ML20040F020
| ML20040F020 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1982 |
| From: | Caruso R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kay J YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040F021 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6425-1, TASK-07-02, TASK-7-2, TASK-RR LSO5-82-02-007, LSO5-82-2-7, NUDOCS 8202080215 | |
| Download: ML20040F020 (4) | |
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February 1,1982 l
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Docket No. 50-29 LS05 02-007
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f 7i 1982&- g Mr. James A. Kay Senior Engineer - Licensing
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Y' N TTTr,S Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingha:n. Massachusetts 01701
Dear fir. Kay:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC VII-2. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) SYSTEM CONTROL LOGIC AND DESIGN, SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT, YANKEE R0WE is our Contractor's technical evaluation of this topic for your plant. Enclosure 2 is the staff's safety evaluation report. is based on Enclosure 1.
These reports have been modified to reflect the coments provided by your November 24, 1981 letter.
The staff finds the electrical isolation of ECCS' logic meets current licensing criteria.
Sincereit, Ralph Caruso, Project Manager Operating React % s Branch No. 5 bpQ Division of Licerving
Enclosures:
'i As stated'
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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 024o OFFiClAL RECORD COPY usam i.u-a.=
o YANKEE R0WE Mr. James A. Kay e
Docket No. 50-29 cc Mr. James E. Tribble, President Yankee Atomic Electric Coapany 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Greenfield Community College 1 College Drive Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301 Chairman Board of Selectmen Town of Rowe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Facilities Siting Council 14th Floor One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 1 Office ATTN: EIS C0ORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Resident Inspector Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC Post Office Box 28 Monroe Bridge, Massachusetts 01350 l
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VII-2 YANKEE ROWE TOPIC: VII-2. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) system control Logic and Design I
INTRODUCTION 4
During the staff review of the Safety Injection System (SIS) reset (issue; i4 in NUREG-0138) the staff detennined that the Enginneered Safety Features Actuation Systems (ESFAS) at both PWRs and BWRs may have design features that raise questions about the independence of redundant channels, the interaction of reset features and individual equipment controls, and the interaction of the ESFAS logic that controls transfers between on-site and off-site power sources. Review of the as-built logic diagrams and schematics, operator action required to supplement the ESFAS automatic i
act' ions, the startup and surveillance testing procedures for demonstrating ESFAS performance appeared to be required.
Several specific concern.s exist with regard to the manual SIS reset feat-ure following a LOCA. They are: (1) If a loss of offsite power occurs after reset, operator action would be required to remove normal shutdown cooling loads from emergency bus and re-establish emergency cooling i
loads. Time would be critical if the loss of offsite power occurred within a few minutes following a LOCA. (2) If loss of offsite power oc-curs after reset, some plants may not restart some essential loads such as diesel cooling water. (3) The plant may suffer a loss of ECCS delivery for some time period before emergency power picks up the ECCS s'ystem. It was also decided to review the ESF system control logic and design, in-cluding bypasses, reset features and interactions with transfers between onsite and offsite power sources.
Since these decisions were made in early 1977, the staff's plans for re-solving these issues have changed. Two generic reviews of the diesel l
generator problems have been conducted by Inspection and Enforcement.
The second review includes consideration of bypasses and resets. In ad-dition. Task Action Plan Generic Task B-24 is involved with reset and by-pass concerns. Accordingly, this SEP Topic has to be modified to reduce duplication of effort.
As a result of the staff's review of the scope of the several related generic efforts and the other SEP Topics, it was decided that the only area that had not been covered was the independance of redundant logic trains. Independence might be compromised by sharing input signals and-the use of conunon controls such as mode switches, reset switches, and logic test facilities.
II. REVIEW CRITERIA The current licensing criteria are presented in Section 2 of EG&G Report EGG-EA-5725, "ESF System Control Logic ant'. Design".
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III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of
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effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics. The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.
Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.
III-6 Seismic Qualification III-ll Seismic Qualification
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III-12 Environmental Qualification IV-1.A Operation with Less than All Loops in Operation VI-4 Bypass and Reset of Engineered Safety Features (B-24)
VI-7.A.3 ECCS Actuation System VI-7.B ESF Switchover from Injection to Recirculation VI-7.C.1 Independence of Onsite Power VI-7.C.2 Failure Mode Analysis-ECCS VI-7.C.3 The effect of loop isolation valve closure on ECCS performance VI-7.0 Long Term Cooling Passive Failures (e.g. flooding)
VI-7.F Accumulator Isolation Valves VI-10. A Testing of Reactor Protection Systems VI-10.8 Shared Systems VII-1.A Reactor ^ Trip System Isolation VII-3 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown VIII-2 Emergency de Power Systems
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VIII-4 Electrical Penetrations IX-3 Ventilation IX-6 Fire Protection The conclusion that suitable isolation devices are provided is a basic assumption for Topics VI-7.C.2 and VII-3.
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REVIEW GUIDELINES l
The review guidelines are presented in Section 3 of Report EGG-EA-5725.
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EVALUATION A description of the isolation devices employed.in Yankee Rowe and a comparison with current design criteria are presented in Report EGG-EA-5725.
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CONCLUSION As a result of our review of our contractor's work the staff concludes that outputs from the Yankee Rowe ECCS logic conforms to current licensing criteria for electrical isolation of redundant safety features. Accord-ingly, the staff considers SEP Topic VII-2 to be completed.
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