ML20041A259
| ML20041A259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1982 |
| From: | Jackiw I, Lanksbury R, Maura F, Reimann F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041A257 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-82-02, 50-373-82-2, NUDOCS 8202190336 | |
| Download: ML20041A259 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1982002
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-373/82-02
Docket No. 50-373
License No. CPPR-99
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Unit 1
Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois
Inspection Co
et
- January 5-8, 12-15, 19 and 20, 1982
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Inspectors:
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F. A. Maura
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Approved By:
N. Jackiv, Chief
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' Test Programs Section
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection on January 5-8, 12-15, 19 and 20, 1982 (Report No.
50-373/82-02)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection to review preoperational
test results and previous items of noncompliance and open items. The inspec-
tion involved 91 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 18
inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.
Results: Of the three areas inspected no items of noncompliance were
identified in two areas. One item of noncompliance was identified (failure
to take prompt corrective action - Paragraph 2) in the remaining area.
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8202190336 820205
PDR ADOCK 05000373
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- B. Stephenson, Project Manager
- R. Bishop, Assistant Superintendent
- W. Huntington, . Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- R. Kyrouac, Operations QA Supervisor
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including
members of the construction, quality assurance, technical and
operating staff.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview of January 20, 1982.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(0 pen) Noncompliance (373/81-28-01A) Failure to conduct proper evalu-
ation and review of test results. The inspector verified that the
licensee had prepared and dispositioned deficiency report SD-PS-101-181
to verify that all process sample system sensors were properly located
as required by the FSAR. This closes the process sample system portion
of this item. The inspector reviewed the standby liquid control system
portion of this item and noted that the required procedures had not been
issued. This portion of this item remains open.
(Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-28-01B) Failure to evaluate nuclear boiler
water level trip switch reset points. As reporte'. in Repe-t
No. 50-373/81-43, the inspector witnessed a special test of one of the
trip switches to verify that the physical construction of the switch
insures that the switch will always reset on the opposite side of the
trip point.
In response to this item, the licensee has initiated addi-
tional augmented reviews and evaluations of preoperational test results.
Additionally, reviews of selected tests by independent personnel will
be implemented. Based upon this and a recheck of the trip and reset
points performed by the licensee's Instrument Maintenance Department
and additional checks of the Nuclear Boiler System water level instru-
mentation that will be performed during the startup test program (STP-9,
Water Level Measurements) this item is closed.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (373/81-28-01C) Failure to correctly specify
the torque switch settings for safety related valves. The inspector
reviewed the work request (L10671) used to document the resetting
of the valves torque switch settings and noted that it only required
three of the four valves in question to be reset.
It is noted that in
the licensee's response (C. Reed letter to J. Keppler dated December 16,
1981) to Report No. 50-373/81-28 it was c;ated that the four valves in
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question were reset to the proper torque switch settings prior to the
exit interview. The licensee stated that if documentation could not
be provided to verify that the fourth valve (1VQ043) torque switch
setting had been correctly set, a new work request would be issued to
have it done. This item remains open pending the licensee providing
documented evidence that valve IVQ043 has the correct torque switch
setting.
(Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-28-01D) Failure to adequately evaluate
test results to assure that test requirements had been sati'sfied. The
inspector reviewed the licensee's response (C. Reed letter to J. Keppler
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dated December 16, 1981) to this item and noted that the licensee plans
to implement additional reviews of test results. The 1,icensee used Ii.EE
STD 450 (1976 and 1980) to justify taking data for every sixth cell in
,
lieu of every cell and reviewed the data subsequent to the time interval
for which no data was recorded to verify the battery charge was acceptable.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (383/81-28-10) Failure to establish adequate measures
to control the use of the " Motor Operator Data" (MOD) Book which prescribes
activities affecting quality. During inspection 373/81-28, the licensee
was cited for not establishing adequate measures to control the use of
the MOD Book. Part of this citation was for not having six valves in the
MOD book though they had been identified four months earlier by the test
engineer as missing. The inspector attempted to verify that the MOD Book
had been annotated, as stated in the licensee's response (C. Reed letter
to J. Keppler dated December 16, 1981) to Report No. 50-373.81-28, to
include the six valves (three for Unit 1 and three for Unit 2) that had
been missing. The licensee also stated in their response that they would
be in full compliance by January 4, 1982. The inspector noted that these
valves were still not entered in the book, but did find that a Field
Change Request (FCR), No. LO267, did exist to make the required change
to the MOD Book. A review of the FCR revealed that it had been initiated
on January 6, 1982 and concurred in by SNED on January 18, 1982. On
Janua ry 19, 1982, after discussion with the responsible test engineer,
the missing valves were entered in the MOD Book. Failure to promptly
and adequately correct a condition adverse to quality is considered a
violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI and is an example of
an item of noncompliance (373/82-02-01).
(Closed) Open Item (373/81-28-23) Testing of suppression pool bulk
water temperature monitoring. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.2.1
has been changed (dated October 28, 1981) and a note added at the
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bottom of the page requiring the results of the demonstration to be
submitted to the Commission within 90 days of completion. The
licensee currently plans to make the required demonstration during
the performance of the In-Plant S/RV Test which per LCO 3.10.8
must be completed prior to thermal power exceeding 60% of rated
thermal power. By Ammendment #59 to the FSAR, December 1981, the
requirement for measuring bulk water temperature has also been deleted.
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(Closed) Open Item (373/81-18-12) Service water pump cavitation problem.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for investigating, diag-
nosing and correcting the service water pump cavitation problem. The
licensee has concluded from their investigation that undesirable flow
patterns at the pump suction contribute to the hydraulic instabilities
and result from the suction-inlet water tunnel arrangement and the
proximity of approach shapes (90 bend, valve) to the pump suction.
In addition, the impeller design results in a tendency for hydraulic
instabilities at flows below the pump design flow. This low flow
hydraulic instability begins at about 90% of the Best Efficiency Point
(BEP) and becomes more severe as the flow is reduced. The licensee
also concluded that the hydraulic instabilities and associated vibra-
tion levels are not severe enough to warrant redesign of the impeller
or to consider installing anti-vortexing devices at the suction piping
flanged inlet.
The licensee is currently taking the following actions to reduce
potential damage to the service water pumps:
a.
Provide a high discharge pressure alarm to alert the operator to
pump low flow operation. Presently, there is a low discharge pres-
sure alarm to alert the operator to high pump flow or runout opera-
tion. These two alarms result in a recommended pump operating range
of about 11,000 to 19,000 gpm. Though operation within this band is
not required at all times, the licensee intends to stay within this
band as much as possible to minimize pump cavitation.
b.
Replace the existing bronze impellers with stainless steel impel-
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lers as impeller replacement becomes necessary or during convenient
pump maintenance activities. The licensee estimates an increased
impeller life of three to four times over that of bronze impellers
due to the greater cavitation resistance of stainless steel.
c.
A service water pump vibration monitoring and t ending program.
The licensee intends to monitor the service water pump vibration
semi-annually and will trend the results in order to determine if
pump servicing is required more frequently than planned.
d.
The pump vendor suggests installing a single, full-length, vertical
baffle in the suction reducer to help stabilize the flow. The
licensee intends to defer this installation until there has been
sufficient time to evaluate changes in impeller performance result-
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ing from the above actions.
(Closed) Standby Gas Treatment System Leak Rate Testing (373/80-25-16)
IE:HQ Resolution of this item (Re:
Inspection Report 50-373/80-49) is
that an initial leak rate test is required prior to fuel load, and that
periodic post operational leak rate testing is not required. The inspec-
tor reviewed the results of leak rate testing performed by Fluid
Engineering Services for the licensee's construction department, and
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the test results evaluation performed by Sargent and Lundy Engineers
.(the site architect engineer). As a result of this review, it was
determined that. leak rates for the Units 1 and 2 Standby Gas Treatment
Systems are within the requirements of Sargent and Lundy developed
acceptance criteria (from S&L Specification S-2583) and compatible with
acceptance requirements of ANSI N509 (1976)/ ANSI N510 (1975) and
ORNL-NSIC-65 (January 1970).
(Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-20-04A) Diesel generator's design does
not have the capability to supply reliable emergency power during peri-
odic testing of the diesel generators. The inspector verified that the
licensee has modified the logic circuitry of the IA, 2A and 0 diesel
generators bus feed breakers to allow on time tripping of the breakers
upon receipt of a LOCA initiating signal.
If normal A-C power is then
lost, all motor loads are shed, the diesel generator breakers reclose,
and the required loads are started automatically. The above modification
was satisfactorily tested during October and November 1981. Section 8
of the FSAR was corrected to reflect this modification by Amendment 59
submitted to NRR in December 1981 and has since been approved.
(Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-20-04B) The design for the load sequen-
cing for several safety related loads was not in accordance with FSAR
Table 8.3-1.
The inspector verified that Table 8.3-1 was corrected to
indicate as built conditions, submitted to NRR as part of FSAR amendment
- 59 in December 1981, and has since been approved by the NRC.
(Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-20-02) (373/80-25-10) Tests of the start-
ing air subsystem of the diesel generators did not demonstrate that the
system was capable of performing as stated in FSAR Section 9.5.6.1.1.
The inspector verified that FSAR Section 9.5.6.1.1 was corrected and sub-
mitted to the NRC as FSAR amendment #59 in December 1981 and has since
been accepted by NRR. The licensee has performed tests to verify that
the air start system of each diesel generator meets the FSAR require-
ments.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-28-27) Modified sections of pipe in IB
and 2B diesel generators subsystems did not meet code requirements
stated in FSAR Table 3.2-1.
The inspector verified that the sections
of pipe involved have been replaced per NCR #538.
(Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-28-28) Correct traceability was not
maintained for five items in the standby gas liquid control system and
one item in the drywell pneumatic system. The inspector verified that
the licensee took the corrective action stated in their letter (C. Reed
to J. Keppler) dated December 16, 1981.
3.
Preoperational Test Results Review
The inspectors reviewed the results of the following test procedures
against the prescribed acceptance criteria.
In addition, the licensee's
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test evaluation was reviewed for adequacy. These procedures were found-
satisfactory unless otherwise noted. Deficiencies which main unresolved
must be reviewed by QA prior to system release for operation. At that
time, all items which must be corrected prior to fuel loading will be
identified.
a.
SD-FW-101, Reactor Feedwater System Demonstration.
Unresolved deficiencies, Open Item (373/82-02-02).
b.
PT-HC-101, Reactor Building Crane Preoperational Test.
Unresolved deficiencies, Open Item (373/82-02-03).
4.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on January 20, 1982. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of
the inspection.
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The licensee acknowledged the statements by the inspectors with respect
to the item of noncompliance (Paragraph 2).
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