ML20041B797

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 810601-0813.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Adequately Implement Fire Protection Program,Inservice Testing of Fire Safety Sys & Equipment & Installation of Inadequate Fire Doors
ML20041B797
Person / Time
Site: Cook  
Issue date: 12/30/1981
From: Deyoung R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20041B791 List:
References
EA-82-003, EA-82-3, NUDOCS 8202250211
Download: ML20041B797 (9)


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4 APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES American Electric Power Service Corporation Docket Nos. 50-315 Indiana and Michigan Power Company 50-316 1

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 EA 82-03 As a result of inspections conducted during the period June 1 through August 13, 1981, at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant near Bridgman, Michigan, it appears that breakdowns have occurred in the control of your licensed activities.

Numerous violations demonstrate that the licensee failed to adequately implement its fire protection program.

The inservice testing program for various fire protection ' ystems was not implemented, certain tests and inspections were not s

conducted on a timely basis and the accuracy of information provided to the Commission regarding the fire protection program was not assured.

Also, adequate control over surveillance testing procedures to assure that such testing did not affect the operability of systems important to safety was not maintained.

Consequently, the performance of a leak rate test resulted in a breach of containment integrity for approximately 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />.

This failure to ensure 4

operability of safety systems following surveillance testing had been previously identified to the licensee.

1 Because of these breakdowns in implementation of and control of licensed activities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose civil penalties j

in the amount of $80,000 for these matters.

Items I.A.,

I.B., I.D., I.E.,

I.F., II.A, II.B, III.A., III.B., and III.C have been categorized at the level described in accordance with the Interim Enforcement Policy 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980).

In categorizing Items I.C.,

I.G.,

I.H., and I.I., the factors identified in the " Criteria for Determining Enforcement Action," which was sent to NRC licensees on December 31, 1974, have been taken into account.

These penalties are proposed pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("Act"), and 10 CFR 2.205.

4 CIVIL PENALTY VIOLATIONS 1.

A number of violations involving the implementation of your fire pro-4 tection program were identified.

The total of the proposed civil penalties for this failure to properly implement your fire protection program is $40,000.

A.

Technical Specification 3.7.10 for Units 1 and 2 requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas shall be i

functional at all times.

With one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional, a continuous fire watch shall be established within one hour.

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i Appendix A (Continued) i Technical Specification 4.7.10 for Units 1 and 2 states, in part, "Each of the above required penetration fire barriers shall be veri-fied to be functional by a visual inspection...at least once per 18 months..."

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Contrary to the above:

1.

As of June 4, 1981, the licensee had not verified by visual inspection that certain penetration fire barriers [ fire doors and fire dampers] protecting safety related areas were functional since the requirement became effective on January 12, 1978, for Unit 1 and on December 23, 1977, for Unit 2.

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Eighteen fire doors protecting safety related areas (including the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms and containment cabling and piping penetration areas) were not functional for the following i

reasons 1

a.

Sixteen doors did not have the required fire rating.

b.

Two fire doors were ob'structed from closing.

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c.

Six fire doors had inoperable closure and/or latching mechanisms.

3.

On June 4, 1981, when the NRC inspector informed licensee man-agement that the visual inspections were overdue,_the licensee failed to implement the provisions of the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10 and thereby satisfy the limiting i

condition for operation.

This is'a Severity Level III violation (Supplement 1).

(Civil Penalty - $10,000).

B.

Technical Specifications 3.3.3.7 for Unit 1 and 3.3.3.8 for Unit 2 state, in part, "As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone...shall be OPERABLE...With the number of OPERABLE fire detection instruments less than required...Within one hour, establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone (s) with the inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour..."

Technical Specifications 4.3.3.7.2 for Unit 1 and 4.3.3.8.2 for Unit 2 state, "The NFPA Code 720 Class B supervised circuits super-vision associated with the detector alarms of each of the above required fire detection instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per six months."

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Appendix A (Continued) 3-Contrary to the above:

s' 1.

As of June 3,1981, the fire detector supervisory circuits had i

I not been demonstrated OPERABLE since the requirements became effective on January 12, 1978, for Unit 1, and on December 23, i

1977, for Unit 2.

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Four fire detector supervisory circuits were not OPERABLE due to malfunctioning relays.

This resulted in a degraded mode of operation for the fire detection instrumentation for those four l

zones.

I 3.

On June 4, 1981, when the NRC inspector informed licensee manage-ment that the OPERABILITY demonstrations were overdue, the licensee failed to implement the provisions of the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 for unit 1 and 3.3.3.8 for Unit 2 and thereby satisfy the limiting condition for operation.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - $5,000).

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f C.

Technical Specification 3.7.9.2 for Units 1 and 2 states, in part, "The spray and/or sprinkler systems located in the areas shown in Table 3.7-5 shall be OPERABLE...Whenever equipment in the spray /

sprinkler protected areas is required to be OPERABLE...with one or more of the above required spray and/or sprinkler systems inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area (s), within one hour..."

Technical Specification 4.7.9.2 for Units 1 and 2 states, in part, that each of the above required spray and/or sprinkler systems shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE at intervals of 12 months and 18 months, in accordance with specified test requirements.

Contrary to the above, until January 3,1980, the spray and sprinkler systems listed in Technical Specification Table 3.7-5 had not been demonstrated OPERABLE since the requirement became effective on January. 12, 1978, for Unit 1 and on December 23, 1977, for Unit 2.

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This is an Infraction.

(Civil Penalty - $4,000).

j D.

Technical Specification 3.7.9.1 for Units 1 and 2 requires that the fire suppression water system shall be OPERABLE with two high pressure pumps.

With the fire suppression water system otherwise inoperable a backup fire suppression water system shall be established within-24 hours.

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Appendix A (Continued).

Technical Specification 4.7.9.1.1 states, in part, "The fire suppres-sion water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE...At least once per 18 months by performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the syster, throughout its operating sequence, and... Verifying that each high pressure pump starts (sequentially) to maintain the fire suppression water system pressure

> 100 psig..."

Contrary to the above, the fire suppression water system was due for testing on November 5, 1980, but was not tested until April 7, 1981.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

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(Civil Penalty - $4,000).

E.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requires that activities affecting quality shan be prescribed by documented procedures and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures.

Procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria.

Plant Manager Instruction, PMI 2010, " Plant Manager and Department Head Instructions, Procedures and Associated Indexes," implements these requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

PMI 2010 i

states, in part, " Acceptance criteria shall include the specific i

requirements that must be obtained before a Procedure can be con-sidered as having been properly completed."

Contrary to the above, Operations Head Procedure 1-0HP 4030.STP.120, 5

Data /Signoff Sheet 6.5, " Auxiliary Building Water /C0 Flow Path 2

Verification," did not include acceptance criteria for determining the proper completion of the procedure employed for testing of fire protection system components.

Consequently, the procedure was approved as being satisfactorily completed on February 27, 1981, when l

the test data showed pressures that were far in excess of the system capability during a flow obstruction test.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - $2,500).

F.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.e for Units 1 and 2 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the ' Emergency Plan implementation.

The Donald C. Cook Emergency Plan which is contained in Section 12.3.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report was amended in December 1977 (Amendment No. 80) to include a requirement in Part IX.F.4 that fire brigade members participate in quarterly fire drills.

Contrary to the above, written procedures were not established to implement this requirement.

Consecuently, the requirement was not satisfied on four occasions as follows:

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Appendix A (Continued) <

1.

The Operating Shift A Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire drill in the second quarter of 1979.

2.

The Operating Shift C Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire drill in the third quarter of 1979.

3.

The Operating Shift B Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire i

drill in the third quarter of 1980.

1 4.

The Operating Shift D Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire drill in the fourth quarter of 1980.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - $2,500).

G.

As part of the NRC staff review of fire protection at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, the staff requested, by letter dated September 30, 1976, that the licensee prepare a fire hazards analysis of the facility.

The licensee's response dated March 31, 1977,

" Fire Hazards Analysis Units 1 and 2," stated that ten specified fire zones were provided with 12 (Underwriter's Laboratories approved)

Class B doors.

Contrary to section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the state-ment in the licensee's March 31, 1977 response is a material false statement.

It is false in that none of the 12 specified doors had l

any fire resistance rating.

This false statement is material in that the staff relied upon it in reaching its conclusions regarding l

the acceptability of the licensee's fire protection program.

(Civil Penalty - $4,000).

H.

The NRC staff requested by letter dated July 11, 1977, that the licensee provide information concerning unprotected openings in the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms.

The licensee's response dated November 22, 1977, stated, in part, "The four feedwater pump rooms are equipped with [ Underwriter's Laboratories approved] three hour rated fire doors..."

Contrary. to section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the statement in the licensee's November 22, 1977 response is a material false statement.

It is false in that it was determined that none of these doors had a fire resistance rating.

This false statement is material in that the staff relied upon it in reaching its conclusions regarding the acceptability of the licensee's fire protection program.

(Civil Penalty - $4,000).

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Appendix A (Continued),

I.

The NRC staff requested by letters dated July 16 and 30, 1976, that the licensee make a comparison of the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant fire protection program with the positions in Appendix A to Branch Techni-cal Position APCSB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976." One of the positions in Appendix A states, in part, " Effective administrative measures should be implemented to prohibit bulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety related buildings or systems during operation or maintenance periods..." The licensee's response dated January 31, 1977, stated, in part, " Administrative measures have been established to control the storage of combustible materials and to prohibit their storage in the vicinity of safety related systems."

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Contrary to section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the statement in the licensee's January 31, 1977 response is a material false statement.

It is false in that it was determined during an NRC inspection that administrative measures had not been established at the time of the licensee's January 31, 1977 response and they were not estabjished until July 28, 1977.

This false statement is material in that ' M staff relied upon it in reaching its conclusions regarding the acceptability of the licensee's fire protection program.

(Civil Penalty - $4,000).

l II.

The following violations relate to the degradation of containment integrity and failure to make a timely notification of the event.

The total of the proposed civil penalties for these violations is $40,000.

A.

Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires that primary containment f

integrity be maintained during power operation, startup, hot standby and hot shutdown (modes 1, 2, 3 and 4).

If primary containment integrity is lost, it is required to be restored within one hour or the plant be placed in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, primary containment integrity was not maintained from about 10:45 a.m. on May 10, 1981, to 10:30 p.m. on May 12, 1981, i

(a period of about 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />) while the Unit 2 reactor was in hot standby and hot shutdown (modes 3 and 4) in that a containment sensing line plug, removed to install a test instrument, was not replaced following completion of the Integrated Leak Rate Test.

The calculated leakage rate from the sensing li'ne with the plug removed i

exceeded the limits allowed by Technical Specification.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - $30,000).

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Appendix A (Continued) !

B.

Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 requires that NRC be notified of certain events within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by telephone and with a written followup report within 14 days.

One event that requires reporting withing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is:

" Personnel error or procedural inadequacy wnich prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional i

requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR."

10 CFR 50.72 requires the notification of the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour by telephone of the occurrence of " Personnel error or procedural inadequacy whico, during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, or i

accident conditions, prevents or could prevent, by itself, the ful-fillment of the safety function of those structures, systems, and 1

components important to safety that are needed to (i) shut down the reactor safely and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (ii) remove residual heat following reactor shutdown, or (iii) limit the release of radioactive material to acceptable levels or reduce the potential for such release."

Contrary to the above, telephone notification was not made of the event described above in Item II.A and a written report was not submitted within 14 days.

The event was identified by the licensee on May 12, 1981, but was not reported to the NRC until July 15, 1981.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - $10,000).

I III. VIOLATIONS NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY A.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III and XVII require, respectively, that:

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" Design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design i

control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design."

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" Sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality."

Contrary to the above, a 1/2 inch valve and associated section of s

i piping on Unit 1 containment penetration CPN-30 was not subjected to design control measurec commensurate with those applied to the original design.

In addition, no records were maintained to furnish i

evidence of activities affecting quality.

l This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

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4 Appendix A (Continued) B.

Technical Specification 6.5.1.6 requires that the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee (PNSRC) be responsible for review of all procedures required by Technical Specification 6.8 and changes thereto.

Technical Specification 6.8 includes requirements to have surveillance test procedures.

Contrary to the above, surveillance test Procedure 12THP4030 STP.202, Revision 3, was changed in that the isolation valves for containment pressure transmitters PPA-310 and PPA-311, which were not addressed in the procedure, were closed during the Integrated Leak Rate Test with-out review by the PNSRC.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

C.

10 CFR 50, Appendix J, requires that Type C tests be performed during each reactor shutdown for refueling but in no case at intervals greater than two years.

Contrary to the above, the valve installation described in Item B above, which was installed prior to the last shutdown for refueling had not been Type C leak tested.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, American Electric Power Service Corporation is hereby required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation, including for each alleged violation; (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation; (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted; (3) the ccrrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.

Under the Authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, American Electric Power Service Corporation may pay the civil penalties in the cumulative amount of Eighty Thousand Dollars or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part by a written answer.

Should American Electric Power Service Corporation fail to answer within the time specified, this office will issue an Order imposing the civil penalties in the amount proposed above.

Should American Electric Power Service Corporation elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, such answer may:

(1) deny the violations listed in this Notice in whole or in part; (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances; (3) show error in this Notice; or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed.

In addition I

to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties.

Any answer in accordance with, 1

10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation

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Appendix A (Continued) in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate by specific reference (e.g., giving page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.

American Electric Power Service Corporation's attention is directed to the other provi-sions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.

Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due, which have been subsequently deter-mined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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[- f r S M ('

Richard C. DeYoung, Diredtor Office of Ins'.e'ction and' Enforcement p

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland j

this 30th day of December, 1981.

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