ML20040B904
| ML20040B904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, Columbia, Diablo Canyon, San Onofre, Humboldt Bay, Rancho Seco, Washington Public Power Supply System, Satsop, Trojan |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1981 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19297C884 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-81-326 801121, NUDOCS 8201260558 | |
| Download: ML20040B904 (1) | |
Text
.
po %eoq'o
\\
J UNITED STATES
! '., Y,%
NUCLEAR REGULAlORY CCMMISSICN 2
~/ i REGiCN V h
k.# [
1990 PJ. CALIFORielA ECULEVARD
..s 'i" e SUITE 202. W A LfJUT C*M E N Pt.s2.1 WAL? JUT CREEK. CAllFcarg:A cac;G flovember 21, 1980
- 'OTE TO: ALL THOSE C.'i IE 3'JLLETIN CISTRI;*JTIC:' LIST FROM:
IE, REGION Y
SUBJECT:
IE BULLETIfl f!0. 80-24, "PREVENTIC'i 0F D.aMAGE DUE TO WATER LEAKAGE INSIDECOMTAINMEllT(0CTOBER 17, 1980 INDIAN' POINT 2 EVENT)"
The attached IE Bulletin flo. 80-24 was issued this date to the folloving licensees:
1.
Arizona Public Service Company (Palo Verde 1, 2 & 3, Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529 & 50-530).
2.
Pacific Gas & Electric Ccmpany (Humboldt Bay Unit 3, Dia'olo Canyon Units 1 & 2, Docket Nos. 50-133, 50-275 & 50-323) 3.
Portland General Electric Company (Trojan, Docket No. 50-344).
4.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco, Docket No. 50-312).
5.
Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Units 1, 2 & 3, Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361 & 50-362).
6.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WNP-1, WNP-2, WNP-3, WNP-4 &
WNP-5, Occket Nos. 50-397, 50-460, 50-508, 50-509 & 50-513).
Region V has made distribution to the Accessions Unit for the PDR, LPDR, NSIC and TIC.
Enclosures:
1.
Transmittal Letter 2.
l i
8201260558 811002 PDR FOIA JEWETT81-326 PDR
/
g
f* *.' %es UNITED STATES E I,"
- /
NUCLEAR RECULATOR'l CCMM!SS!CN 7,. AC.,M. 7, i
.n ;;on v 3, (Ab.[4 / [
1"lCO ?J. CALIFOR.*JIA 3 3ULIVARD h, *
-(" [
- UITY 02. *!Al! JUT CREEK P'.AZA 4AL::UT C*iiE:f, CAL!F"9?llA 9459G
- !ovem'er 21, 1930 o
Docket ::os. 50-523. 50-529, 50-530 Ari:Ona Public Service Comoany P. O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Attention:
Mr. E. E. Van Brunt. Jr.
' lice President, fluclear Projects Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin ilo. 80-24 wnich is transmitted for inforination with regaro to your nuclear power facility.
Should you have any questions regaroing tnis oulletin, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
.. c. 5.
, m.., *
~~
R. H. Engelken Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Bulletin flo. 80 24 2.
Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/ enclosures:
F. 'l. Hartley, APS JD 91 o ) 1/
e, y
./
Qh e
m
SSIfiS f!o. :
6220 Accession I'c.:
8008220270 IEB E0-24 U:!I~ED STATES OFFICE OF IhSPECTICM AllD Ef!FORCFMENT
'dASHIMGTC:1, D.C.
20E55 Y/aM ar 21, 1.T.
IE Bulletin fio. 80-&
PREyr1TIPF OF DM4GE CUE TO '.!ATER LEAKAGE INSIDE CONTAliiMENT (GCTCBER 17, 1980 IllDIAti POI!!T 2, EVENT)
Description of Circumstances:
On October 24. 1980 IE Information tiotice fio. 80-37 described an event that cccurred at the Indian Point Unit 2 (IP-2) facility.
On October 17, 1980, upon centainment entry for repair to a nuclear instrument, it was discovered that several inches of water had accumulated on the containment ficor without the coerators' knowledoe.
This accumulaticn was later oetermineo to have amounted to over 100,000 gallons which flooceo tne reactor vessei pit and wetted the' icwer nine feet or the reactor vessel while the reactor was at cperating tempera ture.
The flooded condition resulteo from the following comoination of conditions:
(1) There were significant multiple service water leaks from piping and fan coolers onto the containment floor.
This system had a history of leakage; (2).Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses and the other due to binding of its float switch; (3) The significance of two containment sump level indicating lignts which indicated that the water leve! was continuously above the pump-down level was not recognized by the operators; (4) There was no high water level alarm and the range of sump level indicating lights failed to indicate the overflowing sump level; (5) The moisture level indicators for the containment atmosphere did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently due to an error in calibration and/or ranging which made them insensitive to the moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (6) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the containment sump also received water from other sources (Unit 1 process water, lab drain water,'etc).
These other water sources masked the effect of cessation cf water flows frcm the Unit 2 sump; (7) The fan cooler condensate wier level measuring instruments were not properly calibrated; (G) There was no water level i.nstrumentation in the reactor vessel pit and the pumps were ineffective since they discharge to the containment floor for ultimate removal by the containme'nt sump pumps.
This Bulletin is issued to enable the NRC staff to formulate requirements for long term generic corrective actions which will be the subject (s) of future NRC actions.
The bulletin requires short tenn actions which will preclude IP-2 type events at other. plants in the interim before the longer term generic actions are acccmplished.
(.
- ~E ~0-2a "overcer 21, ice 0
~cca : cf 3 Acticns to be TaPen bv Licensees:
1.
P-avide a :"- n y dese 4-' ira c' - 9a* ccolino water systems pre' rent irrica --
's'---et.
v ur daterd t
-e e'
4
'"? cccliro weter systems rust inclute:
fa) "cd3 of oceration curino crutine reactor ncaration and in res:ctse to e Lera: (51 F^urce c' mter and tvoical chenical centent of water; (c) 'aterials usec in nind-c ard coolers: (d) Excerience with system leakaoe; (e) Histcry anc tyoe of reca7rs to coolers ano pioino systems (i.e., replacement, weld, braze, etc.); (f) Provisions for isolating portions of the system inside containment in the event of leakage including vulner-ability of those isolation orovisicns to single failure; (g) Provisiens for testina inclation valves in accorcance with Accendix J to 10 CFR 50 (h) Instr r.:ntation f oressure. cnw co1nt. flew, radiatien detecticn, etc.)
and procecures in place to oetect leaxace; ano (i) Provisions to detect radicactive contamination in service water cisenarge from containment.
2.
For plants witn open ccoiing water systems insioe containment take the folicwing actient:
a.
Verify existence or provice recunaant n:eans or detecting ano pronptly alertina contro: room opera ors of d significant accumulation of water in centainnent (including tne reactor vessei pit if present).
b.
Verify existence or provide cositive means for control room operators to deternine.~ low frcm coacaim. enc sump (s) used to collect and remove
'cfa t?P 11'06i COntai dShnt.
c.
Verify or estaalian at ieasc moacoiy surveillance procedures, with acprouriate operating limitations, to assure plant operators have at 1 +ast t.;o methods of deterninic.g water level in each location where water r:ay accumulate. The surveillance procedures shall assure that at least one method to remove water from each such location is available during I.0,;er operation.
In the event either the detection or removal systers toccme inoperable it is recermended that continued power operaticn be limited to seven days and added surveillance measures be instituted.
- d. Peview leakage detection systeris and procedures and provide or verify ability to promptly detect water leakage in centainment, and to isolate
' the leaking ccmponents 'or system.
Periodic containment entry to inspect
- An Open system utilizes an indefinite volume, such as a river, so that leakage frcm the systen could not be detected by inventory decrease.
In addition, a direct radioactive pathway might exist to outside containment in the event of a LOCA simultaneous with a system leak inside containment.
A closed system utilizes a fixed, ronitored volume such that leakage from the system could be detected frnm inventory decrease and a second boundary exists to prevent loss of containment integrity as a result of a system leak inside containment.
IEB 80-24 Mcvs.?ber 21, 1980 Papa 3 of 3 for leakuts should be considered.
e.
Beginninn within 10 days of the fate of this bulletin, whenever the reacter is ocaratinc and until *
- rsesures descrihac in (a) threunh (d) abese ar? imolinented, ccnduc' interin surveillance reasures.
The measuras shall ir.clude where oractical (considering containrent atmosehere ar.d AL?.:A censiderations) a cericdic containment insoection or remote visuai surseillance to check for water leakage.
If containment entry is impractical during operaticn, perform a centair. ment inspection for water leakage at the first plant shutdown for any reason subsequent to receiot of this bulletin.
f.
Establish crecedures to notify the NRC of any service water system leaks witnin containment via a soecial licensee event recort (24 hcurs with written report in 14 days) as a cegradaticn of a containment boundary.
3.
For olants with closea cooling water systens ins 1de containment orovide a summary of experiences with cooling water system leakage into containment.
4.
Provide a written report, signed under oath or affirmation, under the provi-sions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in response to the above items within 45 days of the date of this bulletin.
Include in your report where applicable, your schedule for completing the actions in response to itans 2 (a) thrcugh (d).
Ycur response should be sent to the Director of the appropriate Regional Office with a copy lorwarded to the Director, MRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
20555.
If you desire additional information regarcing this matter please contact the appropriate IE P.cgional Office.
Approved by GAO, BI80225 (R0072); clearance expires !!ovember 30, 1980.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
E e
9 W