ML20040G344
| ML20040G344 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000025 |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1982 |
| From: | Brooks E, Brooks H, Cooley W, Thomas R, Zurakowski P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040G343 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0025-81-10, 70-25-81-10, 700025-81-10, NUDOCS 8202120191 | |
| Download: ML20040G344 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION V 70-25/81-10 Report No.
Docket No.
70-25 License No.
SNM-21 1
Safeguards Group Licensee:
Energy Systems Group
.Rockwell International Corporation Canoga Park, California 91304 Facility Name:
Headquarters Site and Santa Susanna Field Laboratory Inspection at:
Headquarters Site and Santa Susanna Field Laboratory Inspection conducted:
December 7-10, 1981 Inspectors:
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//7/ /r.2 W.J.Coeley,FglFacilitiesInspector Date Signed l
llP.R.Zurakowski,RadiationSpecialist
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A-Aate/ Signed
. Approved by :
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R. D. Thomas, Chief, Materials Radiation Protection Cate Signed Section Approved by:
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h H.' E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch Date Signed Summary:
Inspection on December 7-10, 1981 (Report No.' 70-25/81-10)
Areas Inspected: Modifications and changes to facilities and systems; internal review and audit; safety comittee activities; operations review; criticality safety; emergency planning; radioactive waste management; and radiation protection.
The inspection involved 52 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Resul ts: No items of noncompliance were identified within the areas inspected.
8202120191 820122 PDR ADOCK 07000025 C
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. G. Jones. Vice President and Controller, Finance and Administration
- M. E. Remley, Manager, Health, Safety and Radiation Services Department
- R. J. Tuttle, Manager, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Unit J. D. Moore, Health and Safety Engineer V. J. Schaubert, Manager, Nuclear Material Management Unit D. C. Allen, Staff Assistant, Nuclear Materials Management Unit R. L. Gonyier, Nuclear Material Control Associate I. R. Dominick, Vault Custodian J. H. Wallace, Associate Health Physicist F. H. Badger, Health Physics Representative D. R. Warner, Associate Engineer, Metallurgical Laboratory A. Montoya, QA Lab Analyist W. R. DeLozier, Technician M. M. Kluck, Physicist D. Velazquez, Jr., Reactor Component Welder J. F. Lang, Engineer in Charge, Bldg. 55
- Denotes persons attending the exit interview.
2.
Modifications and Changes.to Facilities and Systems a.
Building 001 Room 118-11 in Building 001 is beir.g decontaminated and remodeled for non-nuclear use. A detailed survey will be conducted after the decontamination work is completed in order to assure that the criteria for unrestricted use is met.
b.
Building 020 A great deal of modification and decontamination work is being performed in Building 020. The decontamination rooms in back of cells 1, 2 and 3 are being cleaned from their present 2
levels of 50,000 dpm/100cm2 to approximately 2000 dpm/100cm.
The service gallery with present contamination levels of approximately 1500 dpm/100 cm2 is being cleaned down to street clothes access levels. The equipment has been moved to the
" hot storage" area which is adjacent to the service gallery.
A special alpha. radiation glove box is being constructed for Cell #2 in which SEFOR and FERMI decladding work will be performed. This box will have triple air filtration (.one on the box, two on the cell) in order to qualify it for work with the plutonium bearing fuel rods.
A similar glove box is being used in Decontamination Room #4.
Two other glove boxes are in the planning stage and nay be constructed for future use in other cells. These glove boxes
2 will be operated in an inert atmosphere with provisions for remote manipulators so that they can be operated from behind the cell shielding.
At the present time, one assembly from the EBR-2 blanket is in storage in cell #4.
In conjunction with the decontamination and modification work, the work areas in front of the cells have been cleaned up and painted. Control panels have also been updated and painted, i
The overall impression is that the licensee will have a vastly improved work facility from both a safety and appearance s tandpoint.
It is anticipated that most of the work will be completed during the first quarter of 1982.
c.
Building 055 Building 055 at the present time employs one full time engineer (who is in charge of the building), one full time technician, and one half time health physicist. One of the plutonium glove boxes has been cleaned out and modified for other work.
At the present time, depleted uranium carbide from the surrounding blanket assembly of the FFTF is being oxidized daily on a batch basis.
In August and September some decladding work on fuel pins from EBR-2 was performed.
In general, the facility appeared clean and in good repair.
The criticality alarms and radiation monitoring equipment are maintained in working order and in calibration.
The half-time health physicist maintains a reasonable monitoring schedule to assure that spills from the mostly unused plutonium glove boxes do not go undetected.
Some low-level plutonium contaminated waste is being stored in the rear air lock. After gamma scanning, the waste will be sent to a DOE facility for reclamation or disposal.
Unless other work can be found for this facility, decommissioning is scheduled for 1983.
3.
Internal Review and Audit / Safety Committee Activities a.
Building 001
'lhis inspection included a review of the licensee's radiation safety reviews for the second and third quarters of 1981. A second quarter review in Building 001 at the DeSoto Avenue indicated a maximum individual external exposure of 200 mrem for the second quarter, 1981.
Forty-thrse persons were monitored and the average external exposure was 65 nrem.
flo positive indications of internal exposure were identified in 17 urinalyses
were in the range of 10-14 -(IVLC)10-d uCi/cc as compared to the and 21 in vivo lung counts Exhaust stack emissions unrestricted area concentration limit of 4 x 10-12 uCi/cc.
Liquid waste discharges were also far below the permissible level.
b.
Building 020 A report of a radiation safety review at Building 020, Santa Susanna Field Laboratory, indicated a maximum external exposure of 820 mrem (130 mrem average) for the 33 persons monitored, No bioassay samples were required.
Exhaust emissions were areas of Building ~ 020 was less than 3 x 10-gtivity for all well below regulatory limits. Ambient air uCi/cc.
Swipe 2
surveys indicated a removable alpha activity less than 50 dpm/100cm.
No radioactive' liquid waste was discharged during the second quarter,11981.
Athirdquarter,1981radiationsafetyreviewatBuilding020, Santa.Susanna,- iridicated a maximum external individual exposure of 500 mrem withian: average exposure' of Building 020 personnel
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for 3 individuals) ys_is bioassay samples (11 separate specimensindica of 51 mrem. -Urinal performed.. The maximum result for an' individual was 297 dpm per 1500 cc identified as' fission products.
Eighty-nine dpm per 1500 cc of that sample was identified as strontium-90 correspond-
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ing to approximately~18% of the body burden for strontium-90.
Subsequent urinalyses indicated a steady elimination of the activity to 34 dpm per 1500 cc on September 29, 1981. No NRC licensed material was involved. The licensee regarded this ninor exposure as nonreportable to the State of California.
I Third quarter,1981 airborne effluents at Building 020 were much less than the permissible concentration.
Eight hundred gallons of radioactive liquid waste were removed from Building 020 to the Radioactive Naterials Disposal Facility (RMDF) for processing, c.
Building 055 The radiation safety review for Building 055 during the 3rd quarter, 1981 indicated that ambient air samples were collected Average weekly at a weekly rather than daily frequency /cc as compared to a exposure results were 9 x '10-13 uGi hr permissible exposure of 6.9 x'10 22 uCi br/cc assuming the alpha activity was due to Pu02-Am-241 residues in glove boxes at that facility.
Individual external maximum exposure was 90 nrem with an average of 27 mrem for all personnel at that facility.
No oositive results were obtained in seven urinalysis samples for seven individual employees. Airborne stack emissions i
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4-were in the range of 10-15 _.10 16 uCi/cc as compared to permissible effluent concentrations of 6 x 10-14 uCi/cc.
No 1,iquid effluent was discharged from Building 055 during the 3r1 quarter,1981.
Criticality safety audits were conducted by the criticality cor. trol advisor in Building 055 on August 24, 1981 and in Building 001 on August 31, 1981. Those reviews covered all work stations in Building 055 and the fuel fabrication and storage areas in Building 001.
No problems with respect to criticality control were observed during those audits. A quarterly criticality audit was conducted at DeSoto Avenue and at Bldg. 055 at Santa Susanna during the 2nd quarter, 1981.
No problems with regard to criticality were observed during that audit.
d.
Other Safety Reviews and Audits A'n additional 11 criticality inspections were conducted by the criticality coordinator between September 3, 1981 and November 15, 1981. Those audits were addressed to adherence to criticality limits and posting at the DeSoto Avenue fuel fabricati6n facilities.
The licensee made annual reviews of five nuclear safety analyses since the last inspection. Those reviews included:
Production and Preparation of Enriched UAL, Powder, NSA-065-200-001 Fabrication of ATR Mark VII Fuel Elements, NSA-065-200-002 Fabrication of TRTR Fuel Elements, N262NSA000001 DeSoto Vault Storage and -Fuel Handling Areas, N262NSA000002 MBA20, N001NSA140004.
Additionally, an annual' review was made of the document, Operational Safety Plan for AI Decontamination and Disposition of Facilities Program SRR-704-990-001. The annual review of safety documents included the document, Radiation Safety Plan for UALx Fuel Fabrication, and the annual review of documents resulted in the issued revision of Radiation Safety Plan for Rockwell International Hot Laboratory-T0200490P000001.
In preparation for the decladding of Advanced Fuel Systems
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mixed oxideLp_ ins in Building.055, the licensee conducted a safety review meeting ~about July 18,~ 1981. A written operational safety evaluation of ths AFS was com. sted and approved on August 4, 1981.
The. nuclear safety analysis for the advanced n
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. fuel studies decladding work was completed and approved on August 13, 1981. Operating procedures for the advanced fuel studies decladding were completed and approved on August 17, 1981.
A meeting of-the Management Safety Committee was held on September 24, 1981.
4.
Operations Review This inspection included visits to all areas where licensed material is used or stored.
The areas visited were the Building 004 Hot Chemistry Complex, the MBA-41 Waste Storage Yard, and the following parts of Building 001:
(1) Powder Prep Room, (2). Room 118-11, (3) QA Laboratory, (4) Vault Area ~, (5) Sampling Room, (6) ATR Assembly Area, (7) Hot Roll Area, (8) Room 119-33C Assembly Area.
In addition, both Building 020 and 055 at the Santa Susanna Field Laboratory were toured.
One infraction of good health physics ~ practices was not.ed during the tour.
The incident involved a technician entering-the powder prep room with a cigarette in his mouth (smoki.ng"is not permitted 4
in this room). The technician was trying to get the attention of the Associate Health Physicist who was with the inspector.
The man did not proceed past the step off pad. After leaving the Powder Prep Room, the Associate Health Physicist immediately reported the infraction to the technician's supervisor and then thoroughly admonished the violator in the inspector's presence. The incident was handled properly in' accordance with the licensee's internal procedures.
No further action is planned by the NRC inspectors.
No violations of good criticality safety practices were noted during the tour.
Current criticality limit signs were observed in all areas where they were required.
Some specific points noted during the tour were:
(1) All sink drains in the Hot Chemistry Complex of Building 004 terminate in an isolated holdup tank. However, at the present time, no liquid radioactive waste is poured down the sinks.
All liquid waste is solidified and transferred to 55 gallon drums for disposal to a commercial low level disposal site.
(2) Two 1500 gallon holdup tanks adjacent to Building 001 were observed in apparent good condition.
It was learned that mop bucket water and other potentially contaminated water from the manufacturing process is transferred to these tanks.
The fill rate is approxi.mately one tank per month.
The water is analyzed by the responsible Health and Safety Engineer and released to the sanitary sewer if it meets Part 20 require-ments. All recent releases were in compliance with Part 20 regulations.
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. (3) The Powder Prep Room s'tep off pad and airlock is smeared daily. Within the r'oom, th action level where clean up must take place is 200 dpm/100cm alpha. The upper action level 2
where work must stop is 20,000 d /100cm alpha. A maximum monthly level of 12,500 dpm/100c was noted by the inspector on a "can opener". This was imediately cleaned up.
A Ludlum Model 177 Alpha Monitor was observed to be in current calibration and in operating condition.. A technician using supplied air was observed preparing to work on an arc melt furnace. An operating and c61brated alpha air monitor was noted nearby.
These instruments are checked daily with a standard U-235 source.
(4)
In the vault area,- the drum scanner was observed in good working _ condition.. It was learned that before the drum scanner'is used, it is calibrated with three standard drums containing known amounts of SNM.
Inside the vault an operating and calibrated radiation alarm was observed. A shipment of 11 drums containing SNM was observed in preparation for shipment to Union Carbide at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The drums were properly labeled and appeared to be in very good shape.
No significant rust spots, dents or holes were observed on any of the drums.
(5)
In Room 119-33, both hot roll and cold roll operations were observed by the inspector. The operation was being conducted with skill and safety awareness by the technicians in the area.
5.
Emergency Planning The licensee conducts emergency drills at a frequency of once per year in each building in which fissile material is used pursuant to the subject license.
Similar drills are conducted in exempt facilities at the Santa Susanna Field Laboratory which are under the jurisdic-tion of the D0E. These drills are unnannounced except to assigned observers. Each drill is conducted according to a preplanned scenario.
Except for the initial sounding of an alarm, the scenario is carried out by means of strategically placed signs, each furnishing additional information regarding the emergency.
Critiques are held following each drill and recommendations for correction and improve-ment are recorded along with assigned actions for correction and improvement.
a.
Building 020 A drill was conducted at Building 020, Santa Susanna Field Laboratory (SSFL), on January 16, 1981'. The scenario involved a postulated sodium fire in a glove box located in decontamina-tion cell No. 4.
The' drill was initiated by activating a heat sensing device and was continued by the use of signs indicating
- . audible airborne activity alarm; stack emission alarm; radia-i -
- tion level alarm inside. cell No. 4; indication of sodium' fire in glove box with loss of glove box integrity; and postulated difficulty in extinguishing the fire.
The critique noted difficultiesiin' radio communication during the drill and the use of-an incorrect e'xtinguisher applied to sodium fire.
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- b.
Building 055 O
A drill involving Bullding 055 (SSFL) was conducted on February 12, 1981. The scenario was' initiated by ~ activating radiation and fire alarms in the glove box room of that building. The scenario included a postulated fire, love box damage, spread g
of contamination, and employee injury.
The critique of the drill noted a number of adverse observa-tions including the failure of the radiation warning signal (siren) after 30 seconds of operation; the retreat of the Health Physics technician member of the. reentry team when he (erroneously) determined that his SCBA unit air supply was depleted. The postulated injured employee's head was permit-
. ted to tilt forward while being transported; delay occurred in establishing a road block near building 055; additional respirator and protective clothing (booties) were required by the reentry team at the building entrance; and the reentry l
team had radio communication problems.
c.
Building 004 A drill at Building 004, DeSoto Avenue site, was initiated on May 14, 1981. The drill was initiated by actuation ~of the.
siren fire alarm. Due to a previous error in alarm system j
wiring the siren signal was introduced into the public address system and alerted personnel in Building 001, guard post #3, and the Health Physics office at DeSoto Avenue. At that. point in time it appeared to employees that simultaneous emergencies i
had occurred in Buildings 004 and 001.
Both buildings were evacuated. The emergency coordinator, having tripped the Building 004 alarm, realized the Buildi_ng 001 alarm might be a true emergency. He thereupon terminated the Building 004
. drill and treated the Building 001 as a real emergency.
d.
. Building 001' An emergency drill was conducted at Building 001, DeSoto Avenue, on May 21, 1981.
The Los Angeles Fire Department was requested to attend, and several members to the battalion f
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level attended as observers. The firemen presented a number of cogent questions regarding protective equipment, radio communication, radiation detection instrumentation,. personnel accountability. -reentry team composition, and the potential for a spread of contamination. The que-tions were answered by u licensee representative of the Prote tve Services Department who escorted the L. A. Fire Department p lonnel.
The. scenario for the drill involved an expiosion and fire in a fissile material glove box resulting in emmoyee injuries.
Also postulated was the activation of the spdnkler system resulting in spread of contamination. in the ims itate area.
e.
Building 022 An emergency drill was conducted on November 24, 1981 in the vicinity of Building 022 at the SSFL. Building 022 is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the D0E. A drill scenario involved radioactive liquid waste spill from a fork lift truck resulting in a radiation alarm actuation.
It was postulated that during the evacuation an employee ran through the spill causing serious contamination of his shoes.
l The drill critique cited the requirement of better communication between Protective Services and the health physics representatives and better leadership by the Building 022 management. The critique noted that the " contaminated" employee should have been monitored sooner by the available health physics technician.
It also noted that the, Building 022 air monitor was not checked and that the visitor's log book had not been removed upon evacuation of the building for purposes of personnel accountability.
f.
Drill Resolutions As stated above in this report,'the various recommendations appearing in emerg'ency. exercise critiques are assigned for resolution. According to a licensee l representative, all those matters have been satisfactorily addressed. The only outstand-ing matter is the radio comunication difficulties experienced at the SSFL. The licensee has retained engineering consultants and it appears that the difficulties are the result of electro-magnetic shielding offered by the building structures. The solution appears to be the installation of multi-directional antennae at each building.
6.
Radioactive Waste Management The MBA-41 Waste Storage Yard was visited as part of this inspection.
Approximately 200 drums and four large boxes were observed in
_9 storage.
It was found that most of the waste is associated with old DOE contracts. Some of the drums have been in outside storage for many years. The licensee was prohibited from disposing of the waste by DOE until it could be shown that recovery of the SNM was uneconomical. The recovery experiments by DOE have now been concluded and disposal has been authorized.
The inspector observed that in many of the drums the corrosion process, which appeared to be proceeding from the inside of the drum, had left small holes approximately one half inch in diameter.
Wipe checks have shown no significant removable radioactive contamination.
At the time of the inspection, three men were observed in the yard moving and repackaging some of the~ drums. The inspector was informed that, where possible, the contents of badly corroded drums would be placed into other drums.
When this' was not possible, " recovery drums" would be used.
In these cases, the entire corroded drum is placed into a larger recovery drum.. The inspector was assured by the Manager of the Nuclear Material Management Group that no highly corroded drum would be shipped without undergoing one of the above repackaging techniques.
It was, disclosed by the Associate Health Physicist in charge of the storage yard that 154 drums ~were scheduled to be shipped to DOE's Hanford^ Disposal Site on' December' 15, 1981.
It appeared to the inspector that the corrosion and disposal problems were being solved adequately by the -licensee.
7.
Radiation Protection This inspection included a review of contamination surveys made from January through November 9,1981. Action limits assigned to 2
contamination levels require clean up at 20 ppm /100cm in noncontrolled areas and outside glove boxes; 200 dpm/100cm on floors of cogtrolled areas; and immediate shutdown and cleanup at 20,000 dpm/100cm at any location.
a.
Survey Data The review of contamination surveys indicated contamination was experienced primarily in the powder preparation room in Building 001.
Survey records indicated floor contamination levels within the controlled area ranging from 100 to 2
approximately 800 dpm/100cm2 A maximum of 8000 dpm/100cm was discovered on a work bench and safe cart top in the ATR powder preparation room. A level of 9,000 dpm/100cm2 was found on the floor of the down draft hood in that area.
Areas adjacent to the powder preparation room (cold side of step-off pad and adjacent corridors) consistently /100cm2 indicated less than 20 dpm/100cm2 alpha and less than 50 dpm beta-gamma activity.
The plate rolling and adjacent quality 1
control areas, etch room, and fissile material vault in Building 001 indicated essentially no contamination.
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' Contamination surveys are conducted weekly in controlled areas and daily at points adjacent to controlled areas including building corridors.
b.
Bioassay Data The licensee's bioassay program includes in vivo lung counts.
On October 21, 1981, 21 persons were counted by an independent laboratory.
A maximum indication of lung deposition was 62 + 41 micrograms U-235. A reevaluation of the maximum permissible lung burden was made by the licensee due to change in the U-234 content of.his starting fissile material. That MPLB is presently 246 micrograms U-235.
c.
Nonreportable Incident On October 12, 1981, the pressurization of a glove box occurred in the powder preparation area due to failure of a pressure / vacuum solenoid.
The pressurization resulted in contamination external to the box to a maximum of 1100 dpm per 100cm2 alpha. Airborne contamination as measured by. lapel air samplers indicated a maximum of 7.x 10-9..uCi br/cc resultfng in a calculated weekly exposure to an individual of 4 x 10
.uCi hr/cc. That exposure extrapolated over the' calendar quarter amounted to 30% of the
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maximum permissible concentration. The individual indicating that maximum exposure by lapel air samol.er participated in the in' vivo. lung. count of October 21,.1981. His lung count (two counts)sindicated 40 + 33 micrograms U-235 and 51 + 36 micrograms U-235c This matter was regarded as a nonrepiirtable incident.
d.
Radia+ ion Moditoring Reports Radiation ' exposure histories were repo,rted to individual employees and to the NRC Director, lianagement and Program Analysis for 24 terminations ending about November 2, 1981, e.
Training Emoloyee training on the Advanced Fuel Systems decladding project procedures was given on August 13, 1981.
A record was made of attendance by name, social security number, and department i
number.
8.
Management Interview The scope and results of this inspection were discussed with manage-ment representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on December 10, 1981.
Those persons were informed that no itens of noncompliance with NRC regulations were identified within the scope of this inspection.
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