ML20041D089
| ML20041D089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1981 |
| From: | Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE |
| To: | Clemenson F NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041D081 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TER-C5257-531, TER-C5257-59, NUDOCS 8203040250 | |
| Download: ML20041D089 (55) | |
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,. i TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT -
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?~'~, CONTROL OF HEAVY L'OADS -
5.- ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMP /,NY
-/ ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE UNITS 1 AND 2 11 . NRC DOCKET NO. 50-313, 50-368 m l FRC PROJECT C5ll57
- i. NRC TAC NO. 07971 FRCASSIGNMENT 3
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NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-79-118 FRC TASKS 59, 531 f. g,. - .
'l - Preparedby
[b Frank!!n Research Center Author: C. Bo=berger f The Parkway at Twentieth Street p ' Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. Sargenc Prepared for I l Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- f. . ! Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead.NRC Engineer: F. Cle=enson.
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!" This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an ip .
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees,
.% makes any warranty, expressed or impiled, or assumes any legal
-- liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of
. . . . such use, of any Information, apparatus, product or process
(.'dg{. - { disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third 5M i party would not Infringe privately owned rights. . Ehc: n . .-
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.. d c$.rs. . Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute The Senprrun Frankhn Parmwey. PMa, Pa.191C3 (215) 4481000' 1;-[ .- . -
l' h TER-C5257-59/531 l CONTENTS Section Title Pace 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- 1. 2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1
; 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . .. . . . . 2
! 2 EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 2. 2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 21 3 CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.1 General Provisiens for Load Handling . . . . . . 25
- 3. 2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 30
- 3. 3 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 i
6 1 rankAn Research Center A Dnemen af The Fromen insamme ;
s . TER-C5257-59/531 1
- 1. INTRODUCTION * '
4 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents the Franklin Research Center j (FRC) review of general load handling policy and procedures at .the Arkansas Power and Light Company's Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Nuclear Power Plant. This evaluation was performed with the following objectives: I o to. assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (1), Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. 4 1. 2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by l j the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 (2) to all power reactor licensees, requesting i information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel. 1 { . The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy
- Icads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.
l " In order to upgrade measures for the control of, heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to ac.hieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of dh Franklin Research Center A Dennen of The Fransen insonne
I TER-C5257-59/531 l failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which , they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might f result in sign'ificant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in i addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the i potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g. , a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate r
. that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.
; Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows: l -
'j 1. provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system
- 2. define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not I cairied over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment
- 3. provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks 'to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.
- 1. 3 PIANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Arkansas Power and Light Company (APL), the Licensee for ANO, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at ANO, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On February 17,.1981, APL provided the i
Ubhu Franklin Research Center A Opnesen af The Famesme insumme ec = w- --
TER-CS257-59/531 initial response (4) to this request. The Licensee provided additional information by letter on June 22, 1981 (5) and by telephone conversation on November 30, 1981 (6]. Actions which the Licensee has committed to perform as a result of this telephone conversation, with NRC and FRC concurrence, will be of ficially documented in the Licensee's next report to the NRC, due December 22, 1981 and have been identified in this report by use of an asterisk (*) for ease of verification when formal documantation is available. s o u00u Franklin Research center. A Os==e.ca of The Fransen lasseuse
TER-C5257-59/531
- 2. EVALUATION AND* RECOMMENDATIONS ,
FRC's evaluation of load handling at ANO is divided into two categories. These categories deal separately with the general guidelines of Article 5.1.1 and the recomme'nded interim protection measures of Article 5.3 of NUREG-0612. Applicable guidelines are referenced in each category. FRC's conclusion and recommendations are provided in the summary for each guideline; 2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612: o Guideix.te 1 - Safe Ioad Paths o Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures o Guideline 3 - Crane operator Training o Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices o Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed) o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing,- and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design. These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems that handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and FRC's evaluation of this verification'are contained in Sections 2.1.1 through 2.1.7 of this report. 2.1.1 Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(1)]
" Safe load paths should be def. led for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc. , such that if the load is dropped, d ", k* @ g ter I
TER-C5257-59/531 1
- the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and g clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.
, Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has indicatec that safe load paths have been defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor versal and in the spent fuel pool or to impact safe shutdown equipment. These load paths are defined in procedures, l '
I shown on equipment layout drawings, and wi11 be clearly marked on the floor in l the area where the load is to be handled prior to moving the D .d. Deviations i from defined load paths will require written alternstive procedures approved by the Plant Safety Committee. In audition, safe load zones have been developed for the spent fuel shipping casks, which provide specific bounds for
- crane movement and delineate pathways where casks are to be carried. The l Licensee noted that these load paths will be reviewed when casks are
, eventually moved and deviations, if necessary, will re, quire the approval of the Plant Safety Committee.
- b. FRC Evaluation Based on APL's response, FRC concurs that safe load paths have been developed to satisfy the criteria of Guideline 1 including those load paths which have been developed for spent fuel shipping casks. This evaluation is based on APL's original submittals [4, 5] and a subsequent telephone conversation (6). - -
- c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations ANO will comply with Guideline 1. For those criteria presently being implemented at ANO (flocs marking and deviations from defined load paths), the Licensee should ensure that these criteria are implemented prior to the i
handling of heavy loads and that these procedures, when completed, are readily available for review by the NRC staff. Further, this conclusion should be "Information received in a telephone conversation [6].
. bd Franklin Research Center A Onamon af The Fransen Inmunde
i I TER-C5257-59/531 verified by review of drawings showing designated safe load paths which APL . has agreed to provide with their next submittal concerning NUREG-0612, scheduled for late December 1981. , 2.1.2 Load Handling Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1'.1(2) ]
" Procedures should be developed t'o cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.
These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states that " procedures have been developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. These procedures cover handling of loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. These procedures include the followings inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the loads definition of the safe load paths; other special precautions."
Generic procedures which comply with this criterion have also been
- developed for the spent fuel shipping casks. As noted for safe load paths, these generic procedures will be reviewed prior to movement of any shipping cask, and deviations or revisions, if required, will receive the proper approvals.
b, FRC Evaluation Load handling procedures developed by APL satisfy the criteria of Guideline ? including those procedures developed for the spent fuel shipping cask. This finding is based on APL's verification that these procedures cover a handlirg of all loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612 and satisfy the criteria specified in the guideline.
'Information received in a telephone conversation (6].
4UOOu Franklin Research Center A Osumen of The Frenien insomme ;
l l TER-C5257-59/531
- c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations ,
ANO complies with criteria for load handling procedures as specified it. I Guideline 2 for those loads identified in the Licensee's response. A portion of this conclusion is based on information provided by APL during a telephone converstation (6) which APL has agreed to document in a subsequent formal submittal. 2.1. 3 Crane Operator Training (Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1. l(3) )
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [7)."
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions -
Selected ANO employees have been trained and qualified as crane operators in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976. APL has also committed to establish appropriate procedures for monitoring
- operator conduct and assuring proper qualification of crane operators. This program is to include preparation of a training effectiveness evaluation to be administered to crane operators.
- b. FRC Evaluation Crane operator training, conduct, and qualification programs being implemented at ANO satisfy the criteria of Guideline 3.
- c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations .
ANO will comply with Guideline 3. Programs for training, qualification,
- and conduct developed by APL are expected to comply with ANSI B30.2-1967.
When complete, such programs should be availaole for NRC staff review. 2.1. 4 Special Lif tine Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1. l(4)1 "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [8]. l *Information received in a telephone conversation (6). l nklin Research Center
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l l l TER-C5257-59/531 This standard should apply to all special lif ting devices which carry ' heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."
- a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states that exception is. taken to the arbitrary application of ANSI N146-1978 to all heavy loads since the standard was specially prepared for nuclear shipping containers weighing greater than 10,000 pounds a'nd for those features of the attachment members that affect the function and safety of the lif t. The Licensee states that, by strict and unyielding interpreta-tion of NURIG-0612, special lifting devices are present at ANO which do not meet ANSI criteria. However, the Licensee states that an attempt is being
- made to obtain non-proprietary information from the original manufacturer and official requests have been made to recover the necessary information.
- b. FRC Evaluation FRC has evaluated the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 and notes that it is difficult to make a strict interpretation of compliance between the standard and existing special lifting devices. Accordingly, FRC agrees that only those sections which are directly related to load handling reliability of the lifting devices need be addressed. Evaluation and review of ANSI N14.6-1978 by FRC has identified several sections which are not pertinent nor do they contain requirements that affect load handling reliability and therefore need l not be addressed by the Licensee. These sections include Scope (Section 1) ,
Definitions (2) , Design Considerations to Minimize Decontamination Effor't's' ' (3. 4) , Coatings (3. 5) , Lubrication (3. 6) , Inspector's Responsibilities (4.2) , and Fabrication Considerations (4. 3) . In addition, evaluation of Section 6 l (Special Lif ting Devices for Critical Loads) need not be included in this review since no loads have been determined to be a " critical load." i l
*Information received in a telephone conversation (6).
. b Franklin Research Center A Dmesen af The Fmhmmmae
TER-C5257-59/531 Review of ANSI N14.6-1978 by FRC has identified several other areas of . concern, however, where load handling reliability is an issue. It is FRC's judgment that these sections (3.1, Designer's Responsibilities; 3.2, Design Criteria; 3.3, Design Considerations; 4.1, Fabricator's Responsibilities; and 5.0, Acceptance Testing, Maintenance, and Assurance of Continued Compliance) identify important information which should be readily available or require-i ments to which the Licensee should adhere in order to adequately substantiate the load handling reliability of the special lif ting devices. Although this standard did not exist when lifting devices were designed and manufactured, it is not anticipated that procurement of information or compliance with the standard's criteria will create undue hardship since (1) criteria of the standard are akin to established industry practices and this standard merely codifies such practices for special lif ting devices; and (2) these sp'ecial lif ting devices are used for infrequent lif ts of the plants' largest components, l generally in the direct vicinity of irradiated fuel, which makes the reliability of design, fabrication, and continued testing of those special lif ting devices a relatively sensitive concern for both the Licensee and the NRC. The following are the minimum necessary criteria against which the Licensee should evaluate special lifting devices: Section 3. Although this section deals with specifications for new handling devices and the Licensee has indicated that sound engineering practices were used, FRC considers certain information to be of significant importance and should be readily available to the Licensee. This info'rmation includes the following:
- 1. Section 3.1: -
- a. limitations on the use of the lif ting devices (3.1.1)
- b. identification of critical components and definition of critical characteristics (3.1.2)
. c. signed stress analyses which demonstrate appropriate margins of saf ety- (3.1.3)
- d. indication of permissible repair procedures (3.1.4)
- 2. Section 3.2:
- a. use of stress design factors of 3 for minimum yield strength and 5 for ultimate strength (3.2.1)
- p. similar stress design factors for load bearing pins, links, and adapters (3. 2. 4) b Franklin Research Cer.ter A Omne.eaetTheF w w
TER-C5257-59/531
- c. slings used comply with ANSI B30. 9-1971 (3. 2. 5) .
- d. subjecting materials to dead weight testing or Charpy impact testing (3.2.6)
- 3. Section 3.3:
- a. consideration of problems related to possible lamellar tearing (3.3.1)
- b. design shall assure even distribution of the load (3.3.4)
- c. retainers fitted for load-carrying components which may become inadvertently disengaged (3.3.5)
- d. verification that remote actuating mechanisms securely engage or disengage (3.3.6) ,
Section 4 Similar to that stated for Section 3, most standard criteria concerning fabrication cannot be applied in retrospect. However, the Licensee should have available certain information, including the following:
- 1. Section 4.1
- a. verify selection and use of material (4.1.3) .
- b. compliance with f abrication practices (4.1.4)
- c. qualification of welders, procedures, and operators (4.1.5)
- d. provisions for a quality assurance program (4.1.6)
- e. provisions for identification and certification of equipment (4.1. 7)
- f. verification that materials or services are produced under appropriate controls and qualifications (4.1.9)
Section S. This section deals with acceptance and follow-on testing and, as such, all criteria related to establishing load handling reliability are the responsibility of the o.iner and should be complied with, including the following items:
. 1. Section 5.1: -
- a. implementation of a periodic testing schedule and a system to indicate the date of expiration (5.1.3)
- b. provisions for establishing operating procedures (5.1.4)
- c. identification of subassemblies which may be exchanged (5.1.5)
- d. ' suitable markings (5.1.6)
- e. maintaining a full record of history (5.1.7)
- f. conditions for removal from service (5.1.8)
- 2. Section 5.2:
- a. load test to'150% and appropriate inspections prior to initial use (5. 2.1)
- b. qualification of replacement parts (5.2.2)
- 3. Section 5.3:
- a. satisfying a'nnual load test or inspection requirements (5.3.1)
- b. testing following major maintenance (5. 3. 2)
_10 03 Frenidin Research Center A Ossenen of The Frapuen W !
. ! 0 TER-C5257-59/531
- l l c. testing af ter application of suustantial stresses (5.3.4) .
t d. inspections by operating (5.3.6) and non-operating or )
. maintenance personnel (5.3.7) l I
- c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations Insufficient information has been made available for FRC to determine l 1
compliance with Guideline 4. When the vendor has provided the necessary
. information, APL should evaluate it with respect to those items affecting load handling reliability and report the results of this review to the NRC. ,
2.1.5 Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1. l(5) ) i "Lif t'ing devices that are not specially designed should be installed and
' used in +:cordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [9).
However, in selecting the proper pling, the load used should be the sum of the atetic and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling shc il be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum i l static and 'ynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only i certain cranas, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they t.sy be used. " I I a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions I
! APL has committed (6) to establish a suitable program for use and installation of slings,'with respect to inspection, replacement, and other ! safe operating practices, which will satisfy the requirements of ANSI The Licensee also stated that selection and marking of slings '*
B30. 9-1971. will incorporate dynamic loading as identified in the general guideline. b.. FRC Evaluation APL is expected to satisfy the requirements of this guideline based on l their verification (6) that a program will be etablished for installation and use of slings which complies with ANSI B30.9-1971 and the dynamic loading criteria identified in this guideline. l
'Information received in a telephone conversation (6).
, i U Franklin Research Center 1
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.I . TER-C5257-59/531
- c. FRC Conclusions and Reccmmendations .
1 APL will comply with Guideline 5. When implemented, revised procedures i and appropriate records should be readily available for review by the NRC staff. , 2.1.6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1. l(6) ]
"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with -
Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the' frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g. , the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power
, operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A program has been developed which satisfies the criteria of Guideline 6 for inspection, testing, and maintenance of overhead and gantry cranes.
- b. FRC Evaluation The Licensee satisfies the criteria of Guideline 6, based on the verifica-tion of such compliance by APL,of its crane inspection, testing, and mainten ,
ance program.
- c. FRC Conclusion l
ANO complies with the criteria of Guideline 6. i 2.1.7 Crane Design (Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(7)]
"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' (10). An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70
$ Franidin Research Center A t>nman of The Preuen insmane ;
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- may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the ,
- specification is satisfied."
+ ,
6 !l Summary of Licensee Statements and Cenclusions 1: a. The Licensee has evaluated the following ANO cranes to determine design
. compliance with CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976:
j o Unit 1 and Unit 2 polar cranes i o fuel and new fuel handling cranes j . o auxiliary fuel handling crane j - o intake structure gantry crane. I j i The Licensee states that the ANO Unit 2 polar crane (2L2) and new fuel j , handling crane (2L35) were both designed and constructed to CMAA-70 and ANSI ]j B30.2-1976 specifications. Both cranes, therefore, comply with the criteria j of Guideline 7. l The auxiliary fuel handling crane is a 2-ton standard manufacturer's I i motorized-trolley hoist, which is suspended from an I-beam welded to one of i[ the main bridge girders of the fuel handling crane. Since the hoist is l integral with the fuel handling crane, the Licensee states that certain CMAA j and ANSI requirements.should be met by the hoist, particularly where the ! structural integrity of the fuel handling crane is affected. The auxiliary i fuel handling crane was also reviewed by ANO to verify conformance with the d requirements of ANSI B30.ll-1973, "Menorail Systems and Underhung Cranes" l [12) , and ANSI B30.16-1973, " Overhead Boists" [13) , and were found to comply with the intent of both standards. i The ANO Unit 1 polar c'rane (L2) and fuel handling crane (L3) were designed I and constructed prior to the issuance of CMAA-70 and ANSI 'B30. 2-1976. Both l cranes w' e re constructed in accordance with EOCI-61, " Specifications for j Electric overhead Traveling Cranes" [11), which was then superseded by CMAA-70. The Licensee has performed a point-by-point review of OGA-70 and ANSI B30. 2-1976 to determine design compliance for these cranes and has e identified only one criterion to be in specific noncompliance with these standards (for both cranes): CMAA-70 (Criterion 4. 4. 3.1) recommends that the ) 4 000) Franklin Research Center A Quuusen af The Feeseen aqueams
_. 2. 2 _ _ _ . _ _ a _ _ _ .m _,. a - - . _ , - _ _ _ TER-C5257-59/531 minisim hoist groove depth be equal to 3/8 times the hoist rope diameter. For . the auxiliary hoists of both the Unit 1 polar crane and the fuel handling crane, this minimum depth is not met (deviations noted are 11.1% for the fuel t handling crane and 6.7% for the polar crane). It is the Licensee's position that the actual hoist groove depths provide sufficient margin of load handling safety. The Licensee states that the intake structure gantry crane was also designed and constructed prior to the isavance of CMAA-7Q and ANSI B30.2-1976 but was built to BOCI-61. APL performed a point-by-point review of CHAA-70 and
; ANSI B30.2-1976 requirements. The intake. structure gantry crane was found to be in non-compliance with only one criterion (2-1.3.1.d) of ANSI B30.2-1976, which specifies that outdoor storage gantry cranes shall be provided with remotely operated rail clamps or equivalent devices and equipped with a wind ,
indicating device which provides an audible and visual alarm at a predetermined wind velocity. The installed crane does not have remotely operated rail clamps or a wind indicating alarm. However, the crane does have a storm lock. ANO
- procedures require that crane operation be terminated, the crane load block placed on the ground or anchored upwind, and the storm lock set upon receipt of a Severe Weather Warning from the National Weather Service (NWS) indicating a high probability of a tornado or winds in excess of 40 knots in the area.
Therefore, the Licensee states that the intent of this ANSI requirement is met by existing design (storm lock) and by weather warnings which are readily available from the NWS, so that a potentially hazardous load handling condition does not result from specific non-compliance with this criterion. Review has identified the following items where revisions incorporated into CMAA-70'were different from criteria contained in EOCl-61. However, actual design of the Unit 1 polar, fuel handling, and intake structure gantry cranes complies with the more restrictive standards of CMAA-70. These criteria are identified as follows:
- 1. Crane hoist speeds are such that the impact allowance requirements of l both standards are satisfied. Hoist speeds for each crane are as follows (in feet per minute): ,
*Information received in a telephone conversation (6].
A Osuuse af The PW tesumme ;
TER-C5257-59/531 , i Crane Main Hook Auxiliarv Hook L2 4. 0 31 L3 4.0 35 L7 14.0 - . (The Licensee notes that, although the auxiliary hook speed for the Unit 1 polar crane and fuel handling crane exceeds 30 f t/ min, these hooks do not carry the heavier loads of concern and these cranes therefore satisfy CMAA-70 requirements for impact allowance.)
- 2. Box girders were used in the manufacture of these cranes; consequently, the IDCI requirements used for determining twisting moments are equivalent to those specified in CMAA-70.
- 3. Allowable compressive stresses fo'r these cranes satisfy the criteria of both CMAA-70 and EDCI-61, on the basis that b/c ratios are less than 38. Ratios (b/c) for each crane are as follows: L2 - 28.7; L3 - 27.5; L7 - 13.6. .
- 4. Cab-control, cab-on-trolley configurations were not used.
- 5. Spring-return controllers were used for all cranes.
Several remaining items were noted in the Licensee review of these cranes for which compliance could not be proved due to non-availability of manufac-turers' data. The Licensee will attempt to obtain this information; however, these items are not considered significant for load handling safety for the following reasons: '
- 1. the intent of the CMAA and ANSI criteria was met by the corresponding IDCI-61 criteria
- 2. the cranes have been in operation since 1974 and load tested without structural mishap or wear beyond expected values -
- 3. the cranes have received the manufacturer's recommended maintenance since being placed in operation,
- b. FRC Evaluation
~
FRC concurs with the Licensee's response that ANO's Unit 2 polar crane and the new fuel handling crane satisfy the criteria of Cnideline 7 based upon the Licensee's verification that both cranes were designed and constructed to CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 standards. l *Information received in a telephone conversation (6). i nklin Research Center A Om of The Frannan mnemme
TER-C5257-59/531 Design of the auxiliary fuel handling crane satisfies the criteria of ,
,' this guideline based upon the Licensee's verification that this crane conforms
, to the requirements of applicable industry standards.
For the ANO Unit 1 polar crane, fuel handling crane, and intake structure gantry crane, FRC has compared the recommendations of CMAA-70 against those contained in E CI-61 and identified several areas where revisions incorporated into CMAA-70 may affect crane safety. The following sections have been satisfactorily addressed in the Licensee response. ,
- 1. Impact allowance. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.1.3 requires that crane design calculations include an impact allowance of 0.5% of the load per foot per minute of hoisting speed but not less than 154. EOCI-61 specifies only a minimum allowance of 15%. Consequently, for cranes with hoist speeds in j excess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impact allowance applied undec EOCI-61 will be less than that required by C4AA-70. ANO satisfies the criteria of CMAA-70 and EOCI-61 since main hoist speeds do not exceed 30 fpm.
- 2. Tornional forces. CMAA-70,- Article 3. 3. 2.1. 3 requires -that twisting -
moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the I' l horizontal.noutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the distance i between the center of gravity of the load, or force center line, and the l l I girder shear center measured normal to the force vector. EOCI-61 states that l such moments are to be calculated with reference to girder center of gravity. For girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box section or I-beam girders commonly used in cranes subject to this review), the shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no !, f ' difference between the two requirements. Such is not the case for nonsymme-h -! trieal girder sections (e.g. , channels) . Box girders were used in the t manufacture of cranes at ANO, satisfying the CMAA-70 requirements. l . l 3. g lowable compressive stress. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies
! allowable hompressive stresses of approximately 50% of yield strength of the recommanded structural material (A-36) for girders where the ratio of the distaret between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c ra'tio) is less than or equal to 38. ,
Allowable compressive stresses decrease b Frer:klin,w Reser, arch Center
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4 e N'
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TER-CS257-59/531 linearly for b/c ratios in excess of 38. EOCI-61 provides a similar method l for calculating allowable compressive stresses except that the allowable stress decreases from approximately 50% of yield only after the b/c ratio exceeds 41. Consequently, structural members with b/c ratios in the general range of 38 to 52 designed under EOCI-61 will allow a slightly higher compressive stress than those designed under CMAA-70. Ratios for cranes at ANO are less than 33.6 and therefore satisfy this criterion.
- 4. Bridge brake design.
CMAA-70, Article 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge . brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque for similar configurations. A cab-on-trolley control arrangement is not used on ANO cranes subject to this review.
- 5. Restart orotection. CHAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not
. equipped with spring-return controllers or momentary-contact push buttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is brought to the OFF position. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61. ANO cranes subject to this review are designed with spring-return controllers.
~
.r.
The following areas have not been addressed in the Licensee's response. i Therefore, the Licensee should evaluate these areas to determine whether the u intent of Guideline 7 of NUREG-0612 is satisfied. The following CMAA-70 issues should be addressed for each of these cranes (ANO Unit 1 polar crane, fuel handling crane, and intake structure gantry crane): Longitudinal stiffeners.
.l.
CHAA-70, Article 3.3.3.l specifies (1) the maximum allowable web depth / thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. EOCI-61 allows the use of longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance. Requirements of CMAA-70 represent a codification of girder design practice and they are expected to be equivalent to design standards employed in cranes built to EOCI-61 specifications. , l s d b Franklin Research Center w at m vnnan m H I
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- 2. Paticue considerations. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable i stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads.
EOCI-61 does not address fatigua failure. The requirements of CMAA-70 are not expected to be "of consequence for cranes subj ect to this review since the cranes are not generally subjected to frequent loads at or near design conditions (CMAA-70 provides allowable stress ranges for loading cycles in excess of 20,000) and are not generally subjected to stress reversal (CMAA-70 allowable stress range is reduced to below the basic allowable stress for only a limited number of joint configurations).
- 3. Hoist roce recuirements. CMAA-70, Article 4. 2.1 requires that the capacity load plus the bottom block divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strengtn. EOCI-61 tequires that the rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. The effect of this variation on crane safety margins depends on the ratio of the weights of the load block and the rated load.
- 4. Drum design. CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads. EOCI-61 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load bending and crushing loads with no stipulation that these loads be combined. This variation is not expected to be of consequeace since the requirements of CMAA-70 represent the codification of good engineerir.g practice which should have been incorporated in cranes built to D3CI-61 specifications although a specific requirement was not contained in EOCI-61. ,
S. Drum'desian. CMAA-70, Article 4. 4.3 provides recommended drum groove depth and pitch; EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. The recommendations in
, CMAA-70 constitute a codification of gcod engineering practice with regard to reeving stability and reduction of rope wear and are not expected to differ substantially from practices employed in the design of cranes subject to this review and built to IDCI-61 specifications. Therefore, based upon the information provided by the Licensee for the ANO Unit 1 polar crane and fuel handling crane, FRC concurs that Licensee non-compliance with CMAA-70 b Frank!!n Research Center A Due,on of The Frumen,m i
6 TER-C5257-59/531 Criterion 4.4.3.1 is acceptable based upon the following: (1) the cranes were ' j built to EOCI-61 specifications, the predecessor to CMAA-70; (2) the Licensee I has not taken exception to the requirements of CMAA-70, item 4.4.3 (machining of of drum grooves), whereas the criteria identified in the non-compliance l item (4.4.3.1, drum groove depth) are re. commendations only; (3) actual groove depths differ by only 6.7% and 11.14; and (4) the deviations occ'ur on the two auxiliary hoists only. The Licensee should make a similar determination regarding compliance for the intake structure gantry crane.
- 6. Gear desion. CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower rating be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association Standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. EOCI-61 provides no similar' guidance. The recommendations in CMAA-70 constitute a codification of good engineering practice for gear design and are not expected to differ substantially from the practices employed in the design of cranes subject to
~ this review and built to EOCI-61 specifications.
- 7. Hoist brake desion. CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist holding brakes, when used with a method of control braking other than I
mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without regard to the type of control brake employed. This variation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this review since mechanical load brakes were typically specified for cranes procured during the period when IDCI-61 was the standard. The addition of a holding brake safety margin in conjunction with electric control braking is a codification of good engineering practice. Some manufacturers provide holding brak'es rated at up to 150% of hoist motor torque when used with electrical control braking systems. S. Bumpers and stoes. CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. No similar guidance is provided in IOCI-61. This variation is not expected to be significant for cranes subject to this review since these crancs are not expected to be operated under load at substantial bridge or trolley speed near
9 TER-C5257-59/531 the end of the same travel. Further, the guidance of CMAA-70 constitutes the codification of good engineering practice that would have been used in cranes built to BOCI-61 specifications.
- 9. Static control systems. CMAA-70, Article 5. 4. 6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only. This variation is not expected to signifi-cantly affect safety because magnetic control systems were generally employed in cranes designed when IDCI-61 was in effect and the static control require-ments identified in CMAA-70 constitute a codification of the same good engheering practice that would have been used in the design of static control systems in cranes built to IDCI-61 specifications.
For the intake structure gantry crane, FRC concurs with the Licensee's response that Criterion 2-1.3.ld of ANSI 330.2-1976 is satisfied by the existing crane storm lock and use of APL's administrative procedures to' terminate load handling operations in the event of severe weather conditions. The Licensee's proposed alternative is acceptable based upon the fact that suitable procedural and administrative measures have bee. identified to verify that the dispatcher will notify the operator, load handling operations will be terminated, and the storm lock will be applied in the event of a Severe Weather Warning from the NWS.
- c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations ANO complies with Guideline 7 for the Unit 2 polar crane (2L2), the new fuel handling crane (2L35), and the auxiliary fuel handling crane based upon the Licensee's verification that these cranes were designed and constructed to CMAA-70, ANSI B30.2-1976, and other current industry standards.
Insufficient information has been provided to enable FRC to fully determine whether APL complies with Guideline 7 for the Unit 1 polar crane (L2) , the fuel handling crane (L3), and the intake structure gantry crane (L7). The Licensee should evaluate existing crane design and determine if the following conditions are satisfied for cranes subject to this review or provide suitable justification for concluding that the intent of CMAA-70 has been satisfied by other means: t ( 0 h Frankun Research Center , A Dhamen of The Frerunn besame . l l . __ _ -_ _ ___m _
? l l
TER-C5257-5?/531 l l
- 1. either longitudinal stiffeners were not used or their design and -
installation substantially conform to the requirements of CMAA-70, and allowable h/t ratios in box girders using longitudinal stiffeners do not exceed those specified in CMAA-70
- 2. fatigue failure was considered in crane design and the number of design loading cycles at or near rated load was less than 20,000
- 3. maximum crane load weight plus the weight of the bottom block, divided by the number of parts of rope, does not exceed 20% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength
- 4. drum design calculations were based on the combination of crushing and bending loads
- 5. drum groove depth and pitch substantially conform to the roccamenda-tions of CMAA-70 (intake structure gantry crane only)
- 6. gear horsepower ratings were based on design allowables and 'calcula-tion methodology equivalent to those incorporated in CMAA-70
- 7. either a mechanical load brake was used or hoist holding brakes used have torque ratings in excess of the hoist motor torque (approximately 125%)
- 8. crane operation under load near the end of bridge or trolley travel is not allowed or is compensated for by bumpers and stops in substantial conformance with the requirements of CNAA-70
- 9. static control systems were not used or substantially conform to the requirements of CMAA-70.
- 2. 2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants ,to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and t' hat measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the
, core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of Guideline 1, Safe Icad Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) . The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:
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TER-CS257-59/531
- 1. Heavy load technical specifications
- 2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section. 2.2.1 Technical Soecifications (Interim P'rotection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.3(1)) *
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,
' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1. "
- a. Sammary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee made no statements or conclusions regarding this interim protection measure.
- b. FRC Evaluation Technical specifications implemented by the Licensee (Technical Specification 3.8.15 at ANO Unit 1 and 3.9.7 at ANO Unit 2) state the following: " Loads in excess of 2000 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool."
These technical specifi-cations satisfy the criteria of Interim Protection Measure 1.
- c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations ANO complies with Interim Protection Measure 1.
2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Articles 5. 3 (2) -5. 3 (5) 1 ,
" Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, lead handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]...
can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of [NUREG-0612]. " nklin Research Center A Chansen arThe Freruen beenme b
[' , . 'd . I TER-05257-59/531 !l ;
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions -
- Summaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in
) , discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, } 2.1.3, and 2.1.6. l i
- b. FRC Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations i FRC's evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in j discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections '2.1.1, 2.1.2,
) 2.1.3, and 2.1.6. 2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core [ Interim Protection } Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.3(6)) i -
"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and i personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel l internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include
- the following for these loads
- (1) review of procedures for installation j of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that
!- sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and ! concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, i slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies
- that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and
' replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and :e f amiliar with specific 4 procedures used in handling these loads, e.g. , hand signals, conduct of ! operations, and content of procedures."
/
i
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions
; Special attention will be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core. ,
) , b. FRC Evaluation } } Based upon the Licensee's verification, the criteria of this interim j protection measure will be satisfied at ANO. I 1 3 I nklin Research Center A Dmusm af The Penee humano 1
. l TER-C5257-59/531
- c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations .
ANO complies with Interim Protection Measure 6 on the basis of the Licensee's verification that special attention will be given to load handling over the core., When action has been completed, the Licensee should again verify that all items identified as requiring special attention have been adequately reviewed. i 4 0000 Franidin Research Center l A Cheeman of The Freesen w g
'h
TER-CS257-59/531
- 3. CONCLthDINGSIM4ARY ,
This summary is provided to consolidate the conclusions and recommenda- l tions of Section 2 and to document FRC's overall evaluation of the handling of heavy loads at ANO. It is divided into two sections dealing with general provisions for lead handling at nuclear power plants (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1) and the staff recommendations for interim protection, pending complete implementation of the guidelines of NUREG-0612 (NOREG-0612, Article 5.3) . In l each case, recommendations for additional Licensee action and additional NRC staff action, where appropriate, are provided. 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIOtiS FOR IDAD HANDLING
- The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage safe shutdown systems. Compliance with these guidelines is necessary to ensure that load handling system design, administrative controls, and operator training and qualificatier. are such that the possibility of a load drop is very small for the critical functions performed by cranes at nuclear power plants. These guidelines are partially satisfied at ANO. .This conclusion is presented in tabular form as Table 3.1. Specific recommendations for achiev-ing full compliance with these guidel'ines are provided as follows:
Guideline Recommendation 1, 2, 3 (Proposed actions, when implemented, will comply with these general guidelines.)
~
4 a. Evaluate these special lif ting devices identified in the Licensee's response (the head and internals handling fixture and tripod, and the ISI lif ting rig) to determine compliance with ANSI N(4.6-1978 and this guideline. , L.
- b. Review all odier lif ting devices, determine those special lif ting 0!
devices in use in areas where impact on irradiated fuel or safe ll shutdown equipment is possible, and verify that these devices !! meet the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 and the stress design factor Il specified in this guideline. ' 1 nklin Research Center A Dmmen of The Frerwen huomme d i i ._ i__-.--____-_-_.
'e e=
CJ Table 3.1. ANG/MtmEG-0612 Compliance Motste 3 EC
- g. Wolght lateste p late:In os Guideline I Culdeline 2 Culdeline 3 Guldeline 4 Guideline $ Culdeline 6 Culdeline 7 feessese I aq Capacit y Measuse 6 Mg Safe lood Csene Operator Special Lifting Caane - Test Techalcol Special Ngery teede (tonal Pathe Procedures Tretning Devices l er
_S h e_ and Ineswetion Csene Deelen Speelticettone Attention th I. IL-28 Unit 1 poter Crane 18e/25 -- -- e A -- -- C 1 - a
$ av Clo se el.2 m C
(
-- 1 -- -- - -
seed m Upper lates- $$ R C == 1 -- - == -- nele a ISI Tool 15.0 B C - 1 -- -- - -- a scr peutos St.6 m C ~ -- n -- - -- a nimelle 42.0 m C -- - m -- -- g' shielde a IJ
- On Csone imod -
a C -- -- R I Stock a Post. Stud 4. S R C -- -- R -- Stossge Rech
-- -- p leend 6 Intes- 6 m C -- -
A == - nele mandling a TsSpod Refueling 2 R C -- - R -- -- Cavity Seal a Plate , Upender 7.8 m C -- - n -- -- - a Seteeling 31.2 R C -- - R -- -- Machine a Aus. Refueling 21.1 R C -- ~ m -- -- Machine
- a g O
(19 N (19 C = Licensee action complies eith asumEG-0642 Guideline. NC = Licensee action does not comply with IsumEG-0642 Guideline. Y tse a = Licensee hoe propueed seelstone/ennillicatione designed to comply ulth sameG-9612 Culdeline. W 8 = lasufficient infosmet ten psovided by the Licensee, h ta V O
- c. - - - _ - .
e e c= C e 3 5E e 5' T.t,le 3. s ICone.
,4 . .,,t g ,, es Guideline 8 'culdeline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline e Guldeline S Eldeline 6 Guideline 7 Intest.
steesuse & Intesta Capacity Meeense 6 safe teed Csame Operatos speelet Lilting Csane - Test g meevy teede leonel_ Pat he Procedusee Training Deelces Silnee Techalcal speclet se and InePection Csene Deeljsg $PeClficatione Attentloj 3 2. 12L-2) Unit 2
$ Folas Csone 858/25 - --
R - C C - a Seector Weaset 50.4 m C ~~ l - -= - -- Need a , Upper Guide 54.3 a C - 8 - - - Stsuctuse a ist Tools 0.5 R C -- 3 -- - -- *-- a DCP pkstos $ 4. 9 R C -- -- R == -- f.- g 4 i , Ctene tend -- A C - -- a - -- elock
-- a seetatenance 17.5 m C -- - R -- - -- R structure CF.tse Duct 1. 4 a- C -- -- R - --
teos k
- a CEsot Shsoud 90 R C -- -
R - -- -- 3 Drendes 7. 2 R C - -- m -- -- -- e aefueling 38.2 a C - -- R -- -- Machine . a e Jlb Csene 7.9 R C - -- R - - -- a
,elueila, C.elt, .e.i n.. . C -
.c -- -- -- -
1 L Plate
- a g
sted Ten.i nes n. 2 m C -- -- - DJ m -- -- - a vi
-I I
us W
\
un ed Bd
"e 5 > ,i 3
3 E-as p Table 3.1 Scont.) g. g3y melght Intesta Intesta n 4 os Geldeline i Geldeline 2 Cepecity Safe load Caldeline 3 Guideline 4 GulJeline S Crane operator special Lifting Guldeline 6 Guideline ? Csene - Test Meneese i Measuse 4 Technical Special d Weavy Boede Itonel Pathe Psoceduses Ts almig_ Devices Silnes and Inspection Csame Deelg Speelficatione Attention it
- 3. 10-38 Fuel handline Crane 100/10 -- - R -- - C I C --
Speat Fuel -- R C -- - - -- -- - -- Shipping Cook rool pleider 2. 9 m C - -- m -- - - - I Cate BAso-l/23 I rest Tsenales 2. 3 m C - -- a - -- - -- y tube case valve BA n al g Feel Nandling 29.7 A C ~ - R -- -- -- -- Machine i BANG-1/23
- l prende, 7. 2 a C - l n -- - - --
S AND-l/23 l t new ruel 2. e a C -- -- a - -- - -- Shlyping Containes lANG-1/ll f Natch-oves- 3. 0 3 C ==
-h p - - - --
Tsala Say , t
- 4. 18L553 Isew Feel i Mandling Crane R C C C 4 -- --
--{ ~ --
u. M LJe
=4
' l us ID
\
un he H
+ .
i l e
O e c=a c-m
* *TI E
3 E . E3 1" 2 3 Table 3.1 Scent.l O .Neight latesin latesle g- or Guideline i Culdeline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guadeline 6 Guideline f Weesure I steesuse 6 Capacity Sete teed Csone Gperator speciel LIftleeg Csone - Test Techalcol Special
* $ Reeer Reede _ttonal Pathe Procedures Tsetnine Deelces Silnee and lampection Csone Deel g $peelfications Attentton S. II,-?) latete . .
Structose 25 - - R - -- C 1 -- -- Crane seselce water Puey As00 t thstor 2. 3 R C - -- R -- -- -- - Pump 4. 3 R C - - R - - -- -- N gg - AMG 3 Stotor 3. 6 R C - -- R - - -- --
., a 3 .u., R C --
Pige Pesap iP-6Al plotos 3. 7 R C == -- ' R - -- == -- Pump 1.6 R C ~
- 1 R - -- -- --
l Pise Pump IP-6al , Engine 15 a C --
- l R - - - --
Pump 3. 3 R C - - ; R == = - -- 6 Roce Ratch 3. 6 R C - -- R -- -- -- -- 1 Pluge
?
- 6. Aus t B las y Poe l ,
pendling Csene 2 - - C ~ C C - ---
- {
! N -
i . A w i N s w 4 l e tJE W
\
I w w e i, H e i 4 i
TER-C5257-59/531 Guideline Recommendation , 5, 6 (APL's proposed actions, when implemented, will comply with these guidelines.) 7 Evaluate existing designs of the ANO Unit 1 polar crane, fuel handling crane, and intake structure gantry crane for compliance with the nine items identified in the rev.iew of the Licensee's j response and CMAA-70. i
- 3. 2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certain l
measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed .a a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit ! the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. FRC's evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that APL has satisfactorily implemented all interim protection measures. 3.3
SUMMARY
Measures have been implemented at Arkansas Power and Light Company's ANO
' nits 1 and 2 which satisfy and comply, to a large extent, with NRC general juidelines'and interim protection measures identified in NUREG-0612. In particular, development of safe load paths and load handling procedures, implementation of ANSI B30.2-1976 for operator training and crane inspection and maintenance, and special attention for heavy loads handled over the core satisfy the criteria of the NRC guidelines.
Licensee action is required for several unresolved items in order to satisfy Guideline 7 (Crane Design) and Guideline 4 (3pecial Lif ting Devices) . l l ' l l Mo nuair; w n. r Res erc.h c.e.nter
* *~ ,
TER-C5257-59/531
- 4. REFERENCES ,
- 1. NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Icads at Nuclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980
- 2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)
Letter to all licensees Subject
- Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 17 May 1978
- 3. NRC Generic letter 81-07 to Arkansas Nuclear One 22 December 1980
- 4. David C. Trimble (APL)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) .
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants 15 May 1981 3
- 5. David C. Trimble (APL)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants 22 June 1981
- 6. Dennis Taylor (APL)
Telecon with F. Clemenson (NRC) and I. Sargent (FRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads at Arkansas Nuclear One 30 November 1981
- 7. ANSI B30.2-1976
" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1976
- 8. ANSI N14.6-1978
" Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" American National Standards Institute, Inc.
I 15 February 1972
- 9. ANSI B30.9-1971
" Slings" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1972
- 10. CMAA-70
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.
1975 000 ' Franklin Research Center A Dnessen of The Fe insomme y dh
O % TER-CS257-59/531
- 11. Electric Overhead Crane Institute Specification No. 61, " Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling -
Cranes" ,
- 12. ANSI B30.ll-1973
" Monorail Systems and Underhung Cranes"
- 13. ANSI B30.16-1973
" Overhead Hoists"
' i
=
nklin Research Center 4 o, .,n rw- , l 1
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