ML20039F133
| ML20039F133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000754 |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1981 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0866, NUREG-866, NUDOCS 8201120033 | |
| Download: ML20039F133 (60) | |
Text
.
NUREG-0866 The Effects of Natural Phenomena on the General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center at Pleasanton, California f*%
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NUREG-0866 The Effects of Natural Phenomena on the General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center at Pleasanton, California 1
Docket No.70-754 ateIu shed ee be 1981 Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
/
SUM 14ARY DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION Part 70 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 70) defines and enumerates the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) policy and procedures for the issuance of licenses for possession and use of special nuclear material (SNM).
Implicit in Sections 70.22 and 70.23 of 10 CFR 70 is a requirement that existing plutonium fabrication plants be examined with the objective of improving, to the extent p ra cticab le, their abilities to withstand adverse natural phenomena without loss of capability to protect the public.*
In accordance with these regulations, the Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety (the staff) of the NRC initiated an analysis of the effects of natural phenomena at the GE VNC.
Following completion of the analysis, the staff has prepared a condensation of the effects of natural phenomena on the facility.
The condensation, published herein, is based on information contained in or derived from the following reports, or in literature referenced in the follow-ing reports:
T.T. Fujita.
" Review of Severe Weather Meteorology at General Elec-tric Company, Valle.citos, California." The University of Chicago, report submitted to Argonne National Laboratory under Contract No. 31-109-38-3731, 31 May 1977.
" Seismic Risk Analysis for the General Electric Plutonium Facility, Pleasanton, California - Part I."
TERA Corporation, Berkley, CA, report submitted to Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 31 July 1978.
" Final Report Seismic Risk Analysis for General Electric Plutonium Facility, Pleasanton, California - Part II."
TERA Corporation, Berkeley, CA, report submitted to Lawrence Livermore Labo ra to ry,
27 June 1980.
" Assistance in Hydrologic Aspects - Analysis of the Effects of Natu-ral Phenomena on Existing Plutonium Fabrication Facilities - Valle-citos."
Transmitted by memorandum from L.G. Hulman of USNRC/ DSE to R.W. Starostecki of USNRC/FC, 29 June 1978.
" Description of the Site Environment - The General Electric Valleci-Los Site."
Transmitted by letter from L.C. Rouse of USNRC/FC to G.E. Cunningham of General Electric Company, 18 January 1980.
- " Statements of Consideration," 10 CFR 70; and 36 FR 17573, 2 September 1971.
iii
J. Mishima and L.C. Schwendiman, Battelle - Pacific Northwest Labo-ra to ry, and J.E. Ayer, USNRC.
" Identification of Features Within Plutonium Fabrication Facilities Whose Failure May Have a Signif-icant Effect on the Source Term."
24 April 1978.
K.C. Mehta, J.R. Mcdonald, and D.A. Smith.
" Response of Structures to Wind Hazard at the General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California." Texas Tech University, Institute for Disaster Research, Lubbock, TX, January 1980.
E.E. Endebrock.
" Seismic Evaluation of Building 102 of the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center."
Los Alamos Scientific Labora-tory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 23 October 1979.
D.W. Pepper.
" Calculation of Particulate Dispersion in a Design-Basis Tornadic Storm from the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California."
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.,
Savannah River Laboratory, Aiken, SC, prepared for the U.S. Dept. of Energy under Contract DE-AC09-76SR00001, DP-1543, November 1979.
J. Mishima and J.E. Ayer; I.D. Hays (ed.),
" Estimated Airborne Release of Plutonium from the 102 Building at the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California, as a Result of Postulated Damage from Severe Wind and Earthquake Hazard." Battelle -
Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-3601, December 1980.
J.D. Jamison and E.C. Watson.
" Environmental Consequences of Pos-tulated Plutonium Releases from General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California, as a Result of Severe Natural Fhenomena."
Battelle - Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-3683, November 1980.
J.W. Johnson.
" Risk Analysis of Postulated Plutonium Releases from the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, Califor-nia, as a Result of Tornado Winds and Earthquakes."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 September 1981.
This summary is derived from the condensation and the above-listed reports.
THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF NATURAL PHENOMENA ON THE GENERAL ELECTRIC OPERATIONS IN BUILDING 102 In this summary of the probable effects of damage to the GE VNC by torna-does and earthquake, the consequence of damage is expressed as dose to several human receptors.
Although dose from the more important pathways was consid-ered, almost all the dose contribution comes from plutonium inhalation during cloud passage and resuspension of deposited material.
The highest dose to organs of interest accrues to lungs and bone.
Therefore, the dose is expreseed in terms of the 50-year committed dose to lungs and bone from inhalation.
The most-likely 50-year committed dose to the nearest resident f rom the most-severe tornado considered is 0.9 rem to lungs and 1.3 rem iv
to bone.
This consequence is caused by a tornado with a wind speed of 103 m/s and probability of occurrence of 1 x 10 8 per year. The most-likely value of 50-year committed dose to the population within 80 km (50 mi) of the plant from the same event is 54 000 person-rem to lungs and 80 000 person-rem to bone.
When this most-severe tornado occurs, the most-likely doses occur roughly 80% of the time, and there is also a probability that higher doses will occur. The highest calculated 50 year doses to the population within 80 km are 770 000 person-rem to lungs and 1.1 million person-rem to bone.
These highest doses occur roughly 0.3% of the time.
These dose and occurrence-rate estimates, derived from Table 17 (p. 41), have a factor of roughly 10 uncert.:inty either way (with about 90% confi-dence).
Hence, the quoted numbers should not be interpreted as being precise--not even to one significant figure--but should be regarded as indicating values only of about an order of magnitude.
The most-likely 50 year committed dose to the nearest resident from damage caused by the most-severe earthquake considered is 5.1 rem to lungs and 7.6 rem to bone.
That earthquake has an annual occurrence rate of about 7x 10 4 and also causes a most-likely 50-year com-2 mitted dose to the population within 80 km (50 mi) of the plant of 4000 person-rem to lungs and 5200 person-rem to bone. These most-likely doses occur roughly 90% of the time.
The highest 80-km calcu-lated doses are 26 000 person-rem to lungs and 38 000 person-rem to bone, which occur roughly 0.3% of the time.
These numbers, like those given above for severe winds, have only an order-of-magnitude precision and, hence, should be interpreted as being quite imprecise.
To put the consequence f rom wind and earthquake hazard in perspective:
if a worker is exposed for 50 years to the maximum permissible concentration of 239Pu under present limits, at the end of that time he would have the maximum permissible body burden and would have received a d(se commitment to bone of 750 rem.
This compares with a 50 year dose commitmt it of 1.3 rem to bone, to the nearest resident, from wind hazard that is most likely to occur in the case of the most-severe tornado evaluated, and 7.6 rem to bone of that same resident in the case of the most-severe earthquake evaluated.
In the case of population dose from these events, the most likely 50-year committed dose to bone of the population within 80 km (50 mi) of the plant is 80 000 person-rem from the tornado and 5200 person-rem from the earthquake. The 50 year col-f lective dose equivalent to the total body from natural-background radiation, to the same population, is estimated at 30 million person-rem.
Thus, the most-likely population dose to bone from the most-severe tornado or earthquake hazard is less than 0.3% of the total-body dose from natural-background radi-ation.
Of course, there are unlikely events that result in significantly
?
greater doses, as described earlier. The unlikely events causing the greatest doses have probabilities that are reduced by a factor of roughly 300 compared with the most likely event.
2 The doses that result from facility damage due to severe weather and earthquake, when multiplied by the occurrence rate for the initiating event, yield the yearly risk.
(Risk, as defined here, is the statistical average consequence.
It should be recognized that many other definitions can be used for " risk," some of which incorporate public aversion to high-consequence accidents.)
v
The greatest risk from the severe weather considered is attributed to the tornado with a 103-m/s wind speed.
The most-likely radiological risk to the population within 80 km (50 mi) of the GE VNC from this event is estimated to be 0.4 person-mrem /yr to the lungs and 0.7 person-mrem /yr to bone.
This compares with an absolute risk of about 600 million person-mrem /yr from natural-background radiation to the total body of the same population.
Similarly, the most-likely radiological risk to the resident nearest the GE VNC from the 103-m/s tornado is about 7x 10 6 mrem /yr to the lungs and I x 10 5 mrem /yr to bone.
From natural-background radiation the nearest resident receives an annual dose rate of 120 mrem /yr to the total body. The above comparisons are conservative in that they all neglect that the consequence component of risk from natural phenomena is the 50-year dose commitment, whereas from natural-background radiation it is the annual dose.
The most-likely radiological risk to the populacion within 80 km (50 mi) of the GE VNC from the most-severe earthquake considered is about 2.3 person-rem /yr to the lungs and 3.0 person-rem /yr to bone.
The nearest resident would risk 2.9 mrem /yr to the lungs and 4.3 mrem /yr to bone from the same event. As discussed above, the consequence term of risk is the 50-year dose commitment.
The staff also analyzed the site from the standpoint of hazard due to flooding.
Although Building 102 is not menaced by natural floods, the threat of damage exists as a result of failure of the Lake Lee Dam during a probable maximum flood (PMF).
The risk associated with the dam-failure flood was not determined, but an annual probability of 10 6 to 10 7 was ascribed to the PMF as not unreasonable.
Any estimate of radiological dose caused by accident is dependent on, among other things, the inventory of radioactive materials in the affected area.
In the analysis summarized here, the areas of concern were assumed to contain kilograms of dispersible plutonium-bearing mixtures and compounds.
Between the time the analysis was started and the date of issue of this report, License No. SNM-960 was amended to revise the authorized possession limit to 500 g of plutonium and terminate plutonium processing and -fabrication activ-ities.
Consistent with the reduction in possession limit, the ceramic-line, scrap-recovery, and nitrate-conversion glove boxes are being removed and decontaminated.
In the light of current activities, the relatively small risk to the public from the effects of natural phenomena based on past inventories and operations is greatly overstated.
RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL PilENOMENA ON THE GENERAL ELECTRIC VALLECITOS NUCLEAR CENTER One of the aims of the ana' lysis is to examine the plant with the objec-tive of improving, to the extent practicable, its ability to withstand adverse natural phenomena without loss of capability to protect the public. The rela-tively small risk to the public from the unlikely events previously discussed would indicate that the public is not seriously threatened by the presence of Building 102 of the GE VNC.
Any potential for damage to structures due to the threat of flood caused by dam failure during a PMF can be averted by removal or strengthening of the Lake Lee Dam.
Thus, it is the judgment of the staff that the benefits to be gained by substantial plant improvements to further mitigate against adverse natural phenomena are not cost ef fective.
vi
CONTENTS Page iii
SUMMARY
viii LIST OF FIGURES.
ix LIST OF TABLES 1.
INTRODUCTION.
I I
1.1 Preface I
1.2 Technical Analysis 2
1.2.1 Severe-Weather Event 2
1.2.2 Earthquake 2
1.2.3 Flood 1.3 Results 2
5 2.
SITE CHARACTERIZATION.......................
5 2.1 Severe-Weather Meteorology.
5 2.1.1 Straight-Line Winds 6
2.1.2 Tornado Frequencies 8
2.1.3 Summary and Conclusions 8
2.2 Seismic Analysis...........
8 2.2.1 Calaveras-Hayward-San Andreas Results 10 2.2.2 Postulated Verona Results 11 2.3 Hydrologic Analysis 12 2.4 Ecological Character.
12 2.4.1 Topography and Land Use 13 2.4.2 Regional Demography
. 14 2.4.3 Flora and Fauna 16 2.4.4 Climatology and Meteorology 20 3.
STP.UCTURAL ANALYSIS..
20 3.1 Areas of Concern.
20 3.2 Structural-Condition Documentation.
21 3.3 Response of Structures to Natural Phenomena 21 3.3.1 Wind Hazard........................
25 3.3.2 Seismic Hazard 31 3.3.3 Flood Hazard...
31 4.
SEVERE-WEATHER DISPERSION...
31 4.1 Tornado Structure 4.2 Dispersion in a Tornadic Storm.
33 35 5.
RELEASES 36 6.
DOSE TO MAN.............
36 6.1 Environmental Exposure Pathways for Plutonium 36 6.2 Radiation-Dose Models for an Atmospheric Release vii s.
Ar#
CONTENTS Page 6.3 Radiation Doses 39 l
6.3.1 Earthquakes 39 6.3.2 Tornadoes 40 6.4 Discussion..
40 42 7.
RISK ANALYSIS 46 REFERENCES FIGURES N*-
1 Flow Diagram for Severe-Weather Aspects of Analysis 3
4 2 Flow Diagram for Seismic Aspects of Analysis 3 GE VNC Site and Vicinity 5
4 Cumulative Number of Tornadoes as a Function of Distance from 6
the GE VNC Site 5 Probabilities of Straight-Line and Tornado Winds vs. Wind Speed.
7 6 Return Period vs. Peak Acceleration at the GE VNC Due to Ea rthquake on the Calaveras, llayward, or San Andreas Fault 9
7 Return Period vs. Peak Acceleration at the GE VNC Due to Earthquake on the Postulated Verona Fault.........
10 8 Return Period vs. Rupture Displacement for the GE VNC Due to Earthquake on the Postulated Verona Fault..
11 32 9 Schematic Diagram of Tornada Model DBT-77.
33 10 Pressure Field Inside the Model Tornado 11 Maximum Ground-Level Centerline Air Concentration from 35 Initialization Point in Storm 12 Significant Potential Exposure Pathways Through Which People May Be Exposed from an Accidental Release of Plutonium 38 13 Complementary Cumulative Distribution for Dose to Lungs of 43 Population Due to Damage from Tornadoes 14 Complementary Cumulative Distribution for Dose to Lungs at the Nearest Residence Due to Damage from Tornadoes 43 15 Complementary Cumulative Distribution for Dose to Lungs of 44 Population Due to Damage from Earthquake 16 Complementary Cumulative Distribut. ion for Dose to Lungs at l
44 i
the Nearest Residence Due to Damage from Earthquake
TABLES No.
Page 14 1 Population Distribution Around the GE VNC in 1980.
2 Annual Average Relative Concentrations 17 16 3 Five Percentile Short-Term Relative Concentrations 4 Fif ty Percentile Short-Term Relative Concentrations 18 19 5 Centerline-Centerpoint Concentrations...............
19 6 Dimensions of a Particulate Cloud.
7 Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleration up to 0.1 g 27 8 Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleration Between 27 0.1 and 0.4 F.
9 Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleration Between 28 0.4 and 0.8 g.
10 Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleration Greater than 0.8 g.
29 29 11 Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement up to 0.15 m..
29 12 Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement Between 0.15 and 0.3 m 13 Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement Between 0.3 and 1.5 m 30 30 14 Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement Between 1.5 and 2.7 m...
15 Source Term Estimates for Building 102 at the GE VNC as a 37 Result of Wind and Seismic Hazard.
39 16 1sotopic Composition of the Plutonium Mixture 17 Fif ty-Year Committed Dose Equivalents from Inhalation Following 41 Severe-Wind and Earthquake Events 18 Best-Estimate Maximum Plutonium Deposition at Significant 41 Locations 42 19 Phenomena Probability and Associated Uncertainties 20 Risk to Nearest Resident and Nearby Population from Postulated 45 Damage Due to Natural Phenomena ix
THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL PHENOMENA ON THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY VALLECITOS NUCLEAR CENTER - BUILDING 102 AT PLEASANTON, CALIFORNIA 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 PREFACE 1 The regulations that establish procedures and criteria for the issuance of licenses to possess and use (and, thereby, fabricate) special nuclear mate-rials (SNM) are contained in Title 10 Part 70 of the Code of Federal Regula-tions, commonly denoted as 10 CFR 70.
In part, 10 CFR 70 describes the content of license applications and supporting documents and requirements for approval of applications and issuance of licenses. Due to a change in the regulations that became effective on 2 September 1971, applications for licenses to possess and use SNM in a plutonium fuel fabrication plant are required to contain a description and safety assessment of the design bases of the principal struc-ture, systems, and components of the plant, including provisions for protection against natural phenomena. Therefore, facilities for which the license appli-cation was filed after 2 September 1971 must be designed to provide protection against natural phenomena. This was not a requirement for facilities of this type that were licensed earlier.
Specific address to the problem of existing facilities and protection against the ef fects of natural phenomena was contained in the required pre-amble to the rulemaking that became effective on 2 September 1971. The State-ments of Consideration stated that existing licensed plutonium fabrication plants would be examined with the objective of improving, to the extent practi-cable, their abilities to withstand adverse natural phenomena without loss of capability to protect the public.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards has started the exami-j nation of existing licensed plutonium fabrication plants.
This summary describes the analyses that support the examination and conclusions reached relative to plutonium operations at the General Electric Company (GE)
Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) at Pleasanton, California.
1.2 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
Experts in the fields of seismology / geology, surf ace hydrology, normal-and severe-weather phenomena, structural analysis, source-term characteriza-tion, meteorological dispersion, demography, ecology, and radiological impact have been engaged in the analyses.
These experts, assembled in teams, have
2 reviewed the facility and provided a realistic assessment of the range of credible conr,equences of natural phenomena and the likelihood thereof.
1.2.1 Severe-Weather Event The site has been described with respect to credible severe weather.
Tornado frequency of occurrence by Fujita scale on a historic, statistical basis constitutes the basic input to the review process.
Severe-weather characterization includes recurrent high-velocity nontor-nadic winds that can have more serious consequences than tornadoes in the event of breach of confinement.
Severe-weather characteristics are translated into transient and steady-state forces for application to structural analysis that determines the response of structure and confinement to storm-induced forces.
Source terms and estimates of rate of release and quantity of mate-rial available for dispersion are estimated for each postulated breach of confinement.
Analysis of dispersion, airborne concentration, and deposition by and from severe weather is coupled with demographic and land / water-use data to permit assessment of radiological impact of releases.
Figure 1 is a graphic depiction of the input / output information flow from reviewer to reviewer in the analytical chain associated with the determination of the consequences of the severe-weather event.
1.2.2 Earthquake For the seismic event, ground motion at the plant foundation is provided as input for the structural and component analysis. Response of the structure and confinement to seismic forces has been determined.
For the event of breach of confinement, a description of the expected damage was prov'ided to an expert on aspiration and levitation of heavy-metal compounds who estimated the rate of release and quantity of material available for dispersion. A meteo-rologist estimated deposition and airborne concentrations, which--when coupled with demographic and land-and water-use data--permitted an assessment of the radiological impact on man and his environment.
Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the flow of information that took place during the review of the consequences of seismic events.
1.2.3 Flood The site has been described from the standpoint of the surface hydrology and topography.
Probable-maximum-precipitation and probable-maximum-flood i
values were determined.
On finding that there was no threat to structures from natural floods, no further analyses were made.
1.3 RESULTS The completed work provides a description and safety assessment of the design of the principal structures, systems, and components of the plant with respect to its ability to withstand the effects of natural phenomena. The i
i L
3 For Each Recurrence Interval Estimate Wind Speed Characteriestion of High in Upper Cloud Layers Character-Velocity, Non Tornadic ~
Vs. Height & Energy ization Winds & Their Return Dissipation Rates W/in Intervals Storm Cell i
Recurrence Interval Vs.
Max. Wind Speed, Radius of Max. Wind & Max. AP/At For Tornadic Winds Structurb -
Analysi t
Bldg. Response; Roof, Wall, Frame, Glove Box,
& Mechanical System Damage W/ Estimate of Error Bands t
Source Term t
o Duantity, Rate & Characteristics of Releases From Structures: Wet h,",'t er
& Dry Deposition Velocities; Meteorology Height (Location) of Releases Wind Rose, Site & Environs Tornadic Climatology, Wind Stability, Dispersion Short-Term Meteorology Data, Avg. Annual X/Q & Conc.of f
Airborne Material Ground Level Centerline Concentration Vs. Downwind
[
Distance & lime, Concentration Demography Width Profiles Vs. Distance &
Trajectory of Pollutant Cloud t
i Site Description, Ecology g,3, Local & Distant Demography, r
I Calculation
& Land Use Patterns i
Dose to Max. Individual / Population Via Direct Exposure, Estimated Potential Environmental Contam-instion, Estimated Potential Dose to Max. Individual / Population Via Indirect Exposure Vs. Event Recurrent Interval Figure 1.
Flow Diagram for Severe-Weather Aspects of Analysis of the Effects of Abnormal Natural Phenomena on Operating Plutonium Fabrication Facilities.
4 eismic Character-Dwerview iration f
1 Recurrence Interval Vs.
Y "g Value to Bedrock & Plant Maintain Uniformity Foundation, Time History of of Treatment of Seismic, Acceleration, & Site Hydrologic, & Severe Ground Period Weather Event r
Structural Analysis Bldg. Response Major Cracking, Collapse: Glove Box
& Mechanical System Damage W/Estimateof Uncertainties Source Term Quantity, Rate & Characteristics of Releases From Structures, Wet Demography r
Meteorology
& Dry Deposition Velocities,
& Point of Release Wind Rose' Site & Environs
(
V'h iculatio Short Term & Annual Avg. Meteorology l
te esc i Dose Climatology, Wind Stability
,g, g
't D
orp
& Land Use Patterns Data, Avg. Annual X/0,& Conc.of Airborne Material Dosa to Max. individual / Population i
l Via Direct Exposure, Estimated Potential Environmental Contamination, l
Estimated Potential Dese to Max.
Individual /Pupulation Via indirect Exposure Vs. Event Recurrence Interval l
Figure 2.
Flow Diagram for Seismic Aspects of Analysis of the Effects of Abnormal Natural Phenomena on Operating Plutonium Fabrication
[
Facilities.
5 results include an assessment of the consequences to the public and the envi-ronment of exposure of the plant to potentially damaging natural phenomena.
This analysis is a part of both the safety assessment and the environmental review that nornially precedes a licensing action.
This is consistent with both Part 51 and Sections 10 CFR 70.22 and 10 CFR 70.23 of the regulations that establish procedures and criteria for the issuance of licenses to possess and use SNM.
The analysis and results provide a basis for determining the modifications, to the extent practicable, necessary to improve the existing plant's ability to withstand adverse natural phenomena.
2.
SITE CHARACTERIZATION 2.1 SEVERE-WEATHER METEOROLOGY 2 The GE VNC is located in the west-central portion of the State of Cali-fornia about 25 km (15 mi) east of the southern end of San Francisco Bay.
It lies on the north side of the Vallecitos Valley, as shown in Figure 3.
The geographical coordinates are 37 37' N Lat. and 121' 50' W Long. Both straight-line winds and tornadoes are considered in arriving at wind-hazard probabili-ties for the site.
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g.
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Figure 3.
4 GE VNC Site and Vicinity.
k (Contour lines and eleva-k
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tions of selected locations are given in feet MSL.)
- T77, N
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(1000 ft =
300 m; 10 mi g
cn#
16 km.)
0
=
4 FREMONT
' \\,
.nio 9
- y%
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T,F % A AL 2.1.1 Su n ght-Line Winds For straight-line winds, the probabilities were determined by combining the observation years for the period 1950-1975 at four stations: Oakland, San 1
Francisco City, San Francisco Airport (normalized to the city), and Stockton.
)
6 For the 86 observation years the annual extreme wind speed of the fastest-mile wind was 22 m/s (49 mph), occurring at the Oakland station in 1953.
The maximum fastest-mile winds occur in cold months, October through February, when California experiences precipitation in advance of cyclones from the Pacific. The fastest-mile wind speed of the year has not been recorded in the j
month of August. The fastest-mile wind speed of 13 m/s (30 mph), or a corre-sponding peak gust of 17 m/s (38 mph), occurred in every year but one in the period of record.
Wind speeds of peak gusts are higher than those of the fastest-mile winds because the duration of the peak gust is considerably shorter than that of the fastest-mile wind. The peak gust is defined as 25%
greater than the fastest-mile wind speed.
In about half the years of the 86 observation-year record, fastest-mile windspeeds greater than 17 m/s (38 mph) and corresponding peak gusts of 21 m/s (48 mph) were posted.
2.1.2 Tornado Frequencies During the 26 years, 1950-1975, 29 tornadoes were reported to have occurred within 230 km (144 mi) of the GE VNC site. The average frequency was 1.1 torna-does per year regardless of tornado site or intensity.
Because of the proxim-ity of the site to San Francisco Bay and the Pacific Ocean, increasing distance from the facility encompasses proportionately larger water surface.
In recog-nition of this, the numbers of tornadoes vs. distance from GE VNC have been prorated to show the tornado frequency as if the entire area within any range of the site had no water areas.
Figure 4, which is based on data from the National Severe Storms Forecast Center (NSSFC), shows the distribution of tornadoes vs. distance f rom the GE VNC for both actual and prorated cases.
/
Figure 4.
so N, = 0.0025 R' U ame Numb of knadoes (Woter creo prorof ed )
as a Function of Distance from
[ /,
/
the GE VNC Site.
(Based on 29
./
p tornadoes on the NSSFC tape --
1950-75.)
(100 mi = 160 km.)
r 10
--/, *.
\\ = 0.0018 R' N
g y/
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
- 20 14 0
- PAh6E sh MILES
7 With a mean damage path of 22 of the tornadoes on the NSSFC tape with 2
2 known path characteristics of 0.026 km (0.01 mi ) per tornado, the estimated 2
2 total damage area for the 29 reported tornadoes is 0.75 km (0.29 mi ).
The probability of any point within a radius of 230 km (144 mi) experiencing any tornado damage is 2.52 x 10 7 per year.
Reported tornadoes since 1950 were used to compute tornado-hazard probability. The recommended probabilities are i
shown in Figure 5.
The figure shows tornado-hazard probabilities as a function of wind speed.
l 10 0 59 too ISO 200 250 mph k
STRAIGHT-LINE WINDS 1 o'.
48 STATES PEAK GUST from (SELS LOG 8955 -72) l o
Figure 5.
A E
Probabilities of Straight-m Line and Tornado Winds vs.
ic '
N_$
Wind Speed.
(The proba-
{
bility of straight-line i="
gusts is higher than that of tornadoes at wind io"
--A\\
speeds less than 100 mph.
\\
Above 100 mph, the prob-N
{@
~
{j ability of tornado winds exceeds that of straight-10' g
g line winds.)
(100 mph
= 45 m/s.)
10-*
C
\\ 's'Do%
l TORNADOES i
10"
'4 +
10-'
The Damage Area Per Path Length (DAPPLE) method was used to compute the tornado-hazard probabilities within given distances of the GE VNC site.
Practically no surveys for DAPPLE are available for California tornadoes, so DAPPLE values obtained from 174 Midwestern tornadoes in the "superoutbreak" of 3-4 April 1974 were used to represent the California tornadoes. The use of
.8 these values overestimates the damage areas because Midwestern tornadoes are usually larger than California tornadoes. However, the degree of~overestima-tion of DAPPLE values may be offset by the effects of low reporting efficiency that results from factors such as the weakness of California tornadoes and' relative lack of public awareness. A 160-km (100-mi) radius was selected for assessment of the tornado risk applicable to the GE VNC site.
2.1.3 Summary and Conclusions Results of the foregoing computations of wind-speed probabilities are summarized in Figure 5, which includes three curves applicable to the GE VNC:
(1) Probability of fastest-mile wind speed, (2) Probability of peak gust (assumed to be 1.25 times the fastest-mile wind speed), and (3) Tornado probability within the 160-km (100-mi) range.
The fourth curve shows the probability of peak gust wind speeds for all 48 conterminous states, for purposes of comparison.
The figure reveals that the speeds of straight-line winds are higher than those of tornado winds when the probability is greater than about 5 x 10 6 per year.
Tornadoes become important when the probability decreases below 10 6 3
2.2 SEISMIC ANALYSIS
'4 A detailed two part seismic-risk analysis of the GE VNC site at Pleasanton, California, has been completed. The first part presents the seismic hazard at the site that results from exposure to earthquakes on the Calaveras, Hayward, and San Andreas Faults, and from smaller unassociated earthquakes that could not be attributed to these specific faults.
The second part presents the seismic hazard at the GE VNC due to the postulated existence of a capable Verona Fault.
To ensure credible results, sophisticated but well-accepted techniques were employed in the analysis..The calculational method that was used has been previously applied to safety evaluations of major projects.
2.2.1 Calaveras-Hayward-San Andreas Results The historical seismic record was established after a review of available literature, consultation with cperators of local seismic arrays, and examina-tion of appropriate seismic-data bases including those of the U.S. Geological Survey, the University of California, and the National Earthquake Information Service.
Input to the probabilistic seismic-risk assessment is comprised of earth-quake occurrence frequency relations, attenuation functions, and specification of local source regions. Earthquakes in the source region containing_the site dominate the risk at the site; thus, particular attention was directed to the i
validity of the statistics associated with this region.
Paramount to the seismic analysis is the specification of attenuation or decay of peak acceler-ation with distance from the earthquake. Therefore, an attenuation relation
9 was developed that considered data in the range of 20 to 100 km (12 to 60 mi) to estimate the far-field attenuation, data at about 10 km (6 mi) to fix near-field trends, and data within 10 km to establish very-near-field acceler-ations. These input data were used to calculate, for circular sections within each source region at the site, the expected annual number of earthquakes producing accelerations greater than a specified value for each source region.
The expected numbers are summed for each region and the resulting risk calculated.
Uncertainties in the input were explicitly considered in this analysis.
For example, allowance was made for uncertainty in predicting the maximum-possible earthquake in each source zone, the magnitude of the data dispersion about the mean acceleration-attenuation relationship, and the recurrence relation for the source region containing the site.
The results of the first part analysis of the risk from earthquake, which include an estimate of the uncertainties, are expressed as return period vs.
acceleration in Figure 6.
The best-estimate curve indicates that the Valleci-facility will experience 0.30 g every 130 years and 0.60 g every 700 years tos from earthquake on the Calaveras, Hayward, or San Andreas Fault. The bounding curves roughly represent one-standard-deviation confidence limits about the best estimate, reflecting uncertainty in certain portions of the input.
ame s
e V
./
l GAY,!
t l
/
vs
/-
/
/
/
?
/ /
/*
- Figure 6.
Return Period vs. Peak Accelera-e mo -
, /
/
Lion at the GE VNC Due to Earth-l
/ f' f quake on the Calaveras, llaywa rd,
j
_ ///
or San Andreas Fault.
E
/4/
///
W
.l l 1,
W E
E e
N e
M E
PE AK ACCELERATION (% g)
10 2.2.2 Postulated Verona Results The second part of the analysis considers two types of loads imparted by the postulated Verona Fault: vibratory loads and rupture-displacement loads.
In both cases the results are expressed in probabilistic terms; that is, force or offset vs. likelihood of occurrence.
As in the first part, input to the probabilistic seismic-risk assessment of ' vibratory ground motion is comprised of earthquake occurrence frequency relations, attenuation functions, and specification of local source regions. However, historic data descriptive of the seismicity of the sources are incomplete, inaccurate, and of short time span.
Therefore, the analysis was based on geological, as well as seismolog-ical, data to increase the reliability and predictability of the seismicity.
A Poisson model was used to describe earthquake occurrence on each source and a Bernoulli trial was used to model information on magnitudes. An attenuation relation that emphasized the response of embedded structures and focused on the near-source environment was used. Combining the effect of all earthquake sources to arrive at a probability distribution function was the final analyt-ical step. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 7.
The occurrence of peak accelerations exceeding 0.3 g and 0.6 g may be associated with return periods of 2000 and 60 000 years, respectively. Also shown in the figure is an estimate of the plus-and-minus-one standard deviation about the best esti-mate of return period vs. horizontal acceleration.
1" 1'
/
fn55r
/
/
/
/
/. L j '//s
- =
i
- f
/
/
h Figure 7.
f Return Period vs. Peak Accelera-l'"
j tion at the GE VNC Due to Earth-g
//
,/j quake on the Postulated Verona FaulL.
y
~
jI
/j i
I
//
- !)
u u
u u
u u
o 51 A< HOR 120f 4T AL ACCELERATKyd (g)
.,n.
11 The proximity to Building 102 of several shears suggests a possible risk due to fault rupture.
Therefore, a fault-rupture hazard analysis was made.
Detailed knowledge of the fault and fracture pattern in the immediate vicinity of the site did not exist, so a general assessment was made through a ' study of the fault-rupture hazard associated with the adjacent postulated Verona Fault.
The general approach was similar to that used in assessing ground motion hazard.
Each fault system was divided into.a series of segments of equal seismicity.
Earthquake. occurrences within each segment were treated as Poisson-Bernoulli processes.
The random occurrence of all events from each fault was combined with a fault rupture model to develop a probability distri-bution of surface displacement for any point. on the fault. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 8.
The best-estimate return period associated with a maximum displacement exceeding 1 m (3 ft) is 19 500 years. The corres-ponding annual exceedence probability is 5 x 10 5 Also shown in this figure is an estimate of the plus-and-minus-one standard deviation about the best-estimate curve.
2.3 HYDROLOGIC ANALYSIS 5 Building 102 at. the GE VNC would not be flooded by either of the two adjacent tributaries during an occurrence of a probable maximum floo<1 (PMF) s.a.m
/
./
s/
/TNn
/
,.t /
,' i s' 1'
I r r s-I/ /t /
\\
/ / V Figure 8.
5 I
e
'//-
N
///
l Return Period vs.
Rupture Dis-D placement at the GE VNC Due to
/ I/
Earthquake on the Postulated j
'(/,
i 1
i Verona Fault.
[
//
j i
i
/
.=
=
=
D15PL ACEMENT (CM)
12 unless Lake Lee Dam fails.
Potentially, several centimeters of water could accumulate at the entrance to the basement from overland flow during an occur-rence of the local probable maximum precipitation.
Flooding to a depth of about 1.2 m (4 f t) could occur at the same location as the result of failure of the Lake Lee Dam during a PMF. According to NRC staff hydrologists, PMFs are not determined by probabilistic methods, but are derived by deterministic methods.
If it is necessary to assign a probability to the PMF for any purpose, a value of 10 6 to 10 7 would not be unreasonable, but it must be recognized that the probability could range from 10 3 to 10 11, 6
2.4 ECOLOGICAL CHARACTER 2.4.1 Topography and Land Use The regional topography is characteristic of the California coastal mountain ranges. Mountains ranging to 1200 m (4000 ft) dominate the landscape.
The area is pierced by shallow valleys, each valley containing a stream, which is of ten dry in the summer months. Human activities and residential popula-tions cluster in the valleys and along the sea coast, and agricultural activi-ties are quite extensive in the larger valleys. Othe rwis e, rather sere grass-lands and sparse forests cover the western sides and tops of the mountains, with more-verdant cover on the seaward sides. Elevation changes of the order of several hundred meters occur rapidly, and there will often be several of these within an area of a few square kilometers.
From north-northwest through east-northeast the site is separated from the much larger Livermore Valley by the Pleasanton Hills. Except for its connection to the Livermore Valley, and its connection through Niles Canyon to the Santa Clara Valley and the Bay area, the site is almost totally surrounded by mountains beginning with the Black Hills in the north, the Diablo Range extending out to 80 km (50 mi) from the east through south, the Santa Cruz Mountains to the south, and the Sunol-Pleasanton ridges from southwest to north.
The GE VNC site consists of 645.4 ha (1594 acres) about 11 km (7 mi) southwest of the town of Livermore, Alameda County, California. Vallecitos Road (CA State Highway 84) forms the southern boundary of the site with about 2100 m (7000 ft) of road frontage. The east and west site boundaries run due north, with an extended section in the northwest corner. All structures and facilities on the site are located in the southwest corner of the property.
About 200 ha (500 acres) of the lower portion of the site are gently sloped and surrounded by an inner fence intended to prevent intrusion by cattle.
The cattle are grazed on the remaining area of the property during six months of the year, November through May.
The number of cattle varies from 600 to 1200 depending on conditions, several horses graze on a small southern portion of the site, and auction pens for sheep and cattle are located about 0.8 km (0.5 mi) from the site entrance. From the lower southwest corner of the site the elevation increases from 124 m to about 180 m (406 ft to about 600 ft) MSL; then the land rises very sharply to a high point of 392 m (1286 ft) MSL in the northeast corner.
The nearest commercial facility is a concrete-aggregate plant about 7.5 km (4.7 mi) west of the site boundary along State Highway 84.
There are several wholesale nursery operations in the Sunol Valley to the west, and the U.S.
13 Veteran's Administration Hospital 's 8 kn (5 mi) to the northeast.
Interstate Highway 680 intersects State Rote 84 about 2.5 km (1.5 mi) west of the site, and ties the site into the general network of San Francisco Bay area roads.
Two railroad lines approach within 3.9 km (2.4 mi) of the site, running along Niles Canyon and then turning up to Pleasanton and into the Livermore Valley.
The land within a few kilometers of the site is predominately grazing land for cattle, with a small involvement in feed crops, orchards, and vineyards. The major portion of the land, especially from the east to south, is open natural land with grass-covered hills, often sparse because of the limited water.
Live oaks and other trees grow in the canyons and along the streambanks. An area of 235 ha (580 acres) owned by GE, but not now part of the site, was deeded to the Alameda County Land Preserve Program in 1971.
It lies along the northern boundary of the present site.
The very large San Antonio Reservoir, about 3 km (2 mi) to the southeast, is part of a water-gathering and -distribution system that occupies much of the land in the southeast quadrant out to about 8 km (5 mi). This includes the Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct and the Sunol Valley Regional Park. To the north and east-northeast, a large complex of gravel pits is in operation just across the Pleasanton Hills 6 to 8 km (4 to 5 mi) from the site.
Industrial activity within 8 km is confined almost entirely to the Pleasanton-Livermore area in smaller gravel operation the Livermore and Amador Valleys.
In addition, a exists 5 km (3 m) to the south-southwest in the Sunol Valley.
Where agricul-tural activity exists, and is relatively sparse, irrigation is employed.
2.4.2 Regional Demography Because of topography, much of the area surrounding the plant is rela-tively inaccessible for residential housing, and these areas cannot be expected to support large populations in the future.
On the other hand, the very rapidly growing and heavily populated San Francisco Bay area lies among these mountains from the south through the northwest and this area, although somewhat distant, can be expected to continue the rapid rate of growth that it has shown for the past several decades.
The nearest population centers, with their 1970 populations, directions, and distances are:
Sunol (363, 4.5 km, WSW), Pleasanton (18 328, 6.6 km, NNW-N), and Livermore (37 703, 9.9 km, ENE-E).
The nearest area of over 25 000 population is the Pleasanton Division of Alameda County (37 107, 6-9 km, NW-N).
The plant itself is located on the edge of Vallecitos Creek, in central Alameda County. The Counties of Contra Costa, San Mateo, Alameda, San Joaquin, and San Francisc( lie wholly within 80 km (50 mi) of the plant.
Together, these five counties constitute 44% of the area within an 80-km radius.
In addition, 13 other counties also lie within 80 km of the plant.
The largest community wholly within the 80-km radius is the Stockton Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) (290 208, 30 km, NW). The plant itself lies wholly within the San Francisco SMSA (3 109 519), and the SMSA lies almost wholly (79%) within 80 km of the plant.
In addition, five other SMSAs lie within 80 km of the plant:
the Santa Rosa SMSA (204 885) has about 4% of its area within 80 km of the plant, Vallejo-Napa (249 081) about 33%,
Sacramento (800 592) 16%, Modesto (194 506) 72%, and San Jose (1 064 714) 97%.
14
[
When this summary was written, the final figures of the 1980 census of
'.the area within 80 km of the GE VNC were not yet available. Therefore, esti-
. mates of ' the 1980 sector populations were made using the-1970 census' data and -
county growth-rate information from the " Statistical Abstract of the United States" and other sources. The estimated 1980 population within 80 km of the-GE VNC 'as.a function of direction and distance is shown in Table 1.
k Table 1.
Population Distribution Around the GE VNC in 1980 Distance (km)
Sector 0-1,6 1.6-3.2 3.2-4.8 4.8-6.4 6.4-8 8-16 16-32 32-48 48.64-80 j.
N 0
0 0
1 090 209 453 1 098 61 755 451 17 276 NNE 3
0 0
58 526' 6 892 263 13 080 7 346 8 019 NE 5
0 0
35 1 035 32 289 650 1 107 112 783 Ill 852 ENE O
O 0
14 68 16 637 21 329 22 664 17 896 E
O O
O 0
55 163 728 924 3 131 150 289 ESE O
O O
7 0
25 185 0
1 444 11 781 SE 9
0 0
1 6
15 0
334 0
148 SSE O
O o
5 0
32 714 1 198' 18 077 20 905 S
6 0
0 3
19 6 238 621 272 021 4 064 94 730 SSW 4
0 11 28 73 5 300 179 889 350 191 23 101 55 545 SW 0
4 10 57 18 50 125 96 197 115 921 1 353 367 1
h3W 10 0
363 17 15 35 231 76 150 230 521 8 126 0
W 5
57 102 0
51 11 197 57 495 143 530 250 850 0
kWW 4
5 27 361 256 131 259 873 318 187 652 945 130 328 KV 7
7 304 331 744 2 858 4 932 276 627 258 349' 94 513 NNV O
O 271 3 138 12 037 20 195 23 913 213 652 70 397
-108 947 a
[
Annular totals 53 73 1 088 5 145 15 112 165 528 941 345 2 020 377 1 435 081 822 596 Grand total 5 406 398 i
{
The general area has been characterized by a net increase in population for many decades, averaging about 3% per year for the last 10 years.
This has slowed somewhat in recent years, and a 1976 estimate gives an annual compound growth rate of about 1% since 1970.
On the other hand the Livermore Valley has shown a very marked increase, of the order of 13% per year from 1970 to
-1976, and the nearest residential area, the Sunol Valley and the Amador Valley I
are -showing similar growth rates.
At the same time, the mountainous areas about the site strongly inhibit residential growth in many directions.
I.
l 2.4.3 Flora and Fauna 2.4.3.1 Terrestrial Ecology L
The GE VNC site is located in the grassland community in west-central l
California in the Vallecitos Valley.
General descriptions of the area and I
L I
l i
15 specific information from adjacent areas characterize the site environs as follows:
The composition of this community has changed from the once-common native bunch grasses, such as Stipa and Poa spp., to the nondominant introduced annual grasses such as bromegrasses, wild oats, Italian ryegrass, barley, and filares.
This change is generally regarded to be the result of past over-grazing and the introduction of annual weeds and grasses.
In addition to the grasses and forbs, a few trees such as live oaks may be found in the hills, in the canyons, and along intermittent drainages.
The vegetation of this area shows a somewhat limited diversity and, large diverse wildlife population.
Resident therefore, does not support a wildlife of the grassland community includes invertebrates, ground squirrels, reptiles, rabbits, and some birds such as the western meadowlark and horned lark.
Lizzards and snakes such as Gilbert's skink, western fence lizard, western rattlesnake, western and Alameda striped racer, and gopher snake inhabit rock outcroppings or rodent burrows and feed on insects, bird eggs, and some mammals.
Birds found in the area include many of the songbirds and sparrows that feed on seeds and insects and raptors such as the red-tailed hawk, sparrow hawk, and great horned owl that feed on reptiles, birds, and rodents. Mammals are probably the most conspicuous vertebrates of this area, the majority of which are herbivores.
Ground squirrels and gophers are most common in areas Other rodents that are likely to occur on the site of sparse grass coverage.
include several species of mice, moles, rats, and rabbits.
Larger mammals such as deer, coyotes, and foxes may also be found in limited numbers on the
- site, 2.4.3.2 Aquatic Ecology Partly surrounded by cattails, the 8500-m (7-acre-ft) Lake Lee appeared 3
slightly eutrophic before it was drained. Geese; mud hens; mallard, canvasback, and butterball ducks; and catfish, crappie, and bluegill have been seen on and in the lake.
A ditch leading from the lake had a dense vegetative growth, primarily cattails. This was good habitat for amphibians and insects.
No permanent populations of game fish are found in the intermittent creeks of the Alameda Creek watershed (e.g. Vallecitos Creek) and, except for mosquitofish (Gambusias sp.) in isolated pools, nongame. fish are probably also absent.
Alameda Creek had immature representatives of at least three insect species.
The substrate of Alameda Creek is primarily gravel changing to sand and mud below the Town of Niles, where the original ficodplain marshland is severely channelized and replaced by dense urban development. The inflatable "Fabridam," near Niles, blocks upstream movement of anadromous fishes.
Steel-head trout do not reproduce in the creek but do move in through the discharges l
from Calaveras Reservoir. Historically, this was a steelhead stream. Urbani-l zation caused a less of steelhead spawning and nursery habitat, and steelhead l
seem to have been extirpated as permanent stream residents since about 1960.
l Catchable rainbow trout are stocked yearly.
1 l
l
16 Game fish constitute about 1% of the fish population of the creek. A few fish species, including some exotics, have moved into quarry pits used by the Alameda County Water District as percolation facilities.
For example, the tule perch is present in the pits but absent elsewhere in the drainage. Appar-ently these fish move into the pits with water imported from the delta of the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers by way of the South Bay Aquaduct.
2.4.4 Climatology and Meteorology 2.4.4.1 Climatology The climate of the San Francisco Bay area is Mediterranean, with hot, dry summers and mild winters with light to moderate precipitation.
The local climate for the Vallecitos area is controlled by the position and strength of the semipermanent high pressure center in the northeastern Pacific Ocean, the local topography, and the distance from the bay and the ocean.
In summer, the Pacific high pressure area controls airflow over the region and prevents rain producing weather systems from entering the area.
Summer weather is typically a succession of clear, cool nights and hot, sunny days with light to moderate winds and no rain.
In winter, the high pressure area weakens and moves to the south and west; storms originating over the Pacific Ocean can enter the area, producing periods of clouds, rain, and occasional strong winds.
Year-to year variations of rainfall are large.
The general flow of air from west to east in the area carries with it the pollutants generated in the heavily populated areas around the San Francisco Bay; air quality standards for oxidants and suspended particulates near the site are frequently exceeded.
No long-term temperature or precipitation data are collected at the site.
The long-term climatological data for Livermore, California, about 11 km (7 mi) northeast of the facility, are representative of those for the site.
Climatological normals (for 1931-1960) and other climatological data have been extracted f rom records of the National Weather Service cooperative station at Live rmo re.
Those data show that the normal annual temperature is 15.l*C (59. l*F).
On the average, January is the coldest month (7.8 C or 46.l*F) and July the wa rmest (22.l*C or 71.7*F).
As is typical of Mediterranean climates, daily temperature ranges are large, averaging 11.4 C (20.5 F) in January, 19.9 C (35.5 F) in July, and 15.7 C (28.2 F) for the year.
Temperature extremes, based on more than six decades of data, are 46*C (ll5*F) and -7 C (19 F).
Normal precipitation for the area is 366 mm (14.40 in) falling mostly as rain during the winter months (59% in the months of December through February).
Summers are very dry; only 0.9% of the annual average precipitation falls in June through August. Year-to-year variations in monthly precipitation amounts are large.
For example, over a.30-year period, January rainfall has varied from as little as 5 mm to 206 mm (0.20 in to 8.11 in).
Variations in the annual amounts varied from 571 mm in 1952 to 222 mm in 1953 (22.48 in to 8.74 in). The maximum recorded daily rainfall was.88 mm (3.47 in).
GE has provided one year (1974) of onsite wind-speed and -direction data by stability class. These data were used in the dispersion calculations that follow.
17 Wind speed and direction are measured by means of an Aerovane on a well-exposed small hill just east of the plutonium facility. The wind sensor is 12 m (40 ft) above grade. Stability class is determined from the width of the wind-direction trace (the sigma-theta procedure). The measured average annual l
wind speed is about 3.4 m/s (7.5 mph).
Calms occur about 10% of all hours.
18 mph) are infrequent, about 2% of the Strong winds (greater than 8 m/s or time, and are mostly f rom the southwest quadrant.
The most f requent wind direction is from the southwest; winds from the south-southwest through west occur more than 50% of the time.
2.4.4.2 Dispersion Meteorology The average annual relative concentration (X/Q) and relative deposition (D/Q) values for the site were calculated using one year (1974) of onsite meteorological data and the X0QD0Q model developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Table 2 provides X/Q values at selected distances for 16 direc-tions from the plant. These values were calculated for continuous ground-level releases.
The model includes an allowance for plume meander during light winds and stable atmospheric conditions; the open-terrain correction f actor was not used.
The accident-case (short-term, up to 2-h) relative concentrations have been computed, using the onsite meteorological data and the NRC accident.
c.,
dispersion model, and are given in Tables 3 and 4.
The model is direction Table 2.
Annual Average Relative Concentrations 3
(s/m ) Based on Continuous Ground-Level Release and One Year of Onsite Meteorological Data, GE VNC, Vallecitos, California Distance (km)
Sector 0.8 1.6 3.2 6.4 16 40 80 N
1.2-5tl 3.7-6 1.3-6 4.6-7 1.3-7 3.7-8 1.5-8 NNE 1.3-5 3.9-6 1.3-6 4.8-7 1.3-7 3.8-8 1.5-8 KE 1.6-5 5.I-6 1.7-6 6.2-7 1.7-7 4.9-8 1.9-8 ENE 1.4-5 4.3-6 1.5-6 5.3-7 1.4-7 4.2 8 1.6-8 E
1.7-5 5.3-6 1.8-6 6.6-7 1.8-7 5.3-8 2.1-8 ESE 1.4-5 4.5-6 1.5-6 5.6-7 1.6-7 4.7-8 1.9-8 SE 1.1-5 3.4-6 1.2-6 4.3-7 1.2-7 3.6-8 1.5-8 SSE 4.8-6 1.5-6 5.0-7 1.8-7 5.2-8 1.5-8 6.2-9 s
5.0-6 1.3-6 5.3-7 1.9-7 5.4-8 1.6-8 6.5-9 SSW 3.5-6 1.1-6 3.7-7 1.3-7 3.7-8 1.1-8 4.3-9 SW 4.1-6 1.3-6 5.4-7 1.6-7 4.4-8 1.3-8 5.3-9 WSV 3.2-6 9.9-7 3.4-7 1.2-7 3.5-8 1.0-8 4.1-9 W
7.2-6 2.3-6 7.7-7 2.8 7 7.9-8 2.3-8 9.5-9 WNV 6.4-6 2.0-6 6.8-7 2.5-7 7.1-8 2.1-8 8.4-9 NV 4.2-6 1.3-6 4.5-7 1.6-7 4.5-8 1.3-8 5.3-9 NNW 6.4-6 2.0-6 6.8-7 2.5-7 6.9-8 2.0-8 8.1-9 t3 Scientific notation:
1.2-5 = I.2 x 10-l
18 Table 3.
Five Percentile Short-Term 3
(2-h) Relative Concentrations (s/m )
GE VNC, Vallecitos, California Distance (km)
Sector 0.15 0.5 1
2 5
8 1.6-3 6.0-4 3.0-4 1.0-4 N
1.3-2t NNE 1.1-1 1.4-3 5.1-4 2.6-4 1.1-4 NE 1.1-1 1.4-3 5.2-4 2.7-4 1.1-4 EhI 1.3-2 1.5-3 5.6-4 2.9-4 1.2-4 E
1.8-2 2.0-3 8.2-4 4.1-4 1.6-4 ESE 1.8-2 2.2-3 8.3-4 4.1-4 1.7-4 SE 1.4-2 1.7-3 6.5-4 3.4-4 1.4-4 SSE 8.0-3 9.8-4 3.5-4 1.7-4 7.1-5 S
8.4-3
- 1. 0 3.7-4 1.8-4 7.5-5 SSW 5.6-3 6.8-4 2.4-4 1.1-4 4.3-5 SW 6.9-3 8.5-4 3.0-4 1.4-4 5.8-5 k3W 6.2-3 7.6-4 2.7-4 1.2-4 4.7-5 W
9.3-3 1.1-3 4.1-4 2.1-4 8.7-5 kKW 9.9-3 1.2-3 4.4-4 2.2-4 9.0-5 NW 6.4-3 7.9-4 2.8-4 1.4-4 5.7-5 NNW 9.3-3 1.1-3 4.1-4 2.0-4 8.4-5 18 Scientific notation:
1.3-2 = 1.3 x 10 8 Table 4.
Fifty Percentile Short-Term 3
(2-h) Relative Concentrations (s/m )
GE VNC, Vallecitos, California Distance (km)
Sector 0.15 0.5 1
2 5
N 1.6-3t8 1.7-4 5.6-5 3.5-5 1.1-5 hTE 1.5-3 1.9-4 6.8-5 2.9-5 9.5-6 NE 1.3-3 1.5-4 5.2-5 1.9-5 5.2-6 ENE 1.2-3 1.4-4 4.8-5 1.7-5 4.9-6 E
1.4-3 I.7-4 5.9-5 2.4-5 7.8-6 ESE 3.2-3 4.0-4 1.4-4 7.2-5 2.9-5 SE 3.7-3 4.5-4 1.6-4 7.2-5 2.7-5 i
SSE 2.0-3 2.4-4 8.4-5 3.9-5 1.2-5 S
1.6-3 1.5-4 5.3-5 2.2-5 9.6-6 SSW l.2-3 1.5-4 5.0-5 1.8-5 4.7-6 SW l.6-3 1.9-4 6.6-5 2.5-5 6.5-6 k3W l.7-3 2.1-4 7.3-5 2.7-5 7.7-6 W
2.3-3 2.8-4 9.8-5 3.6-5 1.1-5 WNV 3.3-3 4.0-4 1.4-4 7.4-5 3.0-5 NW 2.6-3 3.2-4 1.1-4 5.4-5 2.0-5 NNW 2.2-3 2.7-4 1.1-4 4.2-5 1.4-5 18 Scientific notation:
1.6-3 = 1.6 x 10 8 i
1
i 19 dependent and calculates the X/Q values out to a distance of 5 km (3 mi) immediately following the natural destructive event. The calculation computes the X/Q values that are exceeded 5% and 50% of the time as a function of distance and direction.
This model includes allowance for plume meander during light-wind and stable atmospheric conditions.
Most dispersion models are applicable only to continuous releases during periods of light to moderate steady-state winds, with numerous experiments averaged to yield dispersion parameters.
Concentrations and dimensions of a particulate cloud have been calculated for conditions when the release time is short, the wind speed is very high, and the time the particulate cloud travels across the area is very short.
The values of th^e dispersion parameters were extrapolated fro'm values for unstable conditions and puff releases.
As is standard for instantaneous releases, it is assumed that o = 0 The release height for this calculation Y
is assumed to be 8 to 10 m (25*to 30 ft).
It was arbitrarily assumed that the centerpoint of the cloud of particulates released from the facility traveled downwind with the gust-front with no deposition at speeds of 42.5 m/s (95 mph) and 67.0 m/s (150 mph).
Centerline-centerpoint concentrations are given in Table 5.
To determine the area impacted by the particulate cloud and the time it takes to pass, concent ra tion limits are set at two-sigma, or 0.135, of the centerline-centerpoint concentration.
The dimensions of a particulate cloud at a point and time of its passage are given in Table 6.
Table 5.
Centerline-Centerpoint Concentrations Resulting from Straight-Line Wind Disper-Table 6.
Dimensions of a Particu-sion of a 1-kg Source late Cloud at a Point and Time (42.5 m/s) of Passage of the Cloud j
(42.5 m/s) l Concentration 3
Distance (km)
(pg/m )
Distance (km) y,x (m)
Time (s) 0.8 381 0.8 140 7
2.4 23 2.4 380 18 l
4.0 6
4.0 610 29 l
5.6 3
5.6 820 39 l
7.2 2
7.2 1 025 48 l
12.1 0.4 12.1 1 700 80 24.1 0.1 24.1 3 200 151 i
l 40.2 0.02 40.2 5 200 245 56.3 0.01 56.3 6 800 320 72.4 0.004 72.4 8 400 395 80.0 0.003 80.0 10 300 485
20 3.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS The analysis of the response of structures that house plutonium-handling operations at the GE VNC site was done in several steps. The features within the facility, the failure of which may have a significant effect on the quan-tity of material released, were identified for analysts who were involved in assessing the structural responses of the plant and its equipment. The present structural condition was documented to provide the engineering basis' for -
subsequent structural evaluations.
Finally, the structural 1 response of the building and its components was expressed in terms of threshold values of windspeed and ground-shaking levels necessary to produce postulated damage.
The following sections summarize the above steps.
3.1 AREAS OF CONCERN 7 The consequence of concern in this study is the generation and release of -
an aerosol composed of particles of about 5-pm aerodynamic equivalent diameter (AED).*
In Building 102 both plutonium-bearing liquids 'and finely divided Pu02 powders are processed. Both powders and liquids containing plutonium are of concern because under certain stresses they form aerosols of highly sub-divided material.
The areas of principal concern are glove boxes where large quantities of Pu-bearing powders or liquids are either free' or enclosed in breakable containers in the glovebox atmosphere at some point in the process.
The specific features that warrant individual attention at each location where dispersible plutonium compounds are held in significant quantities were identified, as were other features that may contribute to plutonium release through interaction-or secondary effects.
3.2 STRUCTURAL-CONDITION DOCUMENTATION 8 The purpose of this effort was to document the present condition of the GE VNC to provide the engineering basis for subsequent structural evaluations.
The documents related to the original design and construction of the building structure and critical equipment components were surveyed, including the following:
(1) Construction drawings and specifications, (2) Design computations, (3) Codes and standards in effect at the time of design, (4) Soils reports and other relevant soils data, and (5) Test data and/or material specifications on materials used in construction.
- A particle exhibiting the aerodynamic behavior of a unit-density sphere of the stated size.
21 It was necessary for structural engineers to conduct an extensive site inspection to field check the construction plans and to obtain details on connections and other information that were not shown en the plans.
The areas that were structurally evaluated were those identified as areas of concern.
However, the areas adjacent to those listed were investigated to identify their effects on the critical areas.
The results of the construct'an-data review, facility inspection, and structural-data organization were documented in a form that was used in sub-sequent evaluations. The following information was given in the report and/or shown on schematic plans:
(1)
Line drawings showing plans and sections; (2) Connection details between building elements; (3) Member properties; (4) Masses (based on a detailed weight takedown);
(5) Construction details; (6) Equipment locations, support details, and connecting pipes, ductwork, etc.;
(7) Any recommendations for materials testing and/or additional probing inspections; and (8) Summary of soils data.
3.3 RESPONSE OF STRUCTURES TO NATURAL PilEN0MENA Acronyms used in this section are defined as follows:
AFL - advanced-fuels laboratory APC - atmospheric pressure change PAL - radiochemistry and plutonium analytical laboratory PGA peak ground acceleration PMF probable maximum flood RML - radioactive-materials laboratory 3.3.1 Wind Hazard 9 Damage scenarios for selected probabilities of occurrence of wind speed were established from the threshcid values of wind speed for various calculated failure modes.
Four damage scenarios for selected wind-speed values are pre-sented to establish a trend of increasing damage with diminishing probability of occurrence.
The specific wind-speed values chosen provide a gradation from minimum damage to extensive damage to the areas of concern in the GE VNC facility.
The wind-speed range associated with each damage scenario is based on the variability in the damage pattern. These wind-speed ranges may be ur.ed to provide error bands on potential damage to the facility.
3.3.1.1 Damage Scencrio for a Nominal Wind Speed of 42.5 m/s (95 mph)
Probability of Occurrence Probability of 3 x 10 6 per year.
22 Wind-Speed Range Range of 30 to 60 m/s (67 to 135 mph) based on failure of the glass panels and overturning of the bridge truss.
Building 102 Office Area.
The glass exterior-wall panels could fail.
Winds could circulate through the area. resulting in the collapse of some partition walls.
The protective wall separating the office atea and the laboratory area is not likely to sustain structural damage.
First-Floor Laboratory Area.
No damage of consequence.
Basement Laboratory Area.
No damage of consequence.
Exhaust-Air-Handling System.
The bridge truss that supports the 1.5-m (60-in) diameter exhaust-air duct between Buildings 102 and 102A could over-turn. The air duct would be severed. The air-handling system in Building 102 could be exposed to an APC of 1.4 kPa (29.5 psf) at a rate of 0.12 kPa/s (2.5 psf /s).
Building 102A No damage of consequence.
Vault in Building 105 No damage of consequence.
3.3.1.2 Damage Scenario for a Nominal Wind Speed of 60 m/s (135 mph)
Probability of Occurrence l
Probabil'ity of 6 x 10 7 per year.
i Wind-Speed Range I
Range of 42 to 85 m/s (95 to 191 mph) based on failure of masonry walls.
Building 102 Office Area.
Failure of most of the exterior-wall panels and uplift of the roof panels in the corner areas (4.3 m or 14 f t square) would allow wind to circulate in the office area. Many partition walls are likely to collapse.
A portion of the protective wall separating the office area from the labora-tory area could fail.
Collapse of the protective wall would allow wind to circulate through the oifice area into the laboratory area.
I
23 First-Floor Laboratory Area.
Roof panels in the building corner areas (4.3 m or 14 f t square) could be uplif ted.
The doors in the north, south, or east walls could faII.
Wind would blow through the openings provided by the.
door failures and the failure of the protective wall.
The 10-cm (4-in) reinforced-concrete masonry wall and the gypsum partition wall of the PAL could be damaged. Equipment located in the PAL could sustain some damage; the fraction of pieces of equipment sustair.ing damage may be one-tenth, with upper-and lower-bound values of one-eighth and one-twelfth, respectively.
The filters located on top, but outside, the RML cells could sustain some damags.
A best estimate of the f raction of filters sustaining damage is one-t hird as median, with upper-and lower-bound values being seven-sixteenths and (ne-fourth, respsetively.
Equipment outside the RML cells, but attached to the cell wall, might sustain damage, but the plugs that anchor the equipment to the walls are likely to remain in place. The RML cells will not sustain structural damage.
Basement Laboratory Area.
No damage of consequence.
Exhaust-Air-liandling System.
Through the 1.5-m (60-in) diameter air duct, the exhaust-air-handling system could be exposed to an APC of 2.9 kPa (60 psf) at a rate of 0.34 kPa/s (7.2 psf /s).
Building 102A l
l The doors in Building 102A could fail.
Wind may circulate through the building.
Some of the filters may sustain damage but a significant amount of filter material is not likely to escape the building enclosure.
A best esti-mate of the fraction of filters sustaining damage is one-tenth as median, with upper-and lower-bound values of one-eighth and one-twelf th,- respectively.
Vault in Building 105 No damage of consequence.
3.3.1.3 Damage Scenario for a Nominal Wind Speed of 80 m/s (180 mph)
Probability of Occurrence Probability of 1 x 10 7 per year.
Wind-Speed Range Range of 56.8 to 114 m/s (127 to 255 mph) based on failure of masonry walls.
Building 102 Office Area.
Roof panels along the eaves (4.3 m or 14 ft wide) could be uplifted and most of the exterior-wall panels could fail. The vast majority
24 of the partition walls are likely to collapse. The protective wall-separating the office area from the laboratory area is likely to collapse.
First-Floor Laboratory Area. Roof panels along the building caves (4.3 m or 14 ft wide) could be uplifted. The precast-concrete wall panels in corner areas (about 4.3 m or 14 ft wide) could collapse. Wind circulation through the laboratory area would increase. All the walls, including the 20-cm (8-in) reinforced-concrete masonry walls surrounding the PAL, could collapse. Some of the equipment in the PAL is likely to be crushed. A best estimate of the fraction of pieces of equipment crushed is one-half as median, with upper-and lower-bound values of two-thirds and three-eighths, respectively. Filters on top, but outside, the RML cells could be disconnected and displaced. A best estimate of the fraction of filters disconnected is three-fourths as median, with upper-and lower-bound values of one (all) and nine-sixteenths, respec-tively.
Equipment cutside the RML cells, but attached to the cell walls, could be disconnected, but the plugs that anchor the equipment to the walls are likely to remain in place.
The RML cells will not sustain structural damage.
Basement Laboratory Area. No damage of consequence.
Exhaust-Air-Handling System.
Through the severed 1.5-m (60-in) diameter air duct, the exhaust-air-handling system could be exposed to an APC of 5.1 kPa (106 psi) at a rate of 0.8 kPa/s (17 psf /s).
Building 102A Cladding in the wall corners (1.5 m or 5 f t wide) could be stripped.
Wind circulation through the doors and wall openings could disconnect and displace come filters. A best estimate of the fraction of filters disconnected is one-third as median, with upper-and lower-bound values of seven-sixteenths and one-fourth, respectively.
Some filter material could escape the building enclosure.
Vault in Building 105 No damage of consequence.
3.3.1.4 Damage Scenario for a Nominal Wind Speed of 103 m/s (230 mph)
Probability of Occurrence Probability of 0.5 x 10 8 per year (rounded up to 1x 10 8 per year).
Wind-Speed Range Range of 73 to 145 m/s (163 to 325 mph) based on failure of masonry walls.
1 i
[
i
25 Building 102 Office Area. This area is likely to be destroyed.
First-Floor Laboratory Area. The precast concrete wall panels could fail and the entire roof could be uplif ted.
The collapsing walls would crush all the equipment in the PAL.
Wind blowing through the laboratory area could disconnect and displace all the filters on top, but outside, the RML cells.
Filter material could be blown out of the building enclosure.
Equipment outside the RML cc11s, but attached to the cell walls, could be disconnected, but the plugs that anchor the equipment to the walls are likely to remain in place. The structural integrity of the RML cells is expected to remain intact.
Basement Laboratory Area. No damage of consequence.
Exhaust-Air-Ilandling System.
Through the severed 1.5-m (60-in) diameter air duct, the exhaust-air-handling system could be exposed to an APC of 8.3 kPa (173 psf) at a rate of 1.7 kPa/s (35.7 psf /s).
Building 102A Most of the wall cladding could be stripped. Wind blowing through the building could destroy all the filters. Most of the filter material would be i
blown out of the building enclosure.
Vault in Building 105 No damage of consequence.
3.3.2 Seismic Hazard o i
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the structural capacity of those building structures and critical equipment components that could poten-tially release hazardous chemicals into the environment from Building 102 as a result of damage or failure during an earthquake.
The effort focused primarily on the building structure as representing the final confinement barrier for release of hazardous chemicals. The desig-nated process equipreent, such as glove boxes and exhaust ducting, were also evaluated for structural capacity.
The loss of primary confinement due to d:. rect glovebox failu e or from. indirect glovebox damage caused by interaction with adjacent equipment and connections is identified as the ultimate mode of release resulting from extreme earthquake hazard. The structural capacity of the building and associated equipment systems as related to the ultimate mode of release are addressed in this summa ry, but operational and functional aspects of the facility are not addressed.
Building 102 was constructed in 1956-1957 and designed to comply with the provisions of the 1952 Uniform Building Code.
It is a single-story building nith a partial basement under the eastern half of the structure. The basement encloses the AFL and the base structure of the RML cells. The ground floor
26 houses offices, change rooms, PAL, the RML operating gallery, and several small shielded cells.
The building roof is elevated to form a high bay over the RML cells; the remainder of the roof has a lower profile. The office and laboratory area on the ground floor is of structural-steel construction, with concrete-block masonry and precast-concrete shear walls providing the strength to resist horizontally applied loads. The roof and walls in the high-bay area are supported by the RML cells and by shear walls of concrete block and precast concrete.
The RML cells are essentially massive reinforced-concrete boxes that extend from the basement foundation level to about 5.2 m (17 ft) above the ground floor.
The basement area has a heavy reinforced-concrete slab overhead; the walls are of reinforced concrete, as are the columns and footings that support the ground-floor construction.
The basement-floor slab is not connected structurally to the walls, columns, or footings. All the critical glove boxes and exhaust equipment in the basement are connected to the basement construction to provide support against earthquake vibratory motion.
The determination of the seismic ground motion that brings on failure or collapse was made through analysis of behavior in the inelastic range.
Inelas-tic behavior relates to the capacity of the structure to absorb energy subse-quent to yielding of critical members. The energy-absorption capacity of the structure was determined by integrating the force-deflection curve that char-acterizes the distortion of the structure under load. The ductility method of analysis was used for assessing nonlinear response and capacity of the struc-tural systems for inelastic behavior.
The nonlinear response is included by modification to the elastic-response spectrum that defines the seismic ground motions.
The vibratory ground-motion response analysis of Building 102 was divided into five subparts. These subparts, listed in the order of their importance, are:
(1) Basement and AFL, (2) Glove boxes and exhaust equipment, (3) RML cells, (4) High-bay area, and (5) Low-bay area (including PAL).
3.3.2.1 Damage Scenarios for Vibratory Ground Motion The analysis of Building 102 has demonstrated that the AFL (located in the basement) and its equipment will not be structurally damaged up to a PGA l
in excess of 0.6 g.
The reinforcing steel in the piers between the windows of the RML cells will start to yield at the ground-floor level at a PGA of 0.9 g.
The low-bay area, and therefore the PAL, will be severely damaged at a PGA of about 0.6 g.
The three high block walls adjacent to the RML cells are esti-mated to have an ultimate capacity of 0.5 g.
Damage scenarios for vibratory ground motion are given in Tables 7 through 10.
3.3.2.2 Damage Scenarios for Fault Displacement The damage levels given in Tables 11 through 14 are based on the maximum slip and as a thrust on the l
total displacement occurring independently as a
I
27 Table 7.
Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleration up to 0.1 g (Return period s 8 yr)
Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events Basement, AFL, No damage to basement or equipment.
and critical equipment RML cells and No damage to RML cells.
Possible light cracking high-bay area in high concrete-block walls.
Low-bay area Light cracking in concrete-block walls.
l Table 8.
Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleration Between 0.1 and 0.4 g (Return period up to 270 yr)
Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events Basement, AFL, No damage to basement or equipment.
Light cracking and critical is possible, particularly at construction joints in equipment basement area, and small differential motion could occur between glove boxes, stands, and supports.
RML cells and Light to moderate cracking damage to high concrete-high-bay area block walls on north side of RML cells on each side of the 8.5-m bay.
Collapse is unlikely because walls are reinforced and doueled to adjacent con-struction.
No direct damage to structural system of RML cells.
Light cracking at construction joints is likely.
Cracking at joints between precast wall panels is likely.
Low-bay area Light to moderate cracking at joints between pre-cast walls. Damage to dowels connecting shear walls to structural steel. Differential motion between roof system and concrete-block shear walls of about 2/3 cm.
Moderate to severe cracking at joint between structural steel and concrete block.
28 Table 9.
Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleration Between 0.4 and 0.8 g (Return period up to N 1030 yr)
Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events AFL and criti-Glove boxes 37, 39, 41, and 44 will slide and cal equipment vibrate relative to floor, with motion restricted by loosened saddle tiedowns. Glove boxes and exhaust equipment will likely not be damaged struc-turally. Glove boxes 23, 50, 51, and 51A will move in accord with basement construction to which they are connected. Glove boxes supported by connections to both floor and ceiling may be slightly displaced partly from differential motion when portions of ground-floor (low-bay) wall and roof system fail.
Basement Reinforced concrete construction will be damaged.
There will be differential motion on construction joints and light to moderate cracking of the ceiling slab. The basement reinforced-concrete walls reach yield at 0.6 g PGA. Damage will depend on the dura-tion of the earthquake strong motion. No general collapse will occur, but some local failures are possible.
Concrete-block partition walls will be cracked because of differential motions.
RML cells and liigh concrete-block walls fail with partial col-high-bay area lapse.
Block wall between cells on south side will fail. Precast-concrete walls on east side of high-bay area will fail (0.7 g PGA) from loss of connec-tion to steel f rame; these walls will fall to the east, away from the RML cells. Steel columns on east side may fail.
Structural system of RML cells will be undamaged in terms of their own response pattern.
Low-bay area Roof and shear-wall system will be severely damaged at about 0.6 g PGA with some collapse onto the ground-floor slab over the AFL. The PAL structural containment will be breached.
29 Table 10.
Damage Scenario for Peak Ground Acceleratiou Greater than 0.8 g (Return period > 1030 yr)
Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events AFL and criti-General failure and collapse is unlikely, although cal equipment there may be severe differential motions.
Basement No collapse of the overall structural system is likely at these levels of earthquake vibratory ground motion, depending on the duration. The general collapse is unlikely, as the structural components are well reinforced and constructed.
Local failures of the walls and floor could damage the glove boxes or the exhaust system with the possible attendant loss of containment.
RML cells and Severe damage with some collapse in the high-and
.high-and low-low-bay areas and moderate cracking in piers of bay areas RML cells.
Table 11.
Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement up to 0.15 m Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events
]
Basement, AFL, Local light cracking in the basement walls. Possi-and critical ble small visible crack across roof slab. Slight equipment heaving of floor slab. No damage to glove boxes.
RML cells No damage to RML cells.
Table 12.
Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement Between 0.15 and 0.3 m Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events Basement, AFL, Moderate to severe cracking in the basement walls and critical adjacent to fault zone. Moderate cracking in roof equipment slab about columns that are located near edges of fault zone.
Moderate heaving of floor slab. Light damage to floor-to-ceiling glove boxes.
RML cells Light to moderate cracking in RML cell soil-retaining walls. Light cracking in base slab possible.
1 30 i
Table 13.
Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement Between 0.3 and 1.5 m (Return period up to N 20 000 yr)
Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events Basement, AFL, Severe cracking in basement walls adjacent to fault and critical zone.
Separation of basement-wall and roof-slab equipment joint possible in the fault zone.
Soil enters space between the basement walls and the AFL. Possible light damage to the AFL walls on the north side.
Penetrating cracks possible in the roof slab (path to atmosphere possible).
Significant heaving of floor slab.
Floor-to-ceiling glove boxes could be partially crushed.
RML cells Moderate to severe crackin3 in the soil-retaining walls. Moderate to severe cracking in the base slab.
Table 14.
Damage Scenario for Fault Displacement Between 1.5 and 2.7 m Area of Concern Building-Structure and -Equipment Events Basement, AFL, Collapse of basement walls within and adjacent to and critical the fault zone. Soil is pushed into the space equipment between the basement walls and the AFL walls.
Depending on fault-zone location, insignificant to moderate damage to the AFL walls on the north side and to a wall section on the west side. Heavy localized cracking in roof slab with possible severe heaving of floor slab.
Severe damage possible to floor-to-ceiling glove boxes. Damage to other glove boxes from falling concrete chunks is possible.
RML cells Severe damage to 30-cm below grade soil-retaining walls.
Soil could enter the nonfunctional below-grade space of the cells.
Severe cracking in the base slab possible. Above grade functional part of cells not damaged. Ventilation ducts could be severed from secondary filter bank.
31 l
fault zone occurring anywhere under the basement area in a direction 125' clockwise from the north reference.
Combined faulting and vibratory ground-motion damage was included in the fault-displacement-damage scenarios.
3.3.3 Flood Hazard No analysis was made to evaluate the capacity of the building structures and critical equipment that could potentially release hazardous materials into the environment as a result of damage or failure due to flooding. The hydro-logic analysis showed that potential damage to structures, albeit of low probability, would occur as a result of secondary ef fects.
The threat to Building 102 arises from the failure of the Lake Lee Dam due to the PMF. One intent of these studies is to provide a basis for determining the modifi-cations necessary to improve the ability of the plant to withstand the effects of adverse natural phenomena.
If it is decided that the Lake Lee impoundment constitutes an unacceptable threat'due to dam failure caused by the PMF, the obvious solution is to remove the impoundment or strengthen the dam, not to reinforce building structures.
Although bolstering the structures is an alternative, it seemed so unattractive that no further consideration was given to structural analysis relative to hydrologic effects.
4.
SEVERE-WEATHER DISPERSION 4.1 TORNADO STRUCTURE 11 A model has been developed to represent the windspeed and pressure dis-tribution in and around a tornado vortex. The model tornado DBT-77 was devel-oped to provide more realistic estimations of tornadic features than has been available in earlier models.. Input data is derived from vast experience with actual tornado-damage estimates, and represents the state-of-the-art in tor-nado modeling.
The model incorporates an axially symmetric vortex with a cylindrical core.
The inner core rotates like solid discs stacked in a cylinder, whereas the outer core has air currents spiraling upward. A shallow layer, directly above the earth's surface, provides inflow air to the vortex.
A schematic diagram of DBT-77 is shown in Figure 9.
The depth of the inflow layer is related to the radius of the outer core; large tornadoes have larger inner l
cores and deeper inflow layers than do small tornadoes.
The horizontal windspeed of a tornado is the vector sum of tangential, radial, and translational velocities.
Tangential velocity is treated as a function of both height and radius, whereas radial velocity varies with the crossing angle of inflow air relative to the vortex streamlines. The crossing angle is assumed to be constant at a given height, with airflow outside the core following logarithmic spirals toward the vortex center. Vertical veloc-ity is a function of divergence in the air column and varies with height.
It i
reaches a maximum at the top of the inflow layer. Vertical accelerations in the inflow layer vary with radius and core size.
For a given tangential velocity, small vortices induce greater vertical accelerations than do large ones.
Fu rthe rmo re, the height at which the-maximum vertical acceleration exists decreases with core radius.
As a' result, it is postulated that small
32 Z
k.
- R.-=
1 j
Figure 9.
Schematic Diagram of Tornado 7[og[r$
tiodel DBT-77.
(In this simpli-VELOCITY, V.
.-IN N E R CORE-*
v fied model, the core is divided
\\
into inner and outer portions.
6, C clNFLOW -
Vertical motions are concen-
[ H, = l R..
-g,
-LAYER trated in the outer core and wwwwwmwwmwwmswwwwwwmw the inner core is assumed to rotate like a stack of solid Q
f discs in a cylinder.)
4 l
y7lp. goh.
O vortices are capable of picking up objects near the ground.
The " damage height" of a tornado is the height throughout which maximum damage caused by a given vortex will occur.
Due to variations in inflow-layer depths of tor-nadoes with different core sizes, tall objects are most affected by large-core tornadoes, whereas objects near the ground receive the full impact of small-core tornadoes.
Extremely large pressure gradients must exist inside the tornado vortex to generate the large vertical velocities computed with the model.
Because buoyancy alone is incapable of inducing such accelerations, nonhydrostatic-pressure gradients must be present. Nonhydrostatic pressure is. assumed to be function only of height and radial velocity. What causes nonhydrostatic-a pressure gradients is poorly understood.
In this model, the inertia of the inflow air is assumed to act as a radial compressor to induce nonhydrostatic pressures in the outer core. Thus, air moves against the horizontal pressure gradients, from low pressure to high pressure, while losing kinetic energy.
Total pressure is the pressure generated by the swirling motions of the vortex added to the nonhydrostatic pressure. The total pressure field is represented in Figure 10.
tieteorological parameters such as pressure, windspeed, and temperature vary with time as a tornado passes over a fixed point.
In particular, pres-sure tendencies vary significantly wi% the ratio of core size to transla-tional velocity.
A fast-moving small-core tornado induces extremely large pressure changes.
The total mass of air transported upward by a tornado is proportional to the maximum tangential velocity and to the square of the core radius.
A
" mini-tornado" (max.V = 25 m/s or 56 mph and R = 10 m or 33 f t) may transport about 3 tig/s (about 3 ton /s) of air, whereas a " maxi-tornado" (max V = 100 m/s or 220 mph and R = 150 m or 500 ft) may transport about 2100 ?!g/s (about 2320 ton /s) of air.
33 OUTER CORE l
. ~ lNNER CORE 4 i
[
(
l Spread pread VERTICAL VELOCITY I Figure 10.
j j
.j_ p y,e j
g Pressure Field Inside the Model Tornado.
(Pressure
~~ :s. ~~ ~l ~
i A d "
jumps and vertical-veloc-Ap y, l
4' 8":
ity changes characterize PRESSURE Il = 0.158 -i-p v.*
the boundaries of the outer core.
Similar oo-I servations have been 1 Decrease noted in data inferred from real tornadoes.)
I i
TANGENTIAL VELOCITY l.___ __;i
__ __ _ r _ _ _ __
i I
I i
i i
The model DBT-77 was developed to provide a mathematical representation of the motions associated with a tornado.
The equations appear to simulate actual tornado features well.
The model is used as input to predict the ultimate fate of particles entrained by a tornado.
12 4.2 DISPERSION IN A TORNADIC STORM i
i A three-dimensional numerical model is used to calculate the dispersion of small particulates in a tornadic storm.
The model is designed to allow various meteorological parametets to be updated as more precise information becomes available.
The three-dimensional transient equation of concentration i
j transport is solved by a quasi-Lagrangian method of second moments in an Eulerian mesh centered over the assumed trajectory of the storm.
The horizontal-wind field varies with height over a one-hour period after Building 102 is breached.
The updraf ts and downdraf ts associated with the tornadic storm are calculated from initial empirical estimates,ll and then advected with the storm.
The horizontal rotational-wind field within the storm cell is also advected with the vertical-velocity field. As the storm cell spreads horizontally, the wind field within the storm cell spreads accordingly.
i
34 Because of the lack of precise information regarding turbulence within severe storms, the turbulence-diffusion coefficients are obtained from empir-ical estimates.
These estimates are based on sparse data measured.within storms and on theoretical equations appearing in the literature.
Scavenging is calculated.as a sink term to the governing equation.. Wash-out scavenging below the cloud base acts on large particles; rainout scaveng-ing acts on small. particles within the cloud. However, limited knowledge of scavenging in severe storms necessitates the use of a single general-expression based. on rainfall rates, droplet size, and -100%~ collision efficiency.
The effect of topography downwind of the Building 102 is introduced through speci -
fication of roughness heights used in determining turbulent diffusion below the cloud. The effect of topography on advection is not considered.
The pollutant is assumed to be dispersed throughout the thunderstorm cell.
A skewed log-normal distribution is used to initialize the concentra-tion field.
About 35% of the material is dispersed within the upper regions of the cloud, 15% within the middle section of the storm, and 50% within the lower layers and cloud base of the s to rm.
Once the concentration field is established, scavenging and downdraf t velocities begin to bring the concentra-tion to the ground.
The updraf t and downdraf t vertical-velocity distributions and wet deposi-tion account for most of the material being deposited at the surface one hour after initial uptake of the material.
Scavenging accounts for about 50% of the particle removal from the cloud within 15 minutes. A constant rainfall rate of 20 mm/h (0.8 in/h) is used throughout the calculation. The deposition of concentration at the surface consists primarily of plutonium particles suspended within waterdrops. As additional information on rainfall rates and velocities in tornadic storms becomes available, deposition will likely become highly nonuniform.
Ground-level air concentration begins to reach the surface within five minutes.
Results show values of ground-level concentrations to begin occur-ring within 20 to 45 km (12 to 28 mi) of the GE VNC. Peak centerline concen-trations occur within 15 km (10 mi) of the point of initial dispersion within the cloud.
Ground-level x/Q values are shown in Figure 11 for each of four translational velocities.
The concentration decreases significantly with distance af ter peak ground-level values are reached.
The lateral spread of ground-level concentration is governed principally by the size of the thunder-storm cell directly overhead.
Downdrafts and scavenging have more influence on bringing the c0ncentration directly from the storm cell to the surface than does turbulent diffusion.
Concentration reaching the anvil portion of the cloud is advected at a faster velocity than concentration in the lower levels of the storm. About 5% of the concentration is advected out of the anvil into the stratosphere.
Results obtained with a modified Gaussian. puff model were considered to be low and showed the inflexibility of the analytical solution to account for the transient nature of the vertical-wind field.
Ground-level X/Q values were several orders of magnitude less in value than X/Q values obtained from the numerical method.
35 10 ' [
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Longitudinal 01 stance (I). km 5.
RELEASESI3 The objective of this section is to provide " realistic" estimates of the quantity of plutonium made airborne, as a result of the postulated damage scenarios, and released to the ambient atmosphere around the facility. Esti-mates of airborne releases are necessary for the calculation of dose, which is one component of the ultimate risk analysis.
Inhalation is the only important pathway for acute atmospheric-releases of plutonium; therefore, emphasis is on the estimation of released plutonium particulate material of a size range that can be carried downwind and inhaled.14 Particles of 10-pm AED or less are conservatively assumed to be the respirable fraction.
Such an assumption overstates the potential effect by a factor of 1.5 to -greater than an order of magnitude, depending on the lung-deposition model chosen.15 The estimated source terms are based on potential damage to enclosures and.the resulting airborne release. The damage scenarios are. derived from the structural analysis.
To provide a range of potential source' terms to include the vast majority of normal processing conditions, " upper" and " lower" limits are provided. The range of source terms was calculated by combining ranges of damage with the airborne release determined from ranges of inventory of dis-persible materials at risk.
The largest postulated airborne releases from the building are for the maximum wind hazard (103 m/s or 230 mph) and seismic hazard (peak ground
36 l
acceleration of 0.6 g with a 1-m displacement caused by a thrust fault). Both hazard scenarios postulate destruction of the facility. The source terms are expressed as mass of airborne plutonium particles, AED of 10 pm or less, released with time. From 0.5% to 91% of the source term is generated from two hours to four days after the event.
The overall building source terms from the damage scenarios evaluated are shown in Table 15 in order of increasing severity of wind hazard and earthquake.
6.
DOSE TO MAN 14 This section presents estimates of the potential environmental conse-quences in terms of radiation dose to people resulting from postulated pluto-nium releases accidentally caused by severe weather or other natural phenomena.
The accident scenarios considered include earthquakes, tornadoes, and high winds.
6.1 ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE PATHWAYS FOR PLUT0NIUM Experience hos shown that the more important pathways for exposure to plutonium and daughter products released to the atmosphere are inhalation, cloud submersion, ingestion, and direct ground irradiation.
Of these four pathways, almost all the dose contribution comes from inhalation. Therefore, the radiation doses from inhalation during initial cloud passage and from inhalation of resuspended environmental residual contamination are calculated.
For liquid releases, the important exposure pathways are aquatic-food inges-tion, water consumption, and shoreline exposure.
However, the potential damage from flooding arises from secondary ef fects, and the structures were not analyzed for damage due to these effects.
As a result, this release scenario was not considered. The significant potential exposure pathways that have been considered are shown in Figure 12.
6.2 RADIATION-DOSE MODELS FOR AN ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE Fifty year committed-dose-equivalent factors for acute inhalation were calculated using the computer code DACRIN. 36 This code incorporates the ICRP Task Group Lung Model to calculate the dose commitment to lungs and other organs of interest.
The translocation of americium from the blood to organs of interest has been changed to the values suggested in ICRP-19.
In plutonium dosimetry, the organs of interest are the total body, kidneys, liver, bone, and lungs.
Doses only to the lungs and bone are included in this discussion, because these two organs receive the highest doses.
Plutonium particulates that deposit onto the ground surface from the plume can be resuspended to the atmosphere by natural processes, and subse-quently inhaled by people.
Resuspension rates for material deposited on the ground are time dependent and tend to diminish after initial deposition.
Local conditions can be expected to affect the rate strongly; rainfall, winds, and surface characteristics are predominant. The exact relationships are not well enough understood to account for these effects. However, the airborne concentration from resuspended material can be estimated using a resuspension factor, which is defined as the resuspended air concentration divided by the l
37 Table 15.
Source-Term Estimates for Building 102 at the GE VNC as a Result of Wind and Seismic Hazard (mg)
Mass Release of Plutonium in Respirable Size Range (5 10 pm AED)
Event High Estimate Low Estimate Wind hazard Wind speed 42.5 m/s (95 mph), 3 x 10 8 per year probability of occurrence No significant damage postulated Wind speed 60 m/s (135 mph), 6 x 10 7 per year probability of occurrence Instantaneous 3 (50)tl 0.7 Additional mass released in next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 8
0.05 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 10 0.1 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> 60 0.4 3 days 300 2
Wind speed 80 m/s (180 mph), 1 x 10 7 per year probability of occurrence Instantaneous 1000 (2000) 300 Additional mass released in next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 40 20 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 100 60 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> 300 200 3 days 2000 800 Wind speed 103 m/s (230 mph), 1 x 10
- per year probability of occurrence Instantaneous 2000 (3000) 800 Additional mass released in next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 60 60 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 200 200 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> 500 400 3 days 2000 2000 Seismic hazard Peak ground acceleration less than 0.4 g, greater than 4 x 10 3 per year probability of occurrence No significant damage postulated i
Peak ground acceleration 0.4 to 0.8 g, 1x 10 3 per year probability of occurrence Instantaneous 30 (50) 0.7 Additional mass released in next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 0.3 0.05 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 0.8 0.1 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> 2
0.4 3 days 10
.2 Peak ground acceleration greater than 0.8 g, 7 x 10 ' per year probability of occurrence Instantaneous 2000 (3000) 800 Additional mass released in next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 1
0.6 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 3
2 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> 8
4 3 days 40 20 Peak ground acceleration 0.6 g, I-m displacement caused by thrust fault, 5x 10 5 per year probability of occurrence Instantaneous 1000 200 Additional mass released in next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 20 200 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 20 50 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> 50 3
3 days 200 10 78 Parenthetical entries indicate total mass of plutonium airborne.
38 CN ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE
- ~.
1 l
[
LIQUID I
RELEASE,
j
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/
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'f TO WATER DEPOSITION g
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I IN H ALATION
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i Figure 12.
Significant Potential Exposure Pathways Through Wich People May Be Exposed from an Accidental Release of Plutonium.
surface deposition.
A simple time-dependent model, recommended by Anspaugh et al.,17 was used to predict the average airborne concentration of a resus-pended contaminant.
This model estimates values for the resuspension factor between 10 4 m1 at initial deposition and 10 9 m1 about 20 years later.
About 99% of the total 50 year exposure from resuspension occurs in the first five years.
Chronic 50-year committed-dose-equivalent factors for inhalation of resuspended material were calculated using DACRIN.16
39 6.3 RADIATION DOSES The plutonium postulated to be released to the atmosphere is in the form of plutonium oxides.
Lung retention, as described by the ICRP Task Group lung model, depends on the chemical nature of the compound inhaled.
Compounds of plutonium fall largely into Class Y (retained for years) or Class W (retained for weeks).
There is no evidence of plutonium existing in the environment as Class D material.
Act.inides in the oxide form are currently classified as Class Y, which is assumed in this study. Only that plutonium released in the respirable particle size range was considered (median AED less than 10 p.n).
The isotopic composition by percent weight used in the calculations is given in Table 16.
Table 16.
Isotopic Composition of the Plutonium Mixture Isotope Percent Weightti 238Pu 0.053 239 Pu 87 240Pu 12 24tPu 1.4 242Pu 0.20 241 2
Amt 100 11 All isotope percentages, including the sum, have been rounded to two significant figures.
2 1
This isotope was not considered in the release; however, its buildup from 241Pu in the environment is accounted for.
6.3.1 Earthquakes Committed radiation-dose equivalents to bone and lungs of the hu. nan body were calculated for three earthquake events.
For the first one, peak ground-acceleration levels from 0.4 to 0.8 g were assumed; for the second, greater than 0.8 g was assumed; and for the third, 0.6 g with a 1-m displacement caused by a thrust fault was assumed.
For the zero-to-two-hour period, accident atmospheric-dispersion values for 5% and 50% conditions, calculated by NRC for the~GE VNC site, were used to
40 estimate potential committed dose equivalents to the population and a maximum individual. Annual average atmospheric-dispersion and deposition values, given in Section 2.4.4, were used for all other time periods. For the 5% condition, the annual dispersion and deposition values were multiplied by four.
Four combinations of release and dispersion were considered, referred to as Cases I through IV.
The calculated committed dose equivalents via inhalation are listed in Table 17, as are descriptions of the four dispersion / deposition cases.
The estimated maximum plutonium ground depositions at the site bound-ary, nearest residence, and farm are listed in Table 18.
6.3.2 Tornadoes Average tornado atmospheric-dispersion and deposition values are dis-cussed in Section 4.2.
Values for three windspeeds of 60, 80, and 103 m/s (135, 180, and 230 mph, respectively) were calculated.
These values were assumed to apply during the first two hours after the event.
During this time, the tornadoes were assumed to move ~ in an easterly direction. Annual average atmospheric-dispersion and deposition values were used for all other time periods.
Committed radiation-dose equivalents are given in Table 17 for Class Y plutonium.
The estimated maximum plutonium ground-contamination levels at the significant locations are listed in Table 18.
6.4 DISCUSSION For the tornado, the majority of the radionuclide intake occurs after the first two hours.
At this time, historical site-specific meteorological con-ditions are considered to resume.
The calculated committed dose equivalents are based on the ICRP Publica-tion 2 Metabolic Model, the ICRP Task Group Lung Model, and standard-man parameter values. To the best of 'the staff's knowledge, there are no reported assessments of the accuracy of dose calculations using these models and para-meter values.
Dose results are usually presented with no indication of the error associated with their use.
Present insights into the degree of uncer-l tainty involved are very limited and qualitative. Dose results presented in j
this section are probably accurate within a factor of ten.
The 50-year collective-dose equivalent to the total body from natural-background radiation within an 80-km (50-mi) radius of the GE VNC is 7
3.1 x 10 person-rem.
The natural-background dose rate in California is l
reported to be 115 mrem /yr to the total body. An individual receives a total-body dose of about 5.8 rem from natural-background radiation during a 50-year
[
period.
The avera ge annual dose to the total body of an individual from medical X-ray examinations is about 20 mrem, which corresponds to a 50-year l
collective-dose equivalent of 5.4 x 106 The dose centribution person-rem.
from exposure to fallout is negligible when. compared with natural-background and medical X-ray exposure.
If a radiation worker were involved in an occupa-239 tional accident and received a maximum permissible bone burden of Pu, his 50 year committed dose equivalent to bone would be greater than 1000 rem.
Existing guidelines on acceptable levels of soil contamination from i
2 l
plutonium can be found to range from 0.01 to 270 pCi/m. The EPA has proposed 1
(
41 Table 17.
Fif ty-Year Committed Dose Equivalents from Inhalation Following Severe-Wind and Earthquake Events (Class Y material) 8 Population Doset' Dose at Nearest Residencet (person-ren)
(rem) 8 Case Case Case Case Case Case Case Caset Event Organ I
111 IV I
II III IV 60-m/s I.ungs 8.2+0t*
5.0+1 8.1+2 3.5+3 5.2-4 5.2-3 6.1-2 2.4-1 tornado Bone 1.2+1 7.5*1 1.2+3 5.2+3 7.6-4 7.6-3 9.0-2 3.6 80-m/s Lungs 7.1+3 5.7+4 2.0+4 1.7+5 1.7-1 1.2+0 4.0-1 3.8+0 tornado Bone 1.1+4 8.5+4 3.0+4 2.5+5 2.6-1 1.8+0 5.9-1 5.6+0 103-m/s Lungs 3.6+4 3.3+5 8.0+4 7.7+5 5.5-1 5.5+0 1.4+0 1.4+1 tornado Bone 5.3+4 4.9+5 1.2+5 1.1+6 8.2-1 8.2+0 2.0+0 2.0+1 Earthquake, Lungs T.6+0 3.0+1 1.2+2 4.8+2 3.5-3 1.3-2 1.2-1 4.7-1 0.4 to 0.8 g Bone I 1+1 4.5+1 1.8+2 7.2+2 5.1-3 2.0-2 1.8-1 7.1-1 Earthquake, Lungs 2.5+3 1.0+4 6.3+3 2.6+4 3.2+0 1.2+1 8.1+0 3.1+1
> 0.8 g Bone 2.8+3 1.5+4 9.5+3 3.8+4 4.8+0 1.9+1 1.2+1 4.6+1 Earthquake, Lungs
. 4+3 5.6+3 3.7+3 1.5+4 1.P0 6.2+0 -
4.1+0 1.6+I 0.6 g and 1-m Bone 2.3+3 8 4+3 5.5+3 2.2+4 2.4+0 9.3+0 6.1+0 2.3+1 displacement t3 Population wit an 80-km radius of the plant.
t2 Located $60 m WSW of the advanced-fuels laboratory, except:
16 to 32 km from the plant in the direction of travel of the 60-m/s tort. ado for Cases I and II, 16 to 32 km from the plant in the direction of travel of the 80-m/s tornado for Cases II and IV, and 32 to 48 ' a f rom the plant in the direction of travel of the r
103-m/s tornado for all cases.
12 Case definitions:
I - Imer-bound release and most-likely dispersion.
11 - Lower-bound release and conservative dispersion.
Ill - Upper-bound release and most-likely dispersion.
IV - l'pper-bound release and conservative dispersion.
0 ti Scientific notation:
8.2+0 = 8.2 x 10.
Table 18.
Best-Estimate Maximum Plutonium Depo-sition at Significant Locationstl 2
Plutonium Deposition (pCi/m )
t Residenceta Farmt*
Event Site Boundaryt 5
60-m/s tornado 1.6-21 1.4-3 1.4-3 80-m/s tornado 1.0-1 7.0-2 1.1-1 103-m/s tornado 1.2-1 2.5-1 2.5-1 Earthquake, 0.4 to 0.8 g-3.7-2 8.8-3 7.1-2 Earthquake,
) 0.8 g 2.4+0 5.7-1 4.7+0 Earthquake, 0.6 g and 1-m displacement 1.2+0 2.9-1 2.4+0 li Case III, upper-bound release and most-likely dispersion.
12 Located 370 m SE of the advanced-fuels laboratory.
18 Located $60 m WSW of the advanced-fuels laboratory, except:
16 to 32 km from the plant in the direction of travel of the 60-m/s tornado and 32 to 48 km from the plant in the direction of travel of the 80- and 103-m/s tornadoes.
ti Located 240 m WNW of the advanced-fuels laboratory, except:
16 to 32 km from the plant in the direction of travel of the 60-m/s tornado and 32 to 48 km from the plant in the direction of travel of the 103-m/s tornado.
5 f Scientific notation:
1.6-2 = 1.6 x 10 2,
i
~ 42 a guideline of 0.2 pCi/m for plutonium in the general environment.18 This 2
~
guideline is based ' on an. annual dose of 1 mrad to lungs from inhalation' and 3 mrad to bone from ingestion.
If other reported guidelines are normalized to-these doses, and the same resuspension factor is used, they are all in reason-2 able agreement;with 0.2 pCi/m,
The predicted levels of maximum-residual plutonium contamination on the ground following the earthquakes and the 80-m/s (180-mph) and 103-m/s (230-mph) tornadoes are above the EPA proposed guideline at some or-all of.the sig-nificant. locations.
The estimated-contamination levels that are most likely 2
to occur at these locations range ' from about 0.2 to 14 pCi/m. The predicted ground-contamination level for the 60-m/s (135-mph) tornado is well below the EPA proposed guideline at all significant locations. These data are summarized in Table 18.
19 7.
RISK ANALYSIS Occurrence rates (probability per year) and associated approximate con-fidence bounds for the wind and earthquake events that were considered in the risk analysis are given in Table 19.
l The 50-year committed dose equivalents resulting from tornado and earth-j quake'at the GN VNC are given in Table 17.
I Figures 13 through 16 are graphs of complementary distribution functions, with approximate.90% bounds, for tornadoes-and earthquakes. The curves are adequate to show general behavior.
Other curves, including those obtained using isotonic regression analysis, have been provided by Johnson.19 Table 20 i
indicates the risks resulting from the various tornado and earthquake events, in terms of dose rate, where " risk" is the probability of the event multiplied l-by the dose rate associated with it.
i i
Table 19.
Phenomena Probability and Associated Uncertainties 1.
l Wind Speed Peak Ground
. Probability Approximate 90% Bounds (m/s)
Acceleration per Year on the Probability 60 6.0-7t1 6.0-8 6.0-6 80 1.0-7 1.0-8 1.0-6 103 1.0-8 1.0-9 1.0-7 0.4 to 0.8 g 1.0-3 1.0-4 1.0-2.
> 0.8 g 7.0-4 7.0-5 7.0-3 0.6 g and 1-m displacement 5.0-5 5.0-6 5.0-4 il Scientific notation:
6.0-7 = 6.0 x 10 7 l-l I:
I l
l
l 43 sanage alga annLT9!$ FOR St VALL. PSP. LUIIe sneermo ccer 10**
104
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i Figure 13.
, nr,,
=
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Complementary Cumulative
=
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k Distribution for D~ose to t
Lungs of Population Due E '"
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to Damage from Tornadoes.
g Q l d *
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808 108 108 les 104 10s gge 50 YR DOSE COMMITMENT (PERSON-REM)
TORhAD$
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idence Due to Damage from
]
'y Tornadoes.
m Ir88 '
9 a,
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10-*
10-s gg4 g g-s gge 108 108 50 TR DOSE COMMITMENT (PERSON-REM)
44 tantissunut sten anatists ree et untL. rer. Lune snoofrito ccor 10-8 I
tr.
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A 7
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Complementary Cumulative 8
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Distribution for Dose to 7
g Lungs of Population Due b tr*
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j to Damage from Earth-quake.
Lau_
5
= ir.
E 7
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11 104 i
1
-il 108 108 10e 308 108 108 50 YR DOSE COMMITMENT (PERSON-REM) i taarnaunut miss amatysis roe og vatt. un. Luno anserwo ccor 10-8 i---+
i
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l V un I
Complementary Cumulative y
t u Distribution for Dose to o
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ui 5
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idence Due to Damage from
-L--ML-%
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~
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Hi t o-9 10-e 10-8 108 tal tot 50 YR DOSE COMMITMENT IPERSON-REMI
Table 20.
Risk to Nearest Resident and Nearby Population from Postulated Damage Due to Natural Phenomena Population Doset!
Dose at Nearest Residence (person-rem /yr)
(rem /yr)
Casett Case Case Case Case Case Case Case Case Case Case
' Case Event Organ I
II III IV V
VI I
II III IV V
VI 60-m/s Lungs 2.2-7t8 9.0-8 3.9-5 1.1-5 2.2-5 6.3-6 1.4-11 9.4-12 2.7-9 9 5-10 1.6-9 4.3-10 tornado Bone 3.2-7 1.4-7 5.8-5 1.7-5 3.2-5 9.4-6 2.1-11 1.4-11 4.0-9 1.4-9 2.4-9 6.5-10 80-m/s Lungs 3.2-5 1.7-5 9.7-4 4.4-4 9.0-5 5.1-5 7.7-10 3.6-10 2.1-8 9.5-9 1.8-9 1.1-9 tornado Bone 5.0-5
.2.6-5 1.5-3
'6.8-4 1.4-4 7.5-5 1.2-9 5.4-10 3.2-8 1.4-8 2.7-9 1.7-9 103-m/s Lungs 1l6-5 9.9-6 4.4-4 2.3-4 3.6-5 2.3-5 2.5-10 1.7-10 7'.1-9 4.0-9' 6.3-10 4.2-10
)
tornado Bone 2.4-5 1.5-5 6.5-4 3.3-4 5.4-5 3.3-5 3.7-10 2.5-10 1.1-8 5.9-9 9.0-10 6.0-10 l
Earthquake, Lungs
-3.4-4 9.0-5 2.4-2 5.4-3 5.4-3 1.4-3 1.6-7 3.9-8 1.6-5 3.5-6 5.4-6 1.4-6 j
0.4 to 0.8 g Bone 5.0-4 1.4-4 3.6-2 8.1-3
.8.1-3 2.2-3 2.3-7 6.0-8 2.4-5 5.4-6 8.1-6 2.1 u Earthquake, Lungs 8.0-2 2.1-2 2.3+0 5.0-1 2.0-1 5.5-2 1.0-4 2.5-5 2.9-3
-6.0-4 2.6-4 6.5-5
> 0.8 g Bone 9.0-2 3.2-2 3.0+0 7.5-1 3.0-1 8.0-2 1.5-4 4.0-5 4.3-3 9.5-4 3.8-4 9.5-5 Ea rthqua ki.,
Lungs 3.2-3 8.4-4 9.3-2 2.1-2 8.3-3 2.3-3 3.6-6 9.3-7 1.1-4 2.3-5 9.2-6 2.4-6 0.6 g and 1-m Bone 4.7 1.3-3 1.4-1 3.2-2 1.2-2 3.3-3 5.4-6 1.4-6 1.5-4 3.4-5 1.4-5
-3.5-6 displacement il Population within an 80-km radius of the' plant, t
Case definitions: (parenthetical values are approximate probabilities) 2 I - Lower-bound release (5%) and most-likely dispersion (90%) = (4.5%).
II - Lower-bound release (5%) and conservative dispersion (5%) = (0.3%).
III - Most-likely release (90%) and most-likely dispersion (90%) = (81%).
IV - Most-likely release (90%) and conservative dispersion (5%) = (4.5%).
V - Upper-bound release (5%) and most-likely dispersion (90%) = (4.5%).
' VI - Upper-bound release- (5%) and canaervative dispersion (5%) = (0.3%).
(Cases I, II, V, and'VI in this table correspond to Cases I, II, III, and IV, respectively, in Table 17.)
13 Scientific' notation:
2.2-7 = 2.2 x 10 7 l
l l
l l
l l
46 REFERENCES 1.
J.E. Ayer and W. Burkhardt.
" Analysis of the Effects of Abnormal Natural Phenomena on Existing Plutonium Fabrication Plants." Proceedings of the ANS Topical Meeting on the Plutonium Fuel Cycle, Bal Harbour, FL, 2-4 May 1977.
2.
T.T. Fujita.
" Review of Severe Weather Meteorology at General Electric Company, Vallecitos, California."
The University of Chicago, report submitted to Argonne National Laboratory under Contract No. 31-109-38-3731, 31 May 1977.
3.
" Seismic Risk Analysis for the General Electric Plutonium Facility, Pleasanton, California - Part I."
TERA Corporation, Berkeley, CA, report submitted to Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 31 July 1978.
4.
" Final Report Seismic Risk Analysis for General Electric - Plutonium Facil-ity, Pleasanton, California - Part II."
TERA Corporation, Berkeley, CA, report submitted to Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 27 June 1980.
5.
Derived from:
" Assistance in Hydrologic Aspects - Analysis of the Effects of Natural Phenomena on Existing Plutonium Fabrication Facilities -
Vallecitos." Transmitted by memorandum from L.G. Hulman of USNRC/DSE to R.W. Starostecki of USNRC/FC, 29 June 1978.*
6.
" Description of the Site Environment - The General Electric Vallecitos Site."
Transmitted by letter from L.C. Rouse of USNRC/FC to G.E. Cunningham of General Electric Company, 18 January 1980.*
7.
J. Mishima and L.C. Schwendiman, Battelle - Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and J.E. Ayer, USNRC.
" Identification of Features Within Plutonium Fabrication Facilities Whose Failure May Have a Significant Effect on the Source Term."
24 April 1978.*
8.
" Structural Condition Documentation and Structural Capacity Evaluation of General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center for Earthquake and Flood, Task I - Structural Condition."
Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Inc., prepared for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory,18 November 1977.
9.
K.C. Mehta, J.R. Mcdonald, and D.A. Smith.
" Response of Structures to Wind Hazard at the General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California." Texas Tech University, Institute for Disaster Research, Lubbock, TX, January 1980.
10.
E.E. Endebrock.
" Seismic Evaluation of Building 102 of the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center."
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 23 October 1979.
11.
T.T. Fujita.
" Tornado Structure for Engineering Applications with Design-Basis Tornado Model (DBT-77)."
The University of Chicago, report sub-mitted to Argonne National Laboratory under Contract No. 31-109-38-3731, August 1977.
m.
m.
.47 l
f 12.
D.W. Pepper.
" Calculation. of Particulate Dispersion in a Design-Basis
~ Tornadic Storm from the General Electric Vallecitos. Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California."
E.I. du Pont de Nemours andaCo., Savannah River Laboratory, Aiken, SC, prepared for the-U.S.
Dept. of Energy under Centract DE-AC09-76SR00001, DP-1543, November 1979.
13.
J. Mishima and J.E. Ayer; I.D. Hays (ed.).
" Estimated Airborne Release of Plutonium from the 102 Building at the General Electric Vallecitos-Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California, as a Result of Postulated Damage L
from Severe Wind and Earthquake Hazard.".Battelle
-Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-3601, December 1980.
- 14. ' J.D. Jamison and E.C. Watson. " Environmental Consequences of Postulated-Plutonium Releases from General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California, as.a Result of Severe Natural Phenomena."
Battelle - Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-3683, November 1980.
15.
T.T. Mercer.
" Matching. Sampler Penetration Curves to Definitions of Respirable Fraction."
Health Physics 33(3):259-264, Fig. 2,
- p. 260, September.1977.
4 16.
J.R. Houston, D.L. Strenge, and E.C. Watson.
"DACRIN - A Computer Program for Calculating Organ Dose from Acute or Chronic Inhalation." Battelle.-
Pacific Northwest _ Laboratory, BNWL-B-389, December 1974,' and BNWL-B-387, Supp., February 1975.
l' 17.
L.R. Anspaugh, J.H. Shinn, P.L. Phelps, and N.C. Kennedy.
"Resuspension and Redistribution of Plutonium in Soils."
Health Physics 29:571-582, October 1975.
1 18.
" Proposed Guidance on Dose Limits for Persons Exposed to Transuranium Elements in the General Environment."
U.S. Environmental Protection' Agency, EPA 520/4-77-016, September 1977.
l 19.
J.W. Johnson.
" Risk Analysis of Postulated Plutonium Releases from the l-General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos, California, as a l-Result of Tornado Winds and Earthquakes."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission, 10 September 1981.*
l l-l l
- Available in the NRC Public Document Room for inspection and copying for a fee.
t
a ON M U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-0866
- 4. TtTLE ANO SUBTITLE (Add Volume No.. nf wormeratel
- 2. ILeave umkl The Effects of Natural Phenomena on the General Electric Company, Vallecitos Nuclear Center at Pleasanton, California a RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
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- 15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
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An Analysis of the Effects of Natural Phenomena on the General Electric Company Vallecitos Nuclear Center-Building 102 At Pleasanton, California has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.. The analysis is-in support of the Special Nuclear Materials License held by the subject company.
It addresses the probable effects of damage to the General Electric Plant by severe weather and earthquake and expresses the consequences of damage as dose to several human receptors. The doses that result from facility damage are multiplied by the occurrence rate for the initiating event yielding the s
yearly risk.
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