ML20041F795
| ML20041F795 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1981 |
| From: | Mardis D FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041F788 | List: |
| References | |
| 3F-1281-40, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8203170422 | |
| Download: ML20041F795 (4) | |
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Power C O n P O m a T I O es December 23, 1981
- 3F-1281-40 File: 3-0-3-a-2 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, GA 30303 SUW ECT: Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 IE Bulletin 80-11 Masonary Wall Design
Reference:
RII: JJ L 50-302/81-09
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
During a routine safety inspection (see Inspection Report No. 50-302/81-09) on J une 3 and 4,1981, your Mr. J. J. Lenahan reviewed the field walk-down results required for the subj ect bulletin.
Several discrepancies were identi fied.
On June 23, 1981, Florida Power Corporation received a Notice of Violation dated June 18, 1981, concerning these findings.
On July 17, 1981, FPC responded to the Notice of Violation requesting that it be withdrawn.
Mr. Lenahan received our response and, in late October 1981, notified our Mr.
R.
C.
Widell, of several discrepancies in the response.
Mr. Wi dell, via the Manager of Nuclear Support Services, connitted to having a
resolution to these discrepancies by November 30, 1981.
Per our cocmitment the following revised response, developed from further a aa) investigation, is provided for Item 3:
Eou 3.
The Site Engineer was not specifically looking for cracks in the
$U wall, however, had major cracks been present, 'they would have been l
82 noted.
The cracks identified by the I&E inspector are not ex-
- 5y tensive and are small in size.
The cracks are mainly in the o
mortar joints but, in one case, did extend into the face of the N
block itself.
The interior of the shaft at the location of the gg cracks was reviewed and no evidence of cracking was found on the owo inside.
Neither an inspection of the exterior of the shaft nor-a EO*
cursory inspection of the shaft interior show other areas of cracking.
Since the cracking is minor and will have no real significance to maintaining the structural integrity of the wall, General Office 320i Thirty-fourin street soutn. P O. Box 14042, st. Petersburg, Ronda 33733 813-866-5151
1 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director December 23, 1981 Page Two and since there is no safety significance if the shaft were to collapse under seismic conditions, no further action is considered necessary on this ites.
Further investigation of Item 4 has revealed additional problems associated with the wall identified as Wall 1 in our November 17, 1980 response.
The following explanation is provided for Item 4:
4.
The conduit (No. ACC-29) identified by the inspector as. passing through a portion of Wall 1, but not identifed on the field sur-vey, is, in fact, color-coded and tagged as if it were safety related. Based on the criteria used by the Site Engineer for this survey, this conduit should have been identified.- Research into the function of the cable within the conduit has shown that no safety'related function is performed by the cable (it is a relia-bility feed for lighting in the control complex). This particular reliability feed is a non-safety related circuit to a lighting distribution panel fed from a safety related engineered safeguards motor control center. This type arrangement is used to maintain a high degree of confidence that lighting will be available in the control complex.
There would be no sa fety significance of a i
failure of this circuit or adverse affect on the motor control center.
An "as-built" of Wall 1 was provided to GAI for fu*ther evalua-tion. The actual changes to the wall from the original analysis were minor and not expected to change the results. The new analy-sis, however, revealed that for a safe shutdown earthquake, the wall would be ovcestressed and could possibly collapse.
Florida Power Corporation requested GAI to review both analyses and deter-mine why the wall was acceptable in the first run and, with only a small change (the addition of a 12"x14" opening), the stresses were increased enough to cause overstressing.
Initially, there s
Was no safety Concern since the wall was not overstressed.
The final conclusion is that under seismic loading the wall will be overstressed and could collapse.
Nuclear Engineering has reviewed the effects of the collapse of this wall on safety related equipment.
The only safety related equipment which could be adversely affected by the collapse of the wall is the control complex ventilation system main supply air duct to the lower elevations.
The collapse of the wall could damage the verticle section of this duct where it turns and runs down the west wal.l. Damage to this portion of the duct would cut off cooling air to critical electrical components leading to higher than rated temperatures for continuous duty and subsequent failure of the equipment.
3
r Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director December 23, 1981 Page,three Two possible resolutions to the problem were evaluated. The first was to stiffen the wall using a complex arrangement of an I-beam with through-bolting and attachments to the floor and ceiling.
The other available option was to remove the portion of the wall which would impact the duct if it fell.
We have evaluated these two options and determined that the removal of the wall section would be the quickest, most effective resolution. A modification package, MAR 81-12-13, was issued on December 15, 1981 to perform the removal. This work will be completed by December 31, 1981.
Removal of the wall section will provide final resolution of NRC I&E Bul-letin 80-11 concerns.
Should you have any additional questions concerning these actions, please contact this office.
Very truly yours, bh David G. Mardis Acting Manager Nuclear Licensing Tibbs (FD7)C2-1 cc/W/ Attach: Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, D.C. 20555 i
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. STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF PINELLAS D. G. Hardis states that he is the Acting Manager, Nuclear Licensing Department of Florida Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Connission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, infonnation and belief.
A-D. G. Mdrdis Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County above named, this 31st day of December, 23, 1981.
Ykprydd L'
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Notary Public i
Notary Public, State of Florida at Large, My Connission Expires:
May 29, 1984 DGM/MAMNotary i
Tibbs(F07)C2-1
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