#Wiki_filter:_ O MARK III CONTAINMENT VENTILATION / PURGE: AN ILLINOIS POWER STUDY OF Tile CONTAINMENT CONTINUOUS VENT / PURGE ISSUE AS APPLICABLE TO THE CLINTON POWER STATION Terry L. Riley Staff Specialist Technical Assessment Nuclear Station Engineering Dept. March, 1982 O 8203190340 820310 PDRADOCK05000g A

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pare

, . 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 \~J

2. Illinois Power Company's Position . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1. General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.2. Mark III Containment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.3.Clinton Ventilation / Purge System . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3.1. Containment Ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3.2.Drywell Purge System (DPS) . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3.3.Drywell Cooling System (DCS) . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3.4.Standtv Gas Treatment System (SGTS). . . . . . . 7 2.4.The Need for GPS Continuous Vent /Purro . . . . . . . . 8 2.4.1. Temperature / Humidity Consideraticuc . . . . . . 8 2.4.2. Airborne Buildup Inside Contair" cut . . . . . . 10 2.4.3. Dose Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3. Technical Description of CPS Vent / Purge s:.lvec . . . . . . 13 3.1.Posi-Seal Butterfly Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2. History of Valve Failures in the Nue?cer Power Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4. Vent / Purge Valve Operability Criteria . . . . . . . . . .

18 4.1.NRC Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.2. Proposed IPC Action Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.2.1. Proposed Posi-Seal Valve Strecn Analysis . . . . 23, 4.2.2. Proposed In-Plant Valve Tests . . . . . . . . . 23 4.2.3. Proposed Dose Anlaysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 ,_s            4.2.4. Response to Other Concerns                        . . . . . . . . . . .                      26 i     \
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S. Proposed Schedule for Completion of the IPC /ction Plan . 27

6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

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LIST OF TABLES

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'J Table Title Page 2-1 Environmental Conditions for Normal Operation 30 2-2 Equipment Cubicle Heat Loads & Heat Removal Capabilities 32 2-3 CPS Design Source Terms 33 2-4 Airborne Radioactivity Concentrations 34 2-5 Estimates of Occupational Radiation Dose from Airborne Radioactivity 35 3-1 CPS Valve Specifications (Vent / Purge) 36 3-2 LER Data Summary Table; Valve Materials Table 37 4-1 Purge and Vent Valve Review List 38 4-2 CPS-FSAR " Questions & Responses" 43 5-1 Schedule for Completion of "IPC Action Plan" Items 47 i O ii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS x_) "igure Title Page 2-1 Containment System 48 2-2 Standard Symbols Used in Diagrams 49 2-3 Standard Symbols Used in Diagrams 50 2-4 Standard Symbols Used in Diagrams 51 2-5 Standard Symbols Used in Diagrams 52 2-6 Containment Building HVAC System 53 2-7 Containment Building HVAC System 54 2-8 Containment Building HVAC System 55 2-9 Drywell Purge System 56 2-10 Drywell Purge System 57 2-11 Dryuell Cooling System 58 2-12 Drywell Cooling System 59 2-13 Drywell Cooling System 60 2-14 Standby Gas Treatment System 61 2-15 Standby Gas Treatment System 62 2-16 Backwash Tank and Valve Rooms Temp. Trans-Floor Ht. 63 2-17 Buildup of Airborne Iodine (GE Design Source Terms / 64 100FR50, App. I dose limitations) 2-18 Buildup of Airborne Iodine (GE Design Source Terms / 65

 ,-~s                                       1/3 x 10CFR50, App. I

(_) 3-1 Typical Flow Characteristics dose limitations) 66 3-2 Hydrodynamic Torques 67 3-3 Typical Posi-Seal Butterfly Valve 68 d

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LIST OF REFERE:!CES

1. NUREG-0853, Safety Evaluation Report related to the Operation of ClAnton Power Station, Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-461; February 1982.

2. NUREG-0831, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Grand Gulf Nucicar Station, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos.

50-416 and 50-417; September 1981. 3. Clinton Chapter FSAR), Power Station 9.4.6. - Final Safety Evaluation' Report (CPS-

4. CPS-FSAR, Subsection 9.4.7.

5. I CPS-FSAR, section 9.4.

6. CPS-FSAR, Subsection 6.2.4. .

7. Posi-Seal Inc. Miscellaneous Butterfly Valves Contract; Sargent & Lundy's 29, 1977.specification K-2868, Project Nos. 4536-i. 4597; June ' I . 3. LER Monthly Reports; January 1979 - July 1981. . 9. / NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Reportl

and short-term recommendations; Recommendation 2.1.4; July 1979. 10. NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed As A Rec _lt of the TMI-2 Accident; Item II.E.4.2; May 1980. -: X'

11. -

NUREG-0737, Clarification Item II.E.4.2; November of TMI Action Plan Requireinents; 1980. t ,. 12. NUREG-0800, Revision 2, JulyU.S. NRC Standard Review Plan; Section 6.2.4; 1981. 13. Purge and Vent Valve Operability Review List; provided by NRC staff to IPC for implementation at the CPS, Unit #1. 14. Nuclear Purge Valves Stress Analysis, Stress Report for 8" NRC/N721C-SR40 Nuclear Class 2; Henry Pratt Company; Revision 1, May 1980; performed for Florida Power & Light, St. Lucie Unit 2. 15. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Valve Sizing and Loading Calculations fcr Containment Pur,qe and Vent Vales; Posi-Seal International, Inc.; December 1979; performed for Carolina Power & Light, Brunsuick Units No. 1 & 2. ws iv

i 16. Grand Gulf - FSAR, Chapter 6.2.4.3.3. i (~'/ s-

17. CPS-FSAR, Chapter 11.1.

18. CPS-FSAR, Chapter 12.

19. NED0-21159, Airborne Releases from BWR's for Environmental Impact Evaluations; October 1978.

20. NUREG-0016, Calculation of Releases of Radioacti"e Materials in Gaseous Liquid Effluents from Boiling Water Reactors (BWR-Gale Code); January 1979.

21. Supplement #1, Safety Evaluation Related to Construction of Clinton Power Station Units 1 & 2; December 1975.

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I) \"# ABSTRACT s The Mark III containment design places significant equip-ment in the containment to reduce the possibility of uncon-trolled leakage from such equipment to the environment. This equipment will require inspection and maintenance in order to assure.its function. In order to maintain suitable conditions in the. containment for this equipment and for inspection / main-tenance personnel, continuous purging was incorporated into the system design bases. Since the accident et TMI, the NRC has adopted the posi-tion that" reactor containments should not be continuously purged. This position is contrary to the intended design of the Mark III containment. The purposes of this paper are to provide information on the following subj ects:

1. The current CPS design of the containment vent / purge system.

(_) 2. The impact on CPS operation of not contin-uously purging / venting the containment.

3. A technical description of the CPS containment vent / purge valves.

4. LER discussion on butterfly-type isolation valve failures.

5. The NRC requirements for containment isolation

and purging.

6. An IPC Action Plan to address these NRC require-ments/ concerns.

It is believed that the IPC Action Plan provides adequate assurance that the CPS containment can be continuously purged without undue risk to public health and safety in that the four criteria stated in the CPS CL SER (NUREG 75/013) to allow continous purge of the containment have been met. O V vi

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1. INTRODUCTION ..

The NRC Staff's position over the issue of the continuous containment ventilation / purge systems generic to the Mark III containment design has been recently stated in, , the Clinton Power Station Safety Evaluation Report (CPS-SER) as follows:

             "The applicant has proposed to use the 36-in. line for venti-lation or purging during normal plant operating conditions and the 4-in. bypass line for post-LOCA conditions when the standby gas treatment system or drywell purge. system may be used as backup to the hydrogen recombiners.            The staff has reviewed the design               '

of the containment purge system based on the criteria specified in BTP CSB 6-4, " Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation," and finds that the continuous use of the 36-in. line does not meet the guidelines of BTP CSB 6-4. The staff believes that purging should be minimized during normal reactor operation and should not be relied on for temperature and humidity control." A similar position has been taken, by the NRC staff, in the Grand Gulf-SER (and Supplement #1 to GG-SER). Therefore,~this issue presents a significant licensing concern, generic to all Mark III containments as presently designed. The scope of this report is covered by the following areas:

1. Consequences to the present CPS Mark III design if b

                 .. continuous. purge / vent.of.the. containment is.-not per-      . , . .

formed. - ' " ' ' '

           .2. Technical Description of CPS vent / purge valves.

3. How IPC proposes to meet the NRC vent / purge valve operability' criteria-(as required by NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2).

4. Conclusions regarding the continuous vent / purge issue.

The following study proposes a course of action for resolution of this issue with regard to the CPS Unit #1. [_; (,

2. ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY'S POSITION 2.1. General Discussion The design of the CPS containment purge and ventilation

    -system consists of both 36-in. and 4-in. lines . IPC has proposed to the NRC, in both the PSAR and the FSAR, to use the 36-in. line for ventilation or pugring of the containment during normal plant operations. _The 4-in. bypass line would be used, as necessary, during post-LOCA conditions with the standby gas treatment system or the drywell' purge system, as a backup feedline to the hydrogen recombiners in the. remote event of unavailability of the dedicated hydrogen recombiner feedlines.

References #1 and #2 state the NRC staff's position with regards to this continuous purge / vent issue, as presiously discussed in the introduction to this study. The staff's position and IPC's responses will be discussed in significant detail in.later sections of this study. The staff's current position represents significant impacts upon the CPS project scheduling at this time. This issue is of considerable importance to all Mark III containment design projects presently. in the licensing stage. !' Containment vent / purge systems have been used in a i variety of ways. The following represent examples of such uses:

1. reducing airborne activity concentrations within the 4 containment to facilitate personnel access during reactor power operation.

, 2. controlling containment pressure, temperature and i relative humidity.

3. relief of initial containment pressure buildup caused by the heat load imposed on the containment atmosphere during reactor startup to power operation.

l The above example uses are not all inclusive and not ~ all examples are applicable to every containment design. In l fact, the probicms associated with continuous venting / purge of the containment is generic to Mark III containments (and " ice condenser" plants). l 0 i

(It. 2.2 Mark III Containment Desien The General Electric BWR/6 system sits incide a Mark III containment design. The Mark III design is a single-barrier pressure containment and a multi-barrier fission containment system consisting of the containment vessel (pressure and fission barrier), and fission product barriers, which include the auxiliary building and fuel building, all of which are norcally kept at a negative pressure relative,to atmosphere, to further limit the possibility of significant radiation releases to the environment. The containment structure is shown in Figure 2-1. The containment is a steel-lined leakage barrier which prevents It fission product release in the event of an accident. is classified cylindrical as avessel. pressure seismic Category I structure, is a vertical, The flat bottom liner plate serves as a leak-tight membrane only and not as a pressure retaining part. The dryuell, weir wall cnd reactor vessel pedestal. loads are transferred to the foundation uut. p.- i. s Among the major penetrations through the containment are two, stcndard, double door, personnel access locks and an equipment hccch. The double-door locks permit personnel access to the containment during reactor operation for inspection and mntntenance cf eauipment. . Penetration seals.are utilized at_ locations where

      ,aipin'g (head fittings), mechanical devices, and electrical connecticas' gr.cn through the containment to maintain the-leakage barrier.

In general then the Mark III containment design provides a "; number of important features, including the follouing design bases:

1. Withstand peak transient pressures and temperatures resulting from the design basis accident (DBA).

2. maintain functional integrity

3. flooding capability for post-LOCA recovery.

4. withstand external / internal missile sources.

x a l S. withstand j et . forces associated with pipe ' ruptures. d() 6. limit leakage rates so off-site doses are les's than 10CFR100 guidelines. ,

7. blowdown condensing of steam flow from DBA (pressure suppression).

8. capability for rapid isolation of all "non-essential" pipes that penetrate containment. ,

9. withstand natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, floods.

10. designed for periodic leakage tests.

2.3 Clinton Ventilation / Purge System The CPS containment ventilation and purge systems are comprised of the following: I

1. Containment building ventilation system (VR) .

2. Drywell purge system (VQ) .

3. Drywell cooling system (VP) .

4. Standby gas treatment system (VG) .

/} 2.3.1 Containment Ventilation ( VR ) The purposes of the CPS Mark III containment building VR system are described in detail in Reference #4. A brief description

   'is presented heres Purposes:                                                                        q

1. Provide filtered and heated or cooled outside air for-ventilation.

2. Maintain area temperature within design limits of 104 F for general areas and 122*F in equipment cubicles. ,

3. Maintain a negative pressure ( .25" 1120) with respect to outside atmosphere in the containment building.

4. Minimize airborne radioactive contamination by maintaining air flow from clean areas to areas of progressively greater contamination.

5. Exhaust air from- around the fuel pools to mitigate possible spread of contaminated gas bubbles.

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Items 1, 2, and 4, greatly enhance the habitability require-ments representative of the Mark III design. One of the main ('N s_) functions of the plant operating / maintenance personnel during normal operations is to inspect and maintain equipment inside the containment. The surveillance of plant equipment for proper functioning and the performance of necessary adjustments and repairs on this equipment is vital to the safe and reliable operation of the CPS. Components located outside the drywell, but inside the containment vessel include, but are not limited to, the control rod drive hydraulic modules, standby liquid control system components, reactor water cleanu, system heat enchangers, auxiliary system piping, refueling bridge, polar crane, nuclear system instrumentation, heating and ventilating. Figures 2-2 thru 2-5 explain the standard symbols used in system dia-grams. The containment VR system is shown in Figures 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8. Outside air is drawn through fixed louvers, isolation dampers, and a suppl air filter, which removes particulates from the air. The air is then heated or cooled by electric blast coils or chilled water coils (supply air temperature 62 8 F). The air then enters one of two 100% capacity, dual speed, supply air fans (Capacity 30,000/15,000 cfm). An isolation damper is cupplied downstream of each fan to prevent backflow through an idle fan. Both fan discharges join in a common supply duct. An air operated modulating damper, in the common supply duct, controls the air flow to maintain the -0.25" H2O containment building pressure. The supply air then flous through two air operated, fail closed, primary containment () isolation valves. Manually set balancing dampers and back draft dampers distribute the correct air flow quantity and direction to the individual areas. Exhaust air from the individual areas is brought together into a common duct and then flows through piping and an isolation valve into the drywell purge system. The exhaust air then branches inside the secondary containment after passing through an isolation valve. At the secondary containment the piping is changed to ducting. Two 100% exhaust fans, with isolation dampers, then discharge the air te the common station VR vent.

2. 3. 2. Drvwell Purge System (VO)_,

The purposes of the CPS Mark III containment building VQ are described in detail in Reference #5. A brief description is presented here. Purposes:

1. Provide purge of airborne activity frca the drywell and/or containment under normal modes of plant operation.

2. Provide relief of air pressure inside the drywell.

3. The drywell purge system is used as a backun to the Standby Gas Treatment System (VG), which can be used as l

f'S s/ backup to the redundant post-LOCA containment Hydrogen l Recombiners. i i l

The purge system consists of three 50%-of-full-capacity filter trains, associated dued, dampers and controls. Each filter train consists of the following components listed in the direction of air flow:

1. moisture separator - two stage unit using inlet louvers followed by relatively coarse glass fiber pads; prevents water droplets from reaching HEPA filters.

2. prefilter - pleated glass fiber separated by aluminum separators; minimize loading on HEPAs.

3. heating coils - reduces relative humidity to less than '

70% to ensure high iodine removal capability of the charcoal adsorbers.

4. upstream HEPA filter - reduces particulate loading of the charcoal.

5. charcoal filter - adsorbs radioactive and non-radioactive isotopes of iodine and its organic compounds.

6. downstream HEPA filter - removes charcoal fines from air stream.

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7. exhaust fans - 15,000 cfm capacity.

The VQ is shown in Figures 2-9 and 2-10. The drywell purge system is utilized approximately 4 times a year to purge the drywell before access is desired. The system is also designed to relieve slight drywell.under or over pressures.during normal. operation. A slight differential pressure (between drywell and containment)', , , * ,,

       ..is  anticipated during temperature transients in the.drywell,,occuring during reactor startup and shutdown.

The VQ , .in combination with the containment. VR -system,

       'has five normal operating modes:                                       .

1. Normal containment ventilation mode - no flow through

                   .drywell.

2. Containment purge, normal flow rate - 30,000 cfm using -

containment supply air fans. The air is exhausted through two of the three drywell purge system equipment trains (DPSET's). There is no flow through the drywell.

3. Containment and drywell purge, normal flow rate - a containment supply air fan supplies 3^,000 cfm; 15,000 cfm going to the containment, 15,000 efm going to drywell.

The air is exhausted through two DPSET's. ( ( D l

4. Containment /drywell/ head purge - sane as mode 3. except r- that the purge air exhausted from dryuell is drawn from

(_}/ the drywell head area. This mode is used to purge reactor vessel head area before refueling.

5. Half purge flow rate - allows Unit 1 and Unit 2 to be purged at the same time. With Unit 2 on indefinite hold, this mode is not a concern, at this eine.

2.3.3. Drywell Cooling System (VP) The purposea of the CPSWP are described in detail in Reference #5. A brief description is presented here. Purposes:

1. Maintain the drywell ambient temperatures within the equipment ambient temperature requirements.

2. Prevent actuation of ECCS during a loss of off-site power due to high drywell pressure.

3. Maintain air circulation and comfortable temperatures for personnel in the drywell during plant shutdown.

The VP consists of two 1007. capacity cooling systems. Each 7s system consists of two-air handling units and a 500 ton centrifugal ( ) chilled water chiller cooled by plant service unter. The two air handling units are a 36,000 cfm unit for the upper drywell area and a 23,000 cfm unit for the lower drywell area. Figures 2-11, 2-12, and 2-13 illustrate the VP . The VP is in operation during normal plant operation, is not required to function during abnormal plant operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety design basis. 2.3.4. Standby Gas Treatment System ( VG) The purposes of the CPS- VG are described in detail in Reference #6. A brief description is presented here. Purposes:

1. Treat air from the secondary containnent to remove particulates and radio-iodine prior to release to the atmosphere.; 2. Maintain a -0.25" H2O pressure in the secondary contain-men: during abnormal operations to prevent an unfiltered relcase to the environment.; 3. Provide post-LOCA purge of the containment as a back-up to the Hydrogen Recombiners.
Q k_

The VG can be manually started and will auto-start in response to any of the following signals:

1. high 'drywel1~ pressure (2 psig)

2. Low Reactor Water Level (level 2)

3. high radiation in the containment fuel transfer floor exhaust

4. high radiation in the containment building exhaust

5. high radiation in the fuel building exhaust.

The VG is primarily used to treat the post-LOCA radioactive cases leaking from the primary to_the secondary containment. During operationaof the VG , the containment (and fuel building) VR system supply / exhaust fans are shut down. Figures 2-14 and 2-15 are the CPS- VG piping and instrumentation diagrams. 2.4. The Need for CPS Continuous Vent / Purge The need for continuous ventilation /purning of-the CPS Unit (1 Mark III containment is justified for several reasons. All the < justification presented centers around the need to improve envircnuencal conditions inside the containment. These " environmental conditions"

apply to operating personnel and operating equipment. The considera-() tions that need to-be made were included in the CPS containment vent / purge design bases and system purposes as discussed above.

A more specific discussion of these considerations is now provided. These considerations can be described as follous: i j 1. Temperature / humidity consideration. l 2. Airborne Radionuclide Buildup Inside Containment

3. Dose Considerations

! 2.4.1. Temoerature/ Humidity Considerations i The containment building VR system includes

fen-coil cooling units supplied with cooling water from the Plant Chilled Water System and are located in areas of high equipment

hes.t loads. These units function to limit air temperatures to 1

122 F maximum in equipment cubicles and to 104 F maximum in general

areas. However, the design basis normal temperature for general areas will be 80*F. This design basis temperature will provide
an environment more conducive to personnel comfort and long i equipment operating life. Table 2-1 (from CPS-FSAR, Subsection 3.11) i indicates the design environmental conditions during normal plant operations. Maintaining these conditions, ac described in Table 2-1,

!- uill provide the improved working conditions necessary for maintenance / repair / inspection / surveillance of equipment and enhance the equipnent ' ((^T/ j operating lifetimes and reliability. I If the CPS Unit #1 ccntainment is not continuously ventilated, I) \' the environmental conditions specified in Table 2-1 aould no longer apply. The increased temperatures and humidities would result in the following:

1. reduced equipment operating lifetimes and functional capabilities - due to more corrosive environment present in containment. This equipment includes the following:

a. Control rod hydraulic system;

b. Reactor Water Clean-up System (RWCU) isolation valves, operators and cables (power and instrumentation),

and leak detection cables;

c. Containment Spray System valves;

d. Upper Pool dump valves;

e. RHR/LPCI injection valves;

f. Liquid lines including isolation valves;

g. Steam lines including isolation valves, operators and power cables, and leak detection cables;

h. rod control information system and post-accident monitoring system local panels including leak detection transmitters;

i. neutron monitoring system cables and connectors;

j. post-accident monitoring sensors, channels, and cables (power and instrumentation).

s_) 2. Inadequate environmental conditions for maintenance personnel. This will result in reductions in time spent in the equipma.. areas for maintenance / inspection / surveillance and in possible personnel safety and health hazards. IPC has analyzed the build-up of temperature within the containment as a function of time, post-containment isolation. The results of this computer analysis is shown in Figure 2-16. The major features are:

1. 2 equipment cubicles were chosen for the analysis - the RWCU Backwash Tank and Valve Rooms. The rise in temperature in the remaining cubicles would be similar, being bounded by the curves in Fig. 2-16.

2. Table 2-2 shows typical heat loads and heat removal capabilities for each cubicle. These values are average ones and assume containment ventilation is functioning properly & continuously.

3. The equipment operating temperature requirement for sustained reliable functioning capability, is 122 F.

Note that this is exceeded in a very short time, on the order of a few minutes. O o

(~) 4. The analysis includes heat los- from the atmosphere (~) of each cubicle, through transfer to the cubicle floor structures. Notice that the results are not favorable from the stand-point of equipment functional capability. If an intermittent purging / ventilating technique is used, the continued cyclic variation of temperateres would also put unnecessary thermal stresses on equipment. Also the high temperatures indicative of Fig. 2-16 would result in much higher heat loads when venti-lation would be necessary, prior to personnel entry into the equipment areas. These loads would be highly abnormal during a continuous vent /purga scenario. In conclusion, from a temperature (and humidity) standpoint, a continuous vent / purge operation of the containment is necessary. 2.4.2. Airborne Builduo Inside Containment If the CPS Unit #1, containment is not allowed to be continously ventilated / purged, airborne radioactivity will build up inside the containment. This buildup is a function of the following:

1. Source Terms - These represent General Electric design-basis radioactive material levels in the reactor water, r3 steam and off-gas. The various radioisotopes considered

( ) are grouped as coolant activation products, non-coolant activation products, and fission products. The fission product levels are based on measurements of BWR reactor water and off-gas at several stations through 1977. These design-basis radioactive material levels do not necessarily include all the radioistopes observed or predicted theoretically to be present. The radioisotopes included are considered significant to one or more of the following criteria:

a. plant equipment design,

b. shielding design,

c. understanding system operation and performance,

d. measurement practicability, and

c. evaluating radioactive material releases to the environment.

A detailed description of these source terms can be found in Ref. #18. Table 2-3 is a list of all source terms considered and their levels of release. l (a~)

2. Sources of Leakage / Leakage Paths / Leakage Rates -

s Sources of leakage of radioisotopes into the containment (v ) atmosphere include, but are not limited to the following:

a. reactor steam leakage,

b. reactor water leakage; includes such leakage as might come from the Reactor Water Cleanup System (valves & pumps).

c. evaporation from suppression pool,

d. evaporation from fuel transfer pool.

Leakage rates for each of these sources of course will vary.

3. Partition Factors - The factor representing that portion of the radionuclide released that goes airborne. This will primarily be a function of whether or not the leakage fluid is hot or cold, and whether the radioisotope is gaseous, particulate or organic in nature.

Leakage of fluids from these various sources will result in the release of radionuclides into the containment building. In general, the noble radiogases will remain airborne and will be released to the atmosphere with little delay via the HVAC exhaust ducts. The radionuclides will partition betueen air and water, and airborne radioiodines "plateout" on metal surfaces, concrete, and paint. A signiticant amount of radiciodine remains in air or is desorbed from surfaces. Radiciodines are found in unfiltered (') \_/ ventilation air as methyl iodine and as inorganic iodine (particulates, eierental, and acid forms of iodine). Particulates will also be present in the ventilation exhaust air prior to filtering. The buildup of airborne radiciodine in the containment after vent / purge isolation for CPS Unit #1 has been calculated and is shown in Figures 2-17 and 2-18. The assumptions that went into the developnent of these figures are as follows:

1. GE design source terms (Ref. #20) uere used in both figures.

2. The primary leakage source was the RUCU system.

Evaporation from the suppression pool and fuel transfer pool areas were determined to be minimal.

3. Figure 2-17 : Based on an airborne leakage rate which corresponds to Appendix 1, 10CFR50 release limitations; and a (GE) NEDO-21159 primary coolant specific activity.

4. Figure 2-18: Based on a liquid leakage rate of 1 Epm with a partitinn factor of 0.01 (equivalent to 1/3'x Appendix I, 10C R50 release limitations); and a (GE)

NEDO-21159 primary coolant specific activity. A partition 73 factor of 0.01 was chosen as an average value, since 0.1 ( ,) would be representative of "high energy" leakage and 0.001 would be representative of " low energy" leakage. Reference #21 discusses the NRC " Expected Source Terms." T The use of these source terms in an evaluation of the airborne (~J k buildup of radioactivity inside the CPS containment was not performed because of the following:

1. NRC " Expected Source Terms" are based on annual expected averages (the mean of measured values) and are not to ba applied to design basis evalu-ations.

2. GE " Design Source Terms" represent values which are not likely to be exceeded during normal operations.

3. In terms of basing the airborne activity con-centrations on App. I releases, there is virtually no difference between the GE and Gale code re-sults.

Therefore, use of the NRC " Expected Source Terms" would result in an " annual average airborne concentration" inside the containment. It may be that, statistically speaking, a significant portion of the year would be spent experiencing airborne levels greater than these average values. Access to the containment may be severely limited during these times. Rather than base containment vent / purge system operation upon expected average r conditions, it is only prudent that maximum expected (design (_N) basis) conditions be utilized as the consideration. Although the use of the GE " Design Source Terms" does not rule-out completely the possibility of exceeding these conditions at some time during operation, they do represent a much more conservative upper bound of values. The effects of this airborne build-up of radioactivity inside the CPS containment upon on-site and off-site dose assessments is considered in the next section. 2.4.3. Dose Considerations It is IPC's intention to ensure that all aspects of CPS design and operation are conducted in a manner such that occupational exposure will be "as low as is reasonably achievable" (ALARA). This ALARA policy applies to total man-rem accumulated by all personnel as well as to individual exposures. History and data of radiation exposure at operating BWR's is reported in " Occupational Exposure at Light Water Cooled Power Reactors 1969-1975", NRC Publication NUREG-0109. That information, supplemented by informa-tion received through frequent conversations with personnel from utilities with presently operating BWR's and PWR's forms the basis for many improvements in the CPS design, aimed towards attaining ALARA occupational doses. Several features are added to the CPS design to specifically reduce the maintenance dose, which past 7_s kj i experience indicates has been a significant source of personnel exposure. The CPS containment vent / purge systems are designed to help meet these ALARA goals. The obj ectives of this radiological protection design are the following:

1. Meeting the rec uirements set forth.in 10CFR20 and

(} 10CFR50, Appenc ix A, Criterion 19.

2. Complying with the guidance given in Regulatory Guides 1.3,'1.5, 1.13, 1.25, 1.69, and 8.8.

3. Complying with applicable industry standards.

Reference #19 describes in detail the various radiation pro-tection featurce applicable to the CPS design. Tables 2-4 and 2-5 list the airborne. radioactivity concentrations inside the containment and the corresponding occupational doses from this airborne activity,~respectively, assuming-the containment vent / purge systems are functioning normally and continuously. These dose levels could not.be maintained otherwise. The anticipated occupancy times for the various areas are as described in Ref. #19 (tab-ulated in Table 2-5). The iodine buildup curves of-Figures 2-17 and 2-18 are indicative of the process of radioactive airborne buildup in the CPS containment with purge isolated. This buildup will result in increased dose levels to maintenance personnel (due to iodine alone) . This increase in on-site dose levels would not be consistent with the CPS ALARA standards. In addition, if intermittent purging of the containment was performed (ra-ther than continuous), there would be an increase in the concentrations of the various radionuclides exhausted from the containment to the en-vironment, at each time purging is_ performed. inis would result in in-O creased dose. levels at off-site boundaries during the passage of the dis-charged plume. Again, this is inconsistent with the CPS ALARA philos-ophy, since the doses at the time of release would be higher.

3. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF CPS VENT / PURGE VALVES The CPS ventilation / purge valves used for isolation of the containment are of the butterfly type and are manufactured by ~

Posi-Seal International. This section offers information regarding the valve isolation signals, valve positions, valve materials, valve specifications, and valve failure history for the Posi-Seal Valves used in the CPS ventilation / purge system. 3.1. CPS Posi-Seal Butterfly Valves Table 3-1 lists all relavent data pertinent to the CPS i Containment Ventilation / Purge butterfly valves. In this sub- ! section, a discussion of these various valve features is included. j All containment vent / purge penetrations are equipped with i two redundant isolation valves in series to ensure containment isolation. These isolation valves are designed for fail-safe

i. operation. These valves are operated by spring-loaded air cylinders

! and fail closed on loss of station air or electric power. The valves j are sized as small as practical for the CPS Mark III containment ! () design. The isolation signals that are provided for auto-isolation are: l m

1. high drywell pressure - 2 psig.

2. low reactor water level - 30.2".

n () _ 3. high radiation in the ventilation exhaust duct.

4. high radiation in exhaust air from fuel transfer area.

The time required to completely close the isolation valves, after the isolation signal is received, is specified to be 6 seconds. The bypass valves are 4" gate valves. These bypass valves are nor-mally closed and can only be opened with an administratively con-trolled keylocked switch on the main control board. These bypass valves are motor operated. All containment vent / purge isolation valves are two position valves (i.e. fully open or fully closed) with the exception of the following two valves:

1. The VQ inboard exhaust isolation valve, IVQ002 (24"),

is a 3-position valve.

a. 100% open when in drywell purge (15,000 cfm).

b. 50% open when in drywell head purge (1,000 cfm) .

c. closed.

2. The VQ outboard exhaust isolation valve, 1VQ003 (36"),

is a 4-position valve. (~] \_/

a. 100% open when in containment ventilation or purge (30,000 cfm).

b. 50% open when in drywell purge or drywell head purge or with the containment supply fan running at half speed (15,000 cfm).

c. 25% open when in drywell purge or drywell head purge with the containment supply fan running at half speed (7,500 cfm).

d. closed.

The following valves shall exhibit a leakrate of no more than 0.015 scfm when fully closed and subjected to a pressure of 9 psig across the valve (similar to the peak transient long-term pressure response of the containment during a DBA-LOCA):

1. IVR001A - VR outboard supply isolation valve (36").

2. IVR001B - VR inboard supply isolation valve (36").

3. IVQ004A - VQ outboard exhaust isolation valve (36").

4. IVQ004B - VQ inboard exhaust isolation valve (36").

These four valves provide for the containment isolation function. /~N Q,.) The following list of general valve specifications is f3 applicable to all valves: s >

1. Valves capable of a 90 disc rotation (open - close) under all applicable conditions. See table 3-1.

2. All valves and operators are capable of withstanding the following loads, acting simultaneously, without excessive leakage or component failure. . . . .

a. horizontal seismic loads..... . . ..... ..Both OBE

b. vertical seismic loads.. .. . . . . . ..and SSE

c. dead weight loads of valve components considered.

d. live, operating hydrodynamic loads found under rated operating conditiens.

The sum of these loads will not exceed Section III of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

3. All category I valves comply with the standard specifications for seismic qualification criteria applicable to such

                  " essential" equipment.

4. Valves designed for a service life of 40 years, with a frequency of operation of 100 cycles / year, considering normal maintenance, accounting for corrosion and material

   ,              life, under the following normal environmental conditions:

r i x' a. Temperature - 65 F to 185 F

b. Relative Humidity - 100% max., average 40% to 50%, less than 10% for approximately 880 hrs./yr.

c. Pressure - -0.5"H90 to 2 psig.

d. An integrated gamma dose of 2.0 x 10 8 rad (carbon).

5. Figure 3-1 illustrates the flow characteristics typical of the CPS vent / purge valves.

6. Figure 3-2 illustrates the hydrodynamic torque factors associated with CPS vent / purge valves. The highest hydrodynamic torque values are reached at approximately 70 of disc opening.

7. Figure 3-3 shows a typical Posi-Seal valve.

i l The heart of the Posi-Seal valve is the sealing mechanism, l fy which consists of 2 parts. This combination includes a sealing ( ,) ring and a backing ring. The scaling ring is made of an inert, low-friction, wear-resistant elastomer, called TEFZEL. The I.D. surface of the sealing ring serves to effect a seal ogainst the valve disc, while its flange area securely ~ locks the ring into a "T" slot within the valve body. The backing ring is an "0" ring made from a more resilient elastomer, typically BUNA-N or VITON. When the valve is closed, the backing ring preloads the sealing ring against the valve disc, which affords a static seal. System pressure acting within the "T" slot creates a piston action of the sealing ring, where system pressure is amplified at the sealing surface. Thus, dynamic sealing is accomplished. Hence, the higher the pressure, the tighter the seal. Other valve materials include the following, (as applicable to CPS):

1. Packing - standard nuclear grade asbestos core.

2. Disc - ASME SA351 GRCF8M stainless steel. Affords high corrosion resistance to containment /drywell harsh environ-ment

3. Shaft - ASME SA564 GR630, 17-4 pH nitrided stainless steel.

High strength material capable of functioning under con-tainment/drywell harsh environment (normal operating and (,) x/ DBA-LOCA conditions) without failure due to shaft shear or tvisting. (160 KSI yield strength as compared to 50 KSI yleid strength typical of standard carbon steel shafts). 3.2. History of Valve Failures in the Nuclear Power Industry The NRC staff in the CPS-SER (Ref. #1) addresses the following concern:

           "As a result of numerous reports on the unsatisfactory per-formance of resilient seats in butterfly-type isolation valves because of seal deterioration, periodic leakage integrity tests of the 4-in. and 36-in. butterfly isolation valves in the purge system are necessary."

the history of butterfly-type valve failures in the nuclear power industry has been documented in LERs (Licensee Event Reports). The failure types range from excessive leakage (with valve fully closed) to valve closure failures. The failure mechanisms or causes present a similar variety, ranging from worn / misaligned seals and seating surfaces to causes unknown. IPC has conducted a study of all LER Monthly Reports from January 1979 to July 1981. The results of this study are summarized, in Table 3-2. The total of all LERs found to be applicable to valve operability criteria is 67 (this does not include 11 reports dealing with personnel errorerdefective operating procedures). A Ev) l ilso, 11 of the 67 reports involved valves in systems other than the containment vent / purge system. There ic 1:uch uncertainty I')

\'

as to the age (s) of these valves noted. cre of various ages so the time in service life for each case The plants of concern could not be determined. However, note that tbia could signi-ficantly affect the types of failures involved and the failure rr.te . The more in-service time that a valve accunulates, the 1cre likely that valve is to fail, by whatever r.enns (simply Juc to operating exposure). A detailed discuccion of Table 3-2 ir rot necessary, but brief comments regarding sone of the data is appropriate. On those reports where valve sizes were riven, note the vice range. Therefore, it is not expected, for example, that icr-2r valves fail more often or in more wayn thnn smaller valves (or vice versa). There were 10 manufacturers involved in this brief study. The following valve manufacturers accounted for nearly 80% of all noted LER reports:

1. Fisher Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.3%

2. Henry Pratt Co . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.8%

3. Allis Chalmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4%

Each of the remaining manufacturers had contributions ranging (') s from 5.9% to 1.5%. It is interesting to note the Posi-Scal valve failures (2 LERs), which accounted for only 3.0% of all failures noted (% of LERs attribute to POSI-SEAL). The first failure noted, involving POSI-SEAL manufactured butterfly-type valves, occured at the Brunswick-2 proj ect. Following maintenance on suppression chamber vent valve, CAC-V22, an integrated primary containment leakrate test was performed. The measured combined leakrate for this valve, and the parallel valve, 2-CAC-V8 was added to the previously known primary contain-ment leakrate, producing a total combined leak rate in excess of the technical specifications value. Disassembly of both valves revealed a misaligned sealing ring in the main valve body of valve V8, believed to be due to improper installation. The sealing ring and retaining ring were replaced in valve V8 and both valves returned to service following a successful leak rate test. Excessive or abnormal wear of the original sealing ring was not noted in the LER. It is not known whether the misalignment of the sealing , ring occured from operation of the valve or was actually due to improper installation. No other failures of this type were noted, in the LERs reviewed, for POSI-SEAL.

The second failure noted, involving a POSI-SEAL butterfly-(~') type valve, occured at the Brunswick-1 project. During performance '/ of the Type "C" local leakrate testing of the containment isolation valves, valves 1-CAC-V7, V9, V15, V16, and V17 were found to have excessive leak rates. An inspection of these five valves revealed corroded valve discs. The valve discs were replaced with a more corrosion resistant nickel plated design. The contain-ment vent / purge POSI-SEAL valves used at the CPS Unit #1 valve discs made of stainless steel which is highly resistant to corrosions of the type expected in the containment /drywell environment. There-fore, this type of failure mechanism, resulting in excessive leakage, would not be applicable to Clinton. No other failures of this type were noted, in the LERs reviewed, for POSI-SEAL. The majority ( > 50%) of the LERs reviewed, specifically con-cerned with performance failures of the resilient seats in butterfly-type isolation valves, was attributable to manufacturers that used sealing rings made of resilient clastomers, such as rubber compounds (BUNA-N, EPT, VITON). The CPS purge / vent isolation valves utilize such compounds only as backing ("0") rings. The primary sealing ring used in all CPS vent / purge isolation valves is TEFZEL, a teflon compound. There were only two LERs, both involving Fisher Controls Co. manufactured valves, that reported degradation of sealing surfaces attributable to teflon-type seals. With the sealing materials and mechanisms utilized in the CPS vent / purge valves, this is not anticipated to be of great concern. It should be noted ~~pressures and partial closing of the isolation valves at times prior to 7 seconds.~~

7. No credit was allowed for iodine removal by charcoal ad-sorbers (not normally in service) on the containment exhaust lines.

8. Exclusion area boundary X/Q of 1.78 x 10-4 seconds per cubic meter as given in CPS-FSAR was used in the dose calculation.
~~The 10CFR100 limits are as follows:~~
1. 25 rem whole body

2. 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine

3. These values are for an individual located at the exclusion area boundary for two hours following the DBA-LOCA and an individual located at the lou population zone outer boundary for the entire passage of the radioactive cloud (30 days).
~~U Information contained in Reference #17 indicates that the~~
~~- CPS analysis is comparable to the analysis performed for the ) Grand Gulf project. The differences are explained below:~~
1. The CPS analysis does not assume iodine spike conditions in the primarily coolant. BTP CSB 6-4 requests that this be incorporated into the analysis. However, the CPS analysis does not allow for iodine removal by the charcoal absorbers (item #7). These adsorbers use impregnated activated charcoal.

a. Activated charcoal has been treated by heating with air or steam to burn away more than half the carbon.
~~This leaves a very porous carbon " skeleton" so that a large percentage of the remaining carbon atoms are exposed.~~
~~b. Impregnated charcoal contains stable iodine which improves the efficiency for the removal of organic iodine through a combination of adsorption and ion exchange.~~
Therefore, these charcoal adsorbers remove about 99% of the radioactive forms of iodine, before they exit the containment. If this is accounted for, the presence of an iodine spike would have a small effect anyway. However, assuming the presence of a spike, similar to that used in the Grand r-ulf analysis (4 pCi/g of I-131 dose equivalent), the thyroid dose at the exclusion /^^ area boundary becomes 20x bigger (or 1.72 x 10-2 rem). This is 't - still about 0.006% of the 10CFR100 guideline values.
2. Secondly,, CPS did not perform an analysis (as did Grand Gulf) showing the offsite radiological consequences if the dry 7 ell was being purged at the same time. As stated earlier. this mode of operation is very infrequent and in addition is seldom used during nornal reactor operation. Very stringent operating procedures would be used during such a mode of operation. However, assuming all other conditional assumptions the same, and using the Grand Gulf relative increases for comparison,3 the CPS doses would be (with drywell purge) about 3.1 x 10-rem whole body and 0.13 rem to the thyroid. Again, a very small fraction of the 10CFR100 guideline limitations.
Therefore, the dose analysis, for offsite considerations, conplies with the position taken by the NRC staff in BTP CSB 6-4. No additional analysis would be necessary. 4.2.4. Response to Other Concerns Additional NRC concerns / requirements not strictly applicable to sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.3 will now be discussed. These concerns were presented in section 4.1 of this report. s , 7 The first item concerns the analysis recuired in BTP CSB 6-4 for "the reduction in the containment' pressure resulting from the
/~' partial loss of containment. atmosphere during the accident fcr ECCS \ backpressure determination". This analysis has not been spc6ifically s performed for the CPS since this is not a concern for Mark III type containments. The following reasons are presented: ,
~~1. In response to Grand Gulf Question 021.02, item (g), '~~
IPC states "This position is not applicable to the Mark III type containment because line breaks are isolac2d from the containment by the suppression pool". The worst case line break scenarios occur within the drywell. )
2. The Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) characteristics ,I for the CPS ECCS pumps take no credit for containment backpressure on the pump sizing designs.

3. This concern is more applicabic to PUR, and some BWR designed containments (Mark I & II), where containment design pressures are of the order of 40-50 psig (CPS containment design pressure is 15 psig).
Additional items of concern, presented previously, are dis- - cussed in various " Questions and Responses" section of the CPS-FSAR. ' These " questions and responses" are included here for completness in Table 4-2. IPC responses to items previously discussed are included so that prior clarification of infornation provided to () the NRC staff can be noted. This concludes IPC's responses to all concerns / requirements noted. No additional NRC staff positions have been presented at this time.
~~5. PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION OF CHE IPC ACTION PLAN IPC, in response to the previously discussed _" Action Plan",~~
proposes a schedule for completion of all actions associated with the CPS containment vent / purge issue. This schedule can be found in Table 5-1. The schedule should close-out all requirements with regards to this issue.
6. CONCLUSIONS This study has presented the issue of continuous vent / purge of the CPS Mark III containment, the IPC position regarding this issue, the NRC requirements and concerns, and a proposed "IPC Action Plan" in response to these concerns. Several considerations re'-
garding this issue have been discussed in detail in various sections ; of this study. The concerns, with regard to the CPS Mark III ' containment design, have been the following: i, ] #
~~~ ~~~
~~m -m - 1 - - ,~~
~,
1. temperature /h5midity-control of containment environmental conditions necessary for reliable and safe equipment 03 operati6n; as well as the need to improve working conditions for maintenance personnel performing inspection / repairs /
~~surveillance of such equipment.~~
~~2. . airborne' radioactivity buildup inside containment-effects -~~
~~on on-site and off -site dose levels w.r.t. the CPS ALARA~~
~~, program. ~~~
~~3. a-proposed "IPC Action Plan" - response to various NRC reqbirementa regarding CPS vent / purge systems design.~~
The Mark III containment is-designed to permit normal' access into the containmenE. This is necessary for the normal operation-of the~ station, becau'se of the location of numerous pieces of equipment within the, containment. The CPS containment is designed to be continuously ventila'ted by a 30,000 cfm system which supplies conditioned outdoor air to the containment. Containment air is exhausted from the perimeter of the refueling pools, containment dome, and. equipment cubicles. This air is either exhausted directly to the atmosphere via t'he common station HVAC vent stack or if high radiation is present the air may be filtered through the Drywell Purge System units prior to exhaust through the vent stack. The continuous ventilation system assures habitability for occupancy as required for routine maintenance and surveillance of equipment. Routinely visited areas in the containment are CRD hydraulic control ('"')' units areas, standby liquid control area; the TIP drives area, the RWCU rooms, and the containment personnel and equipment lock areas. The system includes the following features to reduce the occupancy doses to ALARA levels:
1. Air is exhausted from the periphery of the refueling pools, to sweep away any airborne activity from the pool in order to prevent it from contaminating the occupied areas.

2. Airflow patterns are maintained such that air flows from areas of low potential airborne radioactivity to areas
, of higher potential airborne radioactivity. These patterns are maintained so as to keep the radiation cubicles, such as those for RWCU heat exchangers and RWCU filter / demineralizers, at a negative pressure with respect to the general access areas of the containment. This feature helps to isolate and prevent the spread of airborne activity that might originate in the radiation cubicles. . 3. Air flow rates for the various areas of the containment
~~are designed to bb high enough to maintain the airborne activity there at or below 25% of the maximum permissable concentrations (MPC).~~
~~('T~~
~~~./~~
e
4. Exhaust air is routed through a combination of HEPA and charcoal filters when necessary before release, to O- minimize offsite radioactivity levels.

5. Equipment and piaing heat removal from the containment is accomplished by air flow patterns and fan-coil units in individual areas.

6. Additional airborne contaminants including welding fumes, fumes and gases from lubricants, cable insulation, motor windings, paints, adhesives, the suppression pool, etc.
are reasonably diluted with an air change rate of approximately 1 per hour. s In conclusion the CPS containment vent / purge systems are sufficiently designed to perform their stated functions, and respond adequately to safely isolate the containnent structures under worst case (DBA-LOCA) acciden'. conditions. Therefore, continuous purging / ventilating of the CPS containment during normal operation is appropriate, poses no undue risk to the public, and should be allowed. ( I i n U f3 D r%. N_ M TABLE 2-1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS FCR NORMAL OPESATIO*4 RELATIVE FRESSURE TEMP. HUMIDITY RADIATIO *4 TYPE INTEORATED MSE ( ra j,) DESICN-BASIS AREA (AS NOTED) *F t NORMAL ACCIDENT M MAL ACCIDENT ACCIDENT TYPE
1. INSIDE DRYh* ELL Drywell, inside -0.5 to 2.0 135* Avg 40-554 Gamma Gama plus 5x10' 2x10 3 LOCA of reactor shield psig 65* Min 906 Max beta wall 150* Max lot Min

1. Area above Same as Same as same as Gama Gamma plus g shield wall above above above beta 1x10 7 2x10 14CA to top of drywell

2. Region adjacent Same as Same as Same as Gamma Gamma plus y g above above beta %x10 2x10 LOCA to core outside above of reactor shield wall
, 3. Under reactor Same as 135* Avg Same as Gamma Gamma plus u pressure vessel above 65* Min above beta 7 8 o inside of reactor 135* Max 1x10 2x10 IMCA 8 shield wall
4. Vicinity of recir- Same as 120* Avg Same as Gamma Gamma plus culation pump above 65* Min above beta 7 8 motors 135* Max 1x10 2x10 toCA II. CONTAINMENT (OUT-SIDE DRYWELL)
General floor -0.10 in. to 80* Nor 50% Nor Gamma Gamma plus 4 g beta Ix10 2x10 LOCA area (-) 1.0 in. Water gauge 104* Max 904 Max static 65* Min lot Min pressure 6 8 Vicinity of -0.10 in. to 122' Nor 40-504 Gamma Gamma plus 1.8 x 10 2x10 LOCA steanlines -1.0 in. Nor beta (Main Steam Water gauge 148* Max 90-984 Pipe Tunnel) static Max pressure 65* Min 10' Min Standby liquid Same as 104* Max 504 Nor Gamma Gamma plus control area above 65* Min 90% Max beta 4 86* Nor 104 Min 1x10
~~m> iable has been revised ad &e. vevbia fewuded -lb de IdRc for revieur.~~
~~% revisin kes et sipipantl y mpct on & d;5c"5"* Fmenta cx Wis reprf.~~
i
O n W n G TABLE 2.-l. (Cont'd> RELATIVE DESICN= BASIS IIUMIDITY RADIATION TYPE INTEGRATED DOSE (ran PRESSURE TEMP NOR.YAL ACCIDENT ACCIDENT TYPF
*F 4 NORMb ACCIDENT AREA (AS NOTED)
(Garma Plus Beta) 122 Max Same as Gamma Gansna plus 7 g 1.OCA Cleanup systems Same as beta 1x10 2x10 above 118 Avg above
1. Ileat exchangers 65 Min 7 8 IDCA 3.5 x 10 2x10

2. Filters and tanks 8 goeg Same as Gamma Gamma plus 3.5 x 10" 2.6 x 10 Area above sup- Same as same as beta above above above pression pool i
() 1 0 l
1 O ~'a 3 e 2-2 EaulPMENT CoBicle HEAT LoAar Ac Peat REMovAt. CAPA81 LIT!66 Catcut.Aiep Insn.u.en C.oBlCLE/ Room + lear toas cooue>c cAPAciry Bw/ng
~~I.Rucu vni.ve Roar 'A'. 1.2.,950 .~~
~~N'/'ne.~~
2. Pxcta be bw"B". 12950

3. Fuee TaA>>3eeg vat.ve M 12.,5 6 0

4. Main SreAm hfG Tumia bQ750 700,000

5. Rwcu kve % A,',is'eune. " * "
~~9956 t,.ntr/venw Vesset,CuntelA 5'f190 N6,3oo~~
7. Fn.r./wsN. Ilesset.,CusicalB 57,190 M&300 8.Str./resun Napins %eOiexit 20$20

9. PIPE $UB/CLG .$ ?,E2.3
~~/0. Twca BAcku)AGM k6C. 2498I j~~
~~Pune coerctc 41,510 II. Rwcu BAtku) ASH F/.D~~
~~^ }{Ec. TANK CUBICLE tz.Resi Alon-Rec. llx asuiN 115p40 183,800~~
~~13. Ecs.$ AleZrs.Hx Cusicie"X 115) 40 .i83,800 .~~
~~/!/.Ctaw AtERWts1-Ei.203'3" 75.,550 351/80 .~~
Is.Gaam Sta Ess1-6.203' 3" Ef270 351,500 16.GwxAt E8es Wesr-5.779'o" 60,346 5z+'00 17.& mat Rsm EAsr-6.77t'o" 88 026 5%foo O If.&mi AgeA Wes1-6.755'o" lIoof'l!
~~351,500 19.(-mat Agen FAsr-Ei.7tdo" -~~
~~351,500~~
~~->t N o coot tNG UNITS /NSTAiLE* DIN THeSE Ko0ME/C UBic tEf. + IAsFoRNATrar) UA!AVAILABLE AT Til6 T/.1E 'T/// f SEPORT lt)RITTSA) . . -.. . : . z..~~
~~_37_~~
==
TABLE 2-3 : CPS Dssics bue /eam A. PEACTOR WATE'll - CCOLA:;T ACTIVATIC!! PROOCCTS D. STSIC'-RASIC Pr?.'T 11TEP r!O T !r*2 PPOSUa-* datu111trtum yilu.=s - anter1 M reetreulatten linesi e7pgp gc97epgg
/
~~{ J C0!:CENTMTIO!; (,/ ffoT00" HAf? t,;re r 'tm,~~
- CONOC?:TPATION 190T97 !!A? " 1,f rE f "- M1 N-13 10 min 7.1 - 2 M-16 7.1 see 3,3 + 1 Sr-99 52 day 3.3 - 3 N-17 4.1 see 1. 3 - 2 Sr-90 27.7 yr 2.3 - 4 F-18 110 min St-91 9.7 hr 0-19 4. 4 - 2 3.1 - 2 26.8 see 1.2 Sr-92 2.7 hr 1.4 - 1 TO*AL 3.o . 1 Zr-95 65 day 4.1 - 5 D. PEArTop wATrp .;c.:000LANT ACTf'.'ATir*: PP^nUc7q Zr-47 17 hr 3.6 - 5 CCNCENTRATION hb-95 35 day 4.5 - 5 ISOTCPE !!Atr LiPE f uti /d Na-24 go-99 67 hr 2. 5 - 2 15 hr 2,0 - 3 P-32 14.3 day 2.0 - 5 Te-99m 6 hr 9. 4 - 2 Cr-51 27.3 dav 5. 0 .I Te-101 14 min 2.0 - 1 Mn-54 313 day 4,o - g Ma-56 2.6 hr $,0 - 2 Ru-103 39.6 day 2.; - 5 Co-58 71.4 day 5.0 - 3 Ru-106 367 day 2.8 - 6 Co-60 5.3 yr 5.0 - 4 Fe-59 45 day 3,9 - 5 Te-129m 34 day 3.7 - 4 N1-65 2.6 hr 3,o - 4 Te-132 78 hr 1. 5 - 2 2n-65 244 day 2.0 - 6 Zn-69m 13.7 hr 3.0 - 5 Cs-134 1.7 - 4 Ag-110m 253 day 6.0 - 5 Cs-136 1.1 - 4 ; W-187 23.9 hr 3,a -3 Cs-137 30 yr 2.6 - 4 TOTAL 6.2 -J Cs-138 32.2 min 2. 5 - 1, i
~~C. FrST1: nu s pr3CToo creo v7 g.; r e. Ba-139 82.9 min 2. 0 - 1 '~~
~~g. p ng.7---~~
. Da-140 12.8 day 9. 5 - 3 HuCC E'N Ba-141 la nin 2. 4 - 1 CC:: CENTRATION Ba-142 11 min 2. 3 - 1 l IsoTorr. HAIR LIFE -f .c! /il Ce-141 32.5 day 4. 3 - 5 Br-93 2.4 hr 1.7 - 2 Ce-143 33 hr 3.9 - 5 Br-24 31.8 mtn 3.5 - 2 Ce-144 284 day 3.8 - 5 cx Br-85 3.0 min 2.2 - 2 1 3 I-131 8 day 1.5 - 2 Pr-143 13.5 day 4.1 - 5
~~( 1-132 2.3 hr 1.5 - 1~~
,- I-133 21 hr 1.0 - 1 f.d-147 11.1 day 1.5 - 5 1-134 52.8 min 3.0 - 1 I-135 6.7 hr 1." - 1 Nn-239 235 day 2.7 - 1 TCTAL E'-A TOTAL 1. I + C' * ( 7.1 - 2 = 7. 3 x 10 ') '
~~NCBLE RADICGAS SOURCE TERwS6 $0gpCg Tgpg~~
~~.ISOTOPP H AL F-L I F,'- ~~~
~~SOURCE TERM *t=0~~
~~. (,C1/seet JSOTCPE HALF-LIFE (r 1/=ect .~~
~~Kr-83m 1.86 hr 3.4 E3 Xe-142 1.22 sec 7.3 E4 - , .~~
~~. Kr-85m 4.4 hr 6.1 E3 i Xe-143 0.96 see 1.2 E4 '~~
~~q Kr-85 10.74 yr 10 to 20* Xe-144 9.0 sec 5.6 E2~~
. Kr-87 76 min 2.0 E4 Kr-88 2.79 hr 2.0 E4 TOTA 1.S Approx. 2.5 E6 , Kr-89 3.18 man 1.3 E5 Kr-90 32.3 see 2.8 E5
Estamatea trom esperimental observations Kr-91 8.6 sec 3.3 E5 Kr-92 1.84 sec 3.3 E5 ._
~~Kr-93 1.29 sec 9.7 E4 Kr-94 1.0 sec 2.3 E4 coot 337 Ac7gyA7tny ppODUCTS IN PEACTOR STEAM~~
Kr-95 0.5 sec 2.1 E3 Kr-97 1.0 see 1.4 El 73c7epp CONCENTRATION RELEASE RATE Xe-131m g3tp tryg g,c3fg g,eg,,,e3 11.96 day 1.5 El Xe-133m 2.26 day' 2.9 E2
~
~~O Xe-133 5.27 day 8.2 E3 * **# '~~
~~,%, Xe-135 9.16 hr 2.2 E4 N-17 4.1 see 3.5 - 2 5.7 + 4 i~~
Xe-135m 15.7 min 2.6 E4 T-18 110 min 4.4 - 4 7.2 + 2 Xe-137 3.82 min 1.5 E5 0-19 26.8 see 5.9 - 1 9.6 + 5 Xe-138 14.2 min 8.9 E4 X-139 40 see l 2.8 E5 Xe-140 13.6 see 3.0 E5 l
~~, , . . , . l~~
TABLE 2-4 { a f oroe'er Pytfy?"fff emetastett!'N9 f (4/cm 6 1 C R YWt.L ct'sFFAL App A yIy PU *r ? Shcu F/O PkC11 N4 PNT 4 Dff"TL VALVE Ds4 A40 VALVF #4 RWC.U Pt *nQP'LD re r. A pf cr- :ta t w.8 =f f.138 1.1-00 9.0-40 1.1 12 7.9-09 S.I-09 4.9-09 t 133 7.1-00 . 1.1-11 S.3-00 3.3-00 2.6-08 I 13S 1.1-07 - 3.9-13 0.2 00 9.1-00 4.0 00 pr OS 4.3-10 . . . . er 57 4.3-07 . . . . . . sr 99 4.3-47 . . . . . Er 89 2.2-04 , sr 90 1.7-es . . . . . se 133 1.0-07 . . .
~~se 13Se 5.3-07 . .. . . .~~
23 13S 4.6-67 . . . . . Be 13 7 2.0-06 '. . He 130 1.0-o4 . . . . We 24 7.1-11 . . 1.1-11 4.9-12 S.3 12 Rn 56 1.0-09 . . 2.6-10 1.6-10 1.3 10 Ce SO 1.0-10 . . 1.3 12 1.6 11 1,3-11 Ce 40 1.0-11 . . 2.6 12 1.5-12 1.3 12 W 107 1.1-10 . . 1.5-11 1.0-11 0.0-12 sr 89 1.2 10 - 3.2-14 1.7-11 1.1-11 t 0.7-12
~~) Sr 90 0.9-12 .~~
3.0-14 1.3-12 0.2-13 4.6-13 Sr 91 2.9-09 - 3.6-13 4.2 10 2.7-16 2.1-10 sr 92 S.0-09 . S.3-14 7.4-10 4.7-10 3.7 10 RO 99 0.5-10 = 1.5-14 1.3-10 7.6-11 6.4 11 te nel 7.0-09 - = 1.2-09 7.6 14 S.0-10 fe 12N 1.3-11 1.9-14 ' 2.0-12 1.2-12 9.0-13 r To 132 S.7-10 . 1.0 11 # ~ 0.5-11 S.6-11 . 4.2-11
L v Ca 134

6.0-12 . .
~~9.0-13 S.6-13 4.5-13~~
~~Cs 137 9.3-12 . 3,3 34 g,g.g3 g,g.g3 g,,,g, , e ,;,~~
Cs 130 9.6-09 . . 1.4-09 0.0-10 7.2 30 se 139 7.0-09 . . 1.2-09 7.6-10 S.0 10* se let S.7-11
~~6.2 13 0.5-12~~
~~.S.4-12 4.2-12 ta 141 9.3-09 - -~~
1.4-09 0.0-10 4.9-10 Os 142 0.5-09 . . 1.3-09 7.6 10 6.4-10 . hp 239 9.6-0e . - 1.4-09 0.0-10 7.2-10
O O O l I I TABLc 2- 5 j ESTIf1ATES Ol' OCCUPATIO!!AL RADI ATIO!I DOSE PROF 1 AIRBORf 3E RADIOACTIVITY t l , I ! DOSE RATE, ren/hr DOSE (man-rem /yr-unit Whole Occupancy Uhole Lot:ATI3 Thyroid Lung B-Skin Body (man-br/yr) Thyroid Lung 6-Skin Body
~~1. Containment-General Area 1.2-3 5.0-7 - -~~
33,850 4.1+1 1.7-2 - - l l I 2. Containment- i Valve roomn 2.8-2 2.5-5 - - 400 1.1+1 1.0-2 - -
~~3. Dryuell 8.9-2 1.6-4 5.8-3 7.1-3 400 3.5+1 6.2-2 2.3+0 2.8+0 l l~~
e i i, u i w l i I J, l, I i i l 1 l 4 1 l i 3 9 ,
.! l 4 4 i
i
; I r
1 a
s TABE 3-1: CPS VEMT / PURGE VALVE SPEC.I F iCATlONS mu . es m an - t.P ruhD f.P wedu >=,A g . ge A X. . f RJ QVs'J' VhbVE YALVG VA!.,N E F Mu >:cm.ae,t. o,s Vv6 ,,.b.,,c e MW- {c :ot.tE.sgt! r . c. /ntvg vAtn et toof f otn C,11,6 CF 4 E E ATrao Lt Ar R AW r,* a er. 6 L oeunti c .c.a a. v .amost us .ALVE FMLu%E s eacf @ F u u.
~~t* A u co*4 moss~~
.wve c e s.> '^ F *T W* ,n cT'a'a'c oE S ded n eu w a.i,s,4 .,,,,,,c' Ps5M LDIl0P, DI.E r.mesivit.e.a' -
~~z wist +3yat s h*,'q' N ,1 'g #4 8d~~
~~O!"X8 CC*16I.f f4 rui ort o I~~
Tsur Nh,k Trps)p. ea .tsa s..e I*e r o t4il , 6 dh 07) nr.n. (p. 6)47 f es ir, ) (IT/ff e) (LAM S ' (Se c.) ( M C.7 f e vetts /vR T "a
" *
~~CC'5~~
% VR A O.5 *. o n o ,.i Aarst 6 30 100 **'
~~ra *rm 5 "fe'~~
% 0%','1., 36' us I i Ic+ 15 its 2 15 71 o ctostt NN'al.2U 9 '" 'A 3 E'E ' .solb R h00E+.t u .__o _ ....r... .4. . ca (1,;;,
a _4 a t,j vn 4 o,g
~~","Jl[*4* . enan. .n a~~
~~o 1.'f. 36" 1. 104 15 l's5 2 15 71 Co h lu =~~
~~ra b.a - - - - - - -~~
~~so auc u b r.,uppi m.. .,;;- ,... Mew,C _t1 -~~
~~v. sg'. ,-.-.~~
~~,. w . G 5~~
~~non. coms. n e.. o... ..w..,=,.3.,.~~
** 2T 1 1c4 30 Mo 2. 30 80 -- .
~~s u. s.m~~
~~. . .r. , ,~~
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~~, v, r. .a 30 0 3 S S S - . h.%.,~~
~~to ... , . m3. s , 3 ,,. 80 a.~... .s,cs4) e ,g .~~
. + + v . a .w- 24' 5 5 1 150 30 330 2. 6,,a m.
~~2, :ygp .s.mo s.L - --~~
~~s. . .re. 3..,.. ..,;~~
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%s t,m'.;*c, te u.sd - -- ~' - - -A mi e. w n.v v..ac.s!E va '
o.s 1 is 71 '9 C E ls m= un> 0, t'%4. Wi/c".ir. e 3 p. L e i 122. is 185 9 cco,.f., E E. m.n,.. m
~~- ._e.~~
m .a 's_~ __ _ _ _ _ 0 mr.c s.$ t-y VQ _o n.,.T; i . t 1:TI L 3c- 1 '1zt ts its a is 71 c.5 A n ., n. o%, 1m::pa uc,r. ~ ~ - ' - - g - - - - -- - c4 2 30 313 G N..a' % $e. . n'.'.E isa iff, .
~~,4*o s .ag 1c_ _"~~
10 i 150 30 330 o a- - us a.'.' . .__ - ! E 1r ir ,r y 1r 1r ir
~~Vat.vt. MAMuFACTURER FOR cps is Post . seal INTEMATs oMAL DJ 0' .~~
q % ,.r
. a., . o.
c, TABLE 3-2 LER DATA SUMMARS TARE FR ILURE C A tr$ E. CF %f FA.Ludf VALVE $11E OF vnLVE a es Lf as er T.os
, ;' 'fj',848'y*
or-H9E FHituRE Tfrecret VALVE MANDFACTURER TYPE VALVE NEUF & TSER FA AUa's tawSI Tws> e 4*.mrero Att (Ess
~~"*^'""~~
~~EXCESWE i9,%I6'Yrh,4@' ' "~ '#d " # 5 gg, s~ <n w e, nar SUA Kit.TEbl SEttVtCtuATM~~
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~~7,m;g up.a n,aa. -~~
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aure uen.us uaia6s ana ssirs.4. M'/*gM m.ii. u . Te>vo. u .. .u .. u . , c o . . . , RocktoELL MA*]t* FACT. 2 l smar ca. n. t 4s' n+~ea crere 4 i ettsutD Se*T)l$c i Lamanac courap twr
~ "'"" "' " ' klELE') G MLt(tt6R Co. 2.
~~cA <wur (ca :,sats)~~
~~Te sts. Isc6ATicAL [ ""[,"' ,,, 6 I POSI-SEAL ItsrER. 2 '~~
- ca_ar je i tocOJ $E At$ - LEAxAGE ccarT4aospgatr ts u -) wf narT ca. 6 CEMTER-LINE Injc, 1, 'H Ar> 3de > STE84') TEST 5 ^ " " '"*' * **'
Isotetsca . . c e e.,: .a..e es. 15 20* tm~a.6 ai4's.4sAct 1 VERSu PRopuc.75 1 [r2eE('Edd AO* ( e s+d) (19814 Co*'EC' $ '*. A
-re c'*e ' ~~ Mnst":EILintd IHTER 1 nor snito, Le m se NE "- 1 d' .yykNonga Tests , coata, m aT 3 ^[.5 a st e r,aa.s ,.o Is otATit A. -
~~(',$;<gedrat* po32. stat~~
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~~f0TALS 67~~
- - - -L'?*'."?,3 .. 2"S ""**' 2 T hee l.. .incn . . . .tap .r.ett. .. VALVE MATERIALS TABLE sue .t .iu.s can.enea s . ., . ., 1. g ., ,
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at 9)a c.. ao atr .< eniuc am m , s. , , ,.- w e.* ",wm
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. - . . - - - -~-~- ~-----~~~---~---..
~~T kSLE 4-1. PURGE AND VENT VALVE REVIEW LIST I. General Design Data f For each valve type provide the following: A. Valve:~~
. P&ID Designation (number): . Type: (Butterfly, gate, globe etc. ): . Size: . Manufacturer: . Style Number . Serial Number (Optional): . Standards and/or Codes designed to (AWWA, ASME, etc.): . Pressure ratings or classes (25#, 50#,150# etc. ) (body, shaf t/ disc): . Disc type (symetrical, asymetrical etc.):
~~Disc thickness to diameter ratio (A/D):~~
. Shaf t diameter (nominal): . Valve location (inside or outside containment): . Valve opening limitation (90*= full open-butterflies): . Reason for limiting opening (Shaft stress, Operator etc.)
~~where applicable:~~
~~. Means used to limit valve opening (description) where applicable: . System:~~
~~B. Operator~~
. Manufactu rer: . Model Number: . Style Number: . Serial Number (Optional) . Type ( Air-spring, Air-Air, Electric Motor etc. ):
~~, . Standards and/or codes designed to:~~
~~. Accumulator used (yes/no):~~
i C. Pilot Solenoid Valve j Manufacturer: Model Number: Serial Number (0ptional): Type (3-Way, 9-Way): Inside or Outside Containment: 0
O' II. Valve Stroke Time A. What is the valve stroke time? B. What is the valve stroke time required by Tech Specs for inservice testing of these valves? C. If pressure-time profile is used in determining the differential
, pressure the valve is qualified to close against (rather than peak containment pressure). show that the stroke time does not increase under load (as a result of combined valve torques or forces developed and/or containment backpressure). If stroke time does increase the resulting closure and lag time should be used in the qualification.
D. What is the maximum " delay time" from the start of LOCA to the receipt of an isolation signal? III. Determination of Differential Pressure Used to Oualify the Valve A. What is the peak containment pressure? B. Provide the pressure-time profile of the accident case postulated. C. Is the valve assembly (valve and operator) capable of with:.tanding a differential pressure equal to the peak containment pressure of all disc opening angles from initial to full closed. D. If the peak containment pressure was not used as the differential pressure for the qualification, show how the differential pressure O across the valve was established at various disc angles during closure. In addition, provide the following:
~~1. Containment pressure response (Pc) vs. disc angle (and associated stroke time).~~
l
2. Valve inlet pressure (P ) vs. disc angle (and associated stroke time).

3. Pressure drop across valve (differential pressure) disc angle (and associated stroke time).
IV. Determination of Valve Dynamic Torque Coefficients / Loads: A. Butterfly Valves i 1. Test Report j A test report should be submitted which establishes the basis for determining the torque coefficients of butterfly valves . The following areas should be addressed either in the report or in a supplement provided with the report.
a. Description of the test setup (include upstream and downstream piping and inlet and outlet nozzle configurations)

b. Description of test valve and justification that the valve is representative of the inservice valve.
~~) c. Test procedure~~
d. Installation configurations tested, i.e. flow directions, different shaf t vs. elbow orientations and disc closure direction.

e. Test results including a tabulation of torque coef ficients detennined
~~- _at.various angles of opening for the valves under review.~~
f. Piping ficw resistance differences between the test configuration and the actual configuration for the inservice valve.

g. Provide an example of how dynamic torques are calculated for the inservice valve.

2. Installation Factors for Inservice Valves

a. For each purge / vent valve installation provide a sketch or description showing the following:
~~A. Direction of flow B. Disc closure direction~~
~~.._C. . Curved side of valve disc upstream or downstream (asymetric disc) 4 D. Orientation and distance of elbows, tees, bends etc. within 20 pipe diameters upstream of the valve.~~
~~E. Shaft orientation F. Distance between in-series valves.~~
~~b. Describe the procecures (preferably test) used as a basis to show~~
~~~ which installation produces the worst case loads on the valve.~~
m
c. Provide a tabulation of torque coef ficients and corresponding in-service valve torques for the installation determined as the worst case for each valve size and ty]e.

d. What effect will the failure of an upstream in-series valve in the partially or full open position have on flow, differential pressure, and torque coefficients? Describe how these affects were correlated
~~' with installation factors to determine a worst case torque coefficient. B. Valve Types Other Than Butterflies~~
~~' ~~~
' If tests are perforded to establish dynamic loads on valves other than butterfly valves the test reports should be submitted for review. As a minimum these reports should include the following:
1. Description of test setup

2. Description of test valve and justification that the valve is representative of inservice valve.

3. Test procedure

4. Test results

5. Show howid namic loads are calculated for the inservice valve.
O 6. For each globe type purge / vent valve installation provide a sketch of the valve showing the direction of flow througn the valve (during the accident mode). i V. Other Loads
~~, A. Show how dynamic torque determined are combined with other torques, e.g.~~
bearing torques, seating torques, etc. Show how these torques were determined. (For valves other than butterfly type show applicable load combinations). B. Describe how the seismic loads were combined with the torque loads or dynamic loads. VI. Stresses A. Provide a tabulation of the following for each valve type / size:
1. Critical valve parts analyzed

2. Loads or load combinations used (torsional, bending etc.)

3. Stresses calculated (include seismic loads in calculation) and corresponding disc angles ,(or calculated allowable differential pressures based on calculated stresses) s
~~-) 4. Stress allowables~~
~~5. Codes / Standards used to determine allowables for each part (include percentage of yield / ultimate strength)~~
B. Describe how valve structural integrity is assured against containment pressure accident loads when the valve is in the closed position. If determined by test, what margins are available to acccunt for instrument error, environmental effects, etc.? C. Are any of the valve or associated equipment parts over stressed when closing in a no-load situation. VII. Operators A. Is there sufficient torque margin available from the operator to overcome the combined torques developed that tend to oppose valve closure as the valve strckes from its initial open position to the fully seated position. What is the minimum margin available and at what disc angle does this minimum exist? B. Is the torque / load rating of the operatcr exceeded by the absolute value of combined valve torques / loads developed? Where rating is dependent on disc opening angle show that the combined torques do not exceed the rating at any disc opening angle.
~~-5 VIII. Scecific Valve Type Ouestions The following questions apply to specific valve types only and need to be answered only where applicable. If not applicable. state so.~~
A. Torque Due To Containment Backpressure Effect (TCB) For those air operated valves located inside containment is the operator design of a type that can be affected by the containment p; essure rise (backpressure effect) 1.e. where the containment pressure acts to reduce the operator torque capability due to TCB. Discuss the operator design with respect to the air vent and bleeds. Show how TCB was calculated (if applicable). B. Where air operated valve assemblies use accumulators as the fail-safe feature, describe the accumulator air system configuraticn and its cper-ation. Discuss active electrical components in the accumulator system, and the basis used to determine their qualification for the environmental conditions experienced. Is this system seismically designed? How is the allowable leakage from the accumulators determined and monitored. C. For valve assemblies requiring a seal pressurization system (inflatable main seal) describe the air pressurization system configuration and operation including means used to determine that valve closure and seal O_ pressurization have taken place. Discuss active electrical components in this system, and the basis used to determine their qualification for the environmental condition experienced. Is this system seismically designed? D. Where electric motor operators are used to close the valve has the minimum available voltage to the electric operator under both normal or emergency modes been determined and specified to the operator manufacturer to assure the adequacy of the operator to stroke the valve at accident conditions with these lower limit voltages available? Does this reduced voltage operation result in any significant change in stroke timing? Describe the emergency mode power source used. E. Where electric motor and air operator units are equipped with handwheels, does their design provide for automatic re-engagement of the motor operator following the handwheel mode of operation? If not, what steps are taken to preclude the possibility of the valve being lef t in the handwheel mode following some maintenance, test etc. type operation? F. For electric motor operated valves have the torques developed during operation been found to be less than the torque limiting settings? O l
TABLE 4-2, C.P3 -F5 AR *QOcTied as RESPeAl$f[. l
~~'F 480.17 Section 9.4.6 of the PSAR states that the contain-~~
~~ment atmosphere is continuously exhausted during g~~
t normal operation. However, we believe that purging / venting should be minimized during reactor opera-s4 tion because the plant is innerently safer with closed purge valves than with open Lines requiring valve action to provide containment iso 1', tion. In fact, serious consideration should be given to a plant design such that purging / venting is not required during operation. Therefore, provide a detailed discussion of the reasons why the
, Clinton Station needs to purge, and an estimate of the number of hours per year that purging . is expected through each particular valve.
~~RESPONSE~~
General Electric Mark III Containments are designed to be accessible and ventilated during normal reactor operation and during normal shutdown and refueling operation. To provide ventalation, Clinton Station has two 36-inch diameter penetrations in the containment (one for supply and one
~~. for exhaust). Redundant containment isolation valves are provided on each containment ventilation penetration. These containment isolation valves close on any one of the following i~~
~~signals: i~~
a. High Drywell Pressure o

b. Low Reactor Water Level

c. High Radiation in the Containment Building Exhaust Duct

d. High Radiation in the Containment Building Refueling Pool Exhaust Duct.
j' s Normal ve'ntilation in the containment is needed to control the concentrations and the spread of airborne radioactivity in the areas of the containment, as discussed in Subsection 12.3.3. In addition, it is used for controlling the contain-ment pressure, temperature, and relative humidity. - I % Radiological consequences due to the occurrence of a postu-i lated LOCA when the containment is being ventilated during normal operation is given in detail in Subsection 9.4.6.3h. 480.18 The design of the containment purge and venti- -
~~. lation system consists of both 36-inch and '~~
~~4-inch lines. From the discussion in Sections~~
~~, i 9.4.6 and 9.4.7.2, it is not clear what size '~~
~~lines are going to be used to continuously purge / ,, ;['~~
~~, ! vent the containment. Provide this information. '~~
l Also, state your intention to comply with Section , 8.1.b of BTP CSB 6-4 which provides that on-line purge systems should be limited to one purge N 3 RESPONSE line and one vent line. + , Two 36-inch containment penetrations, with two redundant - l containment isolation valves (1VR001A and IVR001B) in the } supply line (lVR01B 36) and two redundant containment isola-l tion valves (IVQ004A and IVQ0048) in the exhaust line 4 (IVQQ2B 36) are provided for containment ventilation or purge during normal plant operating conditions. Each of these four 36-inch containment isolation valves
~~has 4-inch bypass valves (1VR002A, IVR002B, IVQOO6A, and ~ .~~
IVQ0068) which are used post-LOCA when the Standby Gas Treat- l . ment System or Drywell Purge System may be used as a backup to the hydrogen recombiners. These bypass valves are normally
~~closed and can be opened post-LOCA.~~
4 j These penetrations and valves are identified in rigure 9.4-11 i (Sheet 1 of 3) and Figure 9.4-13 (Sheet 2 of 2). One penetra-1 tion provides the supply air and the other is used for exhaust. 1 480.19 In Section 9.4.7.2.2 of the FSAR, there is no ] discussion of how the isolation valves in the purge and ventilation system will be affected by debris which might be generated following
- a LOCA. Since it is our position that Section B.1.g of BTP CSB 6-4 should be met, provide an acceptable debris screen design. Guidance ,s
~~. is provided below which, if followed, wo'J1d -~~
~~represent an acceptable debris screen denign.~~
, a) The debris screen should be seismic cate-gory I and installed typically about one 4 pipe diameter away from the inner side of >
~~j the inboard isolation valve.~~
/
' 1 d a Ne 4-2 (cont'd.) b) The ploing batwaen the deorts scr?en and the valve should also be seismte Cate-4 cry I design, c) The debris screen should be designed to withstand the LCCA differential pressure. d) The dentis screen openinq typically sho'J1d be asout 2 inches by 1-3/16 inch. RFSPONSE Proviston is made to ensure that eucply and exhaust contain-ment tuolation valves closure will not be prevented by debris potentially becoming entrained in the escaptna air by pro-viding protection at the inlets of the connecting ductworn systems. The provisions include the following:
a. CPS has Seismic Category I ductwork attached upstream and downstream of containment ventilation isolation valves. Ductwork openings have screens, grilles, or registers to prevent debris from entering the ductwork and reacning the inboard isolation valves. In addition, filters and cooling coils prevent debris from entering the supply air ductwork.
~~[(, t b. The ductwork and ,tptng of the containment ventilation~~
,/
~~system is designed for Seismic Category I.~~
~~c. During the time between initiation of LOCA and closure of isolation valves, the expected pressure drop is 0.5 psig. It is expacted that these components would stay ,~~
~~intact at this pressure differential.~~
~~d. Typically, the screen opentnq is 0.5 inch by 0.5 inch I~~
~'
~~and the opening for the grilles or registers is an O.75-inch wide slot. , _ .~~
~ - - - - - 'e . The periodic testing of isolation valves will confirm that the valve closure is not inhibited by debris.
~~f. The installing contractor has procedures which require _ .-~~
that ductwork be inspected for cleanliness prior to turnover to the Owner. 480.20 The design and proposed operation of the contain-ment purge system is not in complete conformance with our BTP CSD 6-4, " Containment Purging During Normal Operation." We note that the FSAR does not present information addressing several items in Section B of the BTP. Therefore, provide information in accordance with the attached posttion and address the following areas a) B.5.a - radiological analysis; and b) B.5.d - allowable lean rates.
~~RESPONSE~~
a. The response to this posttion is given in Subsection 9.4.6.3.

b. The response to this position will be provided as part of the response to Question 480.07.
~~f 1~~
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~~We v2 Gowe. .~~
%pC ACTION TLAN SUK!O o63 as clattfted by NURIC-0737; . .4.2 cr-tita-aat ! na l it t -n r=a-a'i*t!itv The centainment isolatten analytical setreint pressure for wark III centainment is arprostrately 2 ?"x?'at*tra psta *drywell pressures. lnder nortal Ocerating
( ) cenottiens, fluctuattens in the atrespnere bare?etric \ ,,/ 1. Ccntatr?cnt isolation system destens shall cc? ply pressure as well as neat inputs frer sucn scurces as with the recor?encations cf Standard Revtew Plan purcs can result in ecntait ent pressure increases on Sucsectten 6.2.4 s i.e., that there be diversity in the crder of 1 pst. Consecuently, the teclatten the cara?eters senseo for the initiation ci setrotnt of 2 psto provices 1 pst margin acove the containtent isolationi. maximum espected cperating pressure. The 1 pst maronn to isolatten has preved to be a suttacle value
2. All plant persennel snall 7tve careful consideratton to mantmtze the pcsstbtitty cf spurtous centatnTent to tne definttien of essenttal and ncnessential isolation. At tne same tire, it is such a low value syste s, tdentity eacn system determineo to be (partteularly in view of the small dry. ell volures essenttal, identify esen system to ne ncnessential, that it provides a very sensittve and pesattve means describe the basis for selectten of each essential of deteettnc and protectina against breats ano leans cystem. Todtfy their containment tsolatton destons in the reacter coolant system. No enance of tne accordingly, and report the results of the setpoint ts necessary.
~~reevaluaticn to the NRC.~~
3. All nonessential syste?n shall be autetatically 6&7. Following is a listing of the CPS containment boundary vent and purge isolatten valvas tsolated oy the containment isolatscn stonal.

4. The destnn of centrol systems fcr autcratte Isolation Sionals valy,q <c.. netos, g,tten teger.3tten ecntain?ent isolatten valves shall be such that resetttnq the tsolatten utgnal will not result in the auto *atic reopentne of centatnrent isotatten valves. IVQ0GIA 1,2,3,4 keylocked, key removaole Peepenin1 of ccntainTent tsolation valves snall .n
~~. " auto~~
~~IVCO34B 1,2,3,4 keylocKed, key removable require deliberate operater acticn.~~
~~in " auto" IVAOC6A 1,2,5 keylocxed, with bypass~~
5. The cci.tatnment setpoint pressure that initiates contatn?ent isolation !cr nonessential penetrations switch IVOOC6B 1,2.5 keylocked, with bypars most te reduced to the etntrum cc?pattble with normal swggen operating conditions. IVR301A 1,2,3,4 keylocked, key removable in " auto *

6. Contatr?ent purge valves that do not satisfy the IVR00lB 1,2,3,4 keylocked, key removable cretioti tv criterta set fcrth in Branch .echntcal in " auto
Pcstticn CC3 6-4 cr the Statt Interim Posttten of IVRO 2A 5 Octccer 23, 1979 Tust ce sealed cicses as defined in keylocked, key removable SEP o.2.4, ltet 11.3.I during cperaticnal condttten: in "-lose" IVRC023 5 keylocked, key removaole 1, ., 3, and 4. Furthermore, tnese valves rust be gn .close" vartfted to be closed at least every 31 days. :A ccpy of the Staff Intertz Posttten is encicsed as Notes
~~/ AttacnTent I).~~
~~l kx .]/ 7. Ccntairvent purge and vent isolaticn valves must~~
~~1. RPV Level 2.~~
~~c!cne en a hton radiation stanal. 2. Crywell pressure high. Ts e.,eere.~~
~~3. Containment exhaust duct high radiation.~~
he contatnment isolation system for CPS has been reviewed in accordance with SUREG-0737. The results of the revtes are as 4. Hiqh radiation in centatnrent refueltnq pool ennaust tollowst duct.
~~1. Every contatnTent isolation valve with the exceptten 5. Contaanrent pressure greater than or equal to 2 pstg.~~
of valves IVRCO2A and IVR]D2B receives at a rintrum, two tsolatten sicnals from diverse sources. The above two valves are tne containment building HVAC At present, all of the above listed valves anbcard and cutcoard isolation valves and receive the meet the intent of positions 6 and 7 of the NUREC. 1solatten sicnal of "contatnment pressure creater than 2 pstg." However, these valves are keylocxed at Purce and vent valves are to isolate on high radtation the nancswatch in the " closed" posttton. stonals, and those purce and vent valves that do not
2. Essential and nonessential systems, for the purpose tsolate on htgn ractation signals are to te of containment isolaticn are tjentified in Table D-2. , Sealed clcsed" valves.
Essential syster.2 are cefined as these systems that may ce required in response to a loss-of-coolant-accident (LCCA1. Monessential systems are defined as those systems not required for any response to
~~- LCCA.~~
As indicated in Table 6.2-47, all ncnessentisl avstem penetratiens Lexcept instrument lines) have two isolatten varriers in series that meet the requirenents of the General Design Criteria specified in the table. Isolatica of nonessentral system penetrations is autcmatic and tased on diverse isolation signals as also specified in Table 6.2-47.
3. This requirement is addressed in Respcnse So. 2 a bove .

4. Control syste.ms for contatr. ment isolation valves wnten autematically isolate do not permit automatic
~~-~s reapening ot these valves wnen the tsolaticn signal~~
~~[ ta reset. The normal control switches fcr these~~
~~\m,, valves must to raniculated inditidually subsequent to the resettin7 of the isolat cn signal to reopen the valves.~~
~~5. Illincts rower 2capany ;ointly sponsored throu1h the C'. R Ceners Group a crcqram to evaluate tnis ccncern.~~
~~The resulta 0: thia prcaram ere satmitted to tne '3C l a .a letter Irem D. 2. Waters. Chaltman bha Cwners' Jroup to L. J. J.1,ennut, .; rector *JC, cated~~
~~. :er 23. . s . na"sts : this s tu.: y follows. . /g $ _~~
~~- g Bale h. 2 (jcod.g)~~
~~TADLE C-2 ESSEN"I7d A:D *:O' E S S r'!T ! A L S Y ST"? S F09 TE I L ii PG E A v T A I:.::E: T 1 A TIC *T l ( '~~
)
System Classification Comrents Main Steam ::anessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA HSIV Luakage Control Essential Required for long-term leaktightness of MSlV's Feedwater Nonessential th t required for shut-down following LOCA Reactor Colc ! solation Essential Necessary for core Cooling cooldown Reactor Water Cleanup Nonessantial Not required for shut-down following LOCA High-Pressure Core Spray Essential ECCS system Low-Pressure Core Spray Essential ECCS system Standby Liquid Control Essential Should be ava.lable as backup to CRD system Equipment Drains onessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Floor Drains ;;onessential Not required for shut- , down following LOCA Supprossion Pool Cleanup ::onessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Primary Containment Essential Required for post-Atmosphere Monitoring accident monitoring of containment atmospnere hydrogen concentration
~~,/m~~
( Pesidual Heat Pemoval Essential ECOS system i Control Rod Drive Nonessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Component Cooling Water ::onessential Not required for shut-Instrument Air down following LOCA ADS Pneumatic Supply Essential For ADS relief valves and ADS accumultors Containment ~ Pneumatic Nonessential Not required for shut-Supply down following LOCA Condensate Storage Nonessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Plant Chilled Water Nonessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Dreathing Air Nonessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Service Air Nonessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Fuel Pool Cooling and Nonessential Not recuired for shut-Cleanup down LOCA Padwaste Nonessential Not required for shut-down following LOCA Firo Protection Nonessential Not recuired for shut-down following LOCA Combustible Gas Control Essential Requirement to nain-tain hydrcqen concen-tration below ignition gs Concentration l 1 i ) Containment liVAC Nonessential Not recurred f e r ::hu t-down following LOCA Drywell Purge t:one ssent tal Not requir:d "or shut-down following LOCA Drywell cooling Nonessential Not required for shut-Chilled Water dcwn following LOCA l Shutdown Service Water Essential Necessary to maintain c atin, tor n, nixin9 sy< ten
TABLE 5-1 Seuscute voa Conviernon of '1?C Aevoa Plu" Ireu - O AREA of IPC. ACTioM -EESPe4fl 0LE comtLG7to10 '% d Ce u R4 PtAO TTEM GRouf(O JATG rs VENT /PvRSE'4.2.1 - Post seal -PoE -SEAL INC . 15c!.,4TICM STRffi AA/ALyft) .JA866MTiLUNPy val.VE 04 cps vtMThuREE E461MEEAS. 7UNEg,g VALVss . - n LIA)Stj POWER. cPERABluT7 CR ITER.1 A. 4.2.2 - - I u. Mols PRIOR To VAL.VG TESTS. Pok)ER c, , Futi. LcAD. 4.2.3 - TOSE ITEM C0:4PLc.TE. - nLIM o 16 M/A. hNhclStS. N o 7 0 R r:4 G y. 70'AER Co. iCTIOM aEq'p. orHER 4,2 A - - SLLIMets M/A . CCA)CERAfs. TTEMS CD:APtsre. Pow &R Co. No FURTMER Acts 0A) rec'D . O
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t 1- I A i _ . .. .- . _1. __ . ;.1.. ...__..a .i. .......t.._. -. ._ ._ m --- . . . . _ FIGURE 2-1G
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~~Bun.vor of A>asexae Iovisie > x) Conrxininear-1000.0 AFTGR PugsE TsomTroN.~~
Based en o. l.i.y* ick leaka correspond s A endly,ge rate ukick I,loCFR50 Asycyt olic Value release limda ion and a NEDD-21159 m 300 in a,lo00 hr5 frimat; coolant specific, activig.] /
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I W - 3 . o O H i.0 7 3 1 1 O ; o.1- ; i ; i i ; i ; ; ; o to 2o so 40 So do 70 80 90 los T)ME AFTER PURGE .HOLAT/0A) (H RS) F16, 2 -18 O Bust.pu? 0F Asasonne .1 opine isu ConrAisimeAli-10 -
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A l O l H 0.1. --- 4 O O,0I i ; i : : i ; i i i ! ! o 10 2o 30 40 5'O 60 70 80 90 /00 TIME AFTER Pl)RGE ISOLATION CHR5) O Fis. 3-1 TYPICAL FLOW CHARACTERISTICS 100 90 80 1 70
~~$ 60 I s[~~
g :z ee O c- 40 E f 30 / 2e / 1e / 0 / 0 10 20 30 40 e0 60 70 80 90 DEGREES OF DISC OPENING O l l
F i c, . 3-2. HYDRODYNAMIC TORQUES 10000 O g i i 1 i 1 8 ! l l ~N ' G
~~f 4 3I I~~
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- l .8 .6 ; , .5 , ; .4 j .3 l .2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Angie of Opening - Degrees O To obtain torque value multiply hydrodynamic torque factor by the A P across valve.
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/,, ,! ' ' M ,- ~ FIG.3-3 Typical 7o31-5 sat 23arvesity. V4ove }~
ltern Of5CftOtlOn I ' - 1 Valve Body 2 Ret. Ring 3 Disc (notes 1 & 31 4 Stem 5 Stem: Disc' Pins i 6 Seal Rina 7 Back-uo Ring 3 Bearina (note 2) 9 Bearino inote 2) 10 Spacer (note 2) 11 Packing 12 Gland 13 Follower 14 Studs (note 4) 15 fluts 1G SCRS
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ML20041G160

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