ML20040F522
| ML20040F522 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1982 |
| From: | Leddick R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Faulkenberry B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, GO3-82-101, NUDOCS 8202090295 | |
| Download: ML20040F522 (6) | |
Text
Docket Nos. 50-508/509 50 55(e) Report Washington Public Power Supply System Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206)482-4428 Docket Numbers 50-508 and 50-509 January 29, 1982 m
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V Q
Office of Inspection and Enforcement 9A 1
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u Attention: Mr. B. H. Faul kenberry Chief, Reactor Construction Projects Branch
Subject:
PROJECT NOS. 3 AND 5 FINAL REPORT OF P0TENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e)
STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS - UNIT N0. 3 (D/N #019 and 021)
Reference:
Letter, G03-81-2756, dated November 17, 1981, R. S. Leddick to B. H. Faulkenberry, Final Report of Potential 10CFR50.55(e)
Structural Steel Connections - Unit No. 5 (D/N #019).
In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), Region V was notified on January 28, 1981 of a potentially reportable deficiency (D/N #19) con-cerning the erection of structural steel and associated documentation for both Units 3 and 5.
A final report, for Unit 5 only, was forwarded to your office by the referenced letter.
Attached is the Supply System approved final report for Unit 3 which pro-vides a description of the deficiency, an analysis of the safety implica-tions and corrective actions taken.
Based on this evaluation, it is con-sidered that the deficiencies (Reported as D/N #19) would adversely affect the safe operations of the plant and, therefore, are reportable as required by 10CFR50.55(e).
The attached report also addresses a related potential 10CFR50.55(e) (Re-ported as D/N #21) concerning a structural connection in which two bolts were found loose.
It appears that the bolts were deliberately tampered with by an unknown individual (s).
Based on an Engineering evaluation it is considered that this deficiency would not adversely affect the safe operations of the plant and, therefore, is not reportable as required:by 10CFR50.55(e).
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Mr. B. H. Faulkenberry Page 2 Should you have any questions or desire'further information, 'please contact me directly.
R. S. Leddick (1000)
Program Director, WNP-3/5 DRC/tt Attachment cc:
J.' Adams NESCO-WO/A D. Smlthpeter - BPA-WO/A Ebasco - New York-WO/A WNP-3/5 Files - Richland-WO/A
STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS - UNIT NO. 3 (D/N #19)
LOOSE BOLTS - MALPRACTICE (D/N #21)
ABSTRACT This report addressed the finding of documentation and hardware deviations in the structural steel connections in the WNP-3 Reactor Auxiliary Building.
A reinspection of all visible bolts was performed by the erection contractor and the results of this reinspection were used to prepare a statistical analy-sis. This statistical analysis along with calculations of the design stresses in the bolts was used to justify acceptance of the "AS-BUILT" condition of the bolts which were not accessible for reinspection.
All structural steel erection documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to field conditions.
All contractor construction and engineering supervision, and quality control personnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoctrination on structural steel erection and inspection requirements.
The hardware deficiencies discovered during the reinspection will be repaired, reworked, or used-as-is in accordance with the recommended dispositions of the NCR's. This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
The deficiencies reported as D/N #19 constitute both significant breakdowns in Morrison-Knudsen's quality assurance program and significant deficiencies in construction as defined by 10CFR50.55(e).
The deficiencies reported as D/N #21 are not significant nor reportable as de-fined by 10CFR50.55(e).
A.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CONCERN On January 21, 1981, Morrison-Knudsen Co. (M-K), the erection contractor of the structural steel for the Reactor Auxiliary Building, issued a Stop Work Order preventing any further bolting, welding, and erection of structural steel by their employees. On the same date M-K issued a Corrective Action Request which described the conditions which must be met prior to lifting the Stop Work Order.
The Stop Work Order and CAR were initiated based on the viscovery, by the on-site NRC inspector, of numerous docuinentation and hardware inconsistencies in the bolted connections of structural steel mem-bers.
The CAR required that the following three actions be performed prior to lifting the Stop Work Order.
1.
All accessible structural steel bolted and welded connections in both units are to be examined to verify conformance to drawings, specifica-tions, etc.
2.
All QC structural steel permanent plant documented records shall be verified for acceptability and conformance to actual field conditions.
Page 2 A.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CONCERN (Continued) 3.
To preclude recurrence, all construction, QC, engineering and super-visory personnel involved with structural steel erection shall re-ceive documented training and indoctrination in structural steel erec-tion and inspection requirements.
The reinspection performed per Item 1 of the CAR discovered:
1.
Fifteen (15) co'nnections with loose bolts.
2.
Two (2) connections with missing bolts.
3.
Two (2) connections with A325 bolts installed instead of A490 bolts.
4.
One (1) connection with two (2) A307 bolts installed instead of A325 bol ts.
5.
Thirtr five (35) connections with bolts having unsatisfactory projec-tion.
6.
Fourteen (14) connections with miscellaneous hardware deficiencies in-cluding improper plate washers over slotted holes, lack of contact be-tween faying surfaces, minor damage on the structural member, incorrect
. washer size, etc.
The review of the documentation records performed per Item 2 of the CAR dis-covered four hundred and eight (408) Unit No. 3 structural steel connections which had documentation errors and/or inconsistencies. The documentation errors and/or inconsistencies included 1) errors in bolt count, 2) lost or nonexistent documentation and 3) miscellaneous errors on documentation.
As a result of the inspections and verifications performed per Items 1 and 2 of the CAR, M-K generated three NCR's for Unit 3 and six NCR's for Unit No. 5.
The deviations discovered in Unit No. 5 were addressed in a separate report dated October 31, 1981 and sent to the NRC on November 17, 1981.
In addition, a Quality Finding Report was issued by Ebasco against M-K on February 23, 1981.
The QFR identified a connection in which two bolts were discovered to be loose.
The bolts were deliberately tampered with by un-known individual (s).
This item has been identified as D/N #21.
The items of concern were as follows:
1.
Since hardware deficiencies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary to reinspect all connections to determine the extent of the problem and the repair and/or rework activities necessary to ensure that the bolting materials and completed connections meet drawing, spe-cification and code requirements.
2.
Since documentation errors, inconsistencies, and inadequacies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary to reinspect all con-nections and review existing documentation to establish a package of com-plete and accurate documentation.
Page 3 B.
ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY IMPLICATIONS D/N #19 The reported documentation and hardware deficiencies were so numerous and extensive that taken as a whole they constitute both significant breakdowns in Morrison-Knudsen's quality assurance program and significant deficiencies in construction. The reported deficiencies would have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant and, therefore, are "significant and reportable" as defined by 10CFR50.55(e).
D/N #21 The QFR identified a condition in which 2 bolts in the 4 bolt connections of pipe chase hanger 146S to beam 397B were loosened after placement of con-crete in the pipe chase slab.
Calculations were made by ESSE to determine the maximum expected load on this hanger.
This load was compared with the AISC allowable tension load for the two remaining 7/8"$ A325 bolts.
This comparison shows that the hanger could safely carry the expected design load with 2 of the 4 bolts removed.
This deviation in construction and quality assurance, were it to have re-mained uncorrected, would not have adversely affected the safety of opera-tions of the plant and, therefore, is not reportable as defined by 10CFR50.55(e).
C.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN The following Corrective Actions concern D/N #19:
All visible bolts were reinspected for conformance to drawing, specification, and code requirements.
All structural steel erectian documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to field conditions.
All contractor construction and engineering supervision, and quality control personnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoctrination in structural steel erection and inspection requirements.
The results of the reinspection were used, to prepare a statistical analysis.
The statistical analysis indicated that:
1.
Of the 18,326 bolts not accessible for reinspection the expected number of deficient bolts varies from 51 to 95 for a 99% confidence level and 57 to 90 for a 95% confidence level and 2.
Of the 296 connections not reinspected, the highest probability of having at least one deficient bolt occurs at one connection, and the highest probability of having two or more deficient bolts occurs at zero connec-tions.
Page 4 C.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN (Continued)
This statistical analysis along with bolt stress calculations for forty-five (45) representative bolted connections and stress calculations for the typical pipe chase connections were used to justify acceptance of the "AS-BUILT" condition of the bolts which were not accessible for reinspec-tion.
Fifteen (15) of the seventeen (17) connections with loose or missing bolts will be reworked by tightening all of the bolts in the connection to the proper torque.
The other two connections will be repaired by first tight-ening the accessible bolts to the proper torque and then fillet welding the accessible portion of the clip angle to the connecting member.
This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
De two connections which have been erected with A325 bolts instead of the equired A490 bolts will be repaired by fillet welding the clip angles on
+4e beams to the columns.
The one connection which had two (2) A307 bolts
- stalled will be reworked by replacing the A307 bolts with A325 bolts.
This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
The thirty-five (35) connections with bolts having unsatisfactory bolt pro-jection and the fourteen (14) connections with miscellaneous hardware deft-ciencies will either be used-as-is or reworked in such a manner as to make the bolts and connections conform to the drawing, specification and code requirements.
This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
The following corrective / preventive Action: concern D/N #21:
The two loose bolts in the connection identified by the Quality Finding Re-port will be reworked by tightening the bolts to the proper torque. This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
Morrison-Knudsen Craft were issued impact and torquing equipment from a con-trolled tool crib enabling only authorized personnel the right to withdraw tools.
Morrison-Knudsen QC personnel were required to complete a final " walk through" just prior to concrete placement to preclude the possibility of loose bolts in a connection and the tampering of those connections.
All dismantling required written notification from Construction to the Quality Assurance department.
A Corrective Action Request (CAR) was issued and resulted in significant changes to M-K's structural steel erection and inspection programs.
The results of Morrison-Knudsen's reinspection showed no evidence of malprac-tice.
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