ML20041F737
| ML20041F737 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vandewalle D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041F738 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-07-01.A, TASK-7-1.A, TASK-RR LSO5-82-03-039, LSO5-82-3-39, NUDOCS 8203170366 | |
| Download: ML20041F737 (6) | |
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Docket No. 50-155 e
1 LS05-02 039 RECD.V*3 2}
UR 171982> 5 n wmsm cum n Mr. David J. VandeWalle
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"I'# " j Nuclear Licensing Administrator s
Consuraers Power Company
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1945 W Parnall Road L
Jackson, Michigan 49201 Dear Mr. VandeWalle;
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC VII-1.A. ISOLATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS, INCLUDING QUALIFICATION OF ISOLATION DEVICES - BIG ROCK POINT is our contractor's technical evaluation of this topic for Big Rock Point. is the staff's draft safety evalua-tion that is based on Enclosure'l.
The staff has concluded that two separate safety concerns must be addressed.
The first concern is a generic issue that has been addressed previously by all operators of General Electric Boiling Water Reactors with the exception of Big Rock Point. The essence of this concern is that a sustained vo3tage or frequency transient in a RPS power supply (motor l
generator of alternate feed) could overheat half of the scram valves l
and prevent a scram.
g*CN The second concern is that the control room meters and recorders are not Class 1E and are not electrically isolated from the nuclear instru-
/ I mentation.
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In order to be consistent with past Consnission policy for the resolution of our first concern, the staff has concluded that modifications should AODI be performed to provide fully redundant Class 1E protection at the U)*/E[
interface of the rion-Class 1E power supplies and the RPS. We have found that the conceptual design proposed by the General Electric Company and the installed modification ou Hatch 1 are acceptable solutions to our concern.
l In view of the above, we believe that you should modify the power supply l
m' for the RPS at your facility.
This modification should be implemented by the end of the next refueling outage.
Should this scheduled outage H
occur within the next six months, the modifications should be accom-l plished by the end of the subsequent refueling outage.
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. We request that you provide within 60 days of your receipt of this letter:
(1) your comitment to install a Class 1E system (2) your schedule for completion of the modification and (3) your schedule for submission of design information and proposed Technical Specif1-cations.
With regard to the second concern, you are requested to review the enclosed report and to provide corrections of fact within 30 days of receipt of this letter.
The need to provide isolation between the nuclear instrumentation and the recorders will be detemined during the integrated safety assessment. This safety evaluation may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessnent is completed.
Sincerely, Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page l
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usceo. m i-aw m NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 024o
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-s Mr. David P. Hoffman cc M. I. Miller, Esquire U. S. Enviror.nental Protection Ishan, Lincoln & Beale Agency Suite 4200 Federal Activities Branch One First National Plaza Region V Office Chicago, Illinois, 60670 ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Chicago, Illinois 60604 Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Jackson, Michigan 49201 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Judd L. Bacon, Esquire U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Consumers Power Company Washington, D. C.
20555 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Dr. George C. Anderson Department of Oceanography Myron M. Cherry, Esquire University of Washington Suite 4501 Seattle, Washington 98195
'One IBM Plaza Chicago, IIlinois 60611 Dr. M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo Ms. Mary P. Sinclair Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive Resident Inspector Midland, Michigan 48640 c/o U. S. NRC Palisades Plant Kalamaz6o Public Library Route 2, P. O. Box 155 315 South Rose Street Covert, Michigan 49043 Kalamazoo, Michigan ~
Robert H. Engelken, Regional Admin.
49006 Township Supervisor Nuclear Regulatory Commission Covert Township
. Region V.
Route 1, Box 10 Office of Inspection and Enforcement Van Buren County, Michigan 49043 1450 Maria Lane Walnut Creek, Cal.ifornia 94596 Office of the Governor (2)
Room 1 - C'apitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 William J. Scanien, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Palisades Plant ATTN: Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 c
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a' Mr. David P. Hoffman CC
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Dr. John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Ms. JoAnn Bier 204 Clir. ton Street Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Thomas S. Moore i
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
Washington, D. C.
20555
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Robert H. Engelken, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V Office of Inspe'etion and Enforcement 1450 Maria Lane Walnut Creek, California 94596 E
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
_s BIG ROCK POINT TOPIC:
Vll-1.A, ISOLATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM NON-SAFETY SYSTD:5, INCLUDIN3 Q'JAllFICATION OF ISOLATION DEVICES 10 INTRODUCTION Non-safety systems generally receive control signals from the reactor protection system (RPS) sensor current loops.
The non-safety circuits are required to have isolation devices to insure the independence of the RPS channels.
Requirements for the design and qualificaton of isolation devices are quite specific.
Recent operating experience has shown that some of the earlier isolation devices or arrangements at operating plants may not be effective.
The objective of our review cas to verify that operating reactors have RPS designs which provide effective and qualified isolation of non-safety systems from safety systems to assure that safety systems will function as required. '
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA The review criteria are presented in Section 2 of EG&G Report 0577J,
" Isolation of Reactor Protection System from Non-Safety Systems."
111.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics.
The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.
Each.of the related topic repo,rts contain the acceptance criteria and review guid-ante for its subject matter.
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VI-7.C.1 independence of Onsite Sou'rces VIII-1.A Degraded Grid IX-6 Fire Protection There are no safety topics dependent on the present topic information because proper isolation has been assumed.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3, of Report 0577 J.
V.
EVALUATION Based on current licensing criteria and review guidelines, the plant reactor protection system complies with all current licensing criteria
'l listed in Section 2.0 of this report except for the following:
J 1.
IEEE Standard 279, Section 4.7.2, requires isolation devices between RPS and cuntrol systems.
There are no isolation devices between the nuclear flux monitoring systems and the process recorders and indicating ins truments.
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The power supplies for the RPS channels do not qualify as IE equip-ment.
Isolation between each RPS channel and its respective power supply is inadequate because a failure in the non-Class 1E power supply can cause the scram valves to remain stuck in their non-scram position due to overheating.
VI.
CONCLUSION The staff's-position is that suitably qualified isolators should be pro-vided for exceptions 1 and 2 noted above.
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