ML20041C854
| ML20041C854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1982 |
| From: | Oprea G HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, ST-HL-AE-785, NUDOCS 8203020611 | |
| Download: ML20041C854 (3) | |
Text
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The Light C O m p M y iionsion i.ix iing & i w cr n
i:o. in,x ivoo iionsion.rexas 77ooi (7i3> 228 92ii February 25, 1982 ST-HL-AE-785 SFft: V-0530 a&Ef
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i' Mr. John T. Collins a
Regional Administrator, Region IV k;l Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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611 Ryan P1aza Dr., Suite 1000
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Arlington, Texas 76012 V-
Dear Mr. Collins:
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 First Interim Report Concerning the Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis On January 19, 1932 Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e), notified your office of an item concerning the existing Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) analysis which was performed by Westinghouse (}i).
Please find attached our first interim report on this subject.
The next report concerning this item will be submitted to your office by May 26, 1982.
If you should have any questions concerning this item, please contact Mr.
Michael E. Powell at (713) 676-8592.
Very tr ly yours
'/
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. W,'
p rea ;/d r.
i Exe iveTice President MEP/blt Attachment s' Q d
8203020611 820225 PDR ADOCK 05000498 S
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Il<mston 1.ighting & Power Company cc:
G. W. Oprea, Jr.
February 25, 1982 J. H. Goldberg ST-HL-AE-785 J. G. Dewease SFN: V-0530 J. D. Parsons Page 2 D. G. Barker C. G. Robertson R. A. Frazar J. W. Williams J. W. Briskin J. E. Geiger R. L. Ulrey S. M. Dew J. T. Collins (NRC)
D. E. Sells (NRC)
W. M. Hill, Jr.
(NRC)
M. D. Schwarz (Baker & Botts)
R. Gordon Gooch (Baker &Botts)
J. R. Newman (Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, & Axelrad)
STP RMS Director, Office of Inspection & Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 R. L. Range /G. W. Muench Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Central Power & Light Company Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board P. O. Box 2121 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Washington, D. C.
20555 R. L. Hancock/G. Pokorny Dr. James C. Lamb, III City of Austin 313 Woodhaven Road P. O. Box 1088 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Austin, Texas 78767 J. B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg Mr. Ernest E. Hill City Public Service Board Lawrence Livermore Laboratory P. O. Box 1771 University of California San Antonio, Texas 78296 P. O. Box 808, L-46 Livermore, California 94550 Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Williain S. Jordan, III Assistant Attorney General Harmon & Weiss for the State of Texas 1725 I Street, N. W.
P. O. Box 12548 Suite 506 Capitol Station Washington, D. C.
20006 Austin, Texas 78711 Lanny Sinkin Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc.
Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn 5106 Casa Oro Route 1, Box 1684 San Antonio, Texas 78233 Brazoria, Texas 77422 Jay Gutierrez, Esquire Hearing Attorney Office of the Executive Legal Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Revision Date 2-22-82
First Interim Report Concerning i
the Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis On January 19, 1982, Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e), notified your office of an item concerning the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) analysis which was performed by Westinghouse (W) and is referenced in FSAR Section 15.6.3.
The accident scenario in question is the SGTR (complete severance of one (1) tube) concurrent with a less of offsite power. The existing FSAR Section 15.6.3.2 indicates that the break flow from the primary side to the secondary side can be terminated within thirty (30) minutes after initiation of the acci-dent. The mechanism used to terminate the break flow is the depressurization of the primary side to a pressure less than or equal to the set pressure of the Main Steam safety valves.
accomplished by either (1)you can depressuri2e the primary side. utilizing normal pr The analysis assumes This can be auxiliary pressurizer spray or (3) utilizing the Pressurizer Powered Operated Relief Valves (PORV's).
For the scenario of a loss of offsite power condition, the RCP's will not be running and therefore normal pressurizer spray is not available. Use of the auxiliary pressurizer spray and the pressurizer PORV's requires use of air operated valves. A loss of offsite power would result in the loss of air to these valves rendering them inoperable.
In order to account for this pos,sibil-ity, W has interface criteria requiring the capability to manually load the instrument air compressor on a redundant emergency power supply. Powering the instrument air compressors from an emergency power supply allows operation of the valves required for depressurization of the primary side within the time frame established in the FSAR SGTR analysis.
The present South Texas Project (STP) design does not have the capability l
to power the instrument air compressor from the redundant Class IE emergency.
power supply. STP design does have the capability to power the instrument air compressors on a non Class 1E B0P diesel that is used primarily for equipment protection.
However, since STP does not have a redundant emergency power supply to support the operation of the instrument air system, further analysis is necessary to evaluate what modifications, if any, will be implemented.
J 1