ML20041F724
| ML20041F724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Counsil W CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041F725 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-07-02, TASK-7-2, TASK-RR LSO5-82-03-038, LSO5-82-3-38, NUDOCS 8203170344 | |
| Download: ML20041F724 (5) | |
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March 5,1982 v>
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O Docket No. 50-213 f
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'a fir. W. G. Counsil, Vice President ncc y6 Nuclear Engineering and Operations Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
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Post Office Box 270
!!artford, Connecticut 06101
Dear dr. Counsil:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC VII-2 EllGIllEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM CONTROL LOGIC AllD DESIGil, SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR llADDAM HECK is our contractor's draft technical evaluation of the subject for your plant. is the staff's draft safety evaluation and it is based on Enclosure 1.
This evaluation is the staff's position
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regarding design of your Tacility in the subject area. With regard to the referenced topic, the staff has concluded your facility meets current licensing criteria.
This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before N
.the integrated assessment is completed.
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Sincerely, I
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Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief ADDI Operating Reactors Branch flo. 5 Division of Licensing g,sh/c7 l
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
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Mr. W. G. Counsil cc Day, Berry & Howard Counselors at Law One Constitution Plaza Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Superintendent Haddam Neck Plant RFD #1 Post Office Box 127E East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Mr. Richard R. Laudenat Manager, Generation Facilities Licensing Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Russell Library 119 Broad Street Middletown, Connecticut 06457 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management ATTN: Under Secretary Energy Division 80 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06115 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Resident Inspector Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station c/o U. S. NRC East Haddam Post Office East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I Office of Inspecti6n and Enforcement 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
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ENCLOSURE 2' ^~
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VII-2 HADDAM NECK TOPIC: yII-2,EN,G,INEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) SYSTEM CONTROL LOGIC AFD DESIGN I.
IMTRODUCTION During the staff review of the Safety Injection System (SIS) reset (issue l
f4 in HUREG-0138) the staff detennined that the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (ESFAS) at both PWRs and BURS may have design features that raise questions about the. independence of redundant channels, the' interaction of reset features and individual equipnent controls, and the interaction of the ESFAS logic that controls transfers between on-site and off-site power sources.
Review of the as-built logic diagrams and schematics, operator action required to supplement the ESFAS automatic actions, the startup and surveillance testing procedures for demonstrating ESFAS performance appeared to be required.
Several specific concerns exist with regard to the manual SIS reset feat-ure following a LOCA.
They are:
(1) If a loss of offsite power occurs af ter reset, operator action would be required to remove normal shutdown cooling loads from the emergency bus and re-establish emergency cooling loads.
Time would be critical it the loss of offsite power occurred within a few minutes following a LOCA.
(2) If loss of offsite power oc-curs af ter reset, some plants way not restart some essential loads such as diesel cooling water.
(3) The plant may suffer a loss of ECCS delivery for some time period before emergency power picks up the ECCS system. It was also decided to review the ESF system control logic and design, in-cluding bypasses, reset features and interactions with transfers between onsite and offsite power sources.
Since these decisions were made in early 1977, the staff's plans for re-solving these issues ha*ve changed.
Two generic reviews of the diesel generator problems have been 1 conducted by Inspection and Enforcement.
,The second review includes consideration of bypasses'and resets. In ad-dition, Task Action Plan Generic Task B-24 is involved with reset and by-pass concerns. Accordingly, this SEP Topic has,been modified to reduce duplication of effort.
i As a result of the staff's review of the scope of the several related
. generic efforts and the other SEP Topics, it was de'cided that the only area t' hat had not been covered was the independence of redundant logic trains.
Independence might be compromised by sharing input signals-and the use of common controls such as made switches, reset switches, and logic test facilities.
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II.
REVIEW CRITERIA The current licensing criteria are presented in Section 2 of EG&G Report EGG-EA-0057J, " Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Control Logic and Design".
III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic.was limited to avoid duplication of effort s'ince some aspects of the review were performed under related topics.
The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.
Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.
III-6 Seismic Qualification III-11 Scismic Qualification III-12 Environmental Qualification IV-1.A Operation with less than All Loops in Operation VI-4 Bypass and Reset of Engineered Safety Features (B-24)
VI-7.A.3 ECCS Actuation System VI-7.B ESF Switchover from Injection to Recirculation VI-1.C.1 Independence of Onsite Power VI-7.C.2 Failure Mode Analysis-ECCS VJ-7.C.3 The effect of loop isolation valve closure on ECCS performance VI-7.D Long Term Cooling Passive failures (e.g. flooding)
VI-7.F Accumulator Isolation Valves VI-10.A Testing of Reactor Protection Systems VI-10.B Shared Systems VII-1.A Reactor Trip System Isolation VII-3 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown VIII-2 Onsite Emergency Power Systems VIII-3 Emergency de Power Systems VIII-4 Electrical Penetrations IX-3 Ventilation IX-6 Fire Protection The conclusion that suitable. isolation devices are provided is a basic assumption for Topics VI-7.C.2 and VII-3.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3 of Report EGG-EA-Od57J,
" Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Control Logic and Design."
V.
EVALUATION A description of the isolation devices employed in Haddam Neck and a comparison with current design criteria are presented in Report EGG-EA- 0057J,
" Engineered Safety Features (.ESF) System Control Logic and Design."
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. VI.
CONCt.US10ft As a result of our review of our contractor's work the staff concludes that Haddam iteck conforms to current licensing criteria for electrical isolation of redundant safety features.
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