ML20041D459
| ML20041D459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/17/1982 |
| From: | Christopher R, Reynolds S, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041D447 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900059 NUDOCS 8203050334 | |
| Download: ML20041D459 (26) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:i 4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 99900059/81-02 Docket No. 99900059 Licensee: Ametek Incorporated Schutte & Koerting Division, Bethayres Plant 2381 Philmont Avenue Bethayres, Pennsylvania Facility Name: Schutte & Koerting Division, Bethayres Plant Investigation at: Bethayres, Pennsylvania 1 Investigation conducted: April 7, 1981 - September 1, 1981 Investigators: f 2.frdf[,dJhkw 2//7[d R. Keith Christoph'er, Investigator date digned 4(4 .'Mff /7 7 b 48amuel D. ReyMlds, Jr., Reactor ddte' signed /. Inspector /,< V) 1kW Approved by: ,powell Tripp, CM4f, Materials d'atd signed and Processes Section Investigation Summary: Investigation from April 7, 1981 thru September 1, 1981 Report No. 99900059/81-02 Areas Investigated: Allegations by an individual regarding the quality of welding performed on various components for nuclear power plants including regenerative heat exchangers, shutdown heat exchangers, aftercooler heat exchangers and plant isolation valve (steam) separator and float switch housing assemblies. 8203050334 820217 PDR GA999 ENVAMET 99900059 PDR
TABLE OF CONTENTS I
SUMMARY
II PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION III BACKGROUND A. Source of Information B. Identification of Involved Organization l IV DETAILS l l A. Scope of Investigation l I B. Interview of Alleger l C. Identification of Components in Question 1 l D-J. Persons Interviewed Regarding Initial Allegation K. Status of Allegation l L. Receipt of Additional Allegations from Alleger M. Followup of Additional Allegation V. EXHIBITS i I l l
i i 3 1.
SUMMARY
An investigation was initiated following an initial telephone call and a subsequent interview of a welding and fabrication foreman previously employed by Ametek, Inc. at their Bethayres, Pa. plant. During the interview, an allegation was made that during his employment at Ametek, an improper shell to head weld was made on a nuclear (steam separator) pressure vessel sometime during November 1980. It was alleged that improper fitup for a consumable insert root pass resulted in lack of fusion on the root side of the weld. The investigation included interviews with the alleger; Quality Assurance (QA), Quality Control (QC), manufacturing and production personnel of Ametek; and the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI). It was established that the component in question was one of twelve " Plant Isolation Valve Separator and Float Switch Housing Assemblies" (a steam moisture separator) fabricated for Turbonetics, Inc., Latham, New York with ultimate installation intended for the Phipps Bend or Hartsville nuclear power plants. The investigation identified one steam separator assembly designated by Ametek as the "L" unit, as the component most probably referred to by the alleger. These separators were designed and fabricated to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 2 requirements. Later allegations by this individual included other components such as regenerative heat exchangers, shutdown heat exchangers, and after cooler heat exchangers. Followup on these allegations is also covered by this report. Initially the investigation was limited to allegations concerning steam separator assemblies. Interviews of QA and QC personnel and the production foreman at Ametek and review of the QC documentation determined that the fitup on the "L" unit was rejected by the QC Departmant and was reported to be refit and subse-quently approved by the Ametek QC inspector and the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI). It was also confirmed through interviews that a defective root pass on this unit was present, was ground out to a depth that would approximte the thickness of the original insert and was rewelded eliminating-the lack of fusion defect. Information obtained from the Turbonetics Project Engineer indicated that the (steam separator) unit is designed for a 150 psig, operates at 125 psig and is hydrotested at 225 psig. The actual stress on the joint was determined to be approximately 3,000 psi whereas the allowable stress for this Class 2 material is 18,800. Based on the above findings, (joint safety factor and rework), disassembly of the unit and reinspection of the internal joint in question was not deemed necessary, thus, no such requests were made by NRC. During the course of the investigation, the alleger made three additional allegations relating to: (1) improper welding of roll bond.ch dding at a circumferential joint on a shutdown heat exchanger (HX); (2) welding of a root pass on a regenerative HX by an unqualified welder, and; (3) failure to repair - defects in tube _to tube sheet welding and weld cladding on after-cooler HX's.
4 All of the shutdown HX's manufactured at the Bethayres plant were returned for rework for reasons other than the questionable clad restoration indicated by the alleger. The rework required removal and rewelding of the questionable i cladding area indicated. i For the welding on heat exchangers alleged to have been performed by an unqualified welder, the position of repair welding and the position of welding for a qualification test assembly wera not available, however, this review of the ASME Performance Qualification Records indicated that the welder in question (Stamp #17) was qualified for the type of welding performed (austenitic stainless steel gas. tungsten arc welding (GTAW)) by having successfully passed a performance test for such welding on March 21, 1979. The allegation concerning visible defects in the cladding and tube to tube sheet welds on the after cooler HX's has been forwarded to NRC, Region II for consideration of the need for further actions. The subject units are in storage at Turbonetics Corporation in Latham, New York and are currently destined for use at the Phipps Bend and Hartsville nuclear power stations. 4 I 4 .I i - 4 _,.-. - -.. - l
o ~ l i 5 II. PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION The purpose of this investigation was to examine the validity and safety implications of allegations made by a former employee of a vendor, Ametek Incorporated (Bethayres, Pa. Division), involving the quality of welding performed on various components for nuclear power plants including regenerative heat exchangers, shutdown heat exchangers, after cooler heat exchangers and plant isolation valve (steam) separator and float switch housing assemblies. S
t O 6 III. BACKGROUND A. Source of Investigation An investigation was initiated following an interview of a former welding and fabrication foreman at the Bethayres, Pa. Division of Ametek Incorporated who alleged that improper welding was performed on various heat exchangers and a steam separator pressure vessel destined for use in nuclear power stations. B. Identification of Involved Organizations 1. AMETEK Schutte Koerting Division Cornwells Heights, Pennsylvania 19020 A vendor constructing various plant components for nuclear power plants.
7 IV. DETAILS A. Scope of Investigation The investigation included interviews of the alleger, and various licensee personnel including; Management, Quality Assurance and Quality Control Inspectors, and welders, who were directly involved in the construction and inspection of the components cited by the alleger. The investigation also included interviews of the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) and an examination of all Quality Control Inspection Records, Drawings, and specification of the components in question. B. Interview of Alleger Mr. Frederick Boone was interviewed on April 7,1981 by NRC Investigator, R. Keith Christopher and Reactor Inspector, Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr. Present at the interview at Mr. Boone's request was his attorney, Joseph N. Hicky. Mr. Boone said he had been employed by the Schutte & Koerting Division of Ametek, Inc. Industries as a Welding and Fabrication Foreman from February 1979 to November 1980, at which time he was " laid off". Mr. Boone alleged that due to improper fitup, a defective root weld containing a lack of fusion defect was made in a nuclear separator. Mr. Boone did not know which nuclear facility the vessel was destined for, nor did he know what type of vessel, or to what section of the ASME Code i it was designed. Mr. Boone said that to the best of his knowledge, the vessel in question was one out of a total of twelve which had been constructed under Ametek Shop Order No. N80-40370. Mr. Boone could not identify I which of the twelve heat exchangers was the one related to this allegation. Boone specifically stated that during the November 1980 time period, he examined a shell to head weld on a vessel that had been fitup during the day shift at the Bethayres, Pa. Division. Mr. Boone said he felt the fitup was improper because of the shell to head mismatch which resulted in localized areas of abutting root faces and improper insert alignment. Mr. Boone stated that he approached the first shift foreman (John Grispeno) about the work but "to the best of his knowledge," the fitup was not modified. Mr. Boone said he mentioned the problem to Ametek Quality Control Inspector (Peter Benedict), the Quality Assurance Manager (William Abbott) and the Shop Quality Assurance. Supervisor (Ernie Lux), but did not feel they adequately responded to his concern. Mr. Boone concluded that he felt his lay off from the facility may have been related to his voicing of concern over the status of the work. Mr. Boone declined to provide a signed statement at that time regarding his allegations. A Results of Interview is appended as Exhibit 1. INVESTIGATORS NOTE: At the time of this interview, Mr. Boone was involved in civil litigation against Ametek regarding the circumstances of his dismissal. l i
8 C. Identification of Components in Question Information obtained from the Ametek Inc. Quality Assurance Manager, (William Abbott) on correlating the materials, size, fabrication time period, numbers of units, and shop order number (N80-40370) identified the vessels of concern as steam separator pressure vessels which were a part of " plant isolation valve separators and float switch housing assemblies" fabricated by Ametek, (Bethayres, Pa. Division) for Turbonetics Corporation, 968 Albany Shaker Road, Latham, New York. The separators in question were fabricated of austenitic stainless steel to ASME Section III, Class 2 requirements. The section in question (weld joint) of the assembly was a shell made from SA312 12" schedule 10 pipe (12.75" OD x 0.180 + 12% wall). The dished head was made from 3/16" SA 240-Plate and the weld joint was a single sided Vee Joint with a 0.010" root face. The root pass was made with a consumable insert of the Class 1 configuration of American Welding Society (AWS) AS.30. The materials were all 304 with 308 filler welding metal. Fabrication drawings supplied by Ametek Inc. indicated that the only non-destructive examination (NDE) called for was liquid penetrant testing of the final weld. No volumetric inspection was required for circumferential joints per NC-5211 of the applicable ASME Code since they were not greater than 3/16" thick. Consumable insert circumferential welds were used on both ends of the steam separator vessels. The first circumferential weld was identified as IP and the closure weld as IN. The design was a cylinder welded into the closure end which made inspection of the weld impossible without the use of a borescope or a mirror thru a small opening in the head. D. Interview of Mr. William Abbott, Director of Quality Assurance, Ametek Incorporated Mr. Abbott was interviewed on May 8, 1981 by NRC Investigator R. Keith Christopher and Reactor Inspector Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr. In addition to providing information to identify the components in question, Mr. Abbott was interviewed regarding the specific unit of concern as stated by Mr. Boone. He first confirmed that Mr. Boone had been employed as a Second Shift Shop Foreman during the time period in question and said Boone was " laid off" when they ceased to operate a Second Shift due to lack of work to justify two shift operation INVESTIGATORS NOTE: The extent of this lay off as described by Mr. Abbott was confirmed by Mr. Ian Darnes, Chief, Reactive Inspections, Vendor Inspection Branch, NRC Region IV during a subsequent unrelated NRC inspection at Ametek. Mr. Abbott said he was in fact made aware of a possible fitup problem by an Ametek QC Inspector (Peter Benedict) regarding one of the vessels in question. He said Mr. Benedict, who was primarily a Dimensional Inspector 1
9 felt he was unqualified to evaluate the weld joint in question. Mr. Abbott said he did look at the root weld in question with a mirror, but was unable to see enough to form an opinion. Mr. Abbott said he had no other involvement or knowledge of rework on this unit, but that the Quality Control Manager (Ernie Lux) had some further knowledge on this subject. Mr. Abbott did note that the unit was identified by an Ametek Internal Code as the "L" unit based on an alphabetical identification system for shop purposes. E. Interview of Mr. Ernie Lux, Quality Control Manager, Ametek Incorporated Mr. Lux was interviewed by NRC Investigator, R. Keith Christopher and Reactor Inspector, Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr., on May 8,1981. Mr. Lux said he was aware of the weld in question because the QC Inspector (Benedict) had left him a note describing the concerns as relayed by Mr. Boone. Mr. Lux said he did not examine the weld as he felt it would be difficult to see anything even with a borescope. Mr. Lux said he only advised the QC Inspectors who were to do the penetrant test to make them aware of Mr. Boone's concern. Additionally, Lux reviewed the QC documentation for the 12 Separator Units with the NRC Investigators. The records indicated that the fitup for welding of the circumferential joint is an Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) holdpoint. These records indicated that the unit identified as "L" was rejected on fitup on 10/30/80 by Mr. Benedict and records showed that the joint was refit and the second fitup approved by Mr. Benedict and the ANI on 10/31/80, however, there was no rework (Non-Conformance Report) documentation to show that the unit was reworked. Mr. Lux explained that a Non-Conformance Report was not written on the repair because the repair ] was an "in process" repair. The primary Ametek manufacturing process sheets were examined by the NRC Investigators, however, none of the other records reflected any similiar fitup problem other than the above cited u n i t " L". The Ametek process sheet for this unit is appended as Exhibit 2. I INVESTIGATORS NOTE: The NRC Inspector, Samuel Reynolds, Jr., reviewed the i ASME final weld (0D) PT report which indicated accept-ability of the joint. 'l F. Interview of Mr. Peter Benedict, Quality Control Inspector, Ametek. Incorporated Mr. Benedict was interviewed by NRC Investigator, R. K. Christopher on May 27, 1981. Mr. Benedict said he has been employed by Ametek for 8 years and has been in the Quality Control Department for 3 years. At the time of the welding in question, Mr. Benedict said he had been at the Bethayres Division of Ametek for approximately six weeks. Mr. Benedict recalled that there was a generic problem with obtaining acceptable fitups and welds on the separator units discussed because it was a difficult assembly (due to the pipe and machined head tolerances) i
10 I to work with. He said that while he had no inspection requirements on the inside of the weld in question, he looked at the weld joint with a mirror at Mr. Boones request. Mr. Benedict said that he was unable to make any determination as to the status of the weld because it was beyond his expertise. Mr. Benedict confirmed that he left a written message for Mr. Lux, the Shop QC Manager to tell him about the questionable weld. Benedict also confirmed that he initially rejected the fitup on the "L Unit" requiring that the joint be refit for welding. Mr. Benedict said that to his recollection, the sequence was reflected on the manufacturing process sheet. Benedict said no Non-Comformance Report was written on the joint fitup because it was an "in process" repair and did not require the documentation. G. Interview of Mr. John Grispeno, Day Shift Shop Welding and Fabricating Foreman, Ametek Inc., Bethayres, pa. Division Mr. Grispeno was interviewed by NRC Investigator, R. K. Christopher and Reactor Inspector, Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr., on May 8,1981. Mr. Grispeno said he was aware of the problem with a defective root pass on the "L" unit joint IN. Mr. Grispeno said that when he examine.d the joint with a borescope, he confirmed that there was a 6" to 8" area that had the appearance of incomplete fusion of the consumable insert. Mr. Grispeno stated that he ordered the area grounded out to a depth that would closely approximate the thickness to the top of the insert for refusion of the original insert. He said that this area was repaired and reinspected to assure elimination of the lack of fusion area. Mr. Grispeno stated that he did the reinspection of this area himself and was satisfied with the repair. INVESTIGATORS NOTE: There was no indication of QA/QC documentation to document the welding deficiencies nor of the dispost-tion of the deficiency. This does not appear to be an unusual occurrence with this particular vendor in t terms of their QA/QC practice. Mr. Grispeno concluded that because'the unit was not disassembled, Mr. Boone must have assumed that no repair was effected on the weld. He further stated that the repair was conducted on the day shift while Mr. Boone was not at:the plant. H. Interview of Mr. George Chacko, Welder, Ametek Inc., Bethayres, Pa. Division Mr. Chacko was interviewed by NRC Investigator, R. K. Christopher and Reactor Inspector, Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr., on May 22, 1981. A review of the Ametek " welding material issuance and weldment records" determined that Mr. Chacko did a majority of the consumable insert welds including the "L" unit. When interviewed, Mr. Chacko confirmed the information in the records and further advised that he worked the day shift under Mr.
o 11 John Grispeno, the Day Shift Supervisor. Mr. Chacko confirmed that there had been problems with the fitups on separators including the "L" unit as would have been expected due to the tolerance problems but to his knowledge, all of these fitup problems were rectified. In the case of the "L"
- unit, Mr. Chacko said he did not do the fitup, but did the repair work specified by Mr. Grispeno on the closure weld in question. Mr. Chacko stated that he would not have welded the repair if the grind out configuration had not been acceptable. He stated that he had received instructions from Mr. Grispeno as to the nature of the repair work to be completed.
Mr. Chacko recalled that the weld was ground to a depth close to the top of the original insert and then he rewelded by refusion to remove the lack of fusion. Mr. Chacko concluded that he was unaware of any units that had the same problem although several fitups done by the Second Shift had to be refit by the first shift before welding could be done. Mr. Chacko provided no further information pertinent to this investigation. I. Interview of Mr. George Carlson, Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI), Factory Mutual Insurance Company Mr. Carlson was interviewed by NRC Investigator, R. Keith Christopher and Reactor Inspector, Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr., on May 22, 1981. Present at the interview at Mr. Carlson's request was Mr. Richard Edl, Operations Supervisor, Engineering Division, Factory Mutual. As background, Carlson stated that he has been employed by Factory Mutual as an ANI Inspector for twelve years and previously was an Authorized Inspector (Sections I and VIII) with Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection Company for eighteen years. Mr. Carlson said he was assigned full-time as the ANI at the Bethayres Division of Ametek for the past two and a half years. Mr. Carlson confirmed that the fitup on the unit in question was an ANI holdpoint and that he also examined the finished weld for proper reinforce-ment. Mr. Carlson said on inspections of this type he would complete his record on the process control sheet at the time of the inspection. Mr. Carlson explained that the holdpoint inspection on this weld joint consists of fitup inspection in the tack welded condition when ready for joint welding. This inspection includes: exanination of the tack welds for crater cracking, alignment of the joint and fitup of the insert. Mr. Carlson was in agreement that when assembled, the inside of the joint could not be seen in order to confirm dimensional conformance requirements. He said the joint fitup acceptance was based on looking at the distance of the projection of the insert above the base of the joint. Mr. Carlson said he signed off on the process sheets only after verifying the-dimensional acceptance criteria. Mr. Carlson further clarified why the process documentation does not indicate any rejection at the holdpoint. He said that his practice was not to sign off the process sheet until the acceptance criteria had been met. Mr. Carlson reviewed the process documentation of the unit in question in the presence of the NRC investigators and confirmed that the ANI sign off-initials on all twelve components were his and were based on his own
12 inspection of the units. Mr. Carlson also confirmed his inspection and acceptance of unit "L" on October 31, 1980 by referring to his nuclear inspection diary for Job Number N80-40370. J. Interview of Mr. Myron Swidersky, Project Engineer, Turbonetics, Inc. Mr. Swidersky was contacted by telephone by NRC Investigator R. Keith Christopher and Reactor Inspector Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr. on May 8,1981. Mr. Swidersky confirmed that the 12 components in question had been received by Turbonetics from Ametek, Inc. (Bethayres Division) in November and December 1980 under Turbonetics Purchase Order 0988910. Mr. Swidersky said these components were scheduled for installation in General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Plants at Hartsville and Phipps Bend. According to Mr. Swidersky, the component in question is a " Mechanical Moisture Separator." It is operated at 125 psig, designed for 150 psig and hydrotested at 225 psig. According to Mr. Swidersky, the unit supplies compressed air between isolation valves to create a pressure above con-tainment to prevent gas leakage. Mr. Swidersky said that at an internal pressurization of 125 psig, the actual stress at the joint is less than 3,000 psi whereas the allowable stress for the material in Class 2 components is 18,800 and the safe shutdown earthquake allowable stress is 22,500 psi. K. Status of Allegation The interviews conducted and documents reviewed by the NRC Investigators indicate a defective area as described by Mr. Boone was discovered on unit "L" of the " Plant Isolation Valve (Steam) Separator and Float House Assembly". The interviews also indicated that the area was reworked to eliminate lack of fusion and was inspected and accepted by the ANI. In view of this fact and the high design safety factor at operating pressure, further disassembly and inspection of the unit was not considered necessary. L. Receipt of Additional Allegations from A11eger In several subsequent telephone contacts with Mr. Boone during the course of the investigation, he made several additional allegations regarding work done at the Bethayres Division of Ametek involving components for various nuclear facilities. On August 11, 1981, Mr. Boone was reinterviewed by the NRC Investigator, R. Keith Christopher and Reactor. Inspector-Samuel D. Reynolds, Jr. At that time, he provided three additional allegations as follows: 1. Allegation No. 1 In April of 1979, he (Boone) worked on a series of heat exchangers (approximately 12 shutdown units) under Purchase Order N7740-188. Mr. Boone indicated that on one particular component, which he could not specifically identify, a hole was being burned in the top of the
~ i 13 unit for nozzle insertion in the channel head. Mr. Boone stated that during this process, the roll bond clad separated from the head to form a 1" gap at the nozzle to head penetration. He stated that this separation was not repaired and that it was only seal welded over the clad to nozzle gap. He stated that this gap remained in the unit. 2. Allegation No. 2 Mr. Boone stated that during August or September of 1980, welding was being performed on the caps of a series of 12 regenerative heat exchangers under Ametek Purchase Order No. N7740-188A and B through N7740-194A and B. On these units, both end caps to forging circum-ferential welds were made with gas tungsten arc (GTA) consumable insert root welds and 2 or 3 additional GTA passes. Mr. Boone alleged that on one of these units (not further identified), 90% of the weld was determined to be rejectable during informational RT done by Peabody Inc. He further alleged that the repair was done by a welder identified as John Harris employing an open root GTA technique. Mr. Boone alleged that Harris was not qualified for this stainless steel welding procedure. 3. Allegation No. 3 Mr. Boone alleged that work was performed on 12 copper-nickel tubed after cooler heat exchangers which were fabricated with copper nickel clad tube sheets and copper-nickel tube-to-tube sheet welds. He said that the requirements called for satisfactory liquid penetrant - i testing of the cladding and tube-to-tube sheet welds. Mr. Boone alleged that he observed some of these units leaving the shop with holes in the cladding that could be seen with the naked eye. He further stated that while some of the holes were patched, he did not believe that the units could legitmately have been accepted in that condition. He provided no further specific information regarding these units. A statement was prepared containing Mr. Boone's allegations for his signature, however, he refused to provide a signed statement regarding these allegations. The unsigned statement is appended to this report as Exhibit 3. 4 M. Followup of Additional Allegations 1. Allegation No. 1 Mr. Boone alleged that improper welding of the cladding on the ID of the head of one unspecified shutdown heat exchanger from a series of twelve was performed. These units were allegedly constructed under-Ametek Purchase Order N7740-188 for Combustion Engineering (CE).
14 Determination of Status of Shutdown Heat Exchangers Mr. William Abbott, QA Manager, Ametek provided documentation that indicated a total of eight sets of shutdown heat exchangers (2 units per set) were initially contracted for by Combustion Engineering. Of these, four sets were cancelled and four were shipped to Combustion Engineering for use in Washington Public Power System and the Duke Power System. Furthermore, it was determined that of these units, all were subsequently returned to Ametek by Combustion Engineering for rework primarily because of thinness in the stainless steel overlay in the channel section and contamination of the tubes in the channel section. During the process of rework, the area of concern was reinspected upon completion by the onsite inspectors from Washington Public Power Supply and Combustion Engineering and accepted. Documen-tation indicating the destination of these ccmponents is appended as Exhibit 4. Status of Investigation Washington Public Power Supply identified deficiencies in these units as supplied by Combustion Engineering. In that Duke Power purchased these heat exchangers from this same vendor (Ametek). Duke Power was advised by Combustion Engineering of the potential deficiencies. Both licensees notified the appropriate NRC Regional offices (Region II and IV) as 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportable items who followed the corrective action taken by the licensees. 2. Allegation No. 2 Mr. Boone alleged that Mr. John Harris, an Ametek Welder was not qualified for open root gas tungsten arc (GTA) stainless steel welding procedures for repair work on end caps to forging for circum-ferential welds on regenerative heat exchangers which had performed. Identification of Units Contact with Mr. William Abbott and review of Ametek work documenta-tion indicated the components in question were a series of fourteen regenerative heat exchangers under Ametek Job Order No. N7740-175 through N7740-198. Of these units, four were cancelled and ten were shipped to various customers. Documentation indicating the destina-tion of the shipments is appended as Exhibit 5. Review of Welder Qualification Records According to the Welder Qualification Records maintained by Ametek, Mr. John Harris was ' qualified for open root GTA and GTA stainless steel welding based on a qualification test taken by Mr. Harris on March 21, 1979 in accordance with Welding Procedure 77WP-C007 (Gas Tungsten Arc Stainless Steel Procedure). Acceptance was based on a
15 radiography report submitted by Peabody, Inc. of the subject test plate. Copies of the records of the qualifications test and the Peabody Radiography Report are appended as Exhibits 6 and 7. There is-no indication on the performance qualification record of the position of the test assembly and no indication of the position of welding for the subject repair weld. INVESTIGATORS NOTE: Mr. John Harris terminated his employment with Ametek on July 11, 1980. Status of Investigation In view of the supporting documentation asserting Mr. Harris's qualifications for the welding procedure and the allegers lack of information in support of the assertions, no further investigative effort is planned. 3. Allegation No. 3 Mr. Boone alleged that out of twelve copper-nickel tubed heat exchangers which were fabricated with copper-nickel clad tube sheets and copper-nickel tube-to-tube sheet welds, many were observed leaving the shop with holes in the cladding that could be seen with the naked eye. Identification of Components Examination of Ametek Purchase Orders and Job Numbers identified the units in question as a total of twelve after cooler heat exchangers delivered to Turbonetics, Inc. in Latham, New York, under Purchase Order No. 998-8898. These components are currently in storage by Turbonetics and are destined for the Phipps Bend and Hartsville Nuclear Power Station Projects. At the time of submission of this report, they had not been delivered to the designated facilities. Status of Investigation This allegation has been forwarded to NRC Region II-for their consideration of the need for any further followup actions-since the Phipps Bend and Hartsville Projects are in that Region. The Vendor Inspection Branch (VIB), Region IV, is also being forwarded a copy of this investigation report for information purposes,. however, VIB inspection of these components at Turbonetics has not been requested at this time. No further actions by Region I are anticipated.
8 0 RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH MR. FREDERICK BOONE AS RECORDED BY NRC INVESTIGATOR R. KEITH CHRISTOPHER ON APRIL 7, 1981 Frederick Boone of 18 Fairmount Drive, Willingboro, NJ 08046 (609-877-2337) was interviewed by Keith Christopher and Sam Reynolds on 4/7/81 commencing at 3:10 p.m. in the law offices of Hicky, Hagar and Williamson,19514 Sproul Road, Broomall, PA. Present during the interview at Mr. Boone's request was his attorney, Joseph N. Hicky. Mr. Boone said that he is currently unemployed after being " laid off" from Ameteck Industries on November 19, 1980. Mr. Boone said he had been employed at Ameteck for 22 months from February 1979 to November 1980 as a welding and fabrication foreman on the afternoon shift. Mr. Boone stated that he felt he was " laid off" from the company, not because of " lack of work", but because (1) he is black and it was a racist. action and (2) he was complaining too much about violations of working standards and work requirements related to nuclear power plant welding fabrication. Specifically, Mr. Boone alleged improper welding of a stainless steel consumable insert root pass in heat exchanger shell to head joints. Mr. Boone said he did not know which plant the heat exchangers were being built for and didn't know what type of heat exchanger it was or what section of the ASME Code it was designed under. Mr. Boone did estimate the diameter of the weld joint at 2 feet. Mr. Boone said he knew the heat exchangers were for a nuclear facility because he saw the blueprint drawing and observed that the drawing number had an "N" in front which to him indicated a nuclear job. Mr. Boone believed the shop order number to be N80-40370. Mr. Boone said that to the best of his knowledge, Ameteck was (at this time) working on a total of 12 of these heat exchangers and that when he left the plant, approximately six had been completed with regards to the portion of work he was involved in. (Shell to head welding). Mr. Boone did not know if any of the heat exchangers had been shipped as of the time of this interview. Mr..Boone said he first became concerned about the quality of work being done during the first week of November 1980. He said he examined a shell to head weld that had been fitup during the day shift and determined that the fitup was improper because of shell to head mismatch, localized areas of abutting root faces and improper insert alignment. Mr. Boone said he talked to the day shift foreman (John Grispeno) whose crew had done the work and he refused to weld the joint on the second shift. Mr. Boone said he told Grispeno that the EB insert was not showing through and that he had an improper fitup. According to Mr. Boone, Grispeno told him that "he would handle it." He said Grispeno said nothing else about the fitup. The following day, he observed Grispeno's welding crew had completed the welding and that to the "best of his knowledge," no modification was made to the fitup.
2 Mr. Boone said that after the welding was done, one of his fabricators, John Smith, locked at the root side of the weld with a borescope. Smith told him that the EB Insert was not " sucked up." Mr. Boone said he looked at it himself with the borescope and also saw that the insert was not completely consumed. Mr. Boone said he asked that the Quality Control Inspector (Pete Benedict) to look at it and he (Benedict) also agreed that the insert wasn't completely consumed. Boone said there was no formal written procedure that required the QC Inspector to look at the work. Boone said he expected Benedict to file a nonconformance report on the work, but he never did. The following day the welders had done other work on the vessel and nothing had been done about the EB Insert. Mr. Boone said he talked to the QA Manager, Bill Abbott, several days after this incident. Mr. Boone said he told Abbott the insert was not completely consumed. Abbott reportedly asked him how he knew that when he couldn't see inside. Boone said he told Abbott he looked at it with a borescope and then got a borescope and had Abbott look at it. Abbott reportedly looked at the weld and said the "EB could be partially sucked up." Mr. Boone asked Mr. Abbott why there wasn't any discoloration of the Insert and he (Abbott) responded to the effect 'I can't argue with that' and walked away. Mr. Boone said he had no further discussions with anyone relative to his concerns until several days later. He said he walked into the Quality Control office between shifts where he approached Pete Benedict and Ernie Lux, the shop QA supervisor. Mr. Boone said he asked them about this job and his concern and Benedict stated in response "Sometimes you see things in the shop and you don't see them." At that point, Mr. Boone said he left the office and said nothing more. Mr. Boone said several days later, Howard Becker, the Personnel Officer gave him his notice of layoff. The reason was given as " lack of work." Mr. Boone said he was the only individual laid off at that time. Mr. Boone said that besides himself and Grispeno, there was one other foreman working in the shop on this job. He identified this individual as Charles Russo. Mr. Boone also recalled additional conversations that occurred in the QA office with Pete Benedict. Benedict had also commented that "if you start to inspect one of these jobs, it could go on and on from one unit to another." i Mr. Boone said that to the best of his recollection, the Purchase Contract called for 12 vessels of that type. He conjectured that 3/4 of the work was done on the vessels. Mr. Boone also said that he examined other vessels and observed the same problem with the inserts on at least 3 other vessels, however, he was unable to identify those vessels. Mr. Boone explained that he has filed a lawsuit against Ameteck citing the reason he was laid off was racist and because he had highlighted welding procedure violations.
3 As background, Mr. Boone stated that he was taught welding at Chester VoTech (2 years), was employed for 6 years as a 1st Class weldor at Sun Ship Building and Dry Dock Co., was employed for three years by RCA at Cornwells Heights as a welding instructor, was certified tc teach welding by the State of Pennsylvania, had worked one year for the Joseph Oat Company (Camden, N.J.) as head of the welding department and had received a VoTech instructors award by the Philadelphia Section of the American Welding Society.
V EXHIBITS 1. Results of interview with Mr. Boone/ April 7,1981. 2. Ametek Manufacturing Process Sheet. 3. Unsigned Statement of Mr. Boone/ August 11, 1981. 4. Combustion Engineering Shutdown Heat Exchanger Documentation. 5. Combustion Engineering Regenerative Heat Exchanger Documentation. 6. Welder Qualification Record for Mr. John Harris / March 21, 1979. 7. Ametek Radiography Report / March 21, 1979.
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/ 4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION I DATE TIME I do hereby make the following free and voluntary statement to Mr. R. K. Christopher, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I make this statement with no threats having been made against me or promises extended to me. As background I am a former employee of Ametek Corp. having-been employed from' February 28, 1979 to November 15, 1980 as a welding and fabrication foreman. During that period I worked the second shift continuously. My first concern regards work done at the Bethayres Div. of Ametek during April of 1979 or thereabouts. We were working on a series of heat exchangers (shutdown units) under purchase order No. N7740-188. This consisted of a total of 12 units. During this time I observed the first shift foreman, John Griskino, with a burning unit on top of one unit cutting the holes for the nozzles in the channel head. Griskino burned through the carbon steel into the stainless. I noticed during this process that a separation gap appeared between the carbon cladding and the stainless steel around the nozzle hole. I cannot identify this unit specifically other than as one of twelve units being constructed under the above. mentioned purchase order. My concern is that this 1 inch gap between the roll b6nd cla'd ID of the formed channel head at both nozzle penetrations was improperly repaired in that a seal bead weld was put across the gap but behind the weld the gap remains. It is also my belief that the stainless steel weld repair was done with improper filler metal in that they used E308 Rod vs E309 as required by procedure specifications. My second concern is that during August or September of 1980 we were welding the caps on a series of 12 regenerative heat exchangers under Purchase No. N7740-188 A and B through N7740-194 A and B. On these units both end caps to forging circumferential welds were made with Gas Tungsten Arc (GTA) consumable Insert Root Welds and 2 to 3 additional GTA passes. On one of these units and I can't identify specifically, 90*4 of the weld was determined to be rejectable'during informational RT done by Peabody, Inc. The repair, which was done by a welder named John Harris, employed an open Root GTA technique. I do not believe that Harris was qualified for this open root GTA stainless steel procedure. I believe other repairs on these same units were made in the same fashion. However, I am unable to be more specific on these additional areas of questions. EXHIBIT 3 h s
7- -7 2 My third and last concern pertains to 12 copper nickel tubed heat exchangers which were fabricated with copper nickel clad tube sheets and copper nickel tube to tube sheet welds. The requirements called for satisfactory penetrant testing of the cladding and tube to tube sheet welds. I observed some of these units leaving the shop with holes in them that could be seen with the naked eye. Some of the holes were patched but I do not believe that the Ametek QC people could legitimately have accepted the units in that condition. I do not know the circumstances of the QC inspection or the criteria or if the leak test results were satisfactory. I do not know what these units are other than the Purchase No. they were constructed under which is N80-40310 and that we worked on them during the winter of 1979. The Ametek QC Inspectors who would have been involved with the work on these units were most probably Joe McCarthy and R. Palmer. I have read, initialed all corrections in the above two page typed statement and understand its contents which I have provided to Mr. Christopher and Mr. Reynolds of the NRC. It is true and accurate to the best of my ability and belief. I declare under Penalty of Perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. J/N/> / WITNESSED BY: BEdemaa fo C 4 ^4 f.//.(.)a/rnief / % e R. Keith Christopher Samuel D. Reynolds
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{, l QW 484 SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR MANUF ACTUf'ER'S RECORD OF WELDER OR WELDING OPERATOR OUALIFICAllON TESTS (See OW 301, Section IX, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code) ] /[e/4 f/3 Chn 6 No 8M S amp No /[ Welder Name We' ding Process 6 7//[t/ [/bf// /,4/ fvpe /t/dA/4//]/.. In accordance mth Weideng Procedure SpeOfecation (V.PS) 77 MM- ( & [ A /8 / Baciong tow 402) Material (OW 403) Spec 7M ~#// -70 to -M -f/h ' /C of P No / to P No / Thic k ness /' Dia Filler Metal (OW 404) Spec No M// - OE 7 Class No [C 3( T l-F No b Other JfA - 3 4 f .3 t 3 L [ Position (OW 405) (IG. 2G. 6G) Gas (OW 4081 Type NA* T r A/ c Composition Electocal Characteristics iOW 4091 Current /7/f 6 2 /~ Polarity C / A /AJ, D /E*M/ #N/~ 7 f Weld Progression (OW 410) /Y/4 JM M/A/, /D DAW Other For Information Only Filler Metal Diameter and Trade Name kh/N - h ) I/W// /A/ h)[ //4. # Submergad Arc Flum Trade Name 8/// Gas Metal Arc Welding Shielc Gas Tcade Name /V/6 Guided Bend Test Results QW-462.2(a), QW-462.3(a). QW462 3(b) Type and Fig N 1 Resut l Radiographic Test Results (QW-304 & QW 305) Fc,r alternative qualification of groove welds by radiography Radiographic Results: kC UA//lCCf/ [ASif DEffCf3 Sf/&lWO 2 Fillet Weld Test Results (See QW-462.4(a). QW-462.4(b)] Fracture Test (Describe the location, nature and site Of any cracit or tear:ng of the speOmen) Length and Per Cent of Defects inches
- n Macro Test-Fusion Appearance--Fillet Size Oegl in X in Conv e =ity oi Conca.ity in Test Conducted by R N U6 MMW/2 D% 8/ /I taboratory-Test No We certify that the statements in this record are correct and that the test welds were prepared, welded and tested in ae ronjarste with the requirements of Sections IX of the ASME Code 4 A/]f 76X."/.fc /W r*1't? c/ l(CO/' O N T O N Organization /M7/My/2
~5 [4NN/ A M E'C N 2 /, /7[7 sy (O AOc oaie so44,- // Oti" Cr/WM A (Detail of record of tests are illustrative only and may be mosf feed to conform to the type am number of tests required by the Code l NOTE: Any essential variables in addition to those above shall be recorded (6/30/78) This form (E000081may be obtaine<t bom the Onter Dept ASME,345 E JI St. '. w % k N.Y.10017 EXHIBIT 6
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i,o- - e,. n=e7 ex. r Ollff if0 \\(, 2-96 10 3 4 ees '.O M M l' OI'c /-{,4,7 1-re n e t,...i e, g,A g sn,m s.ie te a sc.eeas r..- rsee . r. m s se L.ne 2 O v a t 's. g h L., nach 0o [ MJ/nvlC r,ont Q10 c e n t e, f)4 No. of F eem pe. Caggette V ee. c.g $. A gie $ ;p erimposed Oens ty Queat y L *.el 1 K >-N-ct Weld ! Film h A c c. Rej. Remarks R T Shootir.g Sketch Code f.1asking or Blocking if used 1CM I -1/, 37 Lv 90cs, Ici a Y s l ~. - _. e 1 m. e W .m --4 ,\\' Defect Code g rd ~ e 5.,o. o,,,, ,,., n c m :., e, ,,o o eC. v ee,c, Rae,o,,a se, r S - Slag Tl - Tungsten inclusion F A -,ilm An'tif acts L EXHIBIT 7 SNT-TCI A I Il"[llI .}}