ML20041E829
| ML20041E829 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1982 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041E830 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-03-02, TASK-3-2, TASK-RR LAC-8139, NUDOCS 8203150148 | |
| Download: ML20041E829 (6) | |
Text
,..-o-D DA/RYLAND h
bM COOPERA T/VE
- P O. BOX 817 2615 EAST AV SOUTH l
LA CROSSE. WISCONSIN S4601 i
(608) 788-4000 March 5, 1982 l
In reply, please refer to LAC-8139 l-DOCKET NO. 50-409 m
<t Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief 0-
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Operating Reactors Branch No. 5
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Division of Operating Reactors l
7 gh \\g,s[?[ 3 D
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 g
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SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE A
DhgI2 LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO..DPR-45 l
_SEP TOPIC III-2, WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS l
REFERENCE:
(1) NRC Letter, Crutchfield to Linder,
(
dated December 9, 1981.
l (2) NRC Letter, LAC-7738, Linder to l
Crutchfield, dated August 6, 1981.
l l
Gentlemen:
l l
In response to your request in Reference (1) for additional in-formation, the following is presented:
NRC REQUEST 1.
Section 1.3.3.1 refers to Tables 4-2, 4-7, 4-9, 4-10 and l
4-14 in determining pressure coefficients.
In uhat source l
are these tables to be found?
DPC RESPONSE It is inferred that this comment refers to section 1.3.3.1 of the LACBWR Application for a Full-Term Operating License submitted October 9, 1974.
The information and references in this section of the FTOL relating to stack analysis criteria will be superseded [
by the updated stack analysis currently in progress.
s NRC REQUEST i/
2.
Were the gross structural effects of missiles considered when forming the load combinations to be applied to the structures 7N (SRP 3.3.2 " Tornado Loadings.)
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50 OR4MG 8203150148 820305 W.
PDR ADOCK 05000409 3 (,,
P PDR
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 5, 1982 ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield,. Chief LAC-8139 Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 page 2 DPC RESPONSE The gross structural effects of missiles were not considered when
' forming the-load combinations to be applied to the structures.
l NRC REQUEST 3.
It appears that 'not att safety-related structures and non-safety related structures chose failure could affect those that are safety-related vare included in the Topic III-2 SAR.
The following structures vere not included in the SAR:
1 (1)
The diesel fuel oil storage tank uhich is not housed.
(2)
The roof of the subterranean gas tank vault.
(3)
The cable vault.
(4)
Water discharge structure.
The turbine building is adjacent to the control room and diesel generator building.
It appears that the upper steet structure of this building may not be able to resist tornado loading.
Since a failure. of this building may endanger safety-related structures, a revieu of the turbine building regarding-this aspect is needed.
The portions of the' turbine building uhich house safety-related equipment and' are therefore safety-related need to be addressed.
DPC RESPONSE The subject: structures are addressed below:
(1)
The integrity of the outdoor diesel' fuel oil storage tank-is not essential to ensure operation of the emergency diesel generators for safety-related purposes.
Each redundant diesel generator is supplied from its own underground fuel tank.
The fuel tank for the 1B diesel-has a capacity.-of 5500 gallons, containing sufficient fuel for diesel operation in excess-of
.seven days.- The 1A generator draws fuel from a 500-gallon i
fuel tank which provides for 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> of full-load running time.
The' diesel-driven Alternate Core Spray putps located in.the crib house-are likewise provided with' underground fuel storage tanks,.of 120 gallons and 300 gallons capacity, respectively.
- r e
n,
i Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 5, 1982 ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief LAC-8139 Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 page 3 (2)
The " roof" of the subterranean gas tank vault is three feet below grade with the exception of two concrete access hatches at grade.
While the hatches could be momentarily lifted by the design basis 3 psi underpressure, the potential for j
tornado and wind-induced damage to the waste gas storage tanks is minimal due to their underground location and more than adequate design pressure (300 psig).
(3)
The cable vault, or electrical penetration room, is vulnerable to some of the severe environmental effects of Regulatory Guide 1.76 Design Basis Tornado.
The roof will not be able to withstand the severe pressure changes associated with the tornado.
The roof is also vulnerable to penetration by missiles from above (e.g.,
fallen sections of the stack.)
(4)
There is no safety-related water discharge structure at the site that would need protection from wind and tornado loadings.
The fact that the upper portion of the Turbine Building (above the 668-foot elevation) is vulnerable to damage from the effects of wind and tornado loads is acknowledged on page 6, paragraph 4, of the subject SER.
The SER goes on to describe the location of safety-related equipment, stating that all such equipment is located below the 668-foot elevation.
The SER also states that all such equipment is adequately protected by reinforced concrete.
A more current review cf the turbine building indicates that the assessment in the subject SER, while substantially correct, is subject to some qualifications:
(a)
The component cooling water surge tank is part of the system which will be designated as a safety system at LACBWR.
This tank is located on the turbine building main floor adjacent to the control room.
It will, therefore, be vulnerable to wind and tornado effects occurring in the lightly-protected turbine building upper structure.
This tank is a passive component, however.
The loss of this tank will not preclude continued operation of the CCW system in any safety or non-safety related mode.
(b)
The envelope of reinforced concrete protecting safety-related equipment at the mezzanine and grade levels is not completely continuous.
There are gaps as follows:
e l.3 In the northwest corner of the building-there is a sheet-metal roll-up door to allow access to the grade floor level.
The building exterior wall immediately above the door up to the main floor level is also of sheet-metal construction.
V O
4 --
i l
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 5, 1982 l
ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief LAC-8139 l
Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 page 4 l
l l
2.
There is an access opening of approximately 15' by 20' l
through the main floor and mezzanine level down to the grade floor level.
(No safety-related equipment is located directly beneath the opening.)
l 3.
The west wall of the turbine building below 668 feet is not reinforced concrete, but rather is constructed of i
concrete block.
NRC REQUEST l
4.
Provide M.
W. Kctiogg Company dr20ing G071-IEI, "Detaita of Reinforced Concretc Chimney. "
The onc received io lilegible.
DPC RESPONSE The M. W.
Kellogg Company drawing referred to here is 6071-LED, i
l and is enclosed.
l NRC REQUEST
(
5.
The SAR obates that further analycio of the control room, l
clectrical equipment room, machine chop, LACBWR atack and l
Genoa 3 otack io required.
Provide the dates uhon theoc re-l outta vill be available to the ataff.
The atack evaluation report should includc:
a.
Accumptione.
l b.
Analycio of all critical croco ocotione and not just the bacc.
Circumferential otrcocco.
c.
d.
Thermal loadingo in the load combinatione.
Dynamic effecto of vind loading on the atack if it io c.
determined that the dynamic effcoto are significant.
DPC RESPONSE A stack evaluation is in progress.
This will be completed by April 15, 1982, and will comprise a complete re-analysis of the as-built capacity of,the LACBWR and Genoa #3 stacks with respect to wind loading.
All of the considerations identified by the NRC will be addressed in the report.
i e
h
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 5, 1982 ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief LAC-8139 Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 page 5 The control room, electrical equipment room, and the machira shop have been reviewed for their resistance to the effects of the postulated tornado and wind loadings.
This review has revealed certain areas where protection from tornado effects are less than adequate.
Specifically, the north wall of the turbine building adjacent to the control room, machine shop, and electrical equip-ment room is not capable of withstanding the spectrum of postulated tornado missiles or the differential pressure effects associated with the Reg. Guide 1.76 design basis tornado.
In addition, the west wall of the control room (adjacent to the main floor of the turbine building) is constructed of unreinforced masonry block wall.
This offers marginal protection from the potential conse-quences of wind and tornado damage to the turbine building upper structure.
NRC REQUEST 6.
Provido atack otructural drauinga.
DPC RESPONSE Enclosed are 3 copies each of M. W.
Kellogg Company drawings 6071-1ED, -2ED, -3ED, -4ED, -5ED, and -6ED.
These are all of the structural drawings of the stack above ground.
Also enclosed are 3 copies each of Allis-Chalmers drawings 41-503434 aad 41-503435, which are structural drawings of the stack base.
NRC REQUEST 7.
Dravinga raccived arc otamped "Non-controlled copico, verify incue otatua prior to ucc."
Io the information on thcoc drawingo valid to uoo ao a bacia for a abructural reviou?
DPC RESPONSE These words mean that your copy of those drawings are not on the LACBWR controlled distribution list.
The drawings you have are of the latest revision and are valid.
Also, the drawings enclosed are of the latest revision.
NRC REQUEST 8.
Provide cupport calculations for valuca given and identify the limiting atructural alcmente.
g I
i Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 5, 1982 ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief LAC-8139 i
Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 page 6 NRC REQUEST - (cont'd)
Alco, identify the type of analycia (vorking atresa or ultimato l
ntrength), the loading combinationa and structural acceptanca i
critoria.
Doea the structural acceptance criteria conform to Standard Revieu Plan 3.8.47 I
DPC RESPONSE I
l These items will be addressed and included in the stack analysis report as appropriate.
l If you have any further questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE Frank Linder, General Manager FL:llAT:dh Enclosures cc - J.
G.
Koppler, Regional Director, NRC-DRO III NRC Resident Inspector l
i l
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