ML20041B975

Revision to Consolidated Application for Renewal of Certificate of Compliance 5768 for Model BB-250-2,including Results from Addl Testing & Evaluations

ML20041B975
Person / Time
Site:	07105768
Issue date:	01/29/1982
From:	BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20041B972	List: ML20041B971 ML20041B975
References
NUDOCS 8202250459
Download: ML20041B975 (54)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:~. ) S \\.g (O -- 3 n. i BABC0CK & WILC0X, NM&MD, PENNSYLVANIA OPERATIONS -1 CONSOLIDATED APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.#5768 FOR BB-250-2 SHIPPING CONTAINER i l J JANUARY 29, 1982 I 1 i i 1 i ) l l l i f. 8202250459 820129 PDR ADOCK 07105768 i C PDR c 'd

i l t TABLE OF CONTENTS l GENERAL I NFORMATION.................................. CHAPTER 1. 0 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION................................ CHAPTER 2. 0 l NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION............................ CHAPTER 3.0 BABC0CK & WILCOX DRAWING 10-F-771.................... APPENDIX A l UESTINGH0VSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION l DRAUING C7108D10.................................. APP ENDI X B i l U.S. MILITARY STANDARD itS24347....................... APPENDIX C NUf:EC DRAUING #10-F-676.............................. APPENDIX D NUMEC SKETCH #ASK-1324-C............................. APPENDIX E WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION SKETCH SKA-252-1.................................. APPENDIX F THERMAL TEST CALCULATIONS OF THE BABC0CK & WILC0X BB-250 SHIPPING CONTAINER................ APPENDIX G l l

A e W G 3 e CHAPTER 1.0 GENERAL INFORf1ATION 1 l l 1 l 1 l l l l

i CHAPTER 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION ,1.1

== Introduction:== This document represents a consolidated application for renewal of Certificate of Compliance 5768, for the Model BB-250-2 shipping container, used for the shipment of fissile material. 1.2 Package

Description:

1.2.1 Packaging 1.2.1.1 Model Number: BB-250-2 1.2.1.2

Description:

Inner container is 11-1/2" ID, 16-gauge steel cylinder, 63-1/2" long, with bolted and gasketed top flange closure and seal welded bottom plate. Inner container is centered and supported in a 22-1/2" ID by minimum 74" long 16-gauge steel drum uy 1/4" diameter spring steel rods and vermiculite. Maximum weight of packaging and contents is approximately 575 pounds. 1.2.1.3 Drawings: The BB-250-2 packaging is constructed in accordance with Babcock & Wilcox Drawing 10-F-771 (included as Appendix A to this application). The outer cover is secure by either a 12-gauge closure ring or, six (6) 1/2" diameter bolts or studs with nut. Westinghouse Electric Corporation Drawing C7108D10 is included as Appendix B and U.S. Military Standard MS24347 is included as Appendix C to this application. 1.2.2 Contents of Packaging: Application is made for the following categories of contents: 1.2.2.1 Bulk uranium oxide (U02 or U 0 ) powder with a maximum 38 density of 2 g U/cc and enriched to a maximum 5 w/o in the U-235 isotope. The maximum H/U atomic ratio, con-sidering all sources of hydrogenous material within the inner container shall not exceed 1.13. The inner container has dimensions of 9-3/4" diameter x 12". l 1-1

3 Total contents not to exceed 250 pounds, with the U-235 content not to exceed four (4) kilograms. 1.2.2.2 Uranium compounds which will not decompose at temperatures up to 750 F. Uranium may be enriched to a maximum 5 w/o in the U-235 isotope. The maximum H/U atomic ratia. con-sidering all sources of hydrogenous material within the inner container shall not exceed 1.5. Total contents not to exceed 250 pounds, with the U-235 content not to exceed five (5) kilograms. Four (4) steel drums containing not more than 1.3 kilograms U-235 each shall be packaged in the shipping insert Within the inner container as shown in Westinghouse Electric Corporation Sketch SKA-252-1 (Appendix F to this application) and Drawing C7108010. The steel drums shall be constructed in accordance with U. S. Military Standard MS 24347 with a maximum ID of 8-1/2" and a nominal height of 15.4". 1.2.2.3 Uranium oxide pellets, enriched to a maximum of 4.0 w/o in the U-235 isotope. The maximum H/U atomic ratio, considering all sources of hydrogenous material within the inner container, shall not exceed 3.0. The contents described herein shall be contained in either: i a. Metal inner containers having 9-3/4" diameter, or b. The inner container shown on NUMEC Drawing 10-F-676 (Appendix 0 to this application). Total contents not to exceed 250 pounds, with the U-235 content not to exceed 4.0 kilograms. The inner container shown in Babcock & Wilccx Drawing 10-F-771 shall be secured with twelve (12),1/2" diameter bolts only when utilizing metho'd b. above. 1.2.2.4 Uranium oxide enriched to a maximum 4 w/o in the U-235 isotope. Chemically-bound or physically-bound water in mixtures is permitted. Slips or slurries that exhibit a visually discernible liquid second phase are prohibited. Total contents not to exceed 200 pounds, with the U-235 content not to exceed 2.95 kg. The contents shall be contained within two (2) 9.75 inch diameter by 12 inch high sealed metal cans. Empty metal cans will be used to make up the remaining space within the inner container. l l 1-2 l L

l e e m CilAPTER 2.0 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION c,

v t REFERENCE Much of the information presented in Chapter 2.0 herein was extracted from l several pertinent reference documents. These documents had previously received approval from tile Nuclear Regulatory Commission. l Where statements or information extracted from reference documents appear l in this presentation, the text will be numerically footnoted to reference the applicable document. l Numerical notation will be as follows: l (1) Westinghouse Electric Corporation letter dated July 13, 1973. (2) NUMEC Evaluation of November 1966 for the LA-36 Shipping Container. (3) NUMEC Evaluation of November 1966 for the Pu-10-1 Shipping Container. i l (4) Babcock & Wilcox letter dated February 16, 1977. { l

~ CHAPTER 2.0 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION 2.1 Introduction This Chapter provides the structural design and evaluation for the contents described in Sections 1.2.2.1, 1.2.2.2, 1.2.2.3, and 1.2.2.4 of this application. 2.1.1 Structural Design This package utilizes design concepts which are similar to those used in the design of the NUMEC LA-36 and Pu-10-1 packages. The outer shell consists of two 16 gauge 22.5" diameter (nominal) steel drums welded end-to-end to form a package approximately 74" long. The inner container is an 11.5 diameter (maximum), 16 gauge (nominal) steel cylinder with a flanged closure consisting of a 1/2 inch thick (minimum) bolted flange and flange cover. A minimum of six 1/2"-13 NC bolts are used to seat a 1/8 inch thick Anchor Packing Company " Target" or ".125" gasket which is provided to assure a leak-tight closure. Vermiculite is used to provide thermal and mechanical insulation for the gasketed inner container which is positioned with a minimum of 12 steel spring spacers. The top insulation plug may be fabricated of Unibestos. At least 5 inches of vermiculite insulates the inner container from the drum, except at the bottom where its thickness may be 4 inches. (1) The maximum weight of the packaging and contents is approximately 575 pounds. 2.2 General Standards (2) 2.2.1 Positive Closure The outer cover is secured by either a 12-gauge bolted closure ring or six (6) 1/2" diameter bolts or studs with nut. 2.2.2 Lifting Devices No lifting devices are incorporated as a structural part of the package or its lid. 2.2.3 Tie Down Davices No tie down devices are incorporated as a structural part of the package. 2.2.4 Structural Standards for Large Quantity Packaging Not applicable. 2-1 \\

.__g .o 2.a Noriaal Conditions of Transport ~ As stated previously, the BB-250-2 package utilizes design concepts which are similar to those of the LA-36 and Pu-10-1 packages. The below presentation is extracted from previous evaluations of the two latter packages. 2.3.1 Heat (3) Exposure to direct sunlight at an ambient temperature of 130 F in still air. The external container is a steel drum inside of which is a vermiculite insulated steel structure containing a moderator, a stainless steel pressure vessel, and the product solution. All are exposed without damage to more severe thermal con-ditions during the required thermal test with no damage. As previously indicated, the solution may achieve a temperature of 160 F. which is within the allowable limits for the ultra-ethylux bottle. 2.3.2 Cold (3) Exposure to an ambient temperature of -40 F. Loss of properties of the steel and insulating material at that temperature will not occur, and possible crystallization of the moderator will not change its moderating properties. The polyethylene bottle is composed of " ultra-ethylux-28" as produced by Westlake Plastics Company, or equal, and does not embrittle until the temperature is reduced to -55 F. To allow for expansion of the solution on thawing, at least 10% free space is provided in the bottle. 2.3.3 Pressure (3) Exposure to atmospheric pressure of 0.5 times standard atmospheric pressure. The drum lids have no gaskets, allowing the equilization of pressure. 2.3.4 Vibration (3) Each package is vibrated for 5 minutes as a part of the fabrication procedure in order to promote settling of the vermiculite insulation. 2.3.5 WaterSpray(2) A number of containers have been exposed to heavy rain storms for extended periods of time, with no water inleakage. Such exposure exceeds the requirements of the water spray test. 2-2

2.3.6 Free Drop (3) This test was not performed because the Pu-10-1 container does not depend on spacing for nuclear safety. 2.3.7 Corner Drop (3) Because the package is fabricated from steel, this test does not apply. 2.3.8 Penetration The drums are fabricated from 16 gauge steel,(ggd are similar to those used for the NUMEC LA-36 containers. 1 Two sample packages were subjected to a. penetration test as specified in Appendix A of 10 CFR 71. The resulting dents did not exceed a depth of 3/16 inch.(2) 2.3.9 Compression (3) A 2,000 pound load was placed on top of a sample package for a period of 24 hours with no measurable deflection of the drum. Based on the above, we conclude that requirements set forth in 10 CFR 71.35(a) (1), (2), (3); (b) (1) and (4) 111 are satisfied. 10 CFR 71.35(a) (4) and (5) do not apply as there are no coolants in this package. 10 CFR 71.35(b) 1 and 3 are discussed in VI.1.2.2 above, and 10 CFR 71.35(b) (4), (1) and (II) does not apply as the spacing provided by the package does not effect nuclear safety. With regard to 10 CFR 71.35(c), the vent valve is closed prior to all shipments. 2.4 Hypothetical Accident Conditions The inner container of the BB-250-2, when fully loaded, weighs 329.4# resulting in a vertical loading of 3.17 lbs/ind over a base area of 103.87 in2 The inner container of the NUMEC Pu-10-1 container, when fully loaded, and including the neutron moderator weighs 279#, resulting in a vertical loading of 3.55 lbs/in2 over a base area of 78.54 in2, When placed in a horizontal position, the loadings are 0.456 lb/in2 for the BB-250-2, and 0.442 lb/in2 for the NUMEC Pu-10-1 container. Thus the testg performed on the latter container are valid for the BB-250-2 package. ll ) Secondly, as previously stated, the BB-250-2 package utilizes design concepts which are similar to those of the LA-36 and Pu-10-1 packages. The below presentation reiterates the accident test conditions for both the LA-36 and Pu-10-1 containers. The tests performed for these containers are valid for the BB-250-2 package. 2-3

2.4.1 Pu-10-1 Accident Test Conditions (3) \\ Five sample containers identified in Drawings ASK-1058-D-1, 2, and 3 (Figures #1, #2, and #3 of this application) were subjected to the accident test conditions required by 10 CFR 71. These drawings show direction of impact for each container, and indicate maximum internal temperatures recorded. Drop tests were condected in a manner to assure that the lowest point of the container was at least 30 feet above the point of impact on an unyielding surface at the time of release. Thermal tests were performed in a furnace which provided the required conditions. However, containers numbered 1 and 2'were exposed to high temperctures for 36 minutes to compensate for a temperature i l drop in th' ace observed immediately subsequent to the insertion l of the cr 3. The other containers were exposed for the i required s.od. Here, the temperature drop was minimized by additional pre-heating of the furnace to 'l600 F. An 11 liter polyethylene bottle containing sand for-ballast was placed within each container. Container number 5 suffered impact on the top corner causing the drum lid to spring open and release some vermiculite. Resulting from this failure, further testing was held in abeyance pending evaluation of the damage, and the determination of ccrrective measures. As finally determined, these measures consisted of the use of drum lids with a sufficient lip to completely enclose the upper half of the rolled lip on the drum body, and the omission of the lid gasket to assure better seating. That these measures were sufficient to assure closure under accident conditions was demonstrated by container number 3 which was also corner dropped. The lid remained properly seated on. the drum, and *, no vermiculite was lost. Container number 4 was impacted on both its top and bottom surface. The impact onto its top surface caused a seam in the upper drum body to separate slightly, yielding an opening measuring about 1/8 x 1". No measurable amount of vermiculite was lost through this opening, and subsequent to the.1bove tests, the drum was impacted from a height of 40_ inches onto a 6 inch diameter by 8 inch long bar, as specified by 10 CFR 71. Impact occurred on the welded seam joining the drums. Although a 1-1/2" to 2" deep depression resulted, the integrity of the drum and weld was not violated. As previously indicated, other tests were performed as illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3 of this application. Examination of the containers subsequent to their removal from 24 hours of immersion under three feet of water revealed three / principal facts; (1) no water leaked into the containment vessel,, / (2) no moderator was lost, and (3) the maximum temperature / experienced within the containment vessel was in excess of 100 F, 2-4 r s' n i

i but less than 150 F. Additionally, the cadmium wrapping of the containment vessel was in no way effected by.the test sequer;ce. From these findings, we conclude that: 1. No radioactive material will be released from the package under the stated accident conditions. L 2. The package will remain subcritical as the material remains confined to a suberitical geometry, and the geometric form of the container material is not altered (10 CFR 71.35(b)(2). 3. Double containment is maintained in that the internal temperatures noted during the tests are insufficient to compromise the integrity of a. the polyethylene bottle b. the PVC bagging c. the pressure vessel. It is recognized, however, the pressure buildup within the polyethylene bottle may displace gram quantities of solution from the bottle. However, such material remains doubly contained within the double PVC bag and the pressure vessel. 4. No damage was suffered by any of the components or materials l of construction due to exposure to the thermal test. r 2-5 R

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m ~. L 2.4.2 LA-36AccidentTestConditions(2) Two sample packages, each containing at least 36 kg of dry brick mortar, and designated as Drums #1 and #2, were subjected to the accident test conditions, as set forth in Appendix B, 10 CFR 71. g 9 l 1. Impact a Drum number 1 was dropped at a 45' angle from a height of 30 i feet on its cover. The drum caved inward several inches at the point of impact. The ring and cover were not dislodged. s Drum number 2 was dropped from a height of 30 feet so as to strike flat on its side. Impact occurred approximately half way between the spacer rods. This drum was then dropped 30 feet in a vertical positica, suffering impact on its bottom surface. ] 2. Puncture Drum number 1 was dropped through a' distance of 40 inches onto a 6 inch diameter cylindrical target. A dent approximately 3 l 1-1/8 inches deep resulted. 3. Thermal ^ Both drums were placed within a furnace heated in excess of 1500 F prior to insertion of the drums, and maintained at 1475 F for 1/2 hour subsequent to the insertion of the drums. 4. Immersion j Both drums were immersed under three feet of water for a period of 24 hours. 5. Container Dismantling and Inspection c The two sample drums were dismantled, inspected and measured 9 to determine the loss of spacing suffered during the impact tests, and the extent of water inleakage into the 5 gallon p pails. go 5.1 Weight Checks .Ea i All pails were weighed before the tests comenced, and again, on the same scale, on completion of the tests. y These weights are tabulated below, and demonstrate that no measurable inleakage of water into the pails f had occurred, j s h b 2-9 i; 4 m

WEIGHTS OF PAILS NUMEC ORGDP ORGDP (before tests) (before tests) (aftertests) Number 1 Top Pail. 22,470 22,470 22,470 Bottom Pail 20,470 20,440 20,440 Number 2 Top Pail 20,510 20,490 20,490 Bottom Pail 20,450 20,440 20,440 5.2 Inspection Checks 5.2.1 Drum number 1 experienced a maximum temperature of 500 F on the cover plate. Removal of the cover and the pails revealed that water had entered, but only half filled the inner container. The inner container had shifted approximately 1/4 inch as a result of the impact. Both pails experienced maximum temperatures of from 200 to 300 F, and appeared to have suffered little damage. When opened, dryness of the contents was confirmed. 5.2.2 Drum number 2 also experienced a maximum temperature of 500 F on the cover plate. As with drum number 1, water had entered, but only half filled the inner container. The inner container had shifted approxi-mately 7/8 inch as a result of the impact. In addition, the drum had caved in at the point of impact, yielding a total loss of 2-1/2 inches spacing between the center of the inner container, and the nearest point on the outer container. The upper pail experienced a maximum. temperature of 325 F. Pieces of the gasket pulled loose when the lid was removed as a result of the adherence to the side of the pail. The bottom pail experienced deformation on its rolling hoop, suffering a loss of 1 to 1-1/2 inches in overall height. However, the gasket had not deteriorated appreciably, and maintained its seal. A strip of seemingly caked powder 3/8 inches wide by 3/4 inches long by 1/64 inch thick was found near the top of the pail. No other indications of caked material was noted. Attempts to brush this material from the nail with light pressure were unsuccessful, but similar attempts with f!nger nail pressure indicated that it may not have been completely reacted. No other attempt had been made to identify the nature of this caking. However, in view of the general tendency of hygroscopic powdered material to form localized adhesions on many apparently dry surfaces, the nature of the milligram quantities of caked powder observed cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty. It is therefore, on the basis of recorded weight measurements that moderation control is claimed. 2-10 --w

A series of additional tests has been carried out wherein pairs of pails have been dropped together without benefit of the surrounding drum structure, exposed to temperatures typical of those recorded above, and immersed under three feet of water for 24 hours. The results confirm those reported above. Included in these tests were pails which were equipped with lids identical to the standard 17-H lids, except that the closure device is a lever-lock ring formed of.032 steel sheet, in place of the standard lid closure lugs. The lids are identical in all other respects. 1 Based on the above tests, we conclude that: 1. The individual package remains subcritical under all conditions by virtue of the mass limit. 2. The ability to exclude water from the material being shipped provides the basis for evaluating an array of packages on the basis of dryness of the material. 2.5 Additional Testing and Evaluations In the course of renewing the Certificate of Compliance #5768, additional testing and evaluation of the BB-250 shipping container was performed by Babcock & Wilcox Pennsylvania Operations (PA Ops) in calendar year 1981. Inspections conducted throughout the preparation and testing of the container, including the observation of results following the tests, were documented by the PA Ops Quality Assurance Department. In all tests described in this section, the BB-250-2 was filled with five (5) aluminum powder cans filled with lead shot and sand to simulate a total gross weight of a minimum of 650 pounds (295 kg) for the shipping container plus contents. This section provides a description of these tests, evaluations and results. 2.5.1 Normal Condition Tests and Evaluations

2. 5.1.1 Water Spray Test A container was water sprayed for a period of 60 minutes (1 hour).

Upon completion of the testing, the drum was opened and inspected for leakage. The inside of the drum was dry and had no visible signs of moisture present. 2.5.1.2 Free Drop Test Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes after conclusion of the water spray test, the container was inverted so as to hit on the ring, raised to a height of 48" and free dropped onto a concrete pad. Inspection of the container upon completion of testing revealed a 1" compression area on a small portion of the drum. 2.5.1.3 Corner Drop Test The container was free dropped 8 times, 4 times on 2-11 'J

the top and bottom rims once on each quarter. Upon completion of testing, examination of the container revealed the top rim had no dents or distortion of the body while the bottom rim had slight dents at each of the four impact points but no distortion of the body and no visible seam damage.

2. 5.1. 4 Penetration Test A steel cylinder 11" diameter weighing 13 pounds was free dropped 40" onto the center of the lid on the container.

Examination of the container upon completion of the test revealed a dent 1/16" deep but no penetra-tion of the container lid occurred. 2.5.1.5 Compression Test A total weight of 3500 pounds was placed on top of the container. After 24 hours with the weight in this position, there was no distortion or compression of the container due to this weight. 2.5.2 Accident Condition Tests and Evaluations 2.5.2.1 Free Drop Test A container was raised by a crane to a height of thirty (30) feet at approximately a 450 angle. The height was determined by a measured, weighted cord hanging from the container. Aquickreleasemechanismwasusedtg drop the container, which fell at approximately a 45 angle, landing on the corner of the container directly striking the closure ring bolt. Areas at the point of impact were without fracture. The outer container was deformed at the point of impact, but there was no opening around the closure ring or ring bolt. Post-test inspection showed all container components intact. Two (2) of the five (5) aluminum cans were deformed, but there was no damage to the sealing features of the inner container or the cans. 2.5.2.2 Puncture Test Following the 30 foot free drop, the container was free-dropped upside-down through a distance of 40 inches, striking the top end of a 6" 47 x 10" long vertical steel bar mounted on a steel plate. The top horizontal edge of the bar was rounded to a radius of not more than one quarter inch. Following this drop, the lid of the outer container was indented about 13/8", but there was no puncture. 2-12 .~

2.5.2.3 Thermal Evaluation An Engineering evaluation was performed on the BB-250-2 to determine the effect of the thermal test procedure outlined in 10 CFR 71, Appendix B. These thermal test calculations demonstrate the integrity of the inner container will be maintained under the specified hypothetical accident test conditions. This detailed evaluation is provided as Appendix G to this application. 2.5.2.4 Water Immersion Following the puncture test, the container was placed in a tank under 3 feet of water for eight hours. Prior to the loading of the BB-250-2 with the weighted aluminum cans, the inner container had been coated with a light talc-like powder to detect any penetra-tion of moisture. Inspection of the inner container following the immersion showed the inner container was completely dry. 2.5.2.5 Additional Accident Condition Testing In addition to hypothetical accident tests previously described in this section, Babcock & Wilcox also performed further such tests as described below. 2.5.2.5.1 Additional Free Drop Test Another BB-250-2 container was prepared and free-dropped as described in Section 2.5.2.1. All components of the container remained intact. Damage to the side of the outer container, upon completion of the drop, was a tapered dent,12 inches in width running the length of the container. 2.5.2.5.2 Additional Puncture Tests In addition to performing the puncture test on the lid of BB-250-2 as described in Section 2.5.2.2, the puncture test was performed three more t?mes. The BB-250-2 container free-dropped in Section 2.5.2.5.1 was then dropped 40 inches, with the closure ring bolt striking directly on the spike. The spike made an indentation of i inch in depth at the point of impact. No other visible damage occurred. A BB-250-2 container was dropped 40 inches onto the 6 incli diameter steel spike, directly on the welded seam on the center side of the 2-13 A

container. An indentation approximately 16 inches wide by 18 inches long with a maximum depth of 21 inches was formed. There was no indication of weld breaking or metal tearing and all container components remained intact. Finally, a BB-250-2 container was dropped 40 inches onto the steel spike, directly on the bottom center of the outer container. An indentation with a depth of 1 inch was formed. No other damage occurred. 2.6 Babcock & Wilcox Modified BB-250-2 Package Evaluation This section provides the structural design and evaluation for the contents described in Section 1.2.2.3b of this application. In addition to the information presented in Sections 2.1-2.5 of this chapter, the following additional evaluation is presented for the " Babcock & Wilcox modified BB-250-2" package. 2.6.1 General (4) The Babcock & Wilcox modified BB-250-2 package uses the Westing-house inner container with a pellet holder that fits inside. The modified BB-250-2 package is shown in Drawing No.10-F-676 (Appendix D of this application) with deviations as shown in Drawing ASK-1324-C (Appendix E of this application). When pellets are shipped in the container, an additional six bolts (making a total of twelve) are.used to secure the lid of the inner container in place. When fuel containers such as metal cans or fiberpacks are placed in the inner container, six bolts are used to secure the lid. In both cases, however, the inner container is the same, and orily tne insert which fits inside the inner container and the number of securing bolts differs. The drum lid on the modified 88-250-2 package is secured with a lock ring with a bolt and lock nut. In addition, the disc that retains the vermiculite is not drilled for studs, but is a plain disc. This change was done tp eliminate the potential problem of water seepage into the container from around the bolt holes. Prior to initial use, the following tests were done to determine that the inner container was leaktight: (a) Each inner container was tested in its permanent position within the package using a test lid. (b) The test lid was bolted in place. The inner container was evacuated to five (5) inc.hes of mercury (gauge). 2-14 N

O (c) The tests were considered satisfactory if no perceptible pressure increase occurs within a one (1) hour period. Both horizontal and vertical drop tests were conducted to evaluate the integrity of the modified package. Results of the drop tests show that the pellet insert will retain its geometry when the package is subjected to the accident damage tests. The brass nuts will develop the full tensile strength of the steel thru-studs without shear failure of the threads. This was shown in the drop tests since no failure occurred. No thread failure occurred during any of the drop tests. This shows that the tensile stress in the bolt resulting from the torques used to seat the gasket, plus the additional stress caused by a top-corner impact during the accident damage test, does not exceed the yield stress of the bolt material. 2.6.2 liorizontal Drop The modified BB-250-2 package was dropped from a height of 30 feet onto a one inch thick steel plate placed on a concrete pad. The container was dropped, in a horizontal position, with the rectangular insert oriented such that its widest side was parallel to the steel plate. The rectangular insert was loaded with approximately 250 pounds of lead bricks strapped to an oak board. This loading is similar to actual shipping conditions. Following the drop, the container was immersed in water for eight hours in a horizontal position so that the container was covered by at least three feet of water. This test yielded the following results: a. The rectangular insert was deformed on one side slightly less than one inch in the direction of the drop. This deformity was the only damage to the rectangular insert. We do not feel that this slight deformation affects the nuclear safety of the insert. b. The inner container was deformed somewhat less than one inch in the direction of the drop. This was caused by pressure produced by the flanges welded to the rectangular insert. This deformity, however, did not cause any loss of integrity. c. The outer drum was breached at the point where the drum lid contacts the drum. This allowed a small amount of the packing material (vermiculite) to escape. d. There was no in-leakage of water into either the rectangular insert or the inner container. 2.6.3 Vertical Drop The modified BB-250-2 package was then dropped in the vertical position. Because of a minor in-leakage of water into the rectangular insert, the container was modified, as shown in Drawing No.10-F-676, and dropped again. The final modifications represent an improvement in the container and do not affect the 2-15 o

validity of the horizontal test results. Therefore, the horizontal drop was not repeated following modifications. For the second vertical drop, the modified BB-250-2 package was again dropped from a height of 30 feet onto a one inch thick steel plate placed on a concrete pad. The package was canted so that the center of gravity was located directly over the lugs of the closure ring, therefore putting the full impact load on the lugs. The rectangular insert was loaded with approximately 250 pounds of lead bricks strapped to an oak board. This loading is similar to actual shipping conditions. Following the drop, the package was immersed in water for eight hours in a horizontal position so that the container was covered by at least three feet of water. Following the water test, a pressure of 13 psig was applied to the inner container. This test yielded the following results: a. The rectangular insert was not damaged. b. The top of the inner container was slightly dented at the point of impact. c. The outer drum was locally deformed by the impact, but the integrity of the outer drum was not breached. There was no loss of packing material, d. There was no in-leakage of water into either the rectangular insert or the inner container. e. A pressure of 13 psig was applied to the inner container for a period of sixteen hours. Less than 2 psig was lost during this period. 2-16 ~

O O 6 g 1 P I e CHAPTER 3.0 NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION 4 6 s e Ap

4 3.0 Nuclear Safety Evaluation All calculations were performed using the KENO-IV computer code with the Knight-modified Hansen-Roach 16 group cross-section set except the XSDRNPM-123 group cross-section set was used where pellets were considered. All arrays were calculated on a rectangular pitch. In all array calculations the only moderation within the inner container was assumed to be due to polyethylene within the fuel region such that the H/V ratio equals the maximum amount allowed per section 1.2.2. All calculations assumed full reflection by at least 30 cm of water or Oak Ridge concrete. 3.1 for the contents described in 1.2.2.1: a. An individual shipping container is shown safe by ARH-600 III.B.4-6. The critical infinite cylinder diameter, fully reflected, for 5 w/o U235 is 10.1 inches, which is larger than the 9.75 inch diameter container used in the BB-250. b. An array of undamaged shipping containers on 22" centers, infinite in x and y, and 2 high (10 cans), with no moderation between them other than that due to the vermiculite, has a K-effective 2a of 0.848 .010 which is subcritical at the 95% confidence level. c. An array of damaged shipping containers on 22 inch centers,10 x 14 x 2 high, was considered with 5% interspersed H 0, and found to be 2 the most reactive. The resulting K-effective 2a was 0.962 .010, which is subcritical. 3.2 For the contents described in 1.2.2.2: a. An individual shipping container fully flooded and the material (U-metal) homogeneously mixed with polyethylene at the optimum concentration has a maximum K-effective 2a of 0.985 .01 0, which is subcritical at the 95% confidence level. b. An array of undamaged shipping containers 30 x 30 x 9 (8100 units) with no moderation as described in 3.1 b, has a maximum K-effective 12o of 0.966 0.008, which is subcritical at the 95% confidence level. c. An array of damaged shipping containers as large as 18 x 18 x 5 (1620 units) and moderated as in 3.1 c has a maximum K-effective 12o of 0.966 0.010, which is subcritical at the 95% confidence level. 3-1 q

3.3 For the contents described in 1.2.2.3 and assuming uniformly spaced unclad rods of full density U02 on a square pitch. a. An individual shipping container fully flooded and tht rods (at the optimum pitch) homogeneously mixed with polyethylene at the optimum concentration has a maximum K-effective + 2 o 0.978 + 0.013, which is subcritical at the 95% confidence level, b. An array of undamaged shipping containers no larger than 20 x 20 x 7 (2400 units) with no moderation as described in 3.1.b at the 95% confidence level. which is subcritical has a K-effective + 2 o of 0.982 + 0.009, c. An array of damaged shipping containers no larger than 14 x 14 x 4 (784 units) with no vermiculite between the inner and outer con-tainers and an optimum volume fraction water of 0.03 in this region as well as between shipping containers has a maximum K-effective + 2 o of 0.984 + 0.009, which is subcritical at the 95% confidenEe level. d. With rods in the rectangular metal container (7.25" x 9" x 63") an evaluation was performed as in 3.3.c with a resulting maximum K-effective + 2 o of 0.832 + 0.009, which is subcritical at the 95% confidenEe level. 3.4 For the contents described in 1.2.2.4. a. The individual container has a maximum of two cans or one-half the material described in 3.3.a which has a maximum K-effective + 2 o 0.978 +.013. b.1 An array of undamaged shipping containers. no larger than 20 x 19 x 6 (2280 units) with one can per container and with no modera-tion as described in 3.1.b has a K-effective + 2 o of 0.982 + .011 which is subcritical at the 95% confidence leval, b.2 An array of damaged shipping containers no larger than 14 x 14 x 4 (784 units) with one can per container, fully flooded and with no vermiculite between the inner and outer containers has a K-effective + 2 o of 0.965 + 0.010 which is subcritical at the 95% confidenEe level. c.1 An array of undamaged shipping containers no larger than 6 x 6 x 2 (72 units) with two cans per container and with no moderation as described in 3.1.b has a K-effective + 2 o of 0.967 + 0.010 which is subcritical at the 95% confidence level. c.2 An array of damaged shipping containers no larger than 5 x 4 x 2 (40 units) with two cans per container, fully flooded and with no vermiculite between the inner and outer containers has a K-effective + 2 o of 0.978 + 0.012 which is subcritical at the 95% confidenEe level. 3-2

3.5 Fissile Class II The maximum number of shipping containers that could be transported due to weight limitations imposed by governmental transportation regulations would be less than 100. Five. times that number, or 500 units, is less than the smallest damaged or undamaged array allowed. fh0=0.5 Thus: Therefore, any package described in this application except for 3.4.c.1 and 3.4.c.2 would be assigned a transport index of 0.5. For 3.4.c.1 and 3.4.c.2, one-fifth the undamaged array,14 is smaller tFar one-half the damaged array, 20 hence 50 = 3.57 or 3.6 transport units would be assigned. T4 e a e e I a 3-3

su. e 9 e r APPENDIX A BABC0CK AND WILCOX DRAllING 10-F-771 e

9 O s O = APPENDIX B WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. DRAWING C7108D10

APPENDIX C U.S. MILITARY STANDARD MS24347 Q

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C 4 e 4 APPENDIX D NU!1EC DRAWING #10-F-676

O 9 6 e S e 6 APPENDIX E NUMEC SKETCH #ASK-1324-C d G

O 9 e 4 = APPENDIX F WESTIf1GHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. SKETCH SKA-252-1 5

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4 4 i o APPENDIX G THERMAL TEST CALCULATIONS OF THE BABC0CK & WILCOX 88-250 SHIPPIt1G C0t1TAINER O

~ % ~ l BABC0CK & WILC0X NUCLEAR MATERI ALS & MNJUFACTURIflG DIVISI0fl PEtlNSYLVNlIA OPERATI0flS THERMAL TEST CALCULATIONS OF THE BABC0CK & WILC0X BB-250 SHIPPING CONTAINER Prepared by L. J. Ozimek April 2,1981 $~l- $l 2m Kl.L'. Artman, Project Manager Date . Facilities Engineering J O

-~ a GUIDELINES _ ' Thermal test procedure as outlined in 10CFR71 Part 71 Appendix B (hypothetical accident condition). 1. Exposure to a radiation environment of 1475*F for a 30 minute duration 2. Emissivity coefficient of package (0.9) 3. Absorption coefficient of package (0.8) SPECIFICATIONS BB-250 shipping container construction specifications--refer to Babcock & Wilcox Drawing No.10-F-771 Rev. 2. ASSUMPTIONS 1. Inner cylinder gasket (IT.5 Drawing 10-F-771) will maintain its integrity during the thermal test. NOTE: Gasket material normally used is target--a premium grade buna-n bonded. compressed asbestos sheet with a maximum continuous temperature rating of 800 F. Supplied by: Anchor Packing & Supply Company Pittsburgh, PA 2. Inner cylinder cover plate fasteners are pre-torqued to 65 ft-lbs. 3. Annular area between inner and outer cylinder is vented to atmosphere-- resulting in the maximum differential pressure achievable that the inner cylinder shell will be subjected to. 4. Outer cylinder at the start of the thermal test (time zero), is at 1475*F with all internal components at standard temperature (59 F)--establishing the maximum heat flux. 5. Initially established heat flux to remain constant for the duration of the test. Resulting in a calculated internal temperature and' pressure higher than achievable under normal conditions. c

6. Heat flux by conduction only--due to venniculite being well packaged in all areas. 7. Calculated temperature'of inner cylinder shell to be the result af the inner cylinder shell absorbing all the heat flux during the test period. In actuality, the inner cylinder air and solid contents will be absorbing heat, thereby resulting in a lower temperature than calculated. 8. Calculation of pressure to be based on the expansion of dry air inside the inner cylinder. Temperature rise of air to be from standard temperature to the calculated inner shell temperature. Standard pressure assumed at 14.696 PSIA. 9. Exclude spring supports (IT.ll, Drawing 10-F-771 Rev. 2) from calculations. CALCULATION PROCEDURE I -- Calculate the maximum achievable internal temperature of pressure in the inner cylinder of an undamaged shipping container. ~ II -- Factoring in results of the damage'done during the drop and puncture test, recalculate the maximum temperature and pressure. III -- Check integrity of a damaged shipping container's inner cylinder as subjected to the outlined thermal test. I. THERMAL TEST CALCULATIONS g Basic equation for heat flux: Q"fA AT where: Q= conduction heat flux (BTU /Hr) thermal conductivity (BTU /Ft Hr*F) K = length of heat flux path (Ft) L = 2 area of heat flux (Ft ) A = temperature gradient (*F) AT =

Reference:

North American Combustion Handbook Second Edition, Page 81 e

Basically there are three heat flow paths 1. Vermiculite insulation (IT.2 Drawing 10-F-771) A. Top B. Sides C. Bottom 2. Inner cylinder support and stabilizing springs (IT.12 Drawing 10-F-771) 3. Inner band (IT.8 Drawing 10-F-771) 1-A Heat Flux Thru Vermiculite _ (Top) BTU 0.0317 V = (venniculite) Ft Hr F

Reference:

Properties and Uses Zonolite Brand Vermiculite W. R. Grace Company Bulletin G-231 Copyright 1964 Revised 1976, Page 6 Q=fA AT ~ Q = 0. 276.69 BTU /Hr x

2. 7 61 x

(1475 - 59) = ,4 79 1-B Heat Flux Thru Vermiculite (Sides) 36.816 x (1475 - 59)' Q = 0.0 3647.24 BTU /Hr = x ,q l-C Heat Flux Thru Vermiculite (Bottom) 7 372.17 BTU /Hr Q= -x 2.761 x (1475 - 59) = Therefore Total Heat Flux Thru Vermiculite is: 4296.10 BTU /Hr 276.69 + 3647.24 + 372.17 = n Q i 2. Heat Flux Thru Support and Stabili_ zing Springs BTU 24 K = Ft Hr ( Carbon Steel

Reference:

North American Combusti.on Handbook Second Edition Table 4.2b, Page 85 11.00 BTU /Hr 24 Q= x 0.00034 x (1475 - 59) = 1.05 Spring Bu 132.00 BTU /Hr 12 Springs x 11.00 = p ng 3. Heat Flux Thru Inner Band 24 1396.42 BTU /Hr Q= 0.5208 x 0.0214 x (1475 - 59) = Total Heat Flux into Inner Cylinder is: 5824.52 BTU /Hr 4296.10 + 132.00 + 1396.42 = Assuming this heat flux is constant for the 30 minute test, the maximum heat input into the inner cylinder would be: 5824.52 BTU /Hr x 30 Min 2912.26 BTU = 60 Min /Hr 4 Determine Maximum Temperature of Inner Cylinder Density of Carbon Steel (p) 487 PcF = Refe'rence: North American Combustion Handbook Second Edition Table 4.2b, Page 85 c i 9

Densi ty (p ) o uInc (V) ~ = n

Reference:

Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers Eighth Edition Page 1-42 Volume of Inner Cylinder Metal Parts: (Reference Drawing 10-F-771 Rev. 2) 1/2 thick x 14 3/4 diameter > 0.0494 Ft IT.4 16 gage,11 1/2 ID x 631/2 length - > 0.0834 Ft IT.6 - 0.0239 Ft 1/2 thick x 11 5/8 ID 'x 1.51/2 OD IT.7 3 IT.10 - 11 gage x 11 1/2 diameter 0.0075 ft 3 0.0494 + 0.0834 + 0.0239 i 0.0075 0.1642 Ft = Total Volume = 487 lbs/Ft x 0.1642 Ft = 79.96 lbs Mass (W) pV = = Interpretation of Specific Heat Q= Cp M AT

Reference:

General College Chemistry Keenan, Wood and Kleinfelter Fifth Edition, Page 9 where: Q= heat input (BTU) specific heat (BTU /lb F) Cp = mass (lbs) H = temperature rise, T2 - T (* F) AT = j Q = Cp-M AT Q/cp M T Q/Cp M or T AT = = 2 j T2= Q/Cp M + Tj 0.113 BTU /lb*F Cp = Carbon Steel

Reference:

North American Combustion Handbook c Second Edition Table 4.2d, Page 85

2912.26 381.31 F. This is the maximum skin temperature + 59 T = 2 0.113 x 79.96 of the inner cylinder af ter 30 minutes o'f testing (undamaged shipping container). Raising the inner cylinder contents (dry air only) from 59 F to 381.31*F would result in the following pressure build-up. 5/9 [ Degrees Fahrenheit ( F) - 32] Degrees Centigrade ( C) = Degrees Kelv.in (*K)

• C

+ 273.15 =

Reference:

Mark's Standard Handhook for Mechanical Engineers Eighth Edition Page 4-3 288.15*K 59*F T = = j d 467.21*K T 381.31 f = 2 P1 P2 5 5

Reference:

General College Chemistry Keenan, Wood & Kleinfelter Fifth Edition Page 208 initial absolute pressum where: P = j final absolute pressure P = 2 initial absolute temperature T = j final absolute temperature T = 2 plt 2 (14.696 PSIA)(467.21 K) 23.828 PSIA p = T (288.15 K) j +9.132 PSIG This is the maximum inner 14.696 PSI 23.828 PSIA = cylinder pressure build-up after 30 minutes of testing. Results Thus Far: The inner cylinder of an undamaged shipping container could reach a maximum temperature of 381.31 F and pmssure build-up of 9.132 PSIG af ter being exposed to the stated radiation environment. J

II. EXTEllT OF DAf4 AGE OF Tile DROP NID PUtlCTURE TEST 1. Top of shipping container's outer shell collapsed approximately two inches resulting frun impact of the drop and puncture tests. This value is conservation because overall the top did not totally collapse that much. 2. After initial impact during the drop test, the shipping container fell on its side creatj,ng an indentation. Area indented was approximately 0.815 Ft'- and less thar,1 inch deep. Again this value is conservative. 3. Inner bar.d and upper springs were defonned, however their heat flow path lengths will be con,sidered the same as in the undamaged state. 4. Venniculite packing was totally contained. 5. Their was no visible damage to the inner cyiinder components (Items 4, 6, 7,10,16 and 17). Revised Heat Flux Calculations 0.0317 x 2.761 x (1475-59) 440.73 BTU /Hr 1-A' Q = = (New) 0.2812 1-B' Q=

0. 0317 'x (36.816 - 0.815) (1475 - 59) 3566.51 BTU /Hr

= Undamaged 0.4531 c Area 0.0317 98.93 BTU /Hr Q = 0.3698 (0.815)(1475 - 59) = Damaged 3665.44 BTU /Hr 3566.51 + 98.93 = Therefore, total heat flux through vermiculite (revised) = 4478.34 BTU /Hr 440.73 + 3665.44 + 372.17 = Total heat flux into inner cvlinder = 4478.34 + 132.00 + 1396.42 6006.76 BTU /Hr = 6006.76 BTU /Hr x 30 Min = 3003.38 BTU .'. maximum heat input for 30 minutes = 60 Min /Hr 9 4

Final skin temperature of inner cylinder = T2

• A

+ Tj 3003.38 + 59 391.40 F This is the maximum = = -cpm 0.113 x 79.96 skin temperature of the inner cylinder after 30 minutes (damagedshipping container). Determine Maximum Pressure of Inner Cylinder 472.82 K. T2 391.40 F = = PjT2 (14.696)(472.82) 24.114 PSIA p = 2 T (288.15) j +9.418 PSIG This is the maximum inner cylinder pressure 24.114 - 14.696 = buil-up after 30 minutes (damaged shipping container). III. DETERMINATION OF INNER CYLINDER INTEGRITY AT AN INTERNAL PRESSURE OF +9.418 PSIG AND SKIN TEMPERATURE OF 391.40 F Check Circumferential Stress of Inner Cylinder Wall (IT.6) h For thin walled cylinders where,., wall thickness ID >l 5 S= circumferential stress in tension (PSI) where S = internal pressure (PSI) p = inside diameter (inches) D = wall thickness (inches) t =

Reference:

Machine Design by Creamer Temple University Technical Institute Copyright 1968 Pages 428 and 429 (9.418)(11.5) 867 PSI 3 = (2)(0.0625) e Q E

i Check Longitudinal Stress of Inner Cylinder (IT.6) h Same reference and units as above. S = = - 31 ) 433 PSI S = 0 Note: Ultimate short time strength of carbon steel at 400 F = 70,000 PSI

Reference:

Metals Handbook 1948 Edition American Society for Metals Page 117 .. Inner cylinder wall will not faii. Check Inner cylinder Bottom Plate Stress (IT.10) = I [P-Reference of units as stated above except d = plate t 2 ys diameter (inches)--pages 433 and 434. 9' i2 2 2x 20 2 = 21,624 PSI S = .11.5 within the ult'imate stress.:. inner cylinder bottom will not fall. Check Inner Cylinder Lid Stress (IT.4) Assume sealing surface equal to 12.4375 inches diameter. 9.418 1.457 PSI S = = /2 x 0.5 2 ( 12.4375 ~ within 'the. ultimate stress.. inner cylinder lid will not fall. Check Inner Cylinder Fasteners Integrity Six 1/2-13 carbon steel studs with hex brass nuts (class 2) Note: Brass nuts are 7/16 inch thick and pretorqued to assumed value of 65 Ft-lbs. C h

U ~ y Determine Shear Area of the Hex Nuts Internal Tad E )3 3.1416 n LeDhin [ N + 0.57735 (Ds, A n = n m1n max 2 shear area of internal thd (in ) where: fn = I number of thds per inch n = thd engagement (in.) L = e minimum major diameter of external thd (in.) D. = Ein maximum pitch diamete'r o'f internal thd (in.) Ei = max

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seventeenth Edition Page 1051 l l + 0.57735-(0.4876 - 0.4565)] (3.1416)(13)(0.4375)(0.4876) [ 12 x 13) A = n 2 0.4915 in A = n The area in shear of a screw is two times the tensile stress area in order to develop the full strength of the screw with a very small safety factor. Resulting in the screw failing in tension before the thd's shear.

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seventeenth Edition Page 1051 Therefore an equivalent tensile stress area 0.4915 = 0.2457 in2 for each 1/2-13 bolt = Preload Per Bolt when Torqued to 65 Ft-lbs P + 6.2832ur Qx x T-F = 6.2832 r-up R

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seventeenth Edition Page 307 e e e

, force at end of wrench (1bs) where: F = Q = axial load for motion opposite load (Ibs)' icadofthd(in.) = p coefficient of friction = y pitch radius of screw (in.) = r lever ann (in.) R = 780 in-lbs 65 Ft-lbs = = torque Note: FR = 0 " FR (6.2832 r - up) ~ (p + 6.2832 pr)r = 0.44 p brass on steel dry sliding Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers

Reference:

Eighth Edition Pages 3-26 0.0769 1 ~ = P _- 13 thds/in. pitch diameter _ 064ji = 0.225 = 2 p, 2

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seventeenth Edition Page 111 = 6844 lbs preload force on each 780 [(6.2832 x 0.225) - (0.44 x 0.0769)] O " 10.0769 + (6.2832 x 0.44 x.0.225) ] 0.22'S bolt Force per bolt due to pressure build-up (+9.418 PSIG) in a damag container. Assumed sealing surface area gf inner container lid (IT.4) is 12 Note: Area = 121.5 in. c diameter 2 1144 lbs force on six 1/2-13 bolts 9.418 lbs-x 121.5 in = in2 191 lbs/ bolt 1144'1bs- = 6 bolts 6844 + 191 = 7035 lbs Total load per bolt = A

P=SA t

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seve teenth Edition-n Page 1051 axial force (lbs) where: P = tensilestress(PSI) S = 2 ensile stress area (in ) A = t P 7035 28,632 PSI S = g- = 0.2457 = Ultimate stress for brass at 400 F = 40,000 PSI . '. brass nuts will not fail under test conditions

Reference:

Metals Handbook, Volume 1 Eighth Edition American Society for Metals Page 971 Ultimate short time strength of carbon steel at 400*F as already defined is = 70,000 PSI. .'. carbon steel ' studs will not fail under test conditions.

== Conclusion:==

1.. Theoretically the integrity of the inner cylinder will be maintained under the specified thermal test conditions, construction specifications, and assumptions that were made.

O e e b

Check Longitudinal Stress of Inner Cylinder (IT.6) h Same reference and units as above. S = {~9.418)J11.51 = 433 PSI S = (4] (0.0625) Note: Ultimate short time strength of carbon stec1 at 400 F = 70,000 PSI

Reference:

Metals Handbook 1943 Edition American Society for Metals Page 117

1. .. Inner cylinder wall will not fail.

Check Inner cylinder Bottom Plate Stress (IT.10) i P-Reference of units as stated above except'd = plate t = 2 s diameter (inches)--pages 433 and 434. 9' = 21,624 PSI S = 12 2 2x 20)2 .11.5 / ~ within the ult'imate stress.. inner cylinder bottom will not fall. C Check Inner Cylinder Lid Stress (IT.4) Assume sealing surface equal to 12.4375 inches diameter. 9.41 8 1.457 PSI S = = /2 x 0.5)2 ( 12.4375/ within the -ultimate stress.'. inner cylinder lid will not fall. Check Inner cylinder Fasteners Integrity Six 1/2-13 carbon steel studs with hex brass nuts (class 2) Note: Brass nuts are 7/16 inch thick and pretorqued to assumed value e of 65 Ft-lbs.

Detennine Shear Ama of the Hex Nuts Internal Tad { I n 3.1416 n LeDMin [ E + 0.57735 (D, E )3 A = 3 n min max 2 where: A'n shear area of internal thd (in ) = number of thds per inch n = Le thd engagemer.t (in.) = D minimum major diameter of external thd (in.) = hin maximum pitch diamete'r of internal thd (in.) En = max

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seventeenth Edition Page 1051 i l (3.1416)(13)(0.4375)(0.4876) [ 12 x 13) + 0.57735'(0.4876 - 0.4565)] A = n 2 A 0.4915 in = n The area in shear of a screw is two times the tensile stress area in order to develop the full strength of the screw with a very small safety factor. Resulting in the screw failing in tension before the thd's shear.

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seventeenth Edition Page 1051 1 Therefore an equivalent tensile stress area l for each 1/2-13 bolt 0.4915 = 0.2457 in2 = Preload Per Bolt when Torqued to 6S Ft-lbs P + 6.2832ur F Qx x l = 6.2832 r-up R

Reference:

Machinery's Handboek Seventeenth Edition Page 307 c

4 force at end of wrench (lbs) where: F = Q= axial load for motion opposite load (lbs) lead of thd (in.) p = coefficient of friction y = pitch radius of screw (in.) r = lever ann (in.) R = 780 in-lbs 65 Ft-lbs Note: FR torque = = = O " FR (6.2832 r - up) ~ (p + 6.2832 pr)r p = 0.44 brass on steel dry sliding

Reference:

Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers Eighth Edition Pages 3-2G 0.0769 1 = p = 13 thds/in. pitch diameter 0.45 = 0.225 = p = 2 2

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook Seventeenth Edition Page 111 0 " 780 [(6.2832 x 0.225) - (0.44 x 0.0769)J = 6844 lbs re oad force on each [0.0769 + (6.2832 x 0.44 x.0.225) ] 0.225 Force per bolt due to pressure build-up (+9.418 PSIG) in a damaged shipping container. Note: Assumed sealing surfau area gf inner container lid (IT.4) is 12 7/16 diameter Area = 121.5 in. c x 121.5 in2 1144 lbs force on six 1/2-13 bolts 9.418 lbs = in2 Il44'lbs 191 lbs/ bolt = 6 bolts 6844 +.191 = 7035 lbs Total load per bolt = .}}