ML20041F548
| ML20041F548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1982 |
| From: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203170135 | |
| Download: ML20041F548 (11) | |
Text
~
v.-
m DISTRIBU" ION Y
Y, Docket F*le RMattson I
LB#4 r/f RHartfield, MPA
% y lipf DEisenhut/RPurple OELD EAdensam OIE(3)
KJabbour bcc:
Local PDR MDuncan NRC PDR Docket Nos.: 50-413/414 RVollmer TIC JKramer NSIC OParr TERA CBerlinger ACRS (16)
Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.
FCongel JMataro Vice President - Steam Procuction CMacDonald DNellis P.O. Box 33189 LRo' se a
Charlotte, North Carolina 20242 FSchauer bear Hr. Parker:
Subject:
Request for Additional Information - Catawba huclear 5tation In the perfomance of the Catawba Station licensing review, the NRC staff has identified the need for further infomation in the Reactor Systems area as stated in Enclosure 1.
This enclosure contains eleven questions to which
~
your responses were unacceptable.
l identifies aoditional concerns related to the storage of non-Catawba fuel at Catawba Station. We request that you provide the information herein requested no later than April 2,1982.
If you require any clarification of these matters, please contact the project manager, Kahtan Jabbour, at (301) 492-7621.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OM8 cicarance is not required under P.L.96-511.
cv dincerely,
- )
d' jd.
Elinor G. Adensau, Chief N g b
Licensing Branch No. i p
<3 V
Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
g As stated b
na e
cc: See next page mc'>. R.Mg.. l.A;Dkt B.....D1.(
""'I
. MAb.baun.eMQu n..
. EAdeyn
. - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~.
. ~.. ~ ~. ~...
~..
.-~.-~~1 eneb 3/ t /82 U
M U g,"/82 8203170135 820308
" ~ "" "'
E PDR ADOCK 0500
)FFICIAL RECORD COPY
- " " 8 % 28 824.
/
'o UNITED STATES
~
8' "h*
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
/
8 982 1
!!AR Docket Nos.:
50-413/414 I
N
'S t/
afCMED MAR 09 gggy $
Mr. Willian 0. Parker, Jr.
m Vice President - Steam Production P.O. Box 33189 ganss umme #, }
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 W ur.
S
Dear Mr. Parker:
g Subj ect: Request for Additional Information - Catawba Nuclear Station In the performance of the Catawba Station licensing review, the NRC staff has identified the need for further information in the Reactor Systems area as stated in Enclosure 1.
This enclosure contains eleven questions to which your responses were unacceptable. identifies additional concerns related to the storage of non-Catawba fuel at Catawba Station. We request that you provide the information herein requested no i3ter than April 2,1982.
If you require any clarification of these matters, please contact the project manager, Kahtan Jabbour, at (301) 492-7821.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. %-511.
Si ncerely, Elinor G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc: See next page l
l
\\.
CATAW'A B
Mr. William 0. Parker Vice President - Steam Production Duke Power Company P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 cc: William L. Porter, Esq.
North Carolina Electric Membership Duke Power Coapany Corp.
P.O. Box 33189 3333 North Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 P.O. Box 27306 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Debevoise & Liberman Saluda River Electric Cooperative, 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Inc.
Washington, D. C.
20036 207 Sherwood Drive Laurens, South Carolina 29360 North Carolina MPA-1 P.O. Box 95162 James W. Burch, Director Raleigh, North Carolina 27625 Nuclear Advisory Counsel 2600 Bull Street Mr. F. J. Twogood Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Power Systens Division Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Mr. Peter K. VanDoorn P.O. Box 355 Route 2, Box 179N Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 York, South Carolina 29745 Mr. J. C. Plunkett, J r.
Janes P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator NUS Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2536 Countryside Boulevard Region II Clearwater, Florida 33515 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Jesse L. Riley, President Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28208 Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General S.C. Attorney General's Office P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Walton J. McLeod, J r., Esq.
General Counsel South Carolina State Board of Health J. Marion Sins Building 2600 Bull Street
~
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 l
ENCLOSURE 1 ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH 440.104 Your response to Question 440.12 is not acceptable. You state (5.4.7)
"the residual heat removal flow rate is throttled to about 1500 gpm through each of the residual heat removal loops". This implies both loops are operating, therefore, your postulated air entrainment (440.12) event may preclude the continued use of both operating trains instead of one train.
Accordingly, provide the information requested ir.
Items 2 and 3 of Question 440.12.
Describe your procedures for 6
RHR operation when the steam generator tubes are drained.
The staff's position is that each train of the RHR will be provided with an alarm in the control room to alert the operator to RHR degradation.
Provide your basis for the alarm setpoint.
440.105 With regard to the information requested in Question 440.14, (5.4.7) operator actions outside the control room should be suitably justified.
This justification should include a discussion of procedures available to the operator and the operator's ready (440.14) access to the location for the corrective action.
Loss of a single power supply should not result in the inability to initiate at least one RHR train.
440.106 In regard to your response to Question 440.27, the spurious move-(6.3) ment of a motor operated valve is considered to be a single failure.
Such failures that would prevent the ECCS from performing its function for each mode of ECCS operation should be corrected.
(440.27)
WCAP-8966 has not been approved by the staff for generic reference.
The staff's position is that mispositioning of the following valves must be addressed:
1)
Accumulator discharge isolation valves NI54A, NI65B, NI76A and NI88B (spurious closure) 2)
Safety injeection pumps cold. leg discharge isolation valve nil 62A (spurious closure) 3)
RWST to safety injection pumps suction valve nil 00B (spurious closure) 4)
Safety injection pumps miniflow line isolation valve nil 47B (spurious closure) 5)
Safety injection pump hot leg discharge isolation valves nil 21A and nil 52B (spurious opening) 6)
Residual heat removal pumps hot leg discharge isolation valve nil 83B (spurious opening) 7)
Residual heat removal cold leg discharge isolation valves nil 78B and nil 73A (spurious closure) i
t 440.107 Your response to Question 440.28 is not complete.
Provide an evalua-(6.3) tion of your conformance to Branch Technical Position,RSB 6-1, Item B~.5.1 (440.28)
Identify and justify any deviations from this position.
440.108 Your response to Question 440.29 is inadequate and is most likely (6.3) based on your withdrawn FSAR and not the current FSAR.
Provide the (440.29) response to Question 440.29.
Sections 6.3.2.1 and 7 and Table 6.3.2-3 should be consistent and complete.
440.109 The response to Question 440.30 is incomplete.
Feedwater pipe breaks (6.3 &
should also be discussed.
For each type of pipe break in the primary 15.0) and secondary systems, provide the information requested in Question (440.30) 440.30.
Time response for operator reaction (credit only given from time of receipt of control room alarm from safety grade instrumentation) should be discussed, and may be based on ANSI N660 criteria when de-termining accident consequences. The accident description and dis-cussions of consequences should take into consideration the available mitigating equipment as a function of pressure.
440.110 The response to Question 440.36 did not adequately consider the (6.3 &
effects of single failures that could lead to a failure of both safety 15.0) injection pumps. The staff position regarding these single failures (440.36) is presented in Question 440.106.
The response to Question 440.36 states "miniflow recirculation paths are also provided for the charging pumps.
These paths are isolated upon receipt of an "S" signcl. The pump deadheading problem is a valid concern for the charging pumps as operating these pumps at or above their shutoff head would lead to failure of the pumps due to overheating.
Analyses have been performed to show that adequate core cooling is provided by flow from the safety injection and residual heat removal pumps".
Identify those conditions that would lead to failure of the charging pumps.
Include the postulated case of ~ a small break in which the RCS pressure remains at or near the RCS safety valve setpoint.
Describe the analysis that was performed to show that adequate core cooling
~ is provided by the safety injection and residual heat removal pumps.
Show that the Chapter 15 analysis has accounted for the potential failure of the charging pumps.
440.111 Your response to Question 440.37 is not adequate.
You state "In (15.0) addition, the head of water provided by the RWST further ensures (440.37) the lines will remain full and water hammer concerns will not develop."
This does not appear to be correct.
For example, the charging pump subsystem is not aligned to the RWST during the ECCS standby condition.
A small leak in this subsystem could void the charging lines.
Describe the means for_ ensuring water hammer wili-not occur in the charging pump lines including specific Technical Specification testing require-ments and frequency of tests.
R&'
+
A m.-
u i
440.112 Your response to question 440.40 (VCT Level Instrument Malfunction)
(6.3) and the reference it gives (Westinghouse letter,'T. M. Anderson, w, 4
(440.40) to V. Stello, NRC, May 21,1981) are not sufficient to specifically justify the Catawba design for the scenario of concern in question 440.40. Justify the Catawba design against the question 440.40 scenario by providing a chronological timetable indicating initiation of event, indications and alarms (credit given for operator corrective action only upon receipt of control room alarm) at Catawba and times at which they occur, time available to take operator action (after l
alarm) before pumps are damaged, and subsequent scenario analysis
=
if an acceptable operator action time to avert pump damage cannot be justified.
In the analysis justify the number of charging pumps assumed to be running.
440.113 The response to question 440.46 indicated that recirculation sump (6.3) tests are not intended for Catawba.
This is unacceptable.
Our position (440.46) is that Catawba must reference and justify suitable sump tests (whether from another plant, from model tests, or by in-plant testing at Catawba) to demonstrate acceptable ECCS sump design.
440.114 The response to Question 440.58 regarding the content of the Technical (15.0)
Specifications is not consistent with the FSAR.
Provide the updated (440.58) T3chnical Specifications as described in the response to Question 440.58.
4 1
h i
1 c
I a
3-
ENCLOSURE 2 ADDITIONAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE STORAGE OF NON-CATAWBA FUEL AT THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 1.
In the FSAR, you have considered a plan to store irradiated fuel assemblies from Oconee, Unit Nos.1, 2, and 3, and from McGuire, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.
a) Is Duke considering plans to store irradiated fuel assemblies from facilities other than Oconee or McGuire?
b) If answer to (a) is yes, does Duke's present application include request for authority to store irradiated fuel assemblies from facilites other than Oconee and McGuire?
c) What is the earliest date that Duke is considering commencement of shipment of irradiated fuel assemblies from Oconee and McGuire to Catawba and storage thereof at Catawba?
2.
a) What is the minimum storage time prior to the shipment of spent fuel assemblies to Catawba from the Oconee and McGuire Stations?
b)
Provide the technical specification that will limit the spent fuel capacity in the spent fuel pools at Catawba, Unit Nos.1 and 2.
How much space will be reserved for a complete core defueling from Catawba, for other core components, and for fuel assemblies from the Oconee and McGuire Stations? How much additional space will be provided for spent fuel casks from other Duke facilities?
3 a) What is the maximum number of spent fuel assemblies per year and the maximum number of shipments per year that will be transferred from Oconee and McGuire stations to Catawba? Will they be shipped by truck, rail or barge?
' b) What is the estimated water temperature in the spent fuel pool due to the schedule proposed in your response to 3a, above?
c) What is the average weight of U0t in each fuel assembly from the Oconee and McGuire Stations?
d) What is the average irradiation level (burnup) of the spent fuel to be snipped to Catawba?
e) What additional amount of solid radwaste will be generated at Catawba as a result of this alternate plan?
f) Will failed fuel assemblies be shipped from the Oconee or McGuire Stations to be stored in the Catawba spent fuel pools?
4.
Duke Power Company is presently considering spent fuel rod consolidation at Oconee. Provide your plan for possible future use of the Catawba spent fuel pools for storage of consolidated fuel assemblies from Oconee, McGuire, or Catawba.
5.
Provide the nominal value of the effective multiplication factor of the racks and the uncertainty to be added to this valce due to the storage of non-Catawba irradiated fuel at Catawba.
6.
Provide the verification results of the KEN 0 Code used. This should include a description of the experiments which were calculated and the bias and stanaard deviation of the calculational results.
It should be noted that the KEN 0 code was not previously approved by the NRC.
7.
The Oconee fuel assemblies which may be stored in Catawba racks are 15 x 15 rather than 17 x 17 assemblies. For the same enrichment there may be small differences between these and the optimized W2stinghouse design. Provide a discussion of such differences.
l
. 8.
Identify the casks used for fuel shipments between Oconee, McGuire aus and Catawba.
9.
Provide the name of the carrier.
10.
a) Provide the routes that Duke plans to consider in shipping fuel from Oconee and McGuitreto Catawba.,
b) Provide the distancesin miles of the proposed routes.
c) What is the average population density along each of the proposed routes?
11.
When does Duke plan to submit a route approval request in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37 for spent fuel shipments between Oconee, McGuire and Catawba?
12.
Confirm that the material combinations of the fuel and storage racks and the spacer-insert materials to bc ; sed in the Catawba spent fuel pool for non-Catawba fuel are identical to those for Catawba fuel.
13.
Does Duke plan to return any of the Oconee or McGuire fuel stored at Catawba to these facilities (i.e., Oconee or McGuire) in the future?
14.
Discuss the applicability of Table 5-4,10 CFR 51.20, to your plans for shipping fuel from Oconee and McGuire to Catawba.
Include such factors as traffic density, transportation workers, exposure i
of the general public, radiological effects and any pertinent site specific considerations such as a large number of construction workers at any of these plants.
15.
The transportation of spent fuel to Catawba from Oconee and McGuire should result (except for mileage and routes) in an increased impact
I :
on the total spent fuel movement related to Catawba. What will be the additional increase in spent fuel movement over that normally expected i
i if no spent fuel were imported from Oconee and McGuire?
l I
D l
i i
i
[
l b
l i
1 I
i' D
k l
I i
l r
p i
i t
l
. _. -, -., - -,